WASHINGTON — In a televised speech from the annual meeting of his Shura advisory council on September 25, Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz declared that women could be appointed members of the 150-member Shura assembly in the next term and will be able to run for office and vote in municipal elections in 2015.

The announcement was hailed as a giant leap forward for the nation’s women by observers around the world. The White House welcomed the proclamation and noted the “reforms recognize the significant contributions women in Saudi Arabia make to their society and will offer them new ways to participate in the decisions that affect their lives and communities.” The European reaction was similarly encouraging. Britain’s foreign secretary praised the step, saying the U.K. supports moves to increase political and economic participation of women across the Arab world. The spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry called the decree a major advancement for the rights of women in Saudi society. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton welcomed the announcement and encouraged Saudi authorities to continue on the path toward equality between men and women. The decree also won praise from the United Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Human Rights Watch.

But while it will remove Saudi Arabia’s stigma of being among the last countries to give women suffrage — thus increasing both the country’s standing among Western allies and its credibility in global affairs — it is not yet clear whether this decision promises real change in women’s empowerment or is an illusion that will dissipate upon closer inspection. In practice, there are several reasons why King Abdullah’s announcement may have little impact on Saudi society. Only half of the seats on the 178 local councils are elected. Religious authorities may pressure women not to vote. If appointed to the Shura Council, women will not sit in the same room as men but will participate by closed circuit television. And those in power in 2015 may decide entirely against implementing the change.

It is worth noting that similar announcements have met with disappointment before. In 2004, the Saudi government announced that elections would be held the following year. The gender-neutral wording of the announcement did not say women could not vote, so five women announced their candidacies to seats on local councils. But after several months, the government claimed that, because of a lack of polling stations, women would be excluded from the polls.

The timing of the latest royal decree may be tied to concerns about restiveness within a population that has witnessed demands for reforms in the neighborhood during the Arab Spring. The Saudi kingdom signaled its recognition of domestic discontent in March by creating a generous package of jobs, services, and assistance for needy citizens.

Some Saudi women also see the decree as insufficient given continuing social inequalities that have yet to be addressed. Activist Wajeha al-Hawaidar told the Associated Press that the changes should be implemented immediately, not in years to come. Madawi Al-Rasid, a professor of social anthropology at King’s College in London, was quoted in Al-Ahram Weekly that the announcement was superficial, aimed at appeasing those pushing for real change.

Saudi women are still not allowed to drive. Two days after the suffrage announcement, a judge in Jeddah sentenced a female activist to a sentence of 10 lashes for getting behind the wheel of a car, a punishment subsequently overturned by the king. Women must also get permission from a male relative to get a job, go to college, or travel abroad. A member of the senior cleric council signaled discontent with the proposed electoral reform, saying he had not been consulted, which suggests that there may be a conservative backlash.

At the same time, giving women the right to vote comes just as women in Saudi Arabia are seeing cumulative gains in many aspects of life, especially in higher education and business. It is becoming a mark of prestige among the Saudi elite to have a wife with a Ph.D. The king opened a co-ed university two years ago and the world’s largest female-only university this year on the outskirts of Riyadh. He also recently appointed the country’s first female deputy minister. The Women’s Chamber of Commerce of Saudi Arabia is among the most dynamic in the region, and the king took businesswomen with him on a recent trade trip to China.

While there are grounds for skepticism, the powerful symbolism of the king’s edict cannot be easily dismissed. His declaration is seen as a formal recognition of gender equality by the only person in the kingdom with enough clout to overcome clerics’ objections and transfer authority over social issues from the religious to the political establishment. By giving its women a voice in political discourse, Saudi Arabia may be working to have its own voice heard in a global political arena that values human and gender rights. King Abdullah’s formal announcement also created societal expectations that will outlive his reign. An editorial cartoon in the pan-Arab daily newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat depicts a woman in a black burqa emerging from a bottle, mincing hesitantly forward. The genie’s first steps may be limited, but they promise greater strides to come.

Judith Baroody is a Senior Resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC, and a Senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer. The views expressed in this article are her own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the German Marshall Fund, the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.

