All In:  The Education of General David Petraeus.  By Paula Broadwell with Vernon Loeb. The Penguin Press, 2012, 394pp. $29.99.

Writing a first book is challenging in its own right, much less doing so as events unfold.  In All In, The Education of General David Petraeus, Paula Broadwell chose to add a third hurdle:  writing the story of an individual, General David H. Petraeus, who has not only accomplished much in a high profile arena, but whose career has not yet completely run its course.  In her 400 page work, based on her in-progress doctoral dissertation on the development of General Petraeus’ career, Broadwell has delivered a solid treatment of the General’s on-the-ground experiences in what was to become his final mission in uniform – command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from July 2010 until July 2011. For many reasons, All In will be one of the must-reads for any serious student of military affairs and international security issues.

All In is not a comprehensive biography of General, now Director, Petraeus, nor is it a comprehensive history of the war in Afghanistan.  Those who seek either will come away disappointed.  Nor is All In the cocktail party circuit “tell-all.” Indeed, Broadwell does a proper job in relaying the personal stories of the key players without betraying confidences or gossiping. In doing so, she does a valuable service to future writers by capturing insights that otherwise would be lost to history with the passage of time.  While writing All In, Broadwell benefitted greatly from the labors of veteran journalist Vernon Loeb, whom she credits on the cover.  The voice, however, is unmistakably that of Ms. Broadwell, and despite a few areas where editors could have reduced repetition and smoothed out transitions, All In is eminently readable, engaging, and will provide an excellent bridge for future scholarly treatments and more detailed assessments of various aspects of Petraeus’ career (e.g. Iraq) and the still-ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Broadwell tells the story of how General Petraeus became, as the late Richard Holbrooke candidly told a small group of civilians shortly before his death, “the greatest operational commander of our time.”  All In is the story of those who shaped Petraeus’ thinking as a young officer and a story of a General whom the nation called to be the face of two unpopular wars – Iraq in the beginning of 2007 and Afghanistan in the summer of 2010.   Likewise, this is the story of the challenges and successes that some of Petraeus’ protégé’s have faced during that latter conflict. Specifically, Broadwell follows three of the 101^st Airborne Division’s Battalion Commanders and traces the outlines of military operations in 2010 and 2011 in Afghanistan, particularly those in Kandahar and Helmand.  Broadwell chronicles the often vicious fighting against Taliban insurgents and her blow by blow description of battles in the Arghandab bring the reader into the situation as experienced by the commanders on the ground. Broadwell also chronicles the exploits of two members of the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) and brings the reader into the struggle to prod the U.S. military to overcome its endemic aversion to small wars and insurgencies.  While she does not address head-on the issue of whether “too much” has been attempted in Afghanistan as a matter of policy, her telling of the story does remind the reader not all in uniform were “true believers” in the value of COIN and that, indeed, some were simply dismissive of any complex and nuanced notions of conflict.

Broadwell’s style may remind readers of James Kittfield’s Prodigal Soldiers (1995) – a story of U.S. military leaders who sprang from the experience of the Vietnam War. Broadwell alternates between Petraeus’ command in Afghanistan and the career that shaped him prior to the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan. She describes his relatively unassuming childhood where Petraeus’ father taught him that results and not excuses are what matter.  She also chronicles his experiences as a junior officer and field grade leader, and the story is fascinating enough that the reader is left wanting more about what truly shaped and drove a young David Petraeus into such a tenacious and effective leader.  Clearly, one of Petraeus key strengths as a leader was not only finding mentors, but also in seeking out junior officers (and civilians) to mentor himself and providing them opportunities to grow into even stronger leaders.  Additionally, All In gives the reader an understanding of the importance Petreaus placed on building the right team as well as the challenge of ensuring that these teams did not tell him simply what they thought he wanted to hear.

Broadwell uses her study to demonstrate how Petraeus’ experiences – not simply in Iraq, but more importantly over a lifetime of assignments around the world shaped his analytical and decisonmaking processes in Afghanistan.  Perhaps the most important take away during his career was that Petraeus felt that the enemy should not be allowed to define the rules of the fight:  “when the enemy defined their rules, we just changed ours,” a young Lieutenant Colonel Petraeus explained to one of his subordinates during training exercises. Broadwell deliberately focuses much more on the operational nature of his command in Afghanistan and his interaction with his former protégé’s than with Petraeus’ dealings with peers, subordinate general and flag officers, senior civilian officials, and the Afghan military and civilian leadership.

