WASHINGTON—Despite economic worries and domestic political preoccupations, perceptions in the United States and Europe of each other appear to be in better shape now than they were during the presidency of George W. Bush. Americans and Europeans have generally favorable opinions of one another and majorities on both continents believe they share enough common values to be able to cooperate effectively on international problems.

But this year’s annual Transatlantic Trends survey also finds that while many of those polled in 12 member states of the European Union (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) still believe the United States is most important for their national interests, Americans see Asia as important. When asked which was more important in terms of their country’s national interests in the most recent Transatlantic Trends survey, 52% of those polled in the European Union picked the United States over the countries of Asia such as China, Japan, and South Korea, while about 51% of Americans polled chose the countries of Asia over the European Union.

For several years, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been speculating on how the transatlantic community will react to the rise of Asia. Would Asian competition move the United States and Europe — currently the two largest economic centers — closer together or pull them apart? At a time when U.S. unemployment remains high, the eurozone continues to suffer, and China’s growth is over 9%, this question is timelier than ever. Based on the results of this year’s Transatlantic Trends, it seems Americans have made up their minds to orient toward the Orient.

Asia is especially important in the minds of young Americans. Around three-in-four Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 feel that Asia is the more important region for U.S. national interests. With each older age cohort, the importance of Asia decreases, so that only about one-in-three Americans over 64 think of Asia as the more important region for U.S. national interests. Younger Americans are also more likely to see China as an economic opportunity rather than as an economic threat. Fifty-two percent of those aged 18-24 consider China an economic opportunity for new markets and investments, while 72% of those between the ages of 55 and 64 see China as threatening their jobs and economic security. Similarly, more than half of Americans older than 54 perceive China as a military threat, but only one-third of those between the ages of 25 and 34 and 40% of those younger than 25 do.

The rise of Asia divides Europeans too — but by nationality rather than by age. While over half of those polled in Italy, Romania, Germany, Britain, and Poland name the United States as more important than Asia, half of those surveyed in France and more than half of the respondents in Spain and Sweden see Asia as more important for their national interests. Europeans are also more likely than Americans in general to see China as an economic opportunity. The majority of Germans, Dutch, Romanians, Swedes, and British see China as an opportunity. On the other hand, majorities in France and Portugal still see China as an economic threat, though their numbers have decreased over the past year

What does all of this mean? Although Barack Obama rehabilitated the image of the United States in Europe, Europe has so far failed to reinvigorate its image in the United States, particularly among younger Americans who do not necessarily have strong links to European ancestry or positive memories of Cold War-era alliances. For transatlantic relations to thrive in the future, Europe needs to do a lot more to capture the imagination of a new generation of Americans.

Zsolt Nyiri is Director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington.

Thank you, Barbara and Erik, for asking me to speak at this memorial service.  For all of us, this service is a wonderful opportunity to celebrate Ron’s remarkable life and apply warm and happy memories as a balm for our sadness and sense of loss.

It would be natural for me to talk about Ron as the consummate professional and to honor his enormous contribution to GMF and to the transatlantic community.   For the past nine years, Ron’s vision shaped almost every part of GMF and our work in Brussels, Turkey, Poland, Germany, the South Caucasus, Asia and the Middle East will serve as a legacy to his energy and foresight.   Pages have already been written about his many accomplishments and I am sure that many more will be penned in the coming months.  Suffice it to say, Ron was a force – a creative force and a force for good – in his chosen profession.

But, today, I want to talk about friendship and friends.   When I first met Ron in the late 1990s, I would often see him at conferences and other meetings related to NATO enlargement and he was always surrounded by a crowd of ministers, politicians, intellectuals and journalists.   In the evening, Ron would take over one part of the beverage facility and essentially host an extension of the day’s meeting.   As you observed these evening gatherings, you came to realize that Ron was not only very popular with this crowd, but that most of them thought of themselves as a friend. Indeed, what was truly remarkable about Ron is that he made almost everyone in his vast and sundry network his friend and he made them feel special and close.  Over the past days, I have received hundreds of e-mails from Planet Asmus and I have been struck by how many people describe themselves as a “close” or “dear” or even “best” friend of Ron.

