WASHINGTON – As he campaigned for the U.S. presidency in 1952, Republican candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower argued that he would seek to bring “security with solvency” to the American people.  Eisenhower realized that the challenges posed by the Soviet Union could too easily stress America’s finite resources and a strategy to face that threat consider the economic roots of America’s military power and influence in the world. For Eisenhower, economic power was the indispensable source of American global leadership.

In his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, U.S. President Barack Obama seemed to recognize Eisenhower’s insight.  Obama focused largely on the economic challenges still facing the United States — but framed those challenges in the context of recent national security victories and the achievements of the World War II generation.  While Obama did focus on domestic affairs, he both opened and closed his address by praising America’s men and women in uniform — one of the few points drawing bi-partisan applause – and took stock of a broad set of foreign policy and security challenges that face the United States today. He also made clear that the new U.S. defense strategy would also balance security with solvency — saving nearly half a trillion dollars but maintaining the type of first-rate military required to deal with current and emerging threats.

Obama’s address included a call to learn from the shared sacrifice, partnership, and teamwork that the U.S. military demonstrates day after day, to include that shown in the mission to kill Osama bin Laden in May of last year — clearly the most significant national security event of the past twelve months.

Obama was assertive in his description of his vision of America’s role in the world but realistic when considering the complexity of the challenges ahead. In stark contrast to much of the isolationist rhetoric of the Republican primary debates, he argued that America continues to be a strong, ascendant world leader with a “steadfast” commitment to allies around the globe.

Of course, Obama noted the end of the war in Iraq and the determination to transition to Afghan leadership.  He also acknowledged the “wave of change” brought about by the Arab Spring and issued a sharp rebuke to the Assad regime — noting that they would soon discover “that the forces of change can’t be reversed and that human dignity can’t be denied.”   He praised the power of partnerships that have enabled a unified approach to counter the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons but was realistic in his assessment of whether this in and of itself would provide the solution.  Coming a day after U.S., British, and French warships entered the Persian Gulf despite threats from Iran; Obama reiterated that while he hoped for a peaceful resolution, “no options” were off the table.

It is telling that while facing a tough re-election in a poor economy, Obama has chosen to frame domestic problems within the context of foreign policy successes.  It is a clear indication that even while Washington focuses on a Presidential election campaign, the administration will not abdicate the responsibilities the United States has as a global leader.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He has formerly served at the Department of Defense and on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The views expressed are his own.

All In:  The Education of General David Petraeus.  By Paula Broadwell with Vernon Loeb. The Penguin Press, 2012, 394pp. $29.99.

Writing a first book is challenging in its own right, much less doing so as events unfold.  In All In, The Education of General David Petraeus, Paula Broadwell chose to add a third hurdle:  writing the story of an individual, General David H. Petraeus, who has not only accomplished much in a high profile arena, but whose career has not yet completely run its course.  In her 400 page work, based on her in-progress doctoral dissertation on the development of General Petraeus’ career, Broadwell has delivered a solid treatment of the General’s on-the-ground experiences in what was to become his final mission in uniform – command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from July 2010 until July 2011. For many reasons, All In will be one of the must-reads for any serious student of military affairs and international security issues.

All In is not a comprehensive biography of General, now Director, Petraeus, nor is it a comprehensive history of the war in Afghanistan.  Those who seek either will come away disappointed.  Nor is All In the cocktail party circuit “tell-all.” Indeed, Broadwell does a proper job in relaying the personal stories of the key players without betraying confidences or gossiping. In doing so, she does a valuable service to future writers by capturing insights that otherwise would be lost to history with the passage of time.  While writing All In, Broadwell benefitted greatly from the labors of veteran journalist Vernon Loeb, whom she credits on the cover.  The voice, however, is unmistakably that of Ms. Broadwell, and despite a few areas where editors could have reduced repetition and smoothed out transitions, All In is eminently readable, engaging, and will provide an excellent bridge for future scholarly treatments and more detailed assessments of various aspects of Petraeus’ career (e.g. Iraq) and the still-ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Broadwell tells the story of how General Petraeus became, as the late Richard Holbrooke candidly told a small group of civilians shortly before his death, “the greatest operational commander of our time.”  All In is the story of those who shaped Petraeus’ thinking as a young officer and a story of a General whom the nation called to be the face of two unpopular wars – Iraq in the beginning of 2007 and Afghanistan in the summer of 2010.   Likewise, this is the story of the challenges and successes that some of Petraeus’ protégé’s have faced during that latter conflict. Specifically, Broadwell follows three of the 101^st Airborne Division’s Battalion Commanders and traces the outlines of military operations in 2010 and 2011 in Afghanistan, particularly those in Kandahar and Helmand.  Broadwell chronicles the often vicious fighting against Taliban insurgents and her blow by blow description of battles in the Arghandab bring the reader into the situation as experienced by the commanders on the ground. Broadwell also chronicles the exploits of two members of the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) and brings the reader into the struggle to prod the U.S. military to overcome its endemic aversion to small wars and insurgencies.  While she does not address head-on the issue of whether “too much” has been attempted in Afghanistan as a matter of policy, her telling of the story does remind the reader not all in uniform were “true believers” in the value of COIN and that, indeed, some were simply dismissive of any complex and nuanced notions of conflict.