While there is some discussion of non-U.S. NATO forces, All In focuses on the U.S. military, almost exclusively the U.S. Army.  Broadwell’s measurement of his handling of sensitive issues such as air and ground rules of engagement, civilian casualties, and the Afghan Local Police program illustrate that Petraeus practiced what he preached in terms of understanding that “people are the center of gravity,” whether those under your own command or those you seek to protect from the insurgents.  While it is understandable that there is not more of a discussion of General Petraeus’ interactions with often difficult Afghan senior officials and the complexities of Alliance politics, this does mean that the reader misses seeing how truly skilled Petraeus was as not only a soldier, but, in perhaps a way not seen since Eisenhower or Marshall, as a diplomat.  Likewise, there is only scant discussion of the challenges Petraeus faced in dealing with a dysfunctional U.S. Embassy that had a critical role to play in the stabilization and development dimension of the COIN campaign.

In writing All In, Broadwell had tremendous access not only to Petraeus, but to those who were working or had worked with him. She interviewed over 150 individuals to include not just the General’s closest advisors, but former mentors and subordinates. The challenge Broadwell faced, of course, was not just filtering the subjectivity of those she interviewed, but to seek objectivity in her own analysis.  The pride she has in her mentor/subject, his protégés, and her belief in the mission in Afghanistan most certainly shines through. While some will choose to disagree, this does not detract at all from the quality of the book.  In many ways it lets the reader understand how many of those who have served in the U.S. military feel about serving under such a uniquely capable set of military leaders such as Petreaus, McChrystal, Mattis, Stavridis, McRaven, and Rodriguez.

No doubt, for Ms. Broadwell, it was hard not to be proud of the camaraderie, professionalism, and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice that she witnessed while conducting her interviews.  In the end, the strength of this book indeed lays in both Broadwell’s ability to empathize with her subject matter and that her access uniquely gave her the ability to obtain the views of participants as events happened or shortly thereafter when the emotion was often still raw.  Indeed, for this alone, All In will stand the test of time and prove invaluable to future scholars and students of history.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He served as the Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Representative and an advisor both Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal from 2009-2011.

WASHINGTON– Political realities facing the leaders of the United States and Iran mean that military confrontation between the two states is a distinct possibility. In late December, the Iranian armed forces conducted a number of war games — which included the live firing of missiles — in the Straits of Hormuz and adjacent waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. When the aircraft carrier USS John Stennis sailed for a routine repositioning from the Gulf to the North Arabian Sea, Iran told the United States not to return it to the Persian Gulf region. The commander of Iran’s army, General Ataollah Salehi, later reiterated that “The Islamic Republic will not repeat its warning.”

On January 6, three armed patrol boats of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps came within several hundred yards of a U.S. amphibious assault ship, the USS New Orleans. This is precisely the sort of cat-and-mouse games at sea that can lead to serious miscalculations and subsequent escalation. Many Americans will recall that in 1964 a military encounter between North Vietnamese torpedo boats and the USS Maddox resulted in a pitched sea battle, which was enough to persuade the U.S. Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that gave President Lyndon Johnson authority to begin the massive escalation in Southeast Asia.

In addition to military brinksmanship, covert military action against Iran’s nuclear establishment appears to be increasing. On January 11, the Iranians announced that one of their nuclear scientists had been assassinated in Tehran. They blamed both the United States and Israel though they offered no explicit proof. Some Iranians have publicly called for retaliatory killings. Assassinations and reprisals have long been an important driver in the paths to war. Remember the attempted assassination in London of Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov on June 3, 1982? This attack was attributed to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and provided the pretext for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon three days later.

Why might Iran be willing to risk confrontation with the United States at this time? It faces draconian new international sanctions, led by the United States, and if the EU agrees to ban imports of Iranian oil at the end of January, its financial situation will further deteriorate. Its currency is in freefall and the business community appears to be in a state of panic. Even Iran’s great friend China is cutting back on oil purchases. The regime in Tehran also faces the possibility that its closest Middle East ally, Syria, is edging towards civil war and there is a chance that the Bashar al-Assad regime could eventually be ousted. This would radically change the balance of power in the region and undermine other Iranian allies, especially Hezbollah. While Iran has signaled a willingness to return to Turkey for nuclear talks, it has simultaneously blamed the United States for attacks on its people and financial system.

The Obama administration, meanwhile, is being savaged by Republican opponents for appearing weak on Iran, despite warnings that any interference with international traffic through the Straits of Hormuz “will not be tolerated.” When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the killing of the Iranian scientist and stated that Washington had played no role in his killing, former Senator and current presidential candidate Rick Santorum stated bluntly that the condemnation was a mistake. Santorum, along with fellow presidential candidates Newt Gingrich and Mitt Romney, have all taken a much harder line on Iran than the White House and, along with Israel’s most right-wing supporters in the United States, are goading the administration to be tougher on Iran, even to the point of launching a military strike against its nuclear facilities.