How did he do it?  How did he accumulate this enormous collection of friends and make them all feel that he had a special connection to them?

Well, first of all, Ron chose friends who shared one of his many passions whether it was political, regional, culinary or intellectual.  His deep and longstanding interest in all things German produced a group of friends in Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and, of course, Elmau that almost no other American could replicate.  His involvement in NATO enlargement at Rand and then at the State Department gave him a flock of Latvian, Estonian, Czech, Romanian, Polish and other Central and Eastern European friends.  Remarkably, he turned NATO enlargement into a means for adding friends in Sweden, Finland and other countries outside of the alliance.  In the early part of the last decade, he developed an abiding interest in Turkey and the South Caucasus and you can now go to Istanbul, Ankara, Yerevan, Baku and especially Tblisi and find members of the Asmus fan club.

Ron was an activist and a policy entrepreneur but he was also an intellectual and another line of friends centered on his passion for ideas and for history.  Famous professors, thoughtful columnists and probing analysts of foreign policy populated this room in Ron’s mansion of friends.  In another spot, you could find Sake masters, lovers of good scotch and wine and connoisseurs of raki who counted Ron as their friend and fellow epicure, a man who would rework a business trip to Stockholm so he could shop for herring and aquavit before Christmas or ask a friend to take a three hour flight with a collection of smelly cheeses and questionable salamis carefully hidden in his luggage.

Ron loved people who shared his passions.  He was not a casual collector of people or a “networker”; he was a man looking for others who were as deeply interested in the world and its joys as he was.

Ron shared passions with his friends but common interest was just a starting point.   Ron doted on his friends, he got to know them and their families and he actively nurtured these relationships.   I won’t say that Ron did not have superficial relationships and a vast array of casual acquaintances.   But, when he met someone he liked, who shared one of his passions, he did his best to turn them into a friend and then keep them as a friend.

A constant stream of calls, e-mails and texts insured that his friends knew that he cared about them, their families and their common causes.   When Ron received his first Blackberry at GMF, our accounting department was convinced that some sort of billing mistake had been made: how could one person communicate so much with so many people?   Well, if you ever travelled with Ron, you knew the answer.   Waiting for planes was an opportunity to make a dozen calls, some business, some personal and many both.   Fortunately for Ron, technological progress kept up with the expansion of his network of friends.  I can’t imagine how he would have coped with a world dependent on snail mail and devoid of cellular phones.

He was the sort of guy who called friends to congratulate them on good news but maybe more importantly to console and calm them during difficult times.   Again, over the past week, I have heard many wonderful stories about how Ron was there for his friends through births, weddings, failed marriages, professional triumphs and professional defeats.   Indeed, for some reason, my most vivid memories of Ron are of his support during a family tragedy or personal setback.  In those tough times, he knew how to apply the right mix of comfort to you, outrage at the causes of the problem and common sense about how to move forward.

But, one thing he never did was walk away when things were bad.   Ron had a very old fashioned sense of loyalty – a belief that you had a commitment to a friend that could be modified or broken under only the direst of circumstances.   A friend in political trouble was never expendable but rather the focus of great strategizing and the mobilization of far flung resources as Ron plotted to rebuild the person’s career or reputation.   When a friend had financial problems, Ron was quick to help as well as he could.  On more than a few occasions, I would get a call that began “We could use a really great expert on X, couldn’t we?” and I knew that he had a friend, who happened to an expert on X, who needed some temporary work.