Photo by Reuters News

RICHMOND, Va.—I grew up in northern Japan, and in the 15 years I lived there, earthquakes were a part of everyday life. We had earthquake drills all the time; and we also had the real thing, regular tremors of varying strength and impact. The 9.0-magnitude earthquake and ensuing 30-foot tsunami on March 11 were the worst in Japan’s recorded history. The devastation it has wreaked, along with the continuing dire threat of escaping radiation from the Fukushima nuclear power plants, has led both Japan’s Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Naoto Kan to call this Japan’s worst crisis since World War II.
The disaster struck an area unknown to most foreigners and Japanese; visitors and locals alike tend to gravitate to the southern half of Honshu Island, where the metropolises of Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokohama are concentrated. In the worst-hit areas near the northern town of Sendai, close to the epicenter of the earthquake, harsh geography and icy temperatures are still complicating the rescue efforts—and continue to produce stories of singular heroism.

Sendai, formerly with one million inhabitants, was the most populated city north of Tokyo (a mega-metropolis of 30 million) on the main island of Honshu. Much like America’s northwest, northern Japan has its own rugged frontier atmosphere. Covering 25 percent of mainland Japan’s landmass, but with only 5 percent of its population, it is famous for its landscapes and food; the locals speak a distinctive dialect of their own. Gatherings such as the G-8 meetings and the Winter Olympics in Sapporo helped to bring the beauties of northern Japan to international attention. Cruel winters and a largely rural culture reinforced a spirit of traditionalism and pride, which we Northerners cherished—especially compared to the ultra-modern comforts of the south.

It was wrenching to have to watch on a far-away television screen as the hometowns of my old friends were uprooted and swept away by the waves, and much of my adopted homeland was destroyed. Yet, seeing Emperor Akihito stoically give his first-ever television address, I was also reminded of my Japanese elementary school, where I learned about another, earlier speech — that of Akihito’s father Hirohito, who was the first Japanese emperor ever to address his nation, and who taught Japan to “embrace defeat” after World War II and the nuclear disasters in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I remembered asking my history teacher then what the secret of Japan’s resilience was. His response came in one word: Bushido. Directly translated, it means “the way of the warrior.” Bushido was the code of conduct which, in ancient Japan, governed the lives of the samurai, or feudal warriors. Its roots lie in Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism; its key ideals were honesty, courage, and honor. Now, as then, the Emperor spoke to the Japanese to reassure them and to remind them of these fundamental national values.

Indeed, this disaster has already brought out the best in Japanese culture. Where Hurricane Katrina in the United States or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti seemed only to further deepen the fractures in divided communities (and were further compounded by looting and slow government action), the northern Japanese have been patiently enduring a chaotic response from their national government, freezing weather, and a continuing threat of dangerous radiation. It is a case-study in dignity and strength.

This past weekend was particularly bittersweet, as it featured school graduation ceremonies throughout Japan, commemorating the next generation’s coming of age—a generation that will be forever shaped by the events of March 11, 2011. Japanese like to point out the double-edged meaning in the two characters that combine to form the word “crisis” in Japanese: “opportunity” and “danger.” The dangers in the current situation are very real. Even if the current crisis is not deepened by further quakes or a worsening of the nuclear contamination, it is a terrible blow to Japan’s shaky economic recovery. It may well reinforce an already existing tendency toward isolation in the country’s foreign and security policy. Yet there are opportunities as well. Having shown the world their resilience in the face of a terrible natural disaster, the people of northern Japan may have the chance to rebuild a stronger nation with the help of both domestic and international allies and enemies alike.

Joshua W. Walker is an Assistant Professor at the University of Richmond’s Jepson School of Leadership Studies and a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

WASHINGTON — In 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy dismantled camps of Roma migrants in France, Barack Obama’s Justice Department sued Arizona over a law targeting illegal immigrants, and far-right parties across Europe gained traction by stoking xenophobic sentiment. Though polarizing headlines abounded, it behooves governments to pay attention to what the public is actually saying on immigration and integration.

Today marks the release of the third-annual Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey, which polled residents of large migrant-receiving countries in the West, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. While the survey sheds light on the internal debates in each country, there is a transatlantic story to tell as well.

Among the countries surveyed, the lingering effects of the economic crisis — particularly unemployment — has been on the minds of the public. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration shows that the economic crisis has had some effect on how people perceive labor-market competition from immigrants.  In Europe, 49% of those whose household economic situation got worse in 2010 believed that immigrants bring down the wages of native-born workers; this compared to 36% of those whose economic situation got better or stayed the same in 2010. In the United States, those whose personal finances deteriorated last year were also more likely to say that immigrants take jobs away from native-born workers. What does this mean for attitudes about immigration policy? Increasing anxiety about job competition will affect the ability of governments to (re)shape labor migration programs. The coalition government in Britain has already promised to lower net migration to the “tens of thousands,” and an immigration overhaul in the United States will be even more difficult in these conditions, as implications for the American labor market are obvious.

In addition to worries about the economy, the integration of migrants, particularly Muslims and their children, has been front-page news in Europe.  The survey fieldwork was done in 2010, the year of banning face-covering veils for women in France and the rise of Geert Wilder’s Freedom Party in the Netherlands, which relies on an anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agenda. Discussions in Germany last summer centered on a controversial book by Thilo Sarrazin, a former Board Member of the German Bundesbank. The book, entitled “Germany Does Itself In,” argued that the Muslim — primarily Turkish — community in Germany was bringing the country down by failing to integrate. In the survey, respondents in all countries were asked how well they perceived Muslim immigrants to be integrating into their society. In Europe on average, 58% of respondents said that they were integrating poorly, with only one-third (33%) saying they were integrating well. The most pessimistic about Muslim integration were Spanish and Germans respondents, 70% and 67% of who, respectively, said that Muslim immigrants were not integrating well.

On this issue in particular, there was a clear transatlantic divide. Whereas Europeans were clearly pessimistic overall about the extent to which Muslim immigrants were integrated into their societies, a plurality of both Americans and Canadians (45% in each country) answered that Muslim immigrants were integrating well. Tellingly, 14% of Americans did not even answer the question, claiming that they did not know how well Muslims were integrating into American society. The optimism of North Americans on Muslim integration, therefore, may have something to do with the relative scarcity of Muslim immigrants and the lack of discussions about integration in the media. The one common thread among respondents in all countries regarding Muslim integration, however, is a universal perception that the second-generation, or the children of Muslim immigrants, are integrating better than their parents. A plurality of 49% of Europeans as well as 62% of Americans and 66% of Canadians claimed that the native-born children of Muslim migrants were integrating well into their societies.

Though changing economic situations and specific debates about integration appear to have some relationship to public attitudes about immigration, in some ways overall perceptions remain fairly constant. Despite the drastic changes in economic and political landscapes over the past three years, perceptions about whether immigration is more of a problem or more of an opportunity for each country have remained fairly constant, whether positive or negative. For example, around two-thirds of British respondents consistently say that immigration is more of a problem, whereas around half of Americans and only one quarter of Canadians agree. These entrenched perceptions may mean that governments will have less room to maneuver when changing immigration or integration policy, but it also means that they have at least one constant on which to depend. For an issue as fast-moving and controversial as immigration, that, at least, could be a blessing.

Delancey Gustin is a Program Associate with the Immigration and Integration Program of the German Marshall Fund in Washington.

MEMPHIS, Tennessee — The human and civil rights drama unfolding in Belarus in the aftermath of the electoral fraud perpetrated by the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko should be a teaching moment.  It shows that hopes of bringing Belarus closer to the West through a policy of carefully calibrated carrots and sticks were largely an illusion.  The question now is whether the United States and Europe can draw the necessary lessons from the crackdown in Minsk and, also, how they will translate those lessons into policy.

The West’s ability to influence Lukashenko has always been marginal at best.  In contrast, Russia holds far greater sway over Lukashenko’s decisions, notwithstanding occasional friction between Minsk and Moscow.  A “colored revolution” –- long a hope of the West — is not in the cards in Belarus due to the level of police terror applied by the regime, the changing regional dynamic in Eastern Europe, and the more inward-focused priorities in the European Union and the United States.

Nonetheless, Belarus requires a unified response, for it is a piece of a larger Europe, whose periphery is now increasingly being defined by the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia War, the 2010 Ukrainian election, and the resurgence of Russian influence.  It is in the interest of the West to develop a long-term strategy to prevent Belarus from becoming a new fault line.  The “Belarus question” needs to become part of the larger transatlantic agenda, with specific policies and significant resource commitments to follow.

So today, rather than courting him, the West should confront Lukashenko with coordinated diplomatic and economic pressure while making a serious sustained investment in Belarusian grass-roots democratic movement, disseminating uncensored information, and funding NGO democracy initiatives.  This has to be an enduring policy commitment, for clearly there are limits as to what can be achieved short-term.

One country already adjusting its Belarusian policy is Poland, which has made a good-faith effort to bring Minsk out of isolation in the last couple of years.  Today, Poland is developing a two-track policy to put pressure on the Lukashenka regime, while also making a long-term investment in Belarusian democratic opposition.  This is the model that should define the joint American and European response to Lukashenko’s crackdown on pro-democracy forces.  Warsaw has important experiences to share, building on its earlier efforts to promote free media and civil society initiatives in the East.  Since December 2007, the Polish government has been the principal funder of Belsat TV, a free-media outlet under the auspices of the Polish public television TVP, staffed by journalists based in Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania.  Poland has also played host to two radio stations broadcasting into Belarus, the Belarusian radio station “Ratsya” established in 1999 and supported by the Polish government, and the European Radio for Belarus, operating since 2006 with funding from an international consortium.  The ERB broadcasts both over the conventional wave spectrum and the Internet.

Maintaining and expanding such free media outlets will be critical to the future of democratic opposition in Belarus.  The stations operating from Poland urgently need additional funding—something that the United States government, the European Union and private foundations should support, especially now as independent sources of information have been more persistently targeted by Lukashenka’s security forces.  Belsat offices in Minsk were raided by the KGB at the beginning of the current crackdown, and a number of journalists working with the station have been arrested and sentenced.

The policy of supporting grass-roots democratic forces will also require additional seed money for Belarusian NGOs.  Recently, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski announced the doubling of assistance to the opposition in Belarus, from PLN 20 million to PLN 40 million (about $13 million).  This will not be enough, but Sikorski’s decision should be a signal to other Western governments as to what needs to be done.  The transatlantic community should also invest in people-to-people contacts with Belarus at multiple levels.  The Polish government has already lifted visa fees for ordinary Belarusian citizens while imposing travel restriction on regime officials.  In addition, Warsaw has offered to open Polish universities to Belarusian students who have been expelled for pro-democracy activities back home.  There are plans to foster exchange programs for Belarusian opposition activists and conferences in support of Belarusian democracy, organized both by the Polish government and the NGO community.  In short, Warsaw has put forth a series of initiatives to pressure the Belarusian regime while trying to sustain the democratic momentum in the country.  This is the beginning of a long-term policy that, if supported by other democratic governments, holds a promise of success.

The Polish strategy now needs political and financial backing from Washington and Brussels.  Poland cannot do it alone, especially since its ethnic minority in Belarus remains vulnerable to pressure from Minsk.  The crisis requires a joint response from the United States and the European Union. We find ourselves in a moment of stark simplicity: the West needs to stand up for its core principles and meet Lukashenko’s brutality head-on.  It should do so long-term, persistently and with ample resources to back up the effort.  We need to leverage the Internet, peer social networks, programs run by NGOs and universities, as well as the entire gamut of traditional broadcast media in the United States and Europe to keep the “Belarus question” in focus.  The Poles have decades of experience building democratic foundations in the difficult 1970s and 1980s.  The United States and the European Union should draw from that experience.

Andrew A. Michta is Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College and a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.  He is the incoming director of the GMF Warsaw office, which will open in June.

BERLIN — Rarely has an EU summit been as turbulent as the one on September 16. Viviane Reding, the EU’s justice commissioner, charged France with mass deportations of Roma, violating EU law by, according to a leaked French government document, specifically targeting this group. A fierce dispute ensued between Reding, backed by European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who accused the Commission of overstepping its mandate.

This spat is far from over. In the short term, France appears intent on continuing its controversial policy of sending Roma migrants back to their countries of origin in Central and Eastern Europe, claiming that they are not meeting France’s residency rules. The EU, in turn, may take legal action against France before the European Court of Justice. More broadly, the dispute raises issues about key European principles. And if the EU is to defend these principles, it should stick out this fight and protect Roma rights. How this dispute is resolved, in Brussels and in the national capitals, will leave its mark on Europe.

The Roma are nationals of Bulgaria, Romania, and a half-dozen other EU countries. Their deportations violate their fundamental rights as citizens of the European Union — the freedom of movement inside the EU, meaning the right to live, work, study, or retire in another country. No less important is the freedom to live free of discrimination on any grounds, including ethnicity. Both principles are clearly violated by the expulsion of Roma from France and, previously, from Italy, Sweden, and Denmark, among others. The European institutions, as guardians of EU law, are responsible for defending the fundamental rights of European citizens. In fact, one might ask why it took so long for the EU to speak up for the rights of the Roma.

The Roma, estimated at 10-12 million people, are Europe’s largest minority, and also the one that is most politically and economically disenfranchised. Scattered mainly across the EU’s newest member states, they live in conditions of extreme poverty and segregation. Their situation has deteriorated over recent years as the economic crisis and growing xenophobia have exacerbated social tensions. This in itself presents a serious moral challenge to the EU and its member states. After all, one of the EU’s core values is solidarity. Should not this solidarity, invoked most recently by EU members in economic distress, extend to disenfranchised communities such as the Roma as well?

The situation of the Roma is made even worse by the insistence of member states on the principle of subsidiarity. A safeguard against an omnipotent Brussels, subsidiarity places authority for dealing with a given issue at the lowest level — typically the national level — unless the scale or nature of the problem require European responses. However, the scale of the Roma problem is clearly too much for individual countries, regions, or municipalities to handle, particularly the new Eastern member states with their still-fragile institutions. At times, the simple lack of institutional capacity prevents action and effective use of EU funding to help the Roma. Sometimes, a broader bias against Roma causes inaction. Actors below the EU level need to acknowledge these limitations, and open up to Europe-wide action, coordinated and funded by the EU.

The stand-off between the European Commission and France also plays to fears among smaller and newer EU members that the large West European countries dominate EU politics. These anxieties were rekindled by Sarkozy’s threat to veto Romania’s accession to the Schengen Area of visa-free travel, should the country fail to cooperate in receiving Roma deportees. It falls to the European Commission to take a stand against such bullying. Barroso and Reding must maintain a principled position on the Roma question, pursue proceedings against France–or any other country–if infringements of European principles and regulations continue. EU law should apply to all member countries and citizens.

Even more disturbingly, the current Roma dispute reflects a growing influence of right-wing extremists on politics in Europe. These groups work hard to fan anxieties about the future, prosperity, migration, and cultural diversity among Europeans. Such issues have long been neglected by political elites. Under pressure by the Dutch Freedom Party, Hungary’s Jobbik, the Front National in France, or the Sweden Democrats, mainstream parties are trying to regain lost ground by shifting to the right. Sarkozy’s move against Roma migrants comes at a time when he is looking toward re-election in 2012. It is unlikely that this trend will easily find correctives in national politics. Instead, European institutions have to make clear that this political radicalization, and the search for scapegoats such as the Roma, are unacceptable.

In all these respects, the current conflict questions the very foundations on which the EU was built. It is for Brussels now to take a decisive stance in defense of these European values, for the benefit of all Europeans–Roma and non-Roma alike.

Joerg Forbrig is Senior Program Officer for Central and Eastern Europe and Astrid Ziebarth is a Program Officer for Immigration and Integration at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin.

“The President obviously is a – is Christian. He prays every day. He communicates with his religious advisor every single day.” These words came from an Obama White House spokesman on August 19, at the height of the controversy over building a “mosque” near the site of the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York City and the very day that the Pew Research Center released a poll showing that nearly one in five Americans (18%) incorrectly believe that President Obama is a Muslim. The survey found that only 35% correctly identify him as Christian, while a further 43% don’t know what religion he practices.

This misperception matters, especially for Muslim Americans. This population clearly needs an outspoken defender these days, as manifestations of anti-Islamism become more frequent. Misconceptions about the President’s religious beliefs, however, render him politically incapable – or perhaps unwilling – to provide an adequate defense of the right of Muslims to practice their Islamic faith in the United States.

The recent controversy over the Ground Zero Islamic center in New York and the threatened Koran-burning by a Christian fundamentalist preacher in Florida is seen by many commentators as manifestations of increasing anti-Islamic sentiment in the United States. Europeans, in particular, have been quick to recognize some of the discriminatory rhetoric that has been present in their countries for years, even gaining more ground recently as right-wing parties gain prominence across the continent. It seems to many that this prejudice has finally arrived stateside.

But is anti-Muslim sentiment newly arrived in America, or has it just been successfully suppressed until now? Evidence suggests that it is the latter. In 2009, Gallup found that over four in ten Americans (43%) felt at least “a little” prejudice toward Muslims, though open anti-Muslim demonstrations didn’t begin in earnest until the summer of 2010. From September 2001 until early 2009, there was one unlikely voice that can be credited with keeping American anti-Islamism in check: President George W. Bush.

As the man with the biggest microphone in the country, not to mention one with uncontested Christian credentials, Bush drew clear delineations between extremists and the majority of Muslims who reject violence and practice a religion of peace. This message, coming from a quintessential American good ol’ boy, meant that Americans – especially those like him – listened. In a press conference earlier this month, Obama himself recognized Bush’s efforts, saying “One of the things that I most admired about President Bush was after 9/11, him being crystal clear about the fact that we were not at war with Islam.”

Indeed, Bush was almost didactic in his defense of the Muslim faith. Just months after the twin towers fell, Bush told a joint session of Congress, “There are thousands of Muslims who proudly call themselves Americans, and they know what I know – that the Muslim faith is based upon peace and love and compassion.” If he was perceived as being a Muslim himself, could he be so “crystal clear” in his entreaty for tolerance?

President Obama is simply unable to match his predecessor’s effectiveness in defending Muslim Americans, thanks in part to the fact that the public does not perceive him to share the religious beliefs that they hold themselves. America is 78.4% Christian and .6% Muslim, according to a 2008 Pew study, thereby making Obama, in the eyes of 18% of his fellow citizens, to be a member of a very small out-group. If President Obama is not perceived to be part of the Christian in-group in the United States, he may unfortunately be incapable of changing that majority’s mentality about Muslims in any meaningful way.

It has not helped matters that the president has delivered a contradictory message about the proposed Muslim community center. He first seemed to support building the center and then backed away by saying it is a “decision for the local community in New York City to make.”

Cynics, including this author, think that political caution may motivate president Obama to shy away from a stronger defense of Islam because it would reinforce misperceptions about his own religious beliefs and endanger Democrats up for election in November. If politics is the President’s motivation, it is a tragic mistake. It runs the real risk of long-term marginalization, even radicalization, of a minority group in exchange for short-term political considerations. At less than one percent of the population, American Muslims need reassurance that they are accepted by American society. If instead they feel scorned, they and their children may become vulnerable to messages that offer varying degrees of reciprocal rejection and retaliation.

If he wishes to allay right-wing press criticism, President Obama should mount a strong defense of Muslim Americans by first stressing his own Christian beliefs. America is an astonishingly religious country by rich world standards, and appeals to a right to worship one God could at once placate the Christian majority and defend the Muslim minority. Obama’s current strategy, to appeal to America’s historical religious tolerance, simply does not have the same resonance for either group. Instead, this strategy typically involves citing a laundry list of religions (in addition to atheism) represented in the United States. Certainly this does nothing to set the record straight about the President’s own beliefs.

Beyond significantly strengthening his own message, the president needs to challenge prominent Republican leaders to speak out for religious tolerance. These messages need not come from only Protestant or Catholic Republicans, though that would help. Republicans from more diverse religious backgrounds, such as former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney (a practicing Mormon), Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal (the son of Hindu immigrants), or South Carolina gubernatorial candidate Nikki Haley (who was raised Sikh), should add their voices to the defense of Muslim Americans. Such statements might even help to diversify GOP support, which, in these days of Tea Party influence, is looking even more white and Christian than usual.

On the subject of anti-Islamism and its effects on Muslim Americans, President Obama recently said, “When we start acting as if their religion is somehow offensive, what are we saying to them?” Clearly he is cognizant of the messages Muslim Americans are receiving, but he needs to both strengthen his rhetoric and encourage Republicans to join him in condemnation of bigotry. In the post-Bush era, a chorus of voices will be needed to put the cap back on anti-Islamic sentiment in America. There are certainly more than opinion polls at stake.

According to this year’s Transatlantic Trends survey, Turkey can be seen as drifting away from the West. How do we know? After surveying approximately 1,000 people in Turkey (along with about 1,000 in the United States and each of 11 European Union countries) on a host of foreign policy and economic policy questions, we found the following:

1. 28% of Turks approve of Barack Obama’s handling of foreign policy, compared to 78% of Europeans and 52% of Americans

2. 34% of Turks say that Turkey should act alone in the world, down from 43% in 2009

3. 13% of Turks say that Turkey should act in conjunction with the EU, down from 22% in 2009

4. 20% of Turks say that Turkey should act in conjunction with countries in the Middle East, up from 10% in 2009

5. In 2004, 73% of Turks said that joining the EU would be a good thing. In 2010, just 38% of Turks said so.

6. 48% of Turks are not concerned about Iran becoming a nuclear threat, compared with 86% of Americans and 79% of Europeans who are concerned.

7. 25% of Turks are willing to let Iran become a nuclear country, compared with 6% of Europeans and 4% of Americans who would  allow that.

8. In 2004, 53% of Turks felt that NATO was essential to their security. In 2010, just 30% said so.

9. While 51% of Europeans think it is likely Turkey will join the EU, 63% of Turks think it isn’t likely, including 34% saying it isn’t likely at all.

10. 48% of Turks think that Turkey has such different values from the West that it can’t be part of it, and only 30% think Turkey has enough in common with the West.

Note: Edited to correct item #6.

BERLIN — On September 11, Geert Wilders, the controversial Dutch politician who likened the Koran to Mein Kampf, will speak in New York on the anniversary of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, warning about the supposed dangers of Islam and the building of a “ground-zero mega-mosque.” That the proposed structure is neither a mosque — it is a community center with a prayer room — nor at ground zero — it would be two blocks away — does not matter much to Wilders. His goal is to convince the American public that Islam — not just extremist political groups using Islamic rhetoric — intends to become the dominant religion in the United States as well as Europe. He will warn that the building of new mosques and all immigration of Muslims should be stopped immediately because Muslim immigrants’ main aim is to establish the rule of Islam, using the mosques as the beachhead for their invasion.

Although Wilders has often been lampooned in the press, he can no longer be ignored — not in Europe, and now not in the United States.

In the Dutch elections in June, Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) was swept into parliament on an anti-Islam, anti-immigrant agenda, coming in third in the election. While the main parties have refused to include him in a new government, his electoral support is undeniable.  Wilders plays on public fears of the erosion of Western values and the use and misuse of Islamic rhetoric by violent extremist groups. He portrays himself as a fearless knight opposing an army of Muslim migrants. And he fends off criticism by also defending rights for women and gays and by being a staunch defender of the state of Israel.

Wilders’ planned New York visit has, so far, gone largely unnoticed in the United States. But there might be reasons for Americans to be concerned.

Wilders carries in his European backpack — along with a strong, cultural anti-Islamic sentiment that is tied to his anti-immigrant views — plans for a “Geert Wilders International Freedom Alliance,” a proposed grouping of anti-Islam activists initially from five countries: the United States, Canada, Britain, France, and Germany. In Europe, he draws followers from those who believe Islam threatens Western culture and secular norms, concerns that have already fueled minaret and burqa bans in Switzerland and France. In New York, Wilders hopes to find similar support among those who oppose the Islamic community center near ground zero, a debate that has confused facts and myths about Islam and the U.S. Muslim population with fears of terrorism. Moreover, Wilders enters a fragmenting political landscape in the United States that is now dominated by the rise of popular conservative movements with opportunistic leaders fighting to prevail in the November Congressional elections. President Barack Obama’s wobbly stance on the community center and mosque, aptly described by the American comedian Jon Stewart as “Yes, we can! But should we?”, has only complicated matters.

To attract American followers for this anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant transatlantic alliance, Wilders must bring together moderate conservatives and far-right-wing groups. His most effective tool may be his populist style, honed in the rough-and-tumble of Dutch politics, which plays off of us-versus-them public sentiments, reinforcing existing black-and-white American thinking about Islam. Such rhetoric would only reinforce alienation of moderate Muslims and Muslim immigrant groups living in the United States, poisoning constructive dialogue about immigration. This, in turn, could leverage local and state governments in the United States to enact a more right-wing and anti-immigrant agenda.

Of course, Wilders’ anti-Islamic screeds may fall on deaf ears in America. In Europe, Wilders’ support has been fueled by integration debates, or rather debates about failed integration of Muslim immigrants. However, the situation of Muslim immigrants in the United States could not be more different than that in Europe. While in most European countries there is a sizeable and very visible Muslim population — not all of whom are immigrants — the Muslim share of the population in the United States is relatively small. Only about 2.35 million American Muslims are part of the general U.S. population of about 310 million in 2007, according to estimates by the Pew Research Center on Muslim Americans. About two-thirds of those are immigrants and are, