On the Israeli side, Netanyahu is confronted with a crucial decision on whether to end the 10-month freeze on the construction of settlements in the West Bank, which he announced last November. The moratorium, which expires on September 26, was announced originally in response to strong American pressure, as the Obama administration felt that the continuing construction undermined any prospect for future peace talks. Many Israelis now, including Netanyahu’s coalition partners, are hoping to end the freeze and enable the resumption of construction within settlements blocks, in anticipation of territorial swaps that could be negotiated with the Palestinians.

Although Netanyahu has emphasized that there are no preconditions for the planned talks, Abbas has indicated that a failure to extend the settlement freeze could undermine the negotiations. It remains in Israeli interests to continue its warming of relations with the Obama administration and maintain the momentum of the U.S.-sponsored effort. Netanyahu is likely therefore to extend the freeze on settlement constructions or aim for a compromise solution that might be acceptable to the White House, the Palestinians, and his own coalition government.

On the Palestinian side, recent events underscore the threat posed by Hamas, not just to Israel, but also to the stability of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hamas leaders criticized Abbas for agreeing to participate in the Washington summit and cancelled a scheduled reconciliation meeting with his party, Fatah. They also called upon the Palestinian population in the West Bank to revolt against the resumption of peace talks. These moves closely followed a wave of arrests by the Palestinian authorities of Hamas activists. However, it still remains to be seen how successful Hamas will be in its attempts to sabotage the talks through its provocations.

The peace process is also threatened by regional forces. Political circumstances in the Middle East mean that the talks begin with the region in a state of precarious equilibrium. Actors supported or orchestrated by Iran could take advantage of this opportunity to return Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon to a vicious cycle of violence. This could divert attention from Tehran’s nuclear program and domestic Lebanese politics — which are expected to be shaken by the verdict of an international tribunal investigating the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. If Israel and the Palestinian Authority want to prevent the talks from being held hostage — yet again — by the activism of Hamas and Hezbollah, they ought to identify damage control mechanisms and preventive measures that would help surmount possible provocations.

Finally, assuming the two parties overcome both the settlements issue and possible provocations, and that the talks yield a draft agreement, the status of the Palestinian population living under a Hamas regime in Gaza will still remain unsolved. The resulting complications may be aggravated by widening divisions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which in turn might further consolidate Hamas’s power in Gaza. Only a frank and realistic discussion on all these topics, and a courageous decision in principle by the negotiating parties to pursue a successful outcome, can enable them to overcome what will undoubtedly be a bumpy road ahead.

Shirley Salzman is a Legacy Heritage Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

While reports of the leak have dominated media outlets, a related piece of news has also made headlines. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the Pakistani army, has somewhat unexpectedly been granted a second three-year term. Prior to being army chief Kayani served as head of the ISI from 2004-2007, coincidentally not only the same time period covered by the leaked documents, but also the same years during which Pakistani support for the Taliban grew exponentially. Often publicly praised by the West for his crackdown against militants, Kayani is widely accepted as Pakistan’s main strategic decision-maker. Although criticized behind the scenes for his lack of will to sufficiently deal with the Afghan Taliban and other networks, Kayani’s extension has generally been welcomed by the West and several U.S. officials are known to have close ties with the army chief. Notably, the West’s direct engagement with Kayani undercuts the very government it wishes to see strengthened. However, due to the relative weakness of Zardari’s civilian government, which has become ever more evident in light of its poor response to the recent floods, the West is effectively left with little choice but to deal directly with Pakistan’s military elite.

Since launching the new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan last year, President Obama has worked to fully engage Pakistan in the war effort, acknowledging the extent to which it plays a part in the conflict. This has included billions of U.S. dollars in aid in return for cooperation on counter-insurgency missions in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas and elsewhere. This codependency reflects a reality in which Pakistan is part of both the solution and the problem. However, Pakistan’s strategic interests cannot be sufficiently understood without taking another piece of the puzzle into consideration: India. Ultimately, Pakistan’s dealings with the Taliban stem from its obsession with keeping India in check. As pointed out by Mohammed Hanif, Kayani did affirm earlier this year that India remains the focal point of Pakistan’s military and strategic concerns. As long as Pakistan, and perhaps more specifically its military, continue to perceive India as its main strategic threat, maintaining influence in Afghanistan will remain paramount to them. This situation makes it difficult for the West to reconcile its interests with that of Pakistan’s, while also curtailing its ability to control Pakistan’s involvement with the Afghan Taliban.

 David Cameron made one of the strongest statements on this issue during his recent trip to India, shortly after the WikiLeaks incident. In a question and answer session with Indian journalists Mr. Cameron asserted that “we cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country [Pakistan] is allowed to look both ways…to promote terrorism”. While some may initially have attributed this blunt accusation to Cameron’s relative inexperience in foreign policy, it has since become clear that the content of his remarks were intentional. This change in tone and open critique of the government generated tensions between Islamabad and London that led parts of the Pakistani public to call for President Zardari to cancel his trip to the UK. It should be noted that much of the critique also stemmed from the fact that he left the country in the midst of a national disaster. While the President’s trip did go to plan, another UK visit by ISI officers, was canceled. Arguably, Cameron’s comments reflected the private views of most political leaders. However, the cancelation of the ISI visit demonstrates how difficult it can be for the West to keep a forceful stance on this issue.

 So where is this tangled web of relationships and alliances headed? Despite the inherent dependency between Pakistan and its western allies, the fact remains that the partnership lacks an element of trust. The West strives to balance its strategic interests with its need to engage Pakistan, while Pakistan is conducting a similar balancing act of trying to meet expectations at home while simultaneously cooperating with its western allies. The reality of the situation is that the West has no choice but to partner with Pakistan, as it is instrumental in helping to provide logistics routes, military support along the Afghan border, a base for intelligence gathering and general support in counter-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless, the accusatory nature of the WikiLeaks documents has led to a state of affairs where diplomacy has taken on a hardening tone. Although these incidents are unlikely to cause a shift in policy, it is clear that they have already put a strain on relations. Cameron tried hard to turn this around during his recent meeting with President Zardari, but his remarks have not yet been forgotten. While the West has become more publicly vocal about their grievances with Pakistan, they will continue to cooperate with Pakistan’s power elites as a means of resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. Problematic as the partnership may be it is still intrinsic to Western success in the region. Unless the West manages to devise a strategy that significantly shifts their position in Afghanistan, they will have no choice but to continue to engage with this unreliable ally.

This policy debate, with Europeans urging fiscal austerity and Americans promoting continued economic stimulus, has been a sore point for months. Now it is evident that leading European and American economists even disagree on their interpretation of history, with both sides using Japan’s economic stagnation in the 1990s as evidence in support of their preferred course of action today.

This debate is not just about what Tokyo did or didn’t do two decades ago. Transatlantic differences over Japan’s experience are really about whether inflation, the European obsession, or deflation, the American concern, poses the greatest threat to the world economy today. These contrasting European and American perspectives reflect deep-seated economic scars on the European and American psyches, products of their own economic trauma in the early part of the 20th century.

Make no mistake about it. This is no academic debate best resolved by Japanologists. It is rooted in differences in transatlantic experience that may never be resolved and are of great consequence for the global economy.

“Some have suggested,” said Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, at Jackson Hole, “to ignore existing financial imbalances ‘for the time being’ and focus only on the short term. Rather than pressing on with the deleveraging process, more spending could be encouraged to sustain growth in the short term.”

“I believe,” he continued, “that adopting this view would be very dangerous for our economies. There is a very clear example of the consequences of choosing to live with the debt: Japan in the 1990s [with its] ‘lost decade’.”

American economists, such as Nobel-prize winner Paul Krugman, disagree. They argue that Japan’s lost decade was a direct result of turning off the fiscal spigot too early. “The lesson from Japan,” he told the Toronto Globe and Mail recently, “is that despite cutting interest rates, Japan has never had a real recovery. There was enough government spending to keep the economy from plunging, but never enough to generate a boom. And private market forces never kicked in.”

How can Europeans and Americans read such different lessons from Japan’s experience? It actually has little to do with Japan and much to do with contrasting transatlantic trauma before World War II.

Current European views, especially at the European Central Bank, are shaped by Germany’s scarring experience of hyperinflation in the 1920s. When Trichet warns about debt, his real concern is to avoid the inevitable inflation that governments have often used to dig themselves out of debt traps, paying off their obligations in debased currency. When Krugman and members of the Obama administration advocate more government spending, it is to head off a repeat of the debilitating deflation America experienced in the 1930s’ Depression.

In this debate by Japanese proxy, it is instructive to point out that students of Japan’s lost decade tend to agree with Krugman, not Trichet. Richard Koo, chief economist for the Nomura Research Institute, argues that in Japan “fiscal stimuli were applied intermittently and almost always behind the curve, after the effect of the previous stimulus had expired and deflationary pressure had been allowed to again weaken the economy. This on-and-off approach ended up increasing the cumulative deficit and lengthened the recession unnecessarily.” At the time, Japan suffered what Koo calls a “balance-sheet” recession in which “businesses and individuals were saddled with excess liabilities and were forced to pay down debts by curbing consumption and investment. The last thing they were interested in was increasing their borrowings.”

Rather than maximizing profits, individuals and corporations became obsessed with reducing debt. In the face of such caution, monetary policy was ineffective in stimulating borrowing again, despite the Bank of Japan’s cutting short-term interest rates close to zero.

In such a business climate, Koo says, “if everyone is deleveraging and the government does nothing, then the economy falls into deflation.”

Washington and governments in Europe have moved much more rapidly than Tokyo did in the 1990s to turn on the fiscal spigots. But Koo wonders whether policy makers realize just how long the spigots may need to remain open, especially in the United States, where business and individual debt greatly exceeds government debt.

“Given the size of the problem,” Koo warns, “there is absolutely no reason to believe that balance sheets will be repaired with just one pump-priming action by the government.”

Trichet could undoubtedly cite his own Japan experts to counter Koo. But any further such “he said, she said” debate about Japan is a counterproductive distraction.     Europeans and Americans need to stop talking about Japan. They need to acknowledge that their own historical experience may constrain their policy perspective today. And then they need to have a frank debate about current prospects of inflation or deflation.

It may well be that Europe and the United States face different threats going forward. And if Europe’s challenge is rising prices and America’s is falling prices, managing the global economy will be much, much more difficult in the months ahead.

 In Bonn, the same rifts that were the major obstacle at the COP15 returned: the divide between the rich world and poorer countries. Major developing countries seemed to be backtracking on their commitments, made in Copenhagen, to slowly reduce carbon intensity. At the same time, they stated that the developed world was not sufficiently helping the developing world adapt to climate change and its consequences through financing.

 The official statement released by the European Commission was cautiously optimistic about progress in Cancun. This is not surprising as the EU has prided itself in being at the forefront of combating climate change and being a leader in the international climate negotiations. However, the question is how much power and influence the EU really has when it comes to this issue. It is almost certain that no international agreement will be reached in Cancun in December. And it is unclear where the negotiations will be headed in the years to come. So with the climate negotiations stalling, the EU has to find other ways to make its voice heard and push its agenda forward. While making unilateral commitments such as reducing its CO2 emissions by 30% (a possibility announced in May by Commissioner Hedegaard) might resonate well with the developing world, it is questionable if this will help the EU’s bargaining power. At the same time, businesses and trade unions in Europe have started raising concerns about potential loss of competitiveness and jobs.

 The EU should address these concerns and at the same time regain influence on the world stage by focusing on investment in green technology and renewable energy. This is exactly what EU member states such as Germany, Denmark and Portugal are doing. Germany is one of the world leaders in solar energy, with about 19% of the worldwide solar modules being produced there. The German renewable energy industry has created more than 250,000 jobs, with plans to reach half a million by 2020. Denmark meanwhile is home to the world’s largest offshore wind park, which generates electricity for 200,000 households. In Portugal, almost 45% of the country’s electricity needs come from renewable energy, up from 17% only five years ago, making the country less dependent on fossil fuels and volatile oil prices.

But it is not only the Europeans that have discovered green technology as the way forward. China is producing one third of the world’s solar modules and exporting its wind turbines around the world. As China sets a very good climate for investments in green technology, production in renewable energy is only set to rise.

 This is not going unnoticed in the United States. Think tanks like the Centre for American Progress point out that the United States is in danger of losing out in the technology race. Those same Chinese wind turbines are being exported to Texas, and being utilized in one of its largest wind parks. While the wind park will create fewer than 100 jobs in the United States, the production in China will create more than 2,000 jobs.

 While the international negotiations stall and the public becomes increasingly disengaged, green technology generate ever-growing interest from businesses and workforces across the world. The EU can and should use this interest to achieve its objective of combating climate change. The international negotiations might be stalling and seem complicated to the general public. However, green jobs and green technology will be welcomed not only by businesses as creating new opportunities but also by workforces around the world. The EU can play a crucial role in exporting this technology, in particular to the developing world. This could take the form of technology transfer, as well as developing new technology together. European countries already work with developing countries on projects such as DESERTEC, which aims to produce solar power in the Sahara and submit the electricity produced to African and European countries via a supergrid.

 If the EU remains a frontrunner on green technologies, its declared objective of avoiding disastrous climate change might be feasible, no matter where the international negotiations are headed. By exporting its green technologies to the rest of the world, the EU would help the developing world to be green and develop at the same time. The United States will follow suit once it realizes how much it is potentially losing out on in terms of economic opportunities. Leading by example has helped the EU drive the world in combating climate change. It is more crucial than ever that the EU lead and help the rest of the world work toward a path of sustainable and green development.

The Dutch deployment in Afghanistan was primarily about solidarity with the United States after 9/11, or so a Dutch field commander told me. But there was something more about this mission for the Netherlands than just being a good ally. The horrors of Srebrenica — where Dutch peacekeepers had had to stand and watch helplessly while Bosnian Serb militias led off the Muslim refugees they had been guarding — left a long-lasting impression on Dutch society and its military. This time, the officer told me, the Dutch were better prepared, both politically and militarily. I was impressed by the smooth cooperation between the military and the civilian heads of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), who not only worked closer together than administrators I had seen in other parts of Afghanistan, but even shared the same office and made decisions together. And despite the Provincial Reconstruction Team’s emphasis on political outreach to Afghan stakeholders, the presence of Apache attack helicopters and German-made artillery left no doubt about the willingness to use force if necessary.

Five years, 24 dead, and 140 wounded later, the Dutch have left Afghanistan. It is difficult to blame them for this decision. As in almost every European country today, public opinion in the Netherlands has turned heavily against the war, even resulting in the collapse of a coalition government. For a military so small — the Dutch have only about 46,000 active troops — deploying 1,900 soldiers over a period of five years was a major effort. At the same time, it is no secret that almost everybody else — except, one must assume, the Taliban — would have liked the Dutch to have stayed longer. The Netherlands should regard this as a well-earned compliment.

The withdrawal comes at a sensitive moment, with growing western casualties and setbacks in military operations across Afghanistan. The implementation of a new counterinsurgency strategy is proving more difficult than expected, and clearly requires time. But more and more observers doubt that the countries contributing to NATO will have the strategic patience to make success possible. Already there are worries about a domino effect of the Dutch decision possibly causing other NATO allies to follow suit in withdrawing. Indeed, the Canadians could well be next in line, as might the Poles. The new British government wants to withdraw its troops by 2014. The recent WikiLeaks disclosure is likely to further decrease public support for the Afghanistan effort in Europe and the United States.

Yet we should be careful with domino theories, as such predictions have rarely proved true. President Obama has reportedly put Gordon Goldstein’s outstanding book Lessons in Disaster — about former national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, among the best-known proponents of the domino theory — on the must-read list of his national security staff. Let’s just hope that the domino theory will be proven wrong again.

Niels Annen is a Senior Resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC

The domino theory with respect to Vietnam justified the American war effort on the grounds that, if the United States failed in Vietnam, other countries in the region would fall to communist regimes, with critical consequences for American and western interests. Although that theory is often thought to have been demonstrably wrong, in fact, there turned out to be an element of truth in it. Both Laos and Cambodia, in addition to Vietnam, became communist, with catastrophic results for their peoples. But the tragedy was largely limited to those populations; the contagion did not spread to Thailand, and it did not ultimately push the United States out of the region where key allies remained strong and, in some cases such as South Korea, slowly transitioned towards more liberal governments.

In the case of Afghanistan, there are two possible kinds of dominoes. The first kind, unlike in Vietnam, involves our allies. A domino effect among allies in the wake of the Dutch withdrawal would undermine, possibly permanently, the ability of NATO and the west to cooperate on major operations against the threats of the 21st century, especially Islamist terrorists (and it is fair to ask whether this has already occurred). This weakening of will would be exploited by the second kind of “inverse domino,” the terrorist groups who would rally from a defeat of the United States and its allies after a long war. These dominoes, while enemies, are not the kinds of nation states that concerned Americans in the 1970s, but groups with the ability to inflict substantial damage around the world and capable of using their new confidence to gain support among sympathizers. This combination domino effect would be a real and lasting threat to the United States and its allies.

Joseph R. Wood is Senior Resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC

Having watched these efforts unravel, observers in Europe and the rest of the world have begun to wonder whether the United States will make good on its commitment to cut its emissions over the next decade. European leaders worry that without a comprehensive climate and energy program in place, the United States will not meet its emission targets.  Fortunately, it still can, at least in the near term.

At the international climate negotiations in Bonn this week, the United States took pains to give other countries confidence that it was not backing away from President Obama’s promise to reduce its emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. A new World Resources Institute study finds that if the federal government fully flexes its regulatory authority and states take aggressive climate action through 2016, the United States could come close to meeting the U.S. emission reduction goal in the near term. The United States also appears to be on track to deliver its share of the $30 billion in climate financing that developed countries promised by 2013 to help impoverished nations cope with the worst consequences of climate change.

But there are bigger worries to keep European and other climate delegates up at night. Although the United States can use tools other than legislation to reduce its emissions over the next several years, the chances are slim that it will deliver the promised emissions cuts over the long term without a cap on carbon emissions.  Even more problematic is the absence of a clear plan to meet its commitment to help raise $100 billion per year in climate aid by 2020. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made this commitment in Copenhagen, she was counting on U.S. cap-and-trade revenue and new private investment mobilized through a global carbon market.  To date, the Obama administration has met its climate financing commitments through budgetary requests to Congress—the President requested $1.4 billion in climate aid for 2011, a 38 percent increase over 2010 levels.  As pressure to trim the U.S. budget deficit grows, this approach will not be sustainable over the long-term. The United Nations High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing is exploring ways to meet the $100 billion goal.  Options include ear-marking fossil fuel royalties for climate action and taxing international shipping and aviation to generate new revenue for climate aid.

In advance of the next UN climate summit in Cancun this December, Europe and the rest of the world should resist the temptation to focus primarily on encouraging the United States to meet its emission reduction goals. Instead, they should push it to deliver the promised climate financing.  Unless all developed countries, including the United States, do their part to meet the stated goal, the developing world will remain ill-equipped to cope with drought, flooding, and other climate catastrophes.  Furthermore, Europe and the United States will have no leverage to secure climate commitments from China and other major emitters in the developing world.

Cathleen Kelly directs the German Marshall Fund’s Climate and Energy Program in Washington, D.C.

The ICJ’s advisory opinion was hailed as a political victory in Kosovo, and by the 69 countries that have to date recognized its independence (they include 22 of the 27 member states of the European Union). In Belgrade (whose government had asked the court for its opinion), President Boris Tadic admitted that this was a “heavy blow” to Serbia. Some Belgrade newspaper columns talked of a “new defeat for Serbia.”

In truth, the ICJ’s ruling is less unambiguous than it seems, and not just because 4 of the 14 judges on the bench dissented. In examining the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the court was helped by Serbia’s narrow framing of the question, which enabled the judges to avoid the key issue of whether Kosovo actually had the right to secede. The political reality, nonetheless, is that the approximately 2 million Albanians in Kosovo do not wish to live under Belgrade’s rule, nor do the Serbs of Kosovo wish to live under Pristina’s rule. The Serbian state retreated from Kosovo after signing the June 9, 1999, Kumanovo agreement, but retained formal sovereignty through UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

Behind this reality on the ground loom existential political issues: how can Kosovo function as a state? What is the legal status of the ethnic Serbs that live in the northernmost tip of Kosovo, around the city of Mitrovica, and how can they be protected? How can rights and security for all Serbs in Kosovo be enhanced? What status and protection will there be for the Orthodox monasteries south of the Ibar River, which runs through the city? One thing only is certain: Serbia’s — and Kosovo’s — future in Europe depends on a peaceful, negotiated answer to these questions.

Formally, the position of both sides remains clear and unchanged. Belgrade states that it will not recognize the independence of Kosovo; Kosovo contends that it is fully independent and wishes to be recognized as such by Serbia.

Yet even before the ICJ ruling, it was understood by all sides that this legal process would be a necessary rite of passage before opening the next chapter in the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. Belgrade and Pristina both have said that they have chosen and want to work for a future in the European Union. Even more importantly, they have made it clear that they are committed to peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues. Very few people, whether in government or civil society, seek a renewal of the conflicts of the 1990s, which cost the people of the Balkans so heavily. And despite the remaining animosities and unresolved issues, violence on the ground has become the exception rather than the rule. In a region scarred by a decade of war and conflict, this is no small feat.

The road to any settlement will still be long and arduous. The unresolved questions range from the existential/political (the legal position of Northern Kosovo, which remains de-facto under international administration but not under Pristina) to the technical (customs, police cooperation, electricity, water, and the like). In both countries, a war-weary public wants its government to make constructive moves; but in both, a minority of diehard opponents will try to block reconciliation. No one should underestimate just how difficult it will be for both sides to execute these manoeuvres.

The story of the Balkans is a quintessentially European story about competing claims for identity, sovereignty, and independence on a continent profoundly marked by ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, and political diversity and differences. The conflicts in Tyrol and Northern Ireland are (mostly, anyway) resolved; Cyprus remains unresolved; in Spain, the Basques and Catalans are still pulling away from Madrid.

In this story, the Balkans are the next chapter; and the European Union (backed by the United States) has a key role to play in it. What is the European project about if not peaceful post-war reconciliation? The Western Balkans — with Serbia and Kosovo at their heart — are one of the last missing pieces of this project. The transformational pull of Europe is already visible in the whole region. But the EU can do even more to promote cooperation, and help improve the lives of the people. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, said on the day of the ICJ ruling that “the EU is…ready to facilitate a process of dialogue” between Pristina and Belgrade, which was an important signal to the entire region. The priority and promise of enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans based on merit is the crucial framework for a successful way forward.

Still, Belgrade and Pristina remain the two main players in these settlement negotiations. And the process of dialogue (firmly encouraged by the EU and the United States) will in itself be a factor for peace, security, and stability in the region. It buys time, and builds trust; both are sorely needed. The ruling of the ICJ has now handed the question of how to achieve a durable peace back to the actors. In essence, it is saying, time for jaw-jaw after law-law. Ivan Vejvoda directs the German Marshall Fund’s Balkan Trust for Democracy in Belgrade

For instance, the HSR station at the airport in Lyons, France, designed by Santiago Calatrava, is a beautiful building, with an innovative curved black ‘wing’ rising from the terminal. However, the station has not yet resulted in much development in the area.

European cities certainly aren’t relying on “star-chitecture” alone to generate urban development around HSR stations.  Soon after the gorgeous HSR station opened in Liège, Belgium in 2009, the city also completed the nearby Mediacite commercial center.  What had been a decrepit industrial area is now a 160,000 square meter business and leisure center, complete with retail outlets, restaurants, office space, and a host of other luxury amenities. These two projects have transformed the Longdoz district of Liège, which is now expected to draw up to 7 million customers and visitors a year.

New HSR stations have also been instrumental in the selection of sites for other important new cultural attractions, such as museums. These cases may reveal a new dynamic for urban transformation, as the HSR Effect becomes intertwined with the Guggenheim Effect to attract tourism and prestige to formerly run-down industrial cities.

This year, the Pompidou Center Art Museum opened a new museum in the town of Metz in eastern France. Accessible by an 80-minute TGV ride to central Paris, the Metz Pompidou, designed by architects Shigeru Ban, Jean de Gastines and Philip Gumuchdjian, has generated a big buzz in the architecture world, largely because of its complex, freeform, tent-like roof.  Ban has said that they designed the building to be inviting and open to the outside world, and conceived of the vast entryway to be “like a train station.” 

Similarly, The Louvre will open a new satellite museum in 2012 in the town of Lens, France, which also has a HSR station connecting visitors to Paris in just over an hour.

After last weekend’s Wikileaks publication of more than 90,000 classified military documents that paint a bleak picture of the war at the grassroots level, it has become even more difficult to argue that there is indeed any good news coming out of Afghanistan. But the one thing about last week’s Kabul Conference on which everyone agrees is that the event happening at all was a tremendous success.

The largest gathering of foreign leaders to be held in Afghanistan in 30 years passed off without any serious security incidents. Forty foreign ministers flew in to sign off on plans that will channel at least 50% of development aid through the government’s core budget and transfer security responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces by the end of 2014. For Karzai, this constituted the most visible show of international endorsement since last year’s controversial presidential elections. One senior Western diplomat – a noted critic of the president – described him as more confident, more engaged, and more willing to take on responsibilities he had previously evaded.

Still, the balance of opinion in Kabul remains pessimistic. This is due in part to long-standing reasons: a dire security situation; minimal progress in addressing pervasive corruption; doubts about the government’s capacity to extend its writ across the country whatever the success of U.S. military efforts; and profound concerns about the speed with which Afghan security forces can be built up. Many of these problems have been expected to coalesce during the parliamentary elections in September.

The newfound fear is that while the battle here is still on, it may already have been lost in western capitals. As a senior Asian diplomat here put it: “The theater is now Washington, DC, not Afghanistan; there has already been a conceptual withdrawal.” This is not to say that there is any collective expectation of a major military drawdown. In views that were widely repeated, one prominent Afghan security analyst argued, “More and more, people don’t believe that the U.S. is going to leave us anytime soon…at the very least, the five major bases will stay.” Rather, the fear is that there is a collective rush to shake off political responsibility: the pressure from national capitals is now directed toward finding a narrative to justify disengagement rather than delivering the best settlement possible in the circumstances.

Not all consequences of the shortening timeframes are bad. The exit dates are helping to force the pace on certain issues. Some diplomats who have no belief that Afghan security forces will be ready by 2014 contended that the effort to meet the commitment will at least speed up the process. And advocates of reconciliation are pleased that there is now a broad international consensus behind the principle, even if it has come about as a result of desperation rather than conviction.

Yet few fail to note the damaging repercussions of the newfound focus on deadlines. If talk of a withdrawal beginning in July 2011 gave the Taliban the scent of victory, the wider political and diplomatic ramifications of the new withdrawal dynamic are just as acute. Corruption is expected to worsen. As one Afghan political adviser said, “The attitude in the ministries is: if people are going to leave in two years, we should make money while we still have time.” And there is even greater anxiety about the risks of an overly hasty effort at reconciliation, on which so many hopes are now being pinned. “We should try to do it seriously, but instead we’re getting the view emerging that a stitched-up deal backed by Pakistan would be the best thing…the Taliban and Pakistan are only going to need to produce the illusion of peace at the right moment, and even that will come at a heavy price,” as one former Western diplomat put it. This dynamic may have been reinforced by the WikiLeaks documents. Afghan officials in Kabul suggested that the task of “selling” reconciliation internally has been made more difficult since the reports created the impression that the key deal to be struck is with Islamabad.

These observers harbor few if any illusions about what the West can still achieve in Afghanistan; indeed, many of them have taken a consistently skeptical  position toward the U.S. administration’s more ambitious goals. But there is a striking consensus across the opinion spectrum that the current cycle of implausible expectations, crashing disappointments, and ever-shortening deadlines are making even a more modest set of objectives increasingly difficult to achieve.

Andrew Small is a Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program in Brussels