WASHINGTON – Immigration and integration continue to be issues of paramount public concern in both the United States and Europe, and yet so rarely do we hear a transatlantic view on the common challenges faced by countries dealing with diverse immigrant populations. It is crucial to understand the views of the public on these key topics. Today marks the release of the fourth annual Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey (TTI), which this year polled residents in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. While the survey sheds light on the internal debates in each country, there are also trends across countries and transatlantic dynamics that TTI alone captures.

View country-specific findings

In 2011, one of the biggest stories in international affairs, the so-called Arab Spring, posed the specter of a direct migration challenge for countries in Europe, though in practice most migration stayed within the region and did not reach European soil. Some politicians warned of an “invasion” of migrants from the countries in North Africa and the Middle East going through political upheaval. Italy complained of a lack of European burden-sharing on the flows of migrants, with pressures most evident on the island of Lampedusa. French President Nicolas Sarkozy objected to Italy’s admission practices, and temporarily cut off entrance from Italy to avoid receiving unwanted migrants.

Given the rhetoric in 2011 surrounding that migration “crisis,” the continued popularity of populist parties in many European countries, the intensification of the economic crisis and euro crisis in Europe, and continued pro-enforcement discourse in the United States, we expected to see a decline of public support for immigration. Instead, TTI shows a remarkable absence of change in views since 2010. As in previous years, about half the transatlantic public saw immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity, and, equally, about half thought there are “too many” immigrants in their countries. Publics were increasingly unhappy with their governments’ management of immigration, however, with highest discontentment in Italy where 83 percent of respondents reported their government is doing a poor job managing immigration.

The role of the European Union in migration concerns is fundamental to understanding these dynamics. The survey shows evidence of growing support for a strong European Union role in immigration issues, which has been a source of ongoing struggle on the path toward full cooperation and harmonization. On the issue of migration resulting from the Arab Spring, strong majorities in all European countries agreed that the European Union rather than the country of first arrival should be responsible. On the more general question of whether the European Union should have the power to determine countries’ national immigrant admissions numbers, support went up since 2010 in every country polled. Overall, 42 percent of Europeans polled agreed that the EU should decide national immigrant admissions numbers. The highest support was in Italy (60 percent) and Spain (51 percent). Even the U.K., where only 18 percent of respondents supported EU responsibility, showed a large increase from 12 percent in 2010.

Parallel to discussions and dynamics in Europe, on the other side of the Atlantic, Americans also continued to struggle with issues surrounding governance and the appropriate level of government to address immigration. Debates rage on regarding the role of states and localities in immigration enforcement. The most recent initiative in Alabama to step up immigration enforcement is only the latest in a string of state-level moves.

TTI shows signs that the U.S. public is not necessarily in favor of state-level control, and actually prefers centralized control of immigration. Fifty-four percent of U.S. respondents thought that the federal government, rather than state and local authorities, should have primary responsibility for enforcing immigration law. The public is also quite moderate in its views regarding the rights of undocumented children and youths. The public supported, at 65 percent, the provisions of the DREAM Act, which would legalize undocumented youths who successfully enter university or the U.S. military. Even a majority of Republicans surveyed, 55 percent, supported the provisions of the DREAM Act, indicating widespread bipartisan support. On another issue of hot public debate, the preservation of the Constitutional right of automatic citizenship for all people born in U.S. territory regardless of the immigration status of their parents, a majority of Americans, 53 percent, support the preservation of that right. These rather moderate views held by the U.S. public are often invisible in the extreme political discourse focused on the border fence and pro-enforcement measures.

Europe and the United States are facing many common challenges as policymakers seek to manage the consequences of the economic crisis and continue to become increasingly diverse, immigration-receiving states. It is crucial that we take a look at public opinion on these complex issues, to illuminate current debates, and inform policymakers as they design policies and build political will to move forward on issues of critical social, economic, and political importance.

Hamutal Bernstein is a Program Officer with the Immigration and Integration Program of the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

BERLIN – British Prime Minister David Cameron came to Brussels expecting a Europe of 17 and 10.  He left behind a Europe of 26 and 1.  His veto of a treaty intended for all of Europe’s 27 member states, promoting greater fiscal union within the eurozone’s present 17 members, was certainly historic. But this was not the sort of history that anyone should feel proud of making.  This was a victory of short-term tactical considerations over long-term strategic interests.

At the end of ten long hours of fractious negotiations, the only winners were Cameron’s Euroskeptic Members of Parliament.  For them, this is the first salvo in their war for a fundamental renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s relations with Brussels.  Cameron certainly did not win; his “leadership” in vetoing the treaty is understood even within his own party as resulting from weakness rather than strength.  His government didn’t win; the coalition is straining at the seams.  The pro-European Liberal Democrat narrative – that by being in government with the Conservative Party they are providing much needed moderation from the inside – has been shot to bits.  The 1.3 million people employed in the financial services industry in Britain, in whose name Cameron deployed his veto, didn’t win either; the City of London now waits with bated breath to learn how it will be affected by decisions made by a group in which it no longer has representation.  Nor did the many more million people beyond the City’s square-mile win; Cameron used his veto and got nothing for it.  Now either the eurozone survives within a new-look Europe over which Britain’s influence is limited, or it falls apart, with disastrous consequences all round.

But it is also far from clear that the “new Europe” has won.  Up to 26 member states now face a turgid time with their own populaces, parliaments, and lawyers as they try to fashion this new accord.  There will probably be casualties along the way, with Ireland a prime contender courtesy of its referendum requirement. Meanwhile, Europe still faces the same crisis of sovereign debt that it did before the Council met this past weekend.  The new fiscal compact, once it is agreed, might well help eurozone countries avoid similar crises in the future, but the crisis of the moment will still need resolving.  Finally, Europe will be weaker if it has on its periphery rather than in its midst one of the world’s major financial centers and most capable military powers.

It did not need to be like this.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel later commented that she didn’t think Cameron was ever really “at the table.”  He was, but he was misreading the game.  Were France and Germany meant to haggle more to keep the U.K. on board?  And if they refused to fold, as Cameron had feared they might, could the U.K. lead the other non-eurozone member states in heading up a smaller, but still influential, outer core that would keep Europe focused on the broader, rather than the deeper, picture?

Cameron’s strategy was a reasonable one, at least at the outset.  The problem was that his strategy never evolved.  Had Cameron’s team spent as much time listening to the reaction their demands for concessions were eliciting as they did making these demands in the first place, they might have understood earlier which way the cards were falling and adapted accordingly.  For example, Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski had warned Cameron publicly in Berlin only weeks beforehand not to count on Poland, another non-eurozone member, as an ideological ally.  In laying out his vision for deeper integration, he addressed the U.K. directly: “We would prefer you to join in, but if you cannot, please allow us to forge ahead.”  Meanwhile Britain’s lists of demands continued to be submitted on more private channels but were met with total silence.  Should these have been clues that the formula of 17 and 10 might not hold?  Had this been understood, cards could have been played differently.  Why not, for example, seize on the Commission’s suggestion to introduce the new fiscal rules through Protocol 12 – an annex of the treaties – thereby avoiding the need for ratification by national parliaments or referenda, and use this as a basis to secure some less-ambitious concessions?

One weekend of miscalculations later, the end sum is a Europe today that consists of 26 member states aiming to pool sovereignty further while one onlooker looks to retrench.  For some time now, the eurozone crisis has looked set to bring about the dividing of Europe into a core and a periphery.  The UK’s efforts have consequently been directed toward ensuring that, in this eventuality, the periphery would still have real influence with the core.  Now, unexpectedly alone in a periphery of one, this task has suddenly become a whole lot harder.

Sarah Raine is a non-resident fellow based in Berlin with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

BRUSSELS – At five in the morning on Friday, a senior EU official commented that the summit outcome could be the first step toward Britain’s leaving the EU. After Prime Minister David Cameron’s veto of a new treaty embracing all 27 member states, aiming to achieve what German Chancellor Angela Merkel calls a “stability union,” the U.K. found itself totally isolated. The willingness of the other 26 member states to embrace the proposed stability union, subject to parliamentary consultations in Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Poland, left the U.K. without any supporters around the Council table. Britain has lost good will and influence in the European Union and may also do so in the world beyond. From a transatlantic perspective, the United States’ “special relationship” with the U.K. today depends more on Britain’s influence within the European Union than upon supposed cultural affinities. This, too, is likely to suffer if the U.K. persists in relegating itself to the sidelines.

Cameron’s goal of obtaining a protocol to the proposed new treaty that would have protected the City of London failed to attract any support. His comment to the press, after the summit, that Britain remains in the single market will be cold comfort to the City. Many observers have pointed out that the survival of the euro depends less on legal obligations to keep down deficits and debt than on the new union taking on real powers for fiscal policy. It is apparent that competence for regulating banks and capital markets will necessarily move toward the eurozone if Merkel’s stability union is to be effective. Under these circumstances, the U.K. will progressively find itself excluded from decision-making on key issues affecting the City of London and the single market.

The early hours of the morning are not necessarily the best time for laying the foundations of a future fiscal union. On reflection, the British government and other member states would do well to consider how to build bridges between the 27 of the EU and the 17 of the eurozone. Ill-tempered comments after a sleepless night should not obscure enduring interests that link the U.K. to other member states, not least Germany and France. The U.K. and Germany, as major trading economies, share an interest in maintaining the open international economic system. They will need to work together in the aftermath of the failed Doha Development Round and in safeguarding the single market. From a wider perspective, France and the United Kingdom remain the only member states with the willingness and capacity to project EU power beyond its borders.

In the short term, Mr. Cameron has preferred to listen to euroskeptical voices in the Conservative Party than to moderate Conservatives, his Liberal Democratic coalition partners, or colleagues in the EU. The present situation looks bleak for the United Kingdom. Yet the U.K.’s vital interest in the single market and the survival of the eurozone will oblige the British government to start building bridges without delay.

Michael Leigh is a Senior Advisor in the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels office.

WASHINGTON – The emergence of a “new” European Union, in the wake of a sleepless and tumultuous summit held 20 years after the treaty that led to the creation of the political union and the euro currency, was met with ambivalence in Turkey. The irony of Europe’s perennial “sick man” being the most dynamic actor and economy has been widely noted at the same time as Turkey’s own aspirations for membership have waned in recent years. While analysts argue over a common framework for the phenomena sweeping the Mediterranean, commentators across the board have acknowledged that Turkey has been the unambiguous winner of the “Arab Spring” and the “European Fall.”

Since the beginning of the eurozone crisis, Turkey has offered itself as an antidote to an ailing Europe trying to gain strategic leverage to little avail. Echoing a recent refrain, “Hold on Europe, Turkey is on its way,” Turkish leaders have had little sympathy for Europe’s problems. On the final day of the European Summit, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gül, speaking at the World Policy Conference in Vienna, said that “negligence” is to blame for the financial crisis roiling the European continent, contrasting the EU’s malaise with Turkey’s economic and political dynamism. Seen from Ankara, there is a deficit of political leadership in Europe that has resulted from the bad governance that permeates all aspects of the present crisis. Perhaps if Turkey was on the inside of the EU, it might not have such a harsh view, but its own relations with Brussels have always been complicated.

Turkey, with its combination of economic pragmatism and soft-power appeal as a Muslim-majority secular democracy, has fared much better than a depressed and divided Europe in global affairs, particularly in its own neighborhood. Shedding its former policies of disengagement in its region, Ankara has become the most active European participant over the last decade and, given its close geographic proximities to the “hotspots” of 2011, has become Europe’s most valuable partner in the region.

At a moment in which European leadership is being questioned, Turkey’s newfound swagger and emergence as an international leader should be welcomed as signs of the effectiveness of Europe’s soft-power appeal in institutionalizing and encouraging a more responsible partner in regional stability and long-term democratization. Double standards and contradictions, motivated by domestic, economic, or geopolitical interests nonetheless remain in the foreign policies of Turkey and other European countries. To the extent that Europe is defined as a set of principles and value, the very challenge with Turkey is applying these standards consistently and universally in constructing a viable partnership that is consequential, flexible, and mutually beneficial.

Now that Europe has come closer together, the question of what to do about Turkey’s eternal quest for membership will gain further traction and the example of Britain might offer an interesting opportunity for another strategically important yet Euroskeptic regional power in Ankara. Rather than seeing Turkey’s growing international role as a challenge or mere hubris, it should be taken as an opportunity to reinforce Turkey’s European credentials, which makes it a unique and flexible potential new member.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

CAMDEN, Maine – Once again, Europe’s leaders did not brandish the big bazooka that the markets are crying out for. Instead, Europe is doggedly pursuing its step-by-step approach as introduced several summits ago. Given the continuing disconnect between markets and politicians, we know from experience what will likely happen next: After an initially favorable response, the markets will realize that the latest comprehensive plan wasn’t all that comprehensive; that there are not enough short-term crisis resolution measures in Friday’s package to reassure investors about the safety of their assets; and that long-term fixes are impressive, but incomplete. Soon, politicians will scramble for what to do next to prevent a market meltdown.

Therefore, it is already time to map out the next steps. There are at least five:

1. Ensure European Central Bank (ECB) intervention: ECB President Mario Draghi has welcomed the results of the summit because they enforce spending discipline among the countries that use the euro. This positive outcome should reassure Draghi that temporarily enlarging the balance sheet of the ECB is acceptable when the goal is to keep the borrowing costs of southern European countries at a sustainable level. Increasing the volume of the bond purchases on the secondary market when necessary will go a long way toward communicating to the markets that no European country will let the euro fail and that the ECB will provide the bridge funding until the structural reforms work.

2. Prepare a eurobond proposal that Germany can accept: The original draft of the summit’s final statement called for eurobonds. On German insistence, the paragraph was struck from the draft. But German opposition is not as ironclad as it seems. Chancellor Angela Merkel has not said “no, never,” but rather “not now.” She sees eurobonds as the capstone of the European edifice. Last week’s summit results ensure that countries cannot borrow irresponsibly in the future while betting on a European bailout. This outcome should ameliorate Germany’s concern about moral hazard and allow the country to take steps toward formally assuming the joint and several liability that it already has in practice. The temporary “debt redemption fund” that the German Council of Economic Advisors proposed has the best chance of being politically acceptable.

3. Convince the United States to increase the IMF’s firepower: During the summit, the Europeans decided to funnel an additional $ 270 billion through the IMF to help build a wall of money around Spain and Italy in order to contain financial contagion. That’s good, but not enough. U.S. President Barack Obama has said that Europe has enough money to help itself. But the numbers don’t add up. To cover the borrowing needs of Spain and Italy for the next three years (the timespan needed for an adjustment program), $2 trillion will be required. The United States wants Germany to cover the lion’s share of that amount. But Germany is too small to carry such a load. German guarantees for its neighbors already excide next year’s federal budget by 80 percent, and debt already exceeds 80 percent of GDP. The IMF has a remaining lending capacity of $380 billion, now propped up by the Europeans to reach about $650 billion. Clearly not enough. After having travelled to Europe last week to pressure the locals, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner should now travel to Capitol Hill to convey the bad news. No longer do the Americans have the choice whether or not to spend U.S. taxpayer money to address the European crisis. The question is rather whether they would like to pay for the crisis by way of increasing the IMF’s firepower or by way of the global recession/depression that a collapse of the euro would inevitably cause.

4. Work on a growth agenda for Europe: So far, crisis resolution measures have focused on debt and banks. In order to avoid a repeat of the current predicament, Europe needs to rebalance and grow. The next steps toward a fiscal union, as well as the reform packages in the southern countries, need to focus on growth and the restoration of competitiveness. Northern Europe will need to play its part to allow for the adjustment.

5. Bring in Britain from the cold:  No Europe without Britain. If British Prime Minister David Cameron’s veto against fiscal union is the first step toward Great Britain leaving the European Union, the summit will have been a pyrrhic victory for the euro-integrationists.  Therefore, the countries that agree should present another offer to the dissident from the island. On the face of it, David Cameron’s request for safeguards for the British financial industry is not unreasonable as long as it does not require undoing the structural changes toward fiscal union. Only when Britain remains inside the tent will countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, and even Sweden be enticed to stay there as well.

The financial markets might accept that no bazooka will be deployed as long as there is a credible plan for the next steps to be taken. “Step-by-step” should not be misunderstood to mean “stumble along.”

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Senior Director for Strategy, directs the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFuture Project.

WASHINGTON—Despite economic worries and domestic political preoccupations, perceptions in the United States and Europe of each other appear to be in better shape now than they were during the presidency of George W. Bush. Americans and Europeans have generally favorable opinions of one another and majorities on both continents believe they share enough common values to be able to cooperate effectively on international problems.

But this year’s annual Transatlantic Trends survey also finds that while many of those polled in 12 member states of the European Union (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) still believe the United States is most important for their national interests, Americans see Asia as important. When asked which was more important in terms of their country’s national interests in the most recent Transatlantic Trends survey, 52% of those polled in the European Union picked the United States over the countries of Asia such as China, Japan, and South Korea, while about 51% of Americans polled chose the countries of Asia over the European Union.

For several years, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been speculating on how the transatlantic community will react to the rise of Asia. Would Asian competition move the United States and Europe — currently the two largest economic centers — closer together or pull them apart? At a time when U.S. unemployment remains high, the eurozone continues to suffer, and China’s growth is over 9%, this question is timelier than ever. Based on the results of this year’s Transatlantic Trends, it seems Americans have made up their minds to orient toward the Orient.

Asia is especially important in the minds of young Americans. Around three-in-four Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 feel that Asia is the more important region for U.S. national interests. With each older age cohort, the importance of Asia decreases, so that only about one-in-three Americans over 64 think of Asia as the more important region for U.S. national interests. Younger Americans are also more likely to see China as an economic opportunity rather than as an economic threat. Fifty-two percent of those aged 18-24 consider China an economic opportunity for new markets and investments, while 72% of those between the ages of 55 and 64 see China as threatening their jobs and economic security. Similarly, more than half of Americans older than 54 perceive China as a military threat, but only one-third of those between the ages of 25 and 34 and 40% of those younger than 25 do.

The rise of Asia divides Europeans too — but by nationality rather than by age. While over half of those polled in Italy, Romania, Germany, Britain, and Poland name the United States as more important than Asia, half of those surveyed in France and more than half of the respondents in Spain and Sweden see Asia as more important for their national interests. Europeans are also more likely than Americans in general to see China as an economic opportunity. The majority of Germans, Dutch, Romanians, Swedes, and British see China as an opportunity. On the other hand, majorities in France and Portugal still see China as an economic threat, though their numbers have decreased over the past year

What does all of this mean? Although Barack Obama rehabilitated the image of the United States in Europe, Europe has so far failed to reinvigorate its image in the United States, particularly among younger Americans who do not necessarily have strong links to European ancestry or positive memories of Cold War-era alliances. For transatlantic relations to thrive in the future, Europe needs to do a lot more to capture the imagination of a new generation of Americans.

Zsolt Nyiri is Director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington.

AUSTIN, Texas — This Sunday, August 14, marks the 70th anniversary of the Atlantic Charter.  Issued as a 376-word telegram by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill following their historic first meeting aboard the Augusta in Newfoundland’s Placentia Bay, the Atlantic Charter established the blueprint for the transatlantic relationship, multilateral institutions, and international order that emerged in the postwar years and continue into the 21st century.  In the words of historian Elizabeth Borgwardt, the Atlantic Charter “prefigured the rule-of-law orientation of the Nuremberg Charter, the collective security articulated in the United Nations Charter, and even the free-trade ideology of the Bretton Woods charters that established the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.”  To this list of Atlantic Charter-inspired ideals and institutions could be added the Marshall Plan, NATO, the G-8, the World Trade Organization, and even the European Union.

But better remembered today than the Charter itself are the evocative images of that first Atlantic Summit: FDR’s steel will in overcoming his polio to stand and greet Churchill; the transcendence of the Sunday shipboard hymns of faith and hope; and the almost instant forging of the Roosevelt-Churchill bond that would prove so essential in defeating Nazi tyranny.  Such vignettes of history may inspire nostalgia, but do the Atlantic Charter’s principles themselves — of political and economic liberty, of open sea lanes and collective security, and of shared transatlantic values — still endure?

That question is all the more poignant considering that the Charter’s anniversary comes at what may seem an inauspicious time in transatlantic relations, as many of the institutions inspired by the Charter now appear feckless and besieged.  The sovereign debt problems besetting Italy and Spain and imperiling the eurozone, the downgrade of the United States’ credit rating, the ongoing costs and challenges of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and the rioting in the United Kingdom all leave leaders on both sides of the Atlantic preoccupied with multiple crises and with little bandwidth and few resources for nurturing transatlantic ties.

Things may be hard today, but in the day of the Atlantic Charter they were much worse.  Remembering the Charter’s 70th anniversary should remind us that the transatlantic alliance was forged not in a time of tranquility but in the crucible of trial. During the darkest days of the 20th century, Roosevelt and Churchill cast a vision of a peaceful, whole, prosperous, and free Europe even while the continent itself was torn asunder by fascist tyranny, Axis aggression advanced across the globe, and domestic sentiment strongly favored keeping the United States out of conflict and out of international affairs.  That a robust vision for a transatlantic alliance could be cast even under those circumstances tells us much about the leadership of FDR and Churchill, and about the resilience of shared values.

It is, in fact, hard to think of a time when transatlantic relations did not confront some kind of turbulence.  As historian James Sheehan has pointed out, throughout the Cold War, the Atlantic alliance “faced one crisis after another.  Washington and its European allies had disagreed about German rearmament and French defection, the invasion of the Suez and the war in Vietnam, Kennedy’s missile crisis, Nixon’s détente and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.”   To this litany could be added the continuing series of post-Cold War friction points: the first Iraq War, the Balkan crises, climate change negotiations, the second Iraq War, NATO’s role in Afghanistan, and the global financial crisis.

Yet, somehow, the transatlantic alliance has endured.  And here the Atlantic Charter might help explain its past resilience and suggest ways of strengthening transatlantic cooperation in the years ahead.    The Charter demonstrates that shared values must precede institutions, but that institutions are needed in turn to reinforce and promote values.  It shows how the “Special Relationship” between Washington and London is not a barrier but rather a bridge to stronger ties between the United States and the European continent.  It underscores the relationship between political liberty, economic liberty, prosperity, and peace.  And it reinforces the fact that a flourishing transatlantic alliance serves not just the interests of the Atlantic community but of the globe.

William Inboden is a distinguished scholar at the Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas-Austin and a non-resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund.

Photo from paul-simpson.org.

WASHINGTON — When the G20 finance ministers and heads of the central banks gather this weekend in Paris, attention will center on some of the major pledges made at the G20 Summit in Seoul—most notably the commitments related to a more market-determined exchange rate system and to policies to address current account imbalances, whether excessive deficits or large external surpluses. Likely to be added to the agenda are two newer issues: the role of the dollar as a reserve currency and controls on international capital flows.  All of these issues flow in part from the priorities that French President Nicholas Sarkozy set out for himself as leader of the G20 this year.

Substantial movement on these four issues is probably unlikely, given the big differences that emerged in Seoul with respect to the specifics underpinning a number of these general principles. However, buried in some of the devilish details of their weekend agenda is a proposal to create a new governance model for the international monetary system, which could potentially reap immediate results and carry with it long-term benefits.   France’s economy minister, Christine Lagarde, is expected to take up some of the recommendations made by the Palais-Royal Initiative, a group of 18 former ministers and central bankers, headed by Michel Camdessus, former head of the IMF, Alexandre Lamfalussy, the founding president of the European Monetary Institute, and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, former Minister of Economy and Finance in Italy, and a panel that also includes former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker.

The report calls for a three-tiered governance structure for the international financial system, with the top tier consisting of the heads of state, meeting once a year, presumably to set and coordinate overall direction for the IMF.   The second-tier would be made up of the G20 finance ministers and central bankers—the very group meeting in Paris this weekend—sitting as a newly formed “Council” to make strategic decisions relating to the international monetary system and its institutions. The third-tier would consist of the current executive directors, who would oversee the work of the IMF and its managing director.

Placing the G20 heads of state in such an overarching role makes a good deal of sense, as does the formation of a “Council” made up of the G20 finance ministers to give more detailed strategic direction to the IMF.  However, the Palais-Royal Initiative’s recommendation should be taken one step further and applied not only to the IMF, but also to the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the newly created Financial Stability Board (FSB). The G20 heads of state, when sitting as a “Council of Governors,” could set the overall strategic direction of these international institutions.  This would ensure that their mandates are broad enough to cover the many issues that can fall between the cracks of the various institutions, such as exchange rates, energy policy, climate change, and food security, yet tailored enough to ensure that inefficient overlaps or mission creep are avoided. They would also ensure that the work of each of the various institutions moves coherently toward the same goals.  A Council of G20 finance ministers would foster more specific strategic direction-setting for each of the international financial institutions.

Providing the G20 with such a role would allow it to set broad-based strategic direction for all of the international economic institutions, while using the considerable expertise and qualified personnel working for each of these bodies to carry out their leaders’ instructions.  By giving the G20 heads of state the continuing role of coming together at least once a year to perform the fiduciary duty of direction-setting and oversight for these institutions, the G20 would be assured of a consistent and ongoing role in setting the course of global economic activity.   Use of the G20 for this purpose would also give the emerging market countries a permanent and significant voice in global economic governance, getting them more engaged in addressing problems at the multilateral level.  Playing this strategic leadership role would also allow the G20 to fill an oft-cited need for high-level political engagement in the work of the international institutions.   Finally, inclusion of the WTO within the ambit of responsibility of this “Council of Governors” would ensure that the WTO takes its rightful place among the international institutions, in recognition of the critical link between finance, development, and trade, and the imperative of using the expertise and rules of the WTO to ensure that private enterprise can be fully engaged in worldwide economic recovery and future prosperity.

Coming to an agreement on specific targets for deficits or surpluses or finding a solution to perceived currency manipulation or excessive use of capital controls may be too much to expect from the Paris weekend.   But moving forward with long-term revisions to governance structures of international financial institutions may well be just bland enough not to attract too much opposition and just important enough to warrant the time and energy required to reach an agreement that would both improve the overall governance and coherence of international economic policy and carve out an important on-going role for the G20 and its finance ministers.

Jennifer Hillman is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and a current member of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body.

WASHINGTON — In 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy dismantled camps of Roma migrants in France, Barack Obama’s Justice Department sued Arizona over a law targeting illegal immigrants, and far-right parties across Europe gained traction by stoking xenophobic sentiment. Though polarizing headlines abounded, it behooves governments to pay attention to what the public is actually saying on immigration and integration.

Today marks the release of the third-annual Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey, which polled residents of large migrant-receiving countries in the West, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. While the survey sheds light on the internal debates in each country, there is a transatlantic story to tell as well.

Among the countries surveyed, the lingering effects of the economic crisis — particularly unemployment — has been on the minds of the public. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration shows that the economic crisis has had some effect on how people perceive labor-market competition from immigrants.  In Europe, 49% of those whose household economic situation got worse in 2010 believed that immigrants bring down the wages of native-born workers; this compared to 36% of those whose economic situation got better or stayed the same in 2010. In the United States, those whose personal finances deteriorated last year were also more likely to say that immigrants take jobs away from native-born workers. What does this mean for attitudes about immigration policy? Increasing anxiety about job competition will affect the ability of governments to (re)shape labor migration programs. The coalition government in Britain has already promised to lower net migration to the “tens of thousands,” and an immigration overhaul in the United States will be even more difficult in these conditions, as implications for the American labor market are obvious.

In addition to worries about the economy, the integration of migrants, particularly Muslims and their children, has been front-page news in Europe.  The survey fieldwork was done in 2010, the year of banning face-covering veils for women in France and the rise of Geert Wilder’s Freedom Party in the Netherlands, which relies on an anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agenda. Discussions in Germany last summer centered on a controversial book by Thilo Sarrazin, a former Board Member of the German Bundesbank. The book, entitled “Germany Does Itself In,” argued that the Muslim — primarily Turkish — community in Germany was bringing the country down by failing to integrate. In the survey, respondents in all countries were asked how well they perceived Muslim immigrants to be integrating into their society. In Europe on average, 58% of respondents said that they were integrating poorly, with only one-third (33%) saying they were integrating well. The most pessimistic about Muslim integration were Spanish and Germans respondents, 70% and 67% of who, respectively, said that Muslim immigrants were not integrating well.

On this issue in particular, there was a clear transatlantic divide. Whereas Europeans were clearly pessimistic overall about the extent to which Muslim immigrants were integrated into their societies, a plurality of both Americans and Canadians (45% in each country) answered that Muslim immigrants were integrating well. Tellingly, 14% of Americans did not even answer the question, claiming that they did not know how well Muslims were integrating into American society. The optimism of North Americans on Muslim integration, therefore, may have something to do with the relative scarcity of Muslim immigrants and the lack of discussions about integration in the media. The one common thread among respondents in all countries regarding Muslim integration, however, is a universal perception that the second-generation, or the children of Muslim immigrants, are integrating better than their parents. A plurality of 49% of Europeans as well as 62% of Americans and 66% of Canadians claimed that the native-born children of Muslim migrants were integrating well into their societies.

Though changing economic situations and specific debates about integration appear to have some relationship to public attitudes about immigration, in some ways overall perceptions remain fairly constant. Despite the drastic changes in economic and political landscapes over the past three years, perceptions about whether immigration is more of a problem or more of an opportunity for each country have remained fairly constant, whether positive or negative. For example, around two-thirds of British respondents consistently say that immigration is more of a problem, whereas around half of Americans and only one quarter of Canadians agree. These entrenched perceptions may mean that governments will have less room to maneuver when changing immigration or integration policy, but it also means that they have at least one constant on which to depend. For an issue as fast-moving and controversial as immigration, that, at least, could be a blessing.

Delancey Gustin is a Program Associate with the Immigration and Integration Program of the German Marshall Fund in Washington.

BERLIN — “Europe whole and free” owes a great debt to the decision by a courageous Hungarian government to open its frontiers to Austria in the summer of 1989, allowing thousands of East German refugees to escape. Twenty-one years later, and just as it takes over the rotating European presidency, Hungary is a frontrunner once more. The difference is that this time it appears determined to reverse its course. And the risk is that it might take Europe with it.

Normally, the six-month EU presidency is a staid and low-key affair, all the more since the creation of a full-time European President and a foreign-policy czar by the Lisbon Treaty just over a year ago. Few Europeans even noticed that Belgium, Hungary’s predecessor, didn’t have a government for the duration of its tenure. But that is clearly too tame for the pugnacious government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Budapest chose to open the year with a display of political fireworks, featuring two showstopping zingers: a set of new laws restraining the media, and a “crisis tax” on investors.

Uproar ensued. In Hungary, students protested and newspapers appeared with blank front pages. A barrage of criticism came from the rest of Europe:  from EU commissioner Neelie Kroes, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the OSCE’s top media official, and the French government, to a cross-section of the European Parliament and a dozen European CEOs. When senior representatives of Orbán’s Fidesz party shuffled their feet and made conciliatory noises, the prime minister himself stepped in to clarify: “not…in our wildest dreams” would he allow any changes to the law.

In an attempt at transparency (and damage control), the Hungarian government has now published translations of the media laws in English, as well as lengthy refutations of the criticism against them. It’s an unconvincing effort. The new media rules (totaling more than 200 pages) require all outlets, public and private, to register with a powerful new regulatory authority whose five-person board is to be composed entirely of Fidesz nominees. That authority is empowered to probe whether media reporting is “objective and balanced,” and to impose punishing fines or even closures on offenders; it may also require reporters to disclose their sources in the interest of “national security and public order.” In short, the new rules are unduly intrusive, vague, and over-broad. (As for the “crisis tax,” Budapest argues that it covers all companies, foreign and national. The multinationals counter that, because of the high threshold involved, it will be applied almost exclusively to them.)

Calls by some critics to impose legal sanctions on Hungary—or to exclude it from the EU—are unhelpfully melodramatic. The Lisbon Treaty does provide for such sanctions in its Article 7; this was a lesson from an abortive attempt, in 2000, to isolate the conservative Austrian government for entering into a coalition with the party of right-wing extremist Jörg Haider. But Article 7 is the EU’s equivalent of a nuclear option, reserved for “a serious breach” of EU rules, and requiring at least a qualified majority in the 27-member European Council. Instead, Kroes has sensibly opted for opening a so-called “infringement action,” a standard EU procedure, to bring the Hungarian laws into alignment with the EU’s legal system through constructive criticism. This could be a face-saving escape route for Orbán. If he chooses it, that is.

Still, there can be no doubt that Hungary poses a very serious challenge for the European Union. Yet, for now, that challenge is political rather than legal. The new laws are only the latest in a series of profoundly illiberal power grabs—from the constitutional court to pension funds, cultural institutions, and the fiscal and monetary authorities—by the Fidesz government, emboldened by a two-thirds majority win in the April 2009 election.

Orbán, for his part, has never made a secret of his contempt for parliamentary democracy: “The republic,” he said in 2006, “is merely a cloak for the nation.” He could not be farther from the truth. Balance of powers, the accountability of government to the governed, and the protection of civil rights and liberties, including the freedom of the press: these are the core principles of the European res publica. To disdain them is to disdain all that Europe stands for.

True, Europe has been watching silently for months while the Orbán government consolidated its gains. And, yes, press freedoms are treated cavalierly (to say the least) in a number of other European countries, such as Italy or Romania. Germany itself is no stranger to state-sanctioned cronyism: the Chancellor, no less, recently appointed a former speaker to head a state broadcasting institution. Most worryingly, the economic crisis has created a fearful, inward-looking public mood all across Europe, which sets growth and stability above freedom and liberal values, making anxious citizens an easy prey for ruthless demagogues and populists.

None of this can be an excuse to condone what is happening in Hungary or elsewhere in Europe. On the contrary, Europe must defend its principles—in the political arena. It is time to say that Europe is not just about the euro.

Constanze Stelzenmüller is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Berlin