Broadwell’s style may remind readers of James Kittfield’s Prodigal Soldiers (1995) – a story of U.S. military leaders who sprang from the experience of the Vietnam War. Broadwell alternates between Petraeus’ command in Afghanistan and the career that shaped him prior to the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan. She describes his relatively unassuming childhood where Petraeus’ father taught him that results and not excuses are what matter.  She also chronicles his experiences as a junior officer and field grade leader, and the story is fascinating enough that the reader is left wanting more about what truly shaped and drove a young David Petraeus into such a tenacious and effective leader.  Clearly, one of Petraeus key strengths as a leader was not only finding mentors, but also in seeking out junior officers (and civilians) to mentor himself and providing them opportunities to grow into even stronger leaders.  Additionally, All In gives the reader an understanding of the importance Petreaus placed on building the right team as well as the challenge of ensuring that these teams did not tell him simply what they thought he wanted to hear.

Broadwell uses her study to demonstrate how Petraeus’ experiences – not simply in Iraq, but more importantly over a lifetime of assignments around the world shaped his analytical and decisonmaking processes in Afghanistan.  Perhaps the most important take away during his career was that Petraeus felt that the enemy should not be allowed to define the rules of the fight:  “when the enemy defined their rules, we just changed ours,” a young Lieutenant Colonel Petraeus explained to one of his subordinates during training exercises. Broadwell deliberately focuses much more on the operational nature of his command in Afghanistan and his interaction with his former protégé’s than with Petraeus’ dealings with peers, subordinate general and flag officers, senior civilian officials, and the Afghan military and civilian leadership.

While there is some discussion of non-U.S. NATO forces, All In focuses on the U.S. military, almost exclusively the U.S. Army.  Broadwell’s measurement of his handling of sensitive issues such as air and ground rules of engagement, civilian casualties, and the Afghan Local Police program illustrate that Petraeus practiced what he preached in terms of understanding that “people are the center of gravity,” whether those under your own command or those you seek to protect from the insurgents.  While it is understandable that there is not more of a discussion of General Petraeus’ interactions with often difficult Afghan senior officials and the complexities of Alliance politics, this does mean that the reader misses seeing how truly skilled Petraeus was as not only a soldier, but, in perhaps a way not seen since Eisenhower or Marshall, as a diplomat.  Likewise, there is only scant discussion of the challenges Petraeus faced in dealing with a dysfunctional U.S. Embassy that had a critical role to play in the stabilization and development dimension of the COIN campaign.

In writing All In, Broadwell had tremendous access not only to Petraeus, but to those who were working or had worked with him. She interviewed over 150 individuals to include not just the General’s closest advisors, but former mentors and subordinates. The challenge Broadwell faced, of course, was not just filtering the subjectivity of those she interviewed, but to seek objectivity in her own analysis.  The pride she has in her mentor/subject, his protégés, and her belief in the mission in Afghanistan most certainly shines through. While some will choose to disagree, this does not detract at all from the quality of the book.  In many ways it lets the reader understand how many of those who have served in the U.S. military feel about serving under such a uniquely capable set of military leaders such as Petreaus, McChrystal, Mattis, Stavridis, McRaven, and Rodriguez.

No doubt, for Ms. Broadwell, it was hard not to be proud of the camaraderie, professionalism, and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice that she witnessed while conducting her interviews.  In the end, the strength of this book indeed lays in both Broadwell’s ability to empathize with her subject matter and that her access uniquely gave her the ability to obtain the views of participants as events happened or shortly thereafter when the emotion was often still raw.  Indeed, for this alone, All In will stand the test of time and prove invaluable to future scholars and students of history.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He served as the Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Representative and an advisor both Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal from 2009-2011.

WASHINGTON– Political realities facing the leaders of the United States and Iran mean that military confrontation between the two states is a distinct possibility. In late December, the Iranian armed forces conducted a number of war games — which included the live firing of missiles — in the Straits of Hormuz and adjacent waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. When the aircraft carrier USS John Stennis sailed for a routine repositioning from the Gulf to the North Arabian Sea, Iran told the United States not to return it to the Persian Gulf region. The commander of Iran’s army, General Ataollah Salehi, later reiterated that “The Islamic Republic will not repeat its warning.”

On January 6, three armed patrol boats of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps came within several hundred yards of a U.S. amphibious assault ship, the USS New Orleans. This is precisely the sort of cat-and-mouse games at sea that can lead to serious miscalculations and subsequent escalation. Many Americans will recall that in 1964 a military encounter between North Vietnamese torpedo boats and the USS Maddox resulted in a pitched sea battle, which was enough to persuade the U.S. Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that gave President Lyndon Johnson authority to begin the massive escalation in Southeast Asia.

In addition to military brinksmanship, covert military action against Iran’s nuclear establishment appears to be increasing. On January 11, the Iranians announced that one of their nuclear scientists had been assassinated in Tehran. They blamed both the United States and Israel though they offered no explicit proof. Some Iranians have publicly called for retaliatory killings. Assassinations and reprisals have long been an important driver in the paths to war. Remember the attempted assassination in London of Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov on June 3, 1982? This attack was attributed to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and provided the pretext for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon three days later.

Why might Iran be willing to risk confrontation with the United States at this time? It faces draconian new international sanctions, led by the United States, and if the EU agrees to ban imports of Iranian oil at the end of January, its financial situation will further deteriorate. Its currency is in freefall and the business community appears to be in a state of panic. Even Iran’s great friend China is cutting back on oil purchases. The regime in Tehran also faces the possibility that its closest Middle East ally, Syria, is edging towards civil war and there is a chance that the Bashar al-Assad regime could eventually be ousted. This would radically change the balance of power in the region and undermine other Iranian allies, especially Hezbollah. While Iran has signaled a willingness to return to Turkey for nuclear talks, it has simultaneously blamed the United States for attacks on its people and financial system.

The Obama administration, meanwhile, is being savaged by Republican opponents for appearing weak on Iran, despite warnings that any interference with international traffic through the Straits of Hormuz “will not be tolerated.” When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the killing of the Iranian scientist and stated that Washington had played no role in his killing, former Senator and current presidential candidate Rick Santorum stated bluntly that the condemnation was a mistake. Santorum, along with fellow presidential candidates Newt Gingrich and Mitt Romney, have all taken a much harder line on Iran than the White House and, along with Israel’s most right-wing supporters in the United States, are goading the administration to be tougher on Iran, even to the point of launching a military strike against its nuclear facilities.

Given the fragility of the U.S. economy, which seems just on the cusp of recovery, the Obama administration does not want a war with Iran. But the president cannot control or predict Iranian behavior. A truly provocative act by Iran — such as the sinking of a U.S. warship — would force Obama’s hand, especially in an election year, but he must nevertheless resist the temptation to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. This could only be justified if Iran had provided unambiguous evidence that it was determined to develop a nuclear weapon. Under these circumstances, international support for war would likely be forthcoming.

Geoffrey Kemp is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Academy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

Image by the United States Department of Defense.

BRUSSELS—Full details of the Obama administration’s new look in defense spending, force posture, and strategy are not yet out. But enough has been revealed  to venture some thoughts on the logic of the new approach and the longer-term implications for the United States and transatlantic partners.

The shift to a “one war, spoil and manage” strategy contrasts sharply with a decade of costly and inconclusive engagement in irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq. Enormous efforts were undertaken to adapt the U.S. way of war and to focus it on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with the unfortunate effect of eroding the United States’ capacity to address more serious and potentially more demanding long-term challenges, above all in Asia. Today, much of the U.S. strategic community has come to believe that a disproportionate amount of effort has been devoted to meeting nonexistential threats to the national interest and international security. A strategy re-emphasizing core risks, and conventional rather than irregular warfare, simply makes sense against a backdrop of stark resource constraints.

The need to meet serious conventional contingencies with smaller ground forces could spell a renaissance in nuclear strategy. There are precedents for this in the Cold War experience, when the expense and difficulty of forward defense in Europe compelled a reliance on nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence to fill the gap at reasonable cost. Of course, we are unlikely to see a return to a doctrine of massive retaliation to meet security challenges in Asia, a more competitive relationship with Russia, or an aggressive Iran. But the mix of conventional and nuclear deterrence in U.S. strategy could well change as forces are realigned and forward-deployed forces, in particular, become more exposed to ballistic missile attack, perhaps nuclear-armed. Under these conditions, planners may be tempted to reinforce the nuclear dimension. Not quite a trip-wire strategy, but perhaps a bit closer than many U.S. allies would prefer.

Many will be tempted to interpret the Obama administration’s new strategy as a shift away from European defense—and perhaps more important, European defense partnerships—in the face of more pressing challenges in Asia. This interpretation is too dramatic. In reality, the shift away from European defense per se has been underway for two decades. This is not just a question of land forces. The U.S. Sixth Fleet has not kept an aircraft carrier battle group in the Mediterranean for many years. Residual U.S. forces in and around Europe are kept there to enable the United States to meet contingencies elsewhere, across the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. Maintaining a capacity to reinforce Europe’s crisis response capabilities on the European periphery, as in Libya, will continue to depend, above all, on mainly bilateral base access and over-flight arrangements. If anything, transatlantic partners will now have an even greater stake in solidifying these strategic ties. The locus of strategic risk may be shifting; the logic of cooperation endures.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser is the Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Center in Brussels.

BERLIN — When President Barack Obama unveiled a new national defense strategy last week, which confirmed the United States’ intent to play a sustained role in shaping a rising Asia, he noted that “the tide of war is receding.” This observation will have done little to reassure a skeptical Beijing that the strategy is aimed at managing, as opposed to containing, the rise of China. Beijing will note with ire its bracketing, in one part of the strategic review, with Iran: a country with whom the United States has had no diplomatic relations for three decades and with whom the risk of conflict (even if by proxy), remains all too real. Nor will it be pleased by the U.S. commitment to “invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India,” a country whose potential Beijing would prefer to see checked. Seen from Beijing, the administration’s repeated assurances that the United States does not view China as an adversary will be even harder to believe now.

Nevertheless, as Beijing waits to discover the full details of the U.S. realignment and to calibrate its reaction accordingly, a few ironies are already clear. Firstly, despite the fanfare with which the announcement was made, it should be no surprise that Washington plans to pay close attention to Asia. In fact, the realignment reinforces an underlying trend of increased U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, which has been quietly gathering momentum since the 1990s. The wars that followed the 9/11 attacks may have constrained some of this focus, but the ultimate direction of U.S. defense policy has been clear for a while. Likewise, the intention to cultivate India as a long-term strategic partner has roots stretching back across administrations long before Obama’s tenure.

Secondly, the perception of increasingly “assertive” behavior by China in recent years has played its part in crystallizing a stronger U.S. response. The danger is that this in turn bolsters the position of hard-liners in Beijing, including elements of the military, thereby further increasing their influence in foreign and security policymaking. Thirdly, China’s bracketing with Iran as nations pursuing asymmetric means to counter U.S. power projection capabilities is likely to encourage Beijing to mistakenly identify common cause with Tehran. Indeed, a Global Times editorial the day after Obama’s announcement argued, “The U.S. strategic adjustment highlights Iran’s importance to China. Iran’s existence and its stance form a strong check against the U.S.” And finally, as Washington complains about the pursuit of these asymmetric measures, its increased presence in the region is likely to make such activities even more attractive. China will continue to pour resources into access denial, focus on the development of longer-range capabilities, and continue their advances in electronic and cyber warfare.

Yet, for the United States to retain its primacy in Asia whilst ensuring the rise of China within a rules-based international environment, there is no alternative other than pouring more resources into Asia. Ultimately, anyone judging China’s strategic intentions purely by observing the nature of its military build-up would not likely be persuaded by Beijing’s commitment to rise peacefully. For the many U.S. allies and partners in Asia struggling to manage the security implications of their burgeoning trade relations with China, this demonstration of U.S. commitment to the region provides significant reassurance. At the same time, the strategy will also generate tensions with U.S. partners in Asia. More will be demanded of them, which will have financial implications and might require deft political handling domestically. Equally, as South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo has been quick to point out, the United States’ decreased appetite for boots on the ground does not sit easily with a military strategy that presently envisions the deployment of 690,000 American soldiers on the Korean Peninsula in the event of war.

In the struggle to manage the consequences of China’s rise, U.S. military might and strategy will be crucial, but these will not be the only tools required. While a more coherent diplomatic strategy for Asia appears to be emerging with, for example, U.S. participation in the East Asian Summit, U.S. trade policy in Asia remains woefully underdeveloped, the administration’s recent push on the Trans-Pacific Partnership notwithstanding. Ultimately, as intriguing as the consequences of this strategy may be for the broader region, for the moment at least, the Pentagon review remains just a paper. Even once key details are made clear, a lot can happen on the road between intent and reality.

Sarah Raine is a Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellow with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin

PARIS—The Obama administration’s new defense strategy should come as no surprise to observers in France and across Europe. The question of rebalancing American military involvement between Europe and the Asia-Pacific has been a recurring theme of transatlantic relations and of U.S. policy debates since at least the 1950s. In large part, it reflects the historical evolution of U.S. perceptions of the transatlantic relationship, from what the United States should do for Europe to what it should do with Europe. In the context of economic austerity, this evolution assumes an even more urgent quality.

There are certainly legitimate reasons for concern. The stationing of U.S. troops in Europe is not only a key component of deterring potential aggression against U.S. allies, it also significantly enhances its power projection capabilities by locating U.S. forces closer to hotspots in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe’s eastern periphery. A recessed U.S. posture in Europe will have direct implications for the military’s ability to respond to future conflicts or strategic surprises. In the lead-up to intervening in Libya, confusion related to the United States’ role illustrated the increasing and dangerous ambiguity that underscores U.S.-European strategic relations. Whereas the United States “transferred” the command and control of the Libya mission to its European allies, Europeans had been counting on U.S. leadership to conduct the military operations.

At the same time, closer strategic cooperation between the United States and Europe has become even more vital in an unpredictable environment being transformed by the emergence of new powers and threats. In Obama’s words, U.S. rebalancing should “create new opportunities for burden-sharing.” Indeed, the key questions induced by an increasingly Asia-oriented U.S. foreign policy do not concern the United States’ military posture in Europe itself, but rather whether Europe is ready to take responsibility for hard security matters in and around Europe, and across the world. France’s chief of the defense staff, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, recently noted that while “Europe is disarming, the world is rearming,” a trend that could impact Europe’s future in terms of its power projection and influence in world politics.

Burden sharing need not entail a geographical division of labor between Americans and Europeans, whereby the United States focuses on Asia and the Middle East, while Europeans concentrate on their near and Mediterranean neighborhoods. Under certain circumstances, the United States will need European support, as in Afghanistan or sub-Saharan Africa. In others, the EU will need U.S. support and unique capabilities, as in Libya. Defining clear modalities of transatlantic cooperation would help avoid future Libya-like scenarios.

It is as yet unclear whether Europe is ready for all this. While the United States would wish for Europe to develop a more coherent military capacity, Europe is actually evolving in the opposite direction. At the present juncture, virtually no European country has the will or the means to assume these responsibilities. European decision-makers may have welcomed Obama’s commitment to draw to a close the perceived over-militarization of the post-9/11 era, but the Libyan campaign showed that hard power still matters in the 21^st century. Ad hoc coalitions are a short-term solution, Franco-British defense cooperation suffers from ideological divergences, and Germany is occupied dealing with the Euro crisis. NATO can therefore be expected to continue to enhance interoperability and coalition building, rather than acting as the core transatlantic security alliance.

What may appear a pragmatic and natural shift in U.S. geostrategic priorities to Asia and the Middle East means fewer resources for the traditional transatlantic alliance. But this does not entail a post-American Europe or less U.S. interest in the transatlantic partnership. On the contrary, the Obama administration has, in a way, renewed its defense commitments to Europe and acknowledged the continuing strategic importance of Europe in terms of ongoing security challenges and unresolved conflicts.

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is Director of the German Marshall Fund’s Paris office.

WASHINGTON—December 17 marks the first anniversary of a desperate act of self-immolation in Tunisia, which sparked a series of uprisings across the Arabic-speaking world, toppling three regimes, threatening to topple at least two others, and prompting several governments to take unprecedented measures to address popular dissatisfaction. But one year on, there is still widespread disagreement about the nature of the events, their implications, and even what to call them. Indeed, internal and external observers of many stripes — optimists, pessimists, realists, and outright romantics — all feel vindicated by the past year’s developments. Their perceptions and their consequent actions will continue to color the eventual outcome of the “Arab Spring” (as it is still widely referred to in the West). Whatever their preconceptions, observers confront three emerging cleavages in the Arab world: ideological, political, and generational.

The most obvious effect of the Arab Spring has been the recasting of the primary ideological fault line in Arab political culture as between Islamists and liberals, with both camps severely fragmented. The discourse and slogans of the uprisings were indeed non-Islamist, focusing on concrete issues such as representation, corruption, and employment and framed by universal values such as freedom, empowerment, and dignity. Yet, elections in Tunisia and Egypt have handed power to Islamists. The Arab Spring can therefore be framed either as a smartly orchestrated Islamist maneuver utilizing popular action instead of militancy or a result of the dearth of credible alternatives that anticipates the consolidation and institutionalization of liberal political movements. While the poor showing of liberal groups in both the Tunisian and Egyptian elections may have caused disappointment, the fact that they now constitute a sizable legislative minority is itself a considerable development. The Islamists have the benefit of decades of organization, but the Arab Spring constitutes the first significant instance of modern organized Islamism moving from radical to less radical postures. The will of the people is an uncontested principle in the post-Arab Spring era.

Yet if shifts in ideological principles are to translate into democratic values, more deep changes in political cultures will be necessary. A cardinal feature of Arab societies is that they remain largely patriarchal, prone to acknowledging the authority of rulers and expecting an element of paternalistic care in return. But the Arab Spring has deeply shaken the foundations of political paternalism. Even the most entrenched of monarchies have begun to promise reforms in representation and governance. The creation of a democratic culture is a function of civil institutions holding governments accountable for their promises, a role that eager civil society movements across the Arab world are poised to assume. The judicious engagement of the liberal factions of the Arab civil society movement by their international counterparts has become even more urgent than before.

The deepest of the cleavages affecting the wide Arab world is neither ideological nor political, but generational. The demographic youth bulge and the refusal of oligarchs to surrender their control over resources were the actual impetuses of the Arab Spring. Even before the Arab Spring, multiple youth cultures had begun to challenge political paternalism. While some young people in the Arab world indulged in Western-style consumerist pop culture, radical Islamism was also built upon the frustrations of disaffected youth. The Arab Spring provided youth with an unprecedented opportunity to channel their energy into political movements. It is therefore hard to imagine that the mere replacement of old oligarchs with new Islamist Doppelgängers will consign the Arab world’s youth to escapism or nihilism. As demonstrated by Egypt’s “second revolution” in Tahrir Square, youth activism is bound to remain a major force in the next phase of the political transformations in the Arab world.

Understood in light of these divisions, the recent electoral successes of Islamist parties in the Arab world appear precarious and subject to pressures from multiple sources. Far from being the inevitable outcome that both Islamists and their symbiotic detractors predicted, their successes are the transitory result of evolving conditions. If, however, the Islamists are ultimately successful in consolidating their victories, it would be in no small measure a consequence of the failure of liberals worldwide in helping to level the playing field.

Hassan Mneimneh is Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

Image by giaitri59.

WASHINGTON—In a presidential race focused firmly on domestic issues, this week’s Republican presidential debate on foreign policy and national security provides a rare and valuable opportunity for Americans and the rest of the world to hear the candidates revisit the perennial question of “What keeps you up at night?” — and its slightly more frightening follow-on, “What would wake you up at night?” We believe the following subjects should top any candidate’s lists:

Afghanistan: The security situation following the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014 remains far from clear. Afghan forces are currently expected to assume responsibility for security, but questions surround the size and footprint of the remaining international forces (assuming the Afghan government permits any troops to stay). There is little doubt that, without massive international funding, Afghanistan is headed for a disastrous economic recession. What U.S. policymakers intend to do to stave off such a recession and the ensuing challenge to U.S. security remains vague. And we would like to hear presidential candidates discussing what lessons we have learned during the past decade for future counterterrorism efforts — including how to prevent the next Afghanistan.

Greater Middle East: In time, 2011 might come to be seen as the most transformational year for world politics since 1989. But the short-term challenges for the region, with its 750 million inhabitants, as well as for U.S. policy and leadership are huge — and to no small degree uncharted. Depending on with whom you speak in the region, the United States is seen as a declining power, a bully, an ally, or a partner of convenience. Stable long-term U.S. alliances appear to have frayed over issues relating to terrorism, the Israel-Palestine peace process, and the Arab Spring. Iran’s continued defiance of international concern over its nuclear program, in particular, shows how difficult it has become for the United States to forge a consensus not just with its European allies, but also with its Middle Eastern partners. If any issue has the potential for becoming a waking nightmare, it is Iran.

National security spending: Whatever the outcome of ongoing Congressional efforts at reducing U.S. government expenditure by $1.2 trillion dollars, the largest cut is likely to be to defense spending. The real risk is that this will have a devastating effect on the United States’ defense capabilities. Many Americans do not appreciate that only about five percent of the United States’ gross domestic product is spent on defense and foreign affairs, including international development aid. This relatively small amount of money helps secure U.S. freedoms, enables the development of vital technologies, allows the U.S. to provide assistance to people beyond its borders, and permits the United States to protect the freedom of global lines of communication and transport. What the candidates have to say on the topic of defense cuts is therefore not just about saving government money — it lays the groundwork for the future of U.S. foreign and security policy.

Preventing isolationism: Frankly, at a time of overwhelming domestic preoccupations, the very fact of addressing foreign policy and national security in a debate has become an accomplishment in itself. But that is not enough. Faced with a stormy world economy and a slew of foreign policy quagmires, Americans appear to be tempted by isolationism as never before. Yet no candidate can responsibly suggest that drawing up the bridges is a realistic policy option. The United States depends on its trade and other forms of engagement with other countries — much as the world depends on the United States. A number of emerging large economies present opportunities that could translate directly into jobs and growth for the United States. But it’s not all about trade and economic self-interest: The United States’ tradition has been to export values and principles as well as goods. If the candidates are to convince, they must explain to their U.S. viewers why the United States must continue and expand its engagement with the world.

Leaders who cannot explain to the American people, its allies, or the international community at large why the United States must not only remain engaged in the world but play a leadership role would be — if elected —destined to make the United States weaker and more vulnerable, not stronger and safer. What keeps us up late at night is the thought of a United States that appears distracted, disengaged, and uninterested in shouldering its responsibilities as the world’s leading benevolent and democratic power. Promoting U.S. interests and values around the world is not a partisan issue; it is for all Americans, elected and unelected. Therefore, this campaign and this country need to engage in a serious discussion on the United States’ role in the world. Let it begin.

Glenn Nye, a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives (D-VA) and former Foreign Service Officer, and Daniel P. Fata, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy from 2005 to 2008, are Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by Wofford College.

WASHINGTON—The Arab League’s near-unanimous vote to suspend Syria’s membership after eight months of crackdowns on anti-government protestors is being greeted as a game-changer by the West. It recalled a similar action earlier this year when the League suspended Libya’s membership, thus paving the way for the NATO airstrikes that eventually helped bring down Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. European militaries took the lead in the campaign that ousted Gaddafi, while the United States provided critical intelligence and military support. Although calls for similar Western intervention against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may now appear natural, Syria’s case is much more complex and calls for a different strategy.

In fact, the obstacles to a repetition of a Libya-styled intervention far outweigh the opportunities. Amid the ongoing euro crisis, there are concerns about the cost of another military engagement for the West, and one that would be far more challenging. A United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention is unlikely, given strong Russian and Chinese support for Bashar al-Assad. The potential for regional and sectarian instability due to Iran’s involvement makes the situation even more combustible. The Syrian opposition has demonstrated its ability to mobilize and has received critical support from some Western countries, yet it is disorganized and presents no leadership with which to partner. Given these impediments, the Arab League’s action may be the best opportunity for the transatlantic community to encourage and facilitate the removal of Assad’s regime.

Recent decisions by the transatlantic community seem to acknowledge this reality. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton has signaled that European military strikes against the Syrian government are unlikely for now. Meanwhile, the EU increased economic pressure by blocking Syrian access to the European Investment Bank (EIB), which could deprive the Assad government of hundreds of millions of euros in EIB loans, and by extending sanctions against Syrian individuals and companies associated with the regime. Taken in combination with the United States’ sanctions and Turkey’s newly antagonistic stance on the Assad regime, the EU’s efforts are an important step in the right direction.

The result is a policy that may be a harbinger of a new approach to regional problems. The Arab League is taking ownership of problems in its own back yard, instead of delegating to Western powers. As for the EU, much like the United States in the context of the Libya intervention, Europe finds itself “leading from behind” in the action against Syria, choosing to shape the political environment through its support for the Arab League’s decision. This suggests a model for foreign policy decision-making that advances European interests at a time when getting its own fiscal house in order continues to be its own greatest priority. Furthermore, supporting the Arab League allows it to take greater ownership in its own region while giving Damascus time to figure out an orderly succession plan for Assad.

This strategy is not without both short-term and long-term risks. Thousands of government supporters attacked the embassies and consulates of Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and France in Syria after the Arab League decision was announced, and violence continues across the country. The regime, together with its Iranian, Chinese, and Russian supporters, is counting on the implosion and/or subversion of the opposition. In the midst of further tension between Israel and Iran over the latter’s nuclear program, a military, political, or economic meltdown in Syria would reverberate throughout the Middle East and Europe.

Still, the action taken by the Arab League is an important first step in reflecting its greater resolve in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings. Supporting this with concrete actions, such as sanctions and public statements underlining the transatlantic community’s commitment to work with the Arab League and Turkey in supporting the Syrian people, can be seen as a new model and another step forward in the evolution of a more focused and unified European security strategy.

Judith Baroody is Senior Resident Fellow and Joshua W. Walker is Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

ISTANBUL— Even in an otherwise remarkable year for the broader Middle East, the most recent developments have underscored the degree to which the strategic realities of the region have changed. The death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was the latest consequence of the tumultuous Arab Awakening. The United States’ announcement of a final withdrawal from Iraq by the year’s end has raised further questions about the West’s traditional leadership and influence across the region. And Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an’s high-profile blitzkrieg from Somalia to various post-Arab Spring capitals and the United Nations highlighted the role that Turkey — one of the region’s strongest democracies — is now playing in shaping the regional agenda. Yet twin disasters last week in the form of terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on the Turkish border outpost in Hakkari, which resulted in over 24 deaths and 18 injuries, and the 7.2 earthquake in Ercis and Van have raised important questions about the fragility of the Turkish model.

The timing of the Hakkari attacks could not have been more provocative. They occurred on the same day as a major constitutional debate among political parties in Ankara, a day after five policemen and three civilians were killed in a nearby border town, and three days after Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited troops in the region to boost morale. The deadliest PKK assault in several years, it appears to have involved over 100 terrorists in a carefully orchestrated set of maneuvers. On the same day that the United States announced the withdrawal of all troops from Iraq by the end of the year, Turkey launched a massive cross-border operation against Kurdish strongholds in the north of that country.

This dangerous escalation of the Kurdish problem threatens the security of an important border region, while dragging one of the region’s last stable powers into region-wide instability. While embracing the so-called Arab Spring and supporting the Palestinian cause, Turkey’s leaders have not accommodated Kurdish assertions of autonomy or freedom. Erdo?an’s government, while preaching the virtues of soft power — whether in the form of economic engagement, visa liberalization, or “zero problems” with neighbors — has also had to rely once again on traditional hard power. All of this makes it hard to imagine Turkey realizing its full potential until it is able to successfully address the Kurdish problem.

Turkey’s approach to the PKK has also complicated its already tangled relations with other states in the Middle East and beyond. Only two weeks earlier, Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, threatened to support the PKK in response to harsh Turkish criticism of his government, a move that now seems particularly ill-advised. Tensions with both Iran and Saudi Arabia have also increased, complicating the delicate balance in Iraq. And Erdo?an’s out-of-the-blue and unsubstantiated accusation only a week before the Hakkari attacks that a German foundation was providing support to the PKK has also strained relations with the European Union. The only silver lining may be that the attacks serve as a reminder to Ankara of the importance of its alliance with the United States, which has offered it concrete intelligence and military support against the PKK for close to three decades.

Turkey now faces serious challenges to both of its primary strategic objectives: advancing regional stability while enhancing its own influence. Its laudable objective of serving as an honest broker in some of the Middle East’s most intractable conflicts inevitably collides with the reality of having to deal with internal challenges to its own stability. Ultimately, stability in the Middle East rests upon how regional players like Turkey answer their own populations’ demands in a responsible and timely manner. Despite the historic 2009 “Kurdish Opening” proclaimed by Erod?an, Ankara has resorted to ratcheting up its rhetoric to respond to populist outrage. While it is too soon to tell what the long-term impact will be on Turkish foreign policy, the domestic damage has already been done, with the rise of nationalist and populist sentiments that conflate the PKK with all Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. Erdo?an’s signature project — rewriting Turkey’s constitution in a way that guarantees ethnic rights and fairness to all of its citizens — has now become that much harder. Unfortunately, overcoming Ankara’s natural disasters will be much easier than the remaining manmade obstacles along the way.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by Evrim Aydin / Anadolu Agnecy via EPA