In some ways, Ron was at his best when his friends were under attack by intellectual or political enemies.   He relished a fight when he believed in the cause and friendship was a cause he believed in passionately.   In these situations, Ron would often become his friend’s strategist, battlefield general and chief polemicist.  And, believe me; you only had to watch Ron once in this mode to understand how formidable he could be when defending a friend.  Ron regularly violated the famous advice of Don Corleone in the Godfather: “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer”.  Enemies had no place in Ron’s immediate circle even if there was a good tactical reason to do so.

Ron’s loyalty to friends was generally a virtue and occasionally a vice.   A few people would see this big, warm engaging guy and try to use him; a few others accepted his loyalty and all that came with it but didn’t return the same.  These rare cases hurt him deeply but it didn’t stop him from adding new friends or from being a very generous and doting friend.  Indeed, what is amazing is how rare these anomalous cases were for a man with such a vast array of friends.

Ron will leave many legacies through the ideas he championed, the institutions he built and the causes that he embraced.   But, his greatest legacy may be the way he enriched the lives of so many people by being their friend in the first place and then introducing them to one another.  He was never possessive of his friends.  In fact, he made a point of sharing them.  And, it was not a random process for him.  Ron was very intentional in the way he interwove these connections within his network.  He matched friends according to their passions, tastes and personalities and, based on my personal experience, he was pretty good at it.

If you were coming to dinner at his home, it was always a giveaway if he said “Oh, by the way, so and so will be there and I know you will like him”.   At more formal business dinners, I would watch Ron agonize over seating charts not out of a respect for protocol but rather because he wanted to make sure that you met interesting people and had stimulating conversation.   And, you know what, his social engineering worked. My guess is that many of us in this room met one or two or three or four good friends thanks to Ron.   I know my circle of friends has been enriched greatly by Ron and I am very grateful to him for these relationships.

Ron did many things to make the world better.   But his greatest contribution was the example he set in practicing the art of friendship.   In a day when casual acquaintances are “friends” and when Facebook lets you accumulate thousands of superficial relationships that are called friends, Ron and the way he lived his life reminds us now and will remind us forever that friendship has a deeper and more profound meeting.  I know that, for me, his friendship was one of the greatest gifts that I will ever receive.

Barbara and Erik, thank you for sharing Ron with all of us.  Somehow being here with you and so many of Ron’s friends brings back his spirit in a very tangible way and makes me feel just a bit better about our common loss.

BRATISLAVA, Slovakia — If someone asked me to name a person who represents exemplary patriotism, Andrei Sannikov would come to mind.

If someone asked me to name people who are true believers in Europe and democracy, Andrei would be among them.

If someone asked me to name a person who is brave and able to withstand physical and psychological brutality in the name of truth and dignity, I would definitely point to Andrei.

For me, Andrei Sannikov is a trusted friend and a source of inspiration.  Currently in prison at the hands of Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, the freedom fighter is calling for action not only in his beloved homeland, but also in the community of democratic nations.

When I met Andrei for the first time about a decade ago, it did not occur to me he would evolve into a true leader, one who is able to mobilize crowds and challenge Lukashenko’s powerful autocratic regime while exposing his own family to harsh treatment  and even endangering his own health and life.

As a former deputy foreign minister who left the post in protest of corrupt rule in Belarus, he struck me more as a serious diplomat rather than an ambitious leader. After leaving government, he did not have political ambitions but wanted to devote himself to protecting human rights and developing communication channels with democratic Europe. He was among the founders of the respected Charter 97 human rights group, well-known from its excellent trilingual website.  Later, he helped created the European Belarus Movement.

Because of his intellect and analytical and language skills, Andrei was often invited to speak at important international conferences and contributed numerous articles explaining the situation in his troubled motherland. Although he is a polished and controlled person, he was ready to enter into controversial debates, particularly with those decision-makers and analysts who thought that dialogue with Lukashenko can lead to the liberalization of his authoritarian regime.

After serious consideration and discussion with his close friends from the European Movement and encouragement from his wife, the talented journalist Irina Chalip, Andrei decided last year to enter into a serious political game – to run for president against Lukashenko. He knew very well the risks involved, but he had reached the point where he was ready to assume responsibility for challenging the dictator directly.

Despite all kinds of domestic and foreign predictions, a lack of resources, and an oppressive environment, Andrei was able to reinvent himself during the presidential campaign and achieved impressive results. He sensitized and convinced numerous personalities from Belarusian public life and created a campaign team and strategy, in the process creating an atmosphere of significant hope for change across the country.

And then came the elections. Lukashenko won, to no one’s surprise, and to many allegations of fraud.

On December 19, 2010, when tens of thousands of people protested in downtown Minsk against the results and Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule, Andrei was there in front. As an international observer, I saw how people reacted to him while he was addressing them through a loudspeaker. This was a different Andrei than I met 10 years ago.  Here was a brave, decisive man standing on barricades and waving a flag signifying his life’s struggle on behalf of decency and freedom. And then, in an instant, he was knocked down and beaten by Lukashenko’s brutal machinery in an attempt to push back the populace’s growing power. Andrei, his wife, and his closest associates – along with four other candidates and many other activists –– ended up in a Belarusian KGB prison. And the world was shocked by the scenes from Minsk.

Despite worldwide protests and demands, harshly treated political prisoners—including Andrei Sannikov—have not been released. In the last few months, prisoners have gone through absurd and manipulated legal procedures and trials.

Andrei’s trial was announced to take place April 27, 2011. It is expected that Lukashenka’s most prominent opponent will be charged with the longest multi-year sentence among more than 40 political prisoners. I am sure that Andrei will face his trial with dignity, but I am also sure that the world’s democratic community will continue fighting for his release and the release of all Belarusians from Lukashenko’s grip.

In a GMF video feature, Senior Fellow Dan Twining explains the importance of the Afghanistan conference on January 28, and the key topics shaping the discussion.

COPENHAGEN — Finally it’s here: Copenhagen 2009. The climate community has been anticipating this moment since December 2007, when countries agreed to create a new legal binding climate agreement by December 2009 in Copenhagen. Yet, many environmentalists and developing countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are deeply disappointed by recent reality checks on what’s politically feasible at the December climate conference.

At the last round of climate talks in Barcelona in November the UN’s top climate official, Yvo de Boer, acknowledged that countries wouldn’t have time to solidify a legally binding treaty by the December deadline. Instead, he suggested that countries reach a strong politically binding agreement that includes all the trappings of a new climate treaty. At the November Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, world leaders including President Obama, endorsed this new goal. If the goal is met, the Copenhagen agreement would include:

€¢ commitments by developed countries to limit their emissions and provide near-term financing to help developing countries implement environmentally sustainable growth strategies and cope with the impacts of climate change;
€¢ commitments from major emitters in the developing world to limit their emissions growth;
€¢ decisions on other key issues, like cooperation to promote clean energy technologies, reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries, among others.
Countries would then add the fine print to create a new climate treaty by Dec. 2010, when countries will meet for climate talks in Mexico, or shortly thereafter.

Some environmentalists are irate about what one Greenpeace policy adviser described as the €˜no, we can’t’ attitude in the lead-up to Copenhagen–and rightly so given that the strong consensus among scientists (yes, even in the wake of climate-gate) reveals that countries must take dramatic and immediate steps to avoid the most severe impacts of climate change.

Some are blaming President Obama for the lower bar in Copenhagen. This in my view is unfair. First, asking President Obama to undo eight years of U.S. inaction on climate change in a mere 11 months (his time in office before Copenhagen) is unreasonable, particularly since he must shore up any international climate commitments he makes with climate and energy legislation currently contemplated by a reluctant U.S. Congress. Secondly, the U.S. is not the only country that is not ready to endorse a new legally binding climate treaty. China and India are also skittish on the notion of internationally legally binding climate commitments. Is there room for stronger leadership from President Obama? Absolutely! In fact, the U.S. Congress is not likely to pass comprehensive climate and energy legislation without a stronger lean from the Administration.

Although it may not be ideal, it’s hard to argue that the new goal for Copenhagen is not ambitious. Nonetheless, I’m very optimistic that countries will reach a strong political deal later this month, particularly in light of the following recent developments.
1. President Obama announced that he will arrive in Copenhagen on Dec. 18th, the last day of the climate talks (rather than during the first week, as originally planned). He would not do this unless he firmly believed that countries would reach a significant deal.
2. President Obama announced that the U.S. would commit to lowering its emissions €˜in the range of’ 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 (i.e., roughly 4% below U.S. emissions in 1990). This target is in line with climate legislation that was passed by the House and contemplated in the Senate.
3. China announced that it would lower its emissions relative to the size of its economy by 40-45% by 2020, and India pledged to lower its emissions growth by 20 percent by 2020.
4. There’s an emerging consensus among developed countries that together they must deliver $10 billion a year by 2012 to help developing countries deal with the consequences of climate change and lower their emissions growth.
While some say these targets are too weak, they are reasonable opening bids by the world’s biggest emitters on the eve of what is shaping up to be a turning point in history and the beginning of a new era of global cooperation to tackle the threat of climate change.
Don’t forget to visit us here between now and December 20th to read more about the latest developments in the climate talks as GMF policy experts blog about their insights from on the ground in Copenhagen.

Cathleen Kelly

Director, Climate and Energy Program

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

1744 R Street, NW

Washington, DC 20009

Phone: 202-683-2631 (direct) or 202-683-2650 (main number)

Fax: 202-265-1662

email: ckelly@gmfus.org

HALIFAX, Nova Scotia — For those of you who haven’t seen our tweets, facebook, e-mails, or any of the other ways we’ve been broadcasting this weekend, check out the Halifax Forum website for all sorts of good material: videos (including livestreams), transcripts, press releases, and photos. Speakers include a number of high-profile people including Robert Gates, Karl-Theodorr Freiherr zu Guttenberg, Peter MacKay, John McCain, Mark Udall, Stephen Breyer, Beverley McLachlin, Greg Craig, Ellen Tauscher, James Stavridis, and Mark Fitzgerald.

Here at GMF we are celebrating November 9 with a weekly multimedia series called My ’89. (Be sure to check out the first installment with Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff telling the fascinating story of an escape from Hungary.) In that”My ’89″ spirit, our friends over at the World Bank send us this piece that World Bank President Robert Zoellick wrote for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Zoellick is a former GMF fellow and former GMF Board member. Enjoy!

A Story of Germany’s Unification

Robert B. Zoellick

November 5, 2009

Twenty years ago, the Berlin Wall opened, and events moved so quickly that they seemed inevitable. But were they?

German unification is a story about how leaders and diplomats moved quickly to transform a political earthquake into a new political and security order for Europe. But it is also the story of how this statecraft responded to and relied on the actions of the German people. U.S. diplomacy was guided by the need to trust the German public as partners in achieving unification.

Secretary of State James Baker and I believed that East Germans would be a driving force for unity. We suspected that the average East German wanted what his or her cousins had in West Germany €“ and which most East Germans could see on Western TV. Interestingly, this was not the view of the U.S. mission in East Germany. The U.S. diplomats there were in touch with the courageous dissidents who had challenged the communist regime; these intellectuals wanted to find a “third way” between communism and capitalism. But the public did not.

I recall a visit with Baker to a Lutheran church in Potsdam in December 1989, just weeks after the breaching of the Berlin Wall. I listened carefully as the ministers and lay leaders recounted sadly that their congregation wanted the prosperity of the West, not a new experiment in the East.

This insight affirmed two important beliefs. First, the Federal Republic of Germany was the legitimate German state in the eyes of all Germans. Second, events would create a momentum for unity that the Federal Republic and the United States could use to their advantage. But this momentum also posed risks: a stalled diplomatic process could trigger mass migration from the East; an unguided process could provoke dangerous resistance from the Soviets or Europeans who feared one Germany, and their opposition, in turn, could spark uncontrollable protests against weakening local authority and occupying powers.

To offer reassurance amidst the tumult of 1989, the U.S. strategic concept was for free people to enjoy governments based on their consent, leading to a unified Germany within a more integrated Europe. This Europe whole and free would be linked to America through NATO and deeper trans-Atlantic ties with what became the EU. We also needed to build new cooperative frameworks with the then-Soviet Union.

We were alert to the critical need to communicate with the public €“ especially in Germany and Europe. We wanted to show the German people that America stood by Germany at this defining moment. The Two-plus-Four negotiations €“ with the very name recognizing the leading role of the two Germanies, combined with Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States €“ were launched in February 1990 to help steer the external dimensions of German unification.

There was always a risk that while the Soviets would accept unification, they could delay Germany’s international settlement or impose limits as a price of unity. Therefore, Baker always emphasized our support for Germany’s unification in freedom and of not singling out Germany for discriminatory treatment, including limits on its choices of alliances. This posture avoided later generations of Germans from feeling unfairly treated, while aligning our interests with those of a sovereign, democratic Germany.

U.S. officials were fortunate that the American people expressed strong support for unification €“ something I was proud to see. This public trust in Germany enabled U.S. diplomacy to be more agile. In early 1990, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl deferred making a firm commitment on the Polish border, President George Bush could discretely reassure Poland, avoiding a crisis for Kohl.

Strong personal relationships between leaders made a big difference. Most importantly, Kohl and Bush trusted and relied on one another. Baker’s relationship with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and their trust of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze likewise enabled unusual diplomacy. In advance of the NATO summit of July 1990, Baker gave Shevardnadze a description of initiatives the United States hoped NATO would adopt. The early notice positioned Shevardnadze to issue a public endorsement of the overtures when they were announced, pre-empting Soviet opponents. We were at the point where the American and Soviet foreign ministers could plan secretly how to use tentative NATO language to persuade the Soviet Union to accept a unified Germany. Time after time, the confidence Americans had with German officials like Frank Elbe or Horst Teltschik enabled us to act on fast-moving events so the two countries were consistently ahead of others that were trying to resist the momentum.

Over the last twenty years, Germans have accomplished important things. They have helped integrate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union and into the trans-Atlantic security of NATO. They have helped build an historic European Union in peace. The global economic crisis was the first big test of this New Europe. European states, for all their internal debates, have recognized their interdependence. Under stress, Europe did not splinter.

In 1989, the author was the chief U.S. negotiator in the “Two-plus-Four” negotiations. Today, he is President of the World Bank Group.

The September 17 decision itself seemed to strike the right balance between the need to keep U.S. missile defense options open, and to adjust the program to evolving strategic realities and political priorities.The strategic side was left to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Gates to justify, on the ground that the Iranians’ long-range missile threat was less urgent than their short-to-medium range capacities. The U.S. program accordingly needed to be refocused from fixed ground assets designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in mid-course, to mobile, mostly sea-based, more versatile ones to first address the theater missile threat in the vicinity of the main proliferators, North Korea, and Iran. The scope and range of missile defense could later be expanded, as the threat itself evolved. Not only is it a clever presentation, which minimizes the criticism that Obama does not take either the threat or the defense seriously, but it seems to make sense given the military content of the problem: Shahab 3 and Taepodong belong to the same family of expanded-range missiles derived from SCUDs by North Korea, and seem an unlikely basis from which to easily develop an effective long-range missile. It also allows the U.S. missile defense, therefore, refocused on theater capacities to tie-in better with NATO’s own plans, which fall in the same category, (whereas the radar and interceptors to be deployed in Europe under the Bush plan were essentially part of U.S. national missile defense and their relation to NATO unclear at best).

The main suspected motive of the decision, and its most important potential impact, are of a political nature, and concern the West’s relations with Russia in the first instance. By renouncing – at least temporarily – the deployment of U.S. fixed missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic, it removes an important obstacle in U.S.-Russian relations, while giving Russia an incentive to be more forthcoming on the Iranian nuclear issue. For those who believe that policy is about prioritizing issues, it looked indeed more urgent to get Russia to be more cooperative, and specifically help contain the emerging nuclear threat from Iran, than to defend against one of the possible and distant incarnations of that threat in the face of strong objections on her part. The fact is that, as a problem, Iran today matters more than Russia, and under the circumstances the merits of her objections look of secondary importance. In fact, they have ranged from the fantastic, e.g. that missiles based in Poland could have a hidden offensive capability, to the more understandable, i.e. that by establishing a permanent military presence at their doorstep, the United States disregarded Russian interests and sensitivities, and specifically the spirit if not the letter of the 1997 statement by NATO that it saw no need to establish bases on its new members’ territory. Russia’s excuse for that interpretation is, of course, that having a U.S. military presence on their territory was what most motivated Poland and the Czech Republic (the Polish-U.S. agreement was signed on August 20 2008, in the middle of the Georgia crisis, a message Russia did not miss).

The September 17 decision, by U.S. President Barack Obama, does not in itself guarantee better relations with Russia, or its full cooperation on Iran. It was worded so as not to be explicitly addressed to Russia, even if the message was unmistakable, and the Russians first reacted accordingly. They should not be encouraged to believe, however, that some of their reactions to the initial U.S. plans such as the threatened deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad or of tactical nuclear weapons on ships in the Baltic fleet weighted positively on the change in U.S. policy (the latter threat raises questions as to the continued adherence of Russia to the Bush-Gorbachev 1991 undertakings not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea that should be answered). In fact, the “reset” of relations with Russia will require much more work, and high-level engagement from the United States and their allies. The Obama plan may hopefully have changed the atmospherics: beyond strategic nuclear arms, currently the main focus of U.S.-Russian dialogue, and Iran, European security offers a number of issues – from the Medvedev plan, to the Balkans and the Caucasus – on which to follow-up and keep engaging Russia the way it should be, that is on concrete grounds.

In the Czech Republic and Poland, reactions have been mixed. Most official pronouncements underlined the obvious fact that there would still be a role for both countries in the new missile defense architecture retained by the United States. In addition, Poland will keep the benefit of improved Patriot air defenses negotiated as part of their consent to deploying missile defense. Czech President Václav Klaus downplayed the impact of the U.S. decision, but Czech Premier Mirek Topolanek’s comments were sour, mentioning a “dark day” for his country. The Polish President, Lech Kascynski, expressed his fear that his country would be left in a “gray zone” between East and West. Other comments such as those drawing on the coincidence between the dates of Obama’s announcement and that of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, which both took place on September 17, were manifestly exaggerated. After all, NATO has known much more dramatic changes in policy in the past: the abandonment of the multilateral force in the 1960s or U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s 1978 about face on the neutron bomb, a project which Helmut Schmidt had tried to sell to the German public at great political expense only to see it dropped by the United States in a matter of weeks. Decisions arrived at with allies will always have to pass the test of American pragmatism if they prove to lead to an impasse or simply in view of changed circumstances. As with the neutron bomb, the mistake with missile defense was to commit the United States and their allies into a project sustainable only at a disproportionate political cost, not to abandon it. (Or rather alter it, since Obama’s decision leaves many options open; it mostly delays the consideration of those most objectionable from a Russian standpoint). The disappointment expressed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski, that he measured the limits of Poland’s influence in this instance is mistaken. This is nothing special to Poland. It is a natural function of the political and military imbalance of the alliance, an imbalance only made worse by NATO European members’ continued delusion that they can individually entertain a special strategic relation with the United States, rather than think in terms of increasingly global European-U.S. relations (a delusion my own country also seems to entertain as I write).

That is not to say that new members do not harbor special concerns with Russia as a result of history and geography, which should be addressed by their NATO and European allies. But they should do that by further anchoring them in the Western community of nations (visas and energy are good subjects on which to move forward), and by displaying solidarity in instances where Russian deeds or words cross the line of accepted norms of conduct among nations in Europe. They should also challenge the Russians to say whether or not they accept the body of such norms established after the cold war: consideration of the Medvedev plan, inchoate as it seems, would be an opportunity to do that (in practice, it is likely to bring the Russians to reaffirm its validity, lest they find themselves in a minority of one). Plans to deploy missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic were an at best oblique and ineffective way to bring reassurance to these countries vis-à-vis Russia. Such reassurances need not be military: vis-à-vis her European neighbors the worse Russia has attempted is political and economic intimidation. It should be resisted firmly, but in kind, if it occurs again, rather than by military moves that are likely to bring about symbolic but politically dangerous military posturing by Russia.

U.S. President Barack Obama and leaders of the rest of the G-20 won’t arrive in Pittsburgh for the summit until Thursday, but there’s plenty of excitement in the air already. A flurry of last-minute road resurfacing projects wrapped up over the weekend. The first protest marches on Sunday went off without a serious hitch.

For me, a native Pittsburgher, the sign that everything would be all right came Friday, when I saw the city’s iconic fountain spouting again. The fountain at the Point, where the city’s three rivers meet, has been shut down for renovations for many months, and will be again once the week is over. But showing off our city without its signature ornament is akin to wearing sweatpants to the plenary session, so the powers that be got it running again temporarily.

The same can’t be said for Market Square, a pleasant lunchtime gathering spot that was bulldozed two weeks ago. The official reason is a redesign that will be unveiled next year, but that seems an insufficient explanation to tear up one of the few places downtown where you can eat lunch under a tree. Some suspicious folks wonder if Market Square’s transformation from park to construction zone is really a measure to deprive potential protesters of a natural congregating space in the heart of the central business district.

Of course, nobody relishes the idea of rampaging hordes and smashed windows. There are understandable measures needed for security, not to mention expediting the arrival of 20 motorcades. We’re still digesting the announcement last week that the entire downtown will be essentially closed to traffic for Thursday and Friday. But it’s ultimately a fair trade for the good press Pittsburgh stands to garner.

The city has become something of an adopted home base for Barack Obama. While the president has no ties to the city, he utterly captivated longtime Steelers owner Dan Rooney, a lifelong Republican, during the primaries. When the Steelers won the Super Bowl in early February, the normally taciturn Rooney praised Obama from the 50-yard line while holding up the Lombardi trophy. Rooney is now ambassador to Ireland.

When Obama’s spokesman announced Pittsburgh would host the G-20, the White House press corps broke out in guffaws. Pittsburghers are used to being the butt of jokes. The city, which visitors have often called one of the most stunning in North America, built such a reputation as an industrial giant in the early 20th century that its complete transformation in the last several decades is still news to people on the coasts.

Something I do sense in Pittsburgh over the last decade, and the G-20 caps it beautifully, is that residents have finally shed an inferiority complex. Ten years ago, the thought of holding a major world summit in town would have struck many of us as bizarre. But today we get what those reporters at the White House still don’t.

Mark Houser, a 2002 alum of GMF’s American Marshall Memorial Fellowship (MMF), is the MMF coordinator in Pittsburgh and is assisting with the official media center downtown during the G-20.

GMF Vice President Karen Donfried appeared on MSNBC’s Morning Joe to discuss the recently released Transatlantic Trends survey and what it could indicate about the future of the European-American relationship.