Given the fragility of the U.S. economy, which seems just on the cusp of recovery, the Obama administration does not want a war with Iran. But the president cannot control or predict Iranian behavior. A truly provocative act by Iran — such as the sinking of a U.S. warship — would force Obama’s hand, especially in an election year, but he must nevertheless resist the temptation to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. This could only be justified if Iran had provided unambiguous evidence that it was determined to develop a nuclear weapon. Under these circumstances, international support for war would likely be forthcoming.

Geoffrey Kemp is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Academy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

Image by the United States Department of Defense.

BRUSSELS—Full details of the Obama administration’s new look in defense spending, force posture, and strategy are not yet out. But enough has been revealed  to venture some thoughts on the logic of the new approach and the longer-term implications for the United States and transatlantic partners.

The shift to a “one war, spoil and manage” strategy contrasts sharply with a decade of costly and inconclusive engagement in irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq. Enormous efforts were undertaken to adapt the U.S. way of war and to focus it on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with the unfortunate effect of eroding the United States’ capacity to address more serious and potentially more demanding long-term challenges, above all in Asia. Today, much of the U.S. strategic community has come to believe that a disproportionate amount of effort has been devoted to meeting nonexistential threats to the national interest and international security. A strategy re-emphasizing core risks, and conventional rather than irregular warfare, simply makes sense against a backdrop of stark resource constraints.

The need to meet serious conventional contingencies with smaller ground forces could spell a renaissance in nuclear strategy. There are precedents for this in the Cold War experience, when the expense and difficulty of forward defense in Europe compelled a reliance on nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence to fill the gap at reasonable cost. Of course, we are unlikely to see a return to a doctrine of massive retaliation to meet security challenges in Asia, a more competitive relationship with Russia, or an aggressive Iran. But the mix of conventional and nuclear deterrence in U.S. strategy could well change as forces are realigned and forward-deployed forces, in particular, become more exposed to ballistic missile attack, perhaps nuclear-armed. Under these conditions, planners may be tempted to reinforce the nuclear dimension. Not quite a trip-wire strategy, but perhaps a bit closer than many U.S. allies would prefer.

Many will be tempted to interpret the Obama administration’s new strategy as a shift away from European defense—and perhaps more important, European defense partnerships—in the face of more pressing challenges in Asia. This interpretation is too dramatic. In reality, the shift away from European defense per se has been underway for two decades. This is not just a question of land forces. The U.S. Sixth Fleet has not kept an aircraft carrier battle group in the Mediterranean for many years. Residual U.S. forces in and around Europe are kept there to enable the United States to meet contingencies elsewhere, across the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. Maintaining a capacity to reinforce Europe’s crisis response capabilities on the European periphery, as in Libya, will continue to depend, above all, on mainly bilateral base access and over-flight arrangements. If anything, transatlantic partners will now have an even greater stake in solidifying these strategic ties. The locus of strategic risk may be shifting; the logic of cooperation endures.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser is the Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Center in Brussels.

BERLIN — When President Barack Obama unveiled a new national defense strategy last week, which confirmed the United States’ intent to play a sustained role in shaping a rising Asia, he noted that “the tide of war is receding.” This observation will have done little to reassure a skeptical Beijing that the strategy is aimed at managing, as opposed to containing, the rise of China. Beijing will note with ire its bracketing, in one part of the strategic review, with Iran: a country with whom the United States has had no diplomatic relations for three decades and with whom the risk of conflict (even if by proxy), remains all too real. Nor will it be pleased by the U.S. commitment to “invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India,” a country whose potential Beijing would prefer to see checked. Seen from Beijing, the administration’s repeated assurances that the United States does not view China as an adversary will be even harder to believe now.

Nevertheless, as Beijing waits to discover the full details of the U.S. realignment and to calibrate its reaction accordingly, a few ironies are already clear. Firstly, despite the fanfare with which the announcement was made, it should be no surprise that Washington plans to pay close attention to Asia. In fact, the realignment reinforces an underlying trend of increased U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, which has been quietly gathering momentum since the 1990s. The wars that followed the 9/11 attacks may have constrained some of this focus, but the ultimate direction of U.S. defense policy has been clear for a while. Likewise, the intention to cultivate India as a long-term strategic partner has roots stretching back across administrations long before Obama’s tenure.

Secondly, the perception of increasingly “assertive” behavior by China in recent years has played its part in crystallizing a stronger U.S. response. The danger is that this in turn bolsters the position of hard-liners in Beijing, including elements of the military, thereby further increasing their influence in foreign and security policymaking. Thirdly, China’s bracketing with Iran as nations pursuing asymmetric means to counter U.S. power projection capabilities is likely to encourage Beijing to mistakenly identify common cause with Tehran. Indeed, a Global Times editorial the day after Obama’s announcement argued, “The U.S. strategic adjustment highlights Iran’s importance to China. Iran’s existence and its stance form a strong check against the U.S.” And finally, as Washington complains about the pursuit of these asymmetric measures, its increased presence in the region is likely to make such activities even more attractive. China will continue to pour resources into access denial, focus on the development of longer-range capabilities, and continue their advances in electronic and cyber warfare.

Yet, for the United States to retain its primacy in Asia whilst ensuring the rise of China within a rules-based international environment, there is no alternative other than pouring more resources into Asia. Ultimately, anyone judging China’s strategic intentions purely by observing the nature of its military build-up would not likely be persuaded by Beijing’s commitment to rise peacefully. For the many U.S. allies and partners in Asia struggling to manage the security implications of their burgeoning trade relations with China, this demonstration of U.S. commitment to the region provides significant reassurance. At the same time, the strategy will also generate tensions with U.S. partners in Asia. More will be demanded of them, which will have financial implications and might require deft political handling domestically. Equally, as South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo has been quick to point out, the United States’ decreased appetite for boots on the ground does not sit easily with a military strategy that presently envisions the deployment of 690,000 American soldiers on the Korean Peninsula in the event of war.

In the struggle to manage the consequences of China’s rise, U.S. military might and strategy will be crucial, but these will not be the only tools required. While a more coherent diplomatic strategy for Asia appears to be emerging with, for example, U.S. participation in the East Asian Summit, U.S. trade policy in Asia remains woefully underdeveloped, the administration’s recent push on the Trans-Pacific Partnership notwithstanding. Ultimately, as intriguing as the consequences of this strategy may be for the broader region, for the moment at least, the Pentagon review remains just a paper. Even once key details are made clear, a lot can happen on the road between intent and reality.

Sarah Raine is a Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellow with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin

PARIS—The Obama administration’s new defense strategy should come as no surprise to observers in France and across Europe. The question of rebalancing American military involvement between Europe and the Asia-Pacific has been a recurring theme of transatlantic relations and of U.S. policy debates since at least the 1950s. In large part, it reflects the historical evolution of U.S. perceptions of the transatlantic relationship, from what the United States should do for Europe to what it should do with Europe. In the context of economic austerity, this evolution assumes an even more urgent quality.

There are certainly legitimate reasons for concern. The stationing of U.S. troops in Europe is not only a key component of deterring potential aggression against U.S. allies, it also significantly enhances its power projection capabilities by locating U.S. forces closer to hotspots in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe’s eastern periphery. A recessed U.S. posture in Europe will have direct implications for the military’s ability to respond to future conflicts or strategic surprises. In the lead-up to intervening in Libya, confusion related to the United States’ role illustrated the increasing and dangerous ambiguity that underscores U.S.-European strategic relations. Whereas the United States “transferred” the command and control of the Libya mission to its European allies, Europeans had been counting on U.S. leadership to conduct the military operations.

At the same time, closer strategic cooperation between the United States and Europe has become even more vital in an unpredictable environment being transformed by the emergence of new powers and threats. In Obama’s words, U.S. rebalancing should “create new opportunities for burden-sharing.” Indeed, the key questions induced by an increasingly Asia-oriented U.S. foreign policy do not concern the United States’ military posture in Europe itself, but rather whether Europe is ready to take responsibility for hard security matters in and around Europe, and across the world. France’s chief of the defense staff, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, recently noted that while “Europe is disarming, the world is rearming,” a trend that could impact Europe’s future in terms of its power projection and influence in world politics.

Burden sharing need not entail a geographical division of labor between Americans and Europeans, whereby the United States focuses on Asia and the Middle East, while Europeans concentrate on their near and Mediterranean neighborhoods. Under certain circumstances, the United States will need European support, as in Afghanistan or sub-Saharan Africa. In others, the EU will need U.S. support and unique capabilities, as in Libya. Defining clear modalities of transatlantic cooperation would help avoid future Libya-like scenarios.

It is as yet unclear whether Europe is ready for all this. While the United States would wish for Europe to develop a more coherent military capacity, Europe is actually evolving in the opposite direction. At the present juncture, virtually no European country has the will or the means to assume these responsibilities. European decision-makers may have welcomed Obama’s commitment to draw to a close the perceived over-militarization of the post-9/11 era, but the Libyan campaign showed that hard power still matters in the 21^st century. Ad hoc coalitions are a short-term solution, Franco-British defense cooperation suffers from ideological divergences, and Germany is occupied dealing with the Euro crisis. NATO can therefore be expected to continue to enhance interoperability and coalition building, rather than acting as the core transatlantic security alliance.

What may appear a pragmatic and natural shift in U.S. geostrategic priorities to Asia and the Middle East means fewer resources for the traditional transatlantic alliance. But this does not entail a post-American Europe or less U.S. interest in the transatlantic partnership. On the contrary, the Obama administration has, in a way, renewed its defense commitments to Europe and acknowledged the continuing strategic importance of Europe in terms of ongoing security challenges and unresolved conflicts.

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is Director of the German Marshall Fund’s Paris office.

WASHINGTON—In a presidential race focused firmly on domestic issues, this week’s Republican presidential debate on foreign policy and national security provides a rare and valuable opportunity for Americans and the rest of the world to hear the candidates revisit the perennial question of “What keeps you up at night?” — and its slightly more frightening follow-on, “What would wake you up at night?” We believe the following subjects should top any candidate’s lists:

Afghanistan: The security situation following the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014 remains far from clear. Afghan forces are currently expected to assume responsibility for security, but questions surround the size and footprint of the remaining international forces (assuming the Afghan government permits any troops to stay). There is little doubt that, without massive international funding, Afghanistan is headed for a disastrous economic recession. What U.S. policymakers intend to do to stave off such a recession and the ensuing challenge to U.S. security remains vague. And we would like to hear presidential candidates discussing what lessons we have learned during the past decade for future counterterrorism efforts — including how to prevent the next Afghanistan.

Greater Middle East: In time, 2011 might come to be seen as the most transformational year for world politics since 1989. But the short-term challenges for the region, with its 750 million inhabitants, as well as for U.S. policy and leadership are huge — and to no small degree uncharted. Depending on with whom you speak in the region, the United States is seen as a declining power, a bully, an ally, or a partner of convenience. Stable long-term U.S. alliances appear to have frayed over issues relating to terrorism, the Israel-Palestine peace process, and the Arab Spring. Iran’s continued defiance of international concern over its nuclear program, in particular, shows how difficult it has become for the United States to forge a consensus not just with its European allies, but also with its Middle Eastern partners. If any issue has the potential for becoming a waking nightmare, it is Iran.

National security spending: Whatever the outcome of ongoing Congressional efforts at reducing U.S. government expenditure by $1.2 trillion dollars, the largest cut is likely to be to defense spending. The real risk is that this will have a devastating effect on the United States’ defense capabilities. Many Americans do not appreciate that only about five percent of the United States’ gross domestic product is spent on defense and foreign affairs, including international development aid. This relatively small amount of money helps secure U.S. freedoms, enables the development of vital technologies, allows the U.S. to provide assistance to people beyond its borders, and permits the United States to protect the freedom of global lines of communication and transport. What the candidates have to say on the topic of defense cuts is therefore not just about saving government money — it lays the groundwork for the future of U.S. foreign and security policy.

Preventing isolationism: Frankly, at a time of overwhelming domestic preoccupations, the very fact of addressing foreign policy and national security in a debate has become an accomplishment in itself. But that is not enough. Faced with a stormy world economy and a slew of foreign policy quagmires, Americans appear to be tempted by isolationism as never before. Yet no candidate can responsibly suggest that drawing up the bridges is a realistic policy option. The United States depends on its trade and other forms of engagement with other countries — much as the world depends on the United States. A number of emerging large economies present opportunities that could translate directly into jobs and growth for the United States. But it’s not all about trade and economic self-interest: The United States’ tradition has been to export values and principles as well as goods. If the candidates are to convince, they must explain to their U.S. viewers why the United States must continue and expand its engagement with the world.

Leaders who cannot explain to the American people, its allies, or the international community at large why the United States must not only remain engaged in the world but play a leadership role would be — if elected —destined to make the United States weaker and more vulnerable, not stronger and safer. What keeps us up late at night is the thought of a United States that appears distracted, disengaged, and uninterested in shouldering its responsibilities as the world’s leading benevolent and democratic power. Promoting U.S. interests and values around the world is not a partisan issue; it is for all Americans, elected and unelected. Therefore, this campaign and this country need to engage in a serious discussion on the United States’ role in the world. Let it begin.

Glenn Nye, a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives (D-VA) and former Foreign Service Officer, and Daniel P. Fata, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy from 2005 to 2008, are Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by Wofford College.

WASHINGTON—Last week’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran further refutes the conclusion of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran abandoned weaponization activities in 2003. The Annex to the report makes clear that although Iran temporarily halted weaponization activities in 2003 on the heels of the Iraq invasion, the activities resumed later under a different Iranian entity. In addition, the report spells out details of Iran’s preparations for detonation experiments thought to be “strong indicators” of possible weapons development.

Leading European intelligence agencies, as well as many U.S. experts, had previously rejected the NIE’s conclusions as implausible. The IAEA report will focus additional attention in the United States on the question whether the intelligence community should further revise or withdraw its conclusions. Moreover, the report will make clear to governments determined to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran that the window is fast closing on the possibility of effective sanctions.

In the view of many experts, the Iranian program is advancing dangerously close to breakout capability. Iran has long had ample delivery devices for a nuclear weapon in the form of a relatively advanced ballistic missile capability. The IAEA report details Iran’s progress in developing a detonation capability, and Iran already possesses almost 5,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, this amount, if enriched further, is sufficient for four nuclear weapons. Albright assesses that once Iran moves to enrich fuel to weapons grade, it could reach breakout capability in only six months. The question now is whether and how the United States and Europe will respond.

We recommend, as one option, that the P3+1 (U.S., U.K., France, and Germany) table a new Security Council Resolution. Membership of the Security Council is, admittedly, unfavorable for sanctions resolutions at the moment, and there will inevitably be Chinese and Russian obstruction. On the other hand, both China and Russia have previously agreed (after painstaking negotiations) to four separate UNSC sanctions resolutions. The United States, moreover, could more fully engage the significant diplomatic weight of the Saudis, who have leverage with the Chinese and may be newly motivated to assist by the recently-revealed plot against their Ambassador. With a significant diplomatic push, the effort may well succeed.

Second, with or without a new Resolution, the U.S. should adopt new bilateral sanctions. Under U.S. law there are two powerful remaining options: Treasury could sanction the Central Bank of Iran, essentially preventing any bank doing business with the Central Bank from having a correspondent account in the United States. Alternatively, the United States could target the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), cutting off oil revenues and limiting Iran’s supply of refined petroleum.

Third, the United States and its allies should reaffirm the existence of a credible military threat to Iran if the regime continues to pursue a nuclear weapon. The United States has reiterated that military options remain on the table, and U.K. military planners are reportedly stepping up efforts to develop contingency plans to participate in a military operation against Iran. As a next step, the United States could consider joint military exercises with Israel and a willing European ally or allies.

Finally, the United States and Europe should take additional steps to provide Iranian dissident groups with both material and moral support. Although the regime’s violent suppression of the Green Movement following the 2009-2010 protests has prevented the Movement from continuing to stage large protests in the streets, the regime’s behavior has also served to significantly undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian general public. This vulnerability is compounded by recent reports of government corruption.

Iran experts point out that the nuclear program began under a pro-Western government and continued under “reformist” Iranian presidents. That said, there is no question that the chances of persuading the Iranian government to abandon its nuclear weapons program improve significantly if the current regime ends. One of the rallying points of young members of the Green Movement has been the country’s isolation from the rest of the world and economic deprivation in Iran resulting partly from economic mismanagement and partly from international sanctions. A government brought into power by the Green Movement would have significant incentive to rebuild ties with the international community.

To date, restraint by Israel from military action has prevailed in part because of the perception that nonmilitary options remain on the table. The IAEA’s report, however, reveals that the window for these options is closing, and that the costs of inaction are rising. Just in recent months, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen and U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta have spoken publicly about Iranian attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq; the United States has revealed a plot to attack a foreign diplomat and U.S citizens on U.S. soil; and the IAEA has now reported progress toward breakout capability.

Whatever the costs of the actions we recommend, the costs of inaction are higher. A nuclear armed Iran is in no nation’s interest — including Iran’s. Resolving the issue will require bold and decisive leadership from the United States and Europe.

Ambassador Kristen Silverberg is the former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union as well as former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. Daniel Fata is the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO. Both are Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington.

WASHINGTON—Both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have tried hard to prevent Iran from developing and deploying nuclear weapons. The preferred strategy for achieving this objective has been to work closely with key European allies and to put pressure on Russia and China to support tough UN sanctions against the Iranian regime, all in order to get Teheran to come clean about its nuclear activities. The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency makes it clear that it has evidence Iran has made considerable progress in pursuing a nuclear weapons program that would allow Teheran to put warheads on surface-to-surface missiles. But both Russia and China have rejected calls for tougher sanctions.

For this reason there has been a growing debate in Israel and the United States about using force as a last resort to stop the program, or at least to set it back several years. Several of the top Republican contenders to challenge President Obama in 2012 — most notably former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich — are on record as supporting the use of force if more vigorous sanctions are ineffective in changing Iranian behavior. They argue that the Obama administration has failed to slow down Iranian nuclear developments and, if elected, they would pursue a much more aggressive policy.

The very public debate in Israel is unique in that it pits former senior military and intelligence officers who explicitly reject the use of force against the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his minister of defense, Ehud Barak, who are both more open to an Israeli preemptive attack.

Yet a use of force would have many downsides. Not the least of them is that there is no certainty it would be successful, given the dispersal, redundancy, and hardening of Iran’s numerous nuclear facilities. Furthermore, any pre-emptive attack would probably require targeting those Iranian air and naval assets that pose a threat to U.S. or Israeli air and maritime forces. Iran has many ways in which it can retaliate against what it would regard as an act of war. It could attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, could fire thousands of rockets and missiles against Israeli cities.

Perhaps the strongest argument against the use of force concerns the impact a new war in the Gulf would have on oil markets. Following any attack, the price of oil would spike to new highs, rising to perhaps $150 or even $200 a barrel. The fear would be that Iran might, in retaliation, target Arab oil producers and try to disrupt tanker traffic through the Straits of Hormuz. The longer the war, the more uncertainty there would be in the markets and the more protracted would be the price rise. Coming at a time when the world economy is still suffering from the 2008 crisis and the current crisis in the euro zone, such price rises could plunge the world into a new recession or even depression.

There are ways to limit the long-term impact of oil disruptions in the Gulf, but these would not happen immediately, and, to be effective, close cooperation among all major producers and consumers of petroleum would be required. Unless there is some international consensus that war with Iran was necessary, such cooperation will not happen. At this time, indeed, there is almost universal rejection of the use of force, with the exception of Israel and possibly the key Arab Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, who fear an Iranian bomb, though they would prefer to be associated with a U.S. rather than an Israeli attack. Russia, China, France, and Germany have spoken out against military action. And even the overstretched U.S. military establishment appears to harbor no wish to engage in yet another war with a Muslim state. Most experts who talk to Iranian opposition leaders, especially those in the Green Movement, believe that an attack on Iran would strengthen an unpopular regime, not weaken it.

It can be safely predicted that the upcoming election season in the United States will include an acrimonious debate about Iran policy, and how the administration is handling relations with Israel. The Obama administration will support greater military cooperation with Israel while pushing strongly for tougher sanctions against Iran’s financial institutions. But it will resist pressures to contemplate the military option absent a major provocation by Iran.

Geoffrey Kemp is a Fellow of the Transatlantic Academy and Director of Regional Security Programs at the Center for the National Interest.

WASHINGTON — Last week in Baghdad, on his maiden overseas trip as U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta pressed Iraqi officials on whether they wanted American forces to remain in the country after 2011.  Until a few weeks ago, Iraq was largely out of the public spotlight and a low priority for most U.S. policymakers and legislators as a result of the successful “surge” strategy undertaken by the United States after 2007 and the joint U.S.-Iraqi decision in 2008 to withdraw all U.S. forces by December 31, 2011.  Today, the process of U.S. withdrawal is well underway, with only about 46,000 military trainers and advisors remaining in Iraq, down from a peak of more than 150,000 just three years ago.  However, signs of Iranian support for radical Shiite militia groups, the need for further training of Iraqi security forces, and differences within the current Iraqi coalition government over the United States’ presence have started to refocus Washington’s attention.

The American presence in Iraq is also being affected by ongoing budgetary battles in the U.S. Congress, as legislators prepare this year’s Foreign Operations appropriations bill. Congress may well seek to drastically reduce funding for ongoing activities in Iraq, where the United States plans to double the size of its embassy to 16,000 personnel, and for which the State Department has requested $6.2 billion. Although that figure seems high (but is merely a fraction of what was being spent just a few years ago), the State Department will be the U.S. government entity responsible for all U.S. civilian efforts in Iraq when 2012 arrives. It also has to fund its own embassy operations and that of its consulates in a high-risk country, one in which nearly a quarter of the Iraqi government’s own budget is spent on security. In May, recognizing these concerns, the four previous U.S. ambassadors to Iraq sent a letter to Congressional leaders in which they stated that the situation in Iraq “remains fragile and potentially reversible,” and failure to properly fund U.S. efforts going forward “puts at risk the investment America has already made to establish a democratic, peaceful, and economically stable government in this most important region.”

Their argument is spot on. Underfunding post-2011 activities in Iraq will hurt the United States in many ways. It will enable Iran to exert more pressure on the Iraqi government by supporting insurgent efforts, and will allow radical anti-American Shiite groups to have a say in the country’s future. The U.S. transition in Iraq will also serve as a bellwether for its mission in Afghanistan, with underfunding sending the wrong signals to stakeholders in that conflict regarding reconciliation, the transition to Afghan control, and reconstruction and development efforts. Finally, it risks further damage to the United States’ reputation for not being able to finish the job. U.S. policymakers and legislators need to prevent Iraq from becoming another Afghanistan or Pakistan, where American abandonment in the late 1980s contributed to the rise of forces that directly threatened the security of the United States and its allies.

The Foreign Operations appropriations bill will probably not be taken up for a few weeks, if not several months.  While this is a telling indictment of how the American public views the importance of U.S. engagement around the world, it does give time for a serious discussion in Congress on how to fund U.S. civilian-led efforts in Iraq and, if necessary, an extended military mission. The fact is that it is in U.S. national and regional security interests for the United States to maintain a robust presence in Iraq and prevent it from falling into the Iranian security sphere.  An enduring U.S. military presence that supports Iraqi Security Forces — if requested by the Iraqi government — will help ensure that Iraq remains a success story, a fledgling democracy aligned with the United States and the West. Congress and the American people have an obligation to prevent Iran from threatening U.S. interests and allies in the greater Middle East, demonstrate that the United States has the stomach to get the job done, and ensure that the battles fought, dollars spent, lives transformed, and souls forever lost in these efforts were not in vain.

Daniel P. Fata is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington. From 2005 to 2008, he served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy.

Photo courtesy the U.S. Army.

WASHINGTON — The failure of the most recent round of talks between Iran and the “P5+1” in Istanbul was hardly a surprise. To date, negotiations with Iran have made no progress in halting Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program, or in changing the dynamics in a deteriorating relationship between Iran and the West. But the experience in Istanbul highlights some important developments with implications for future strategy.

The context for concern has changed.  There continues to be a fundamental asymmetry in Western and Iranian perceptions of the nuclear impasse. Iran is playing a very long game, with an extended time horizon that has been characterized as “strategic patience.” The West, and to an even greater extent, Israel, perceives Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a ticking clock. For those in Iran’s neighborhood inclined to see the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, the question of how fast the clock is ticking is critical. In part, this is a technical issue, and here the trend in recent months has been toward a more cautious estimate of progress in the Iranian program. Even Israeli analysts now talk in terms of years rather than months. While negotiations have evidently failed to halt the Iranian program, and sanctions may only have an indirect effect, covert intervention on multiple fronts has apparently made a difference. This is good news for crisis management, but may do little to change the longer-term nature of the nuclear challenge. In all likelihood, Iran will opt to remain a near-nuclear power for some time to come. But even this nuclear-ready posture may have serious consequences for military balances, doctrines, and the strategic balance across a wide region, from the Aegean to Central Asia.

The negotiations in Istanbul underscored the increasingly concerted European approach to the Iranian nuclear question. Indeed, the European Union has long been in the forefront of Iran diplomacy, and a common stance on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has been one of the few clear-cut foreign policy achievements at the European level.  Baroness Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was a visible presence before, during, and after the Istanbul talks. For American policymakers skeptical about the emergence of a united Europe in foreign and security policy terms, Iran may be a harbinger of more concerted and visible partnership. Certainly, it matters that a cohesive European policy coincides with what may be the top international security priority for the Obama administration – keeping Iran from going nuclear on its  watch. Current Turkish policy on Iran is a less comfortable fit with European and American interests. Ankara’s Western partners are willing to see Turkey (and Brazil) play a facilitation role. But despite Turkey’s active diplomacy and closer relations with Tehran, there is little that Turkey can achieve if the parties at the core of the nuclear dispute are unwilling to envision a grand bargain.  Neither Tehran, nor Washington will be willing to “outsource” diplomacy on such a critical security issue.

European unity and Turkish activism can only do so much. Given the patient, strategic nature of Iran’s quest for global “weight,” the relationship with Washington will always be central to the outcome. Sabotage and the threat of military retaliation may reduce the chances for an Iranian nuclear breakout in the near term.  Over the longer term, the nature of the U.S.-Iranian security relationship is likely to be the determining factor in Tehran’s nuclear decision-making.  The latest round of international sanctions on Iran may well be having an effect on the Iranian economy. But their effectiveness in hobbling Iran’s nuclear program, or changing the calculus about nuclear proliferation in Tehran, is much less clear.  It might even be argued that effective sanctions will reinforce the regime’s perception of economic and military encirclement, fueling the desire for a minimum nuclear deterrent, whatever the cost.  U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue might alter this equation – but a constructive approach is hardly conceivable against the backdrop of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric.

Events in Tunisia show that the stability of even the most entrenched regimes cannot be taken for granted in the Middle East.  Despite obvious differences of scale, and the character of the state and society, the Tunisian case may yet give new hope to those who would like to see systemic change in Iran. In the meantime, transatlantic partners, including Turkey, need to prepare for a an extended strategy of containment vis-à-vis an Iran that may remain poised on the nuclear threshold for some time to come.

Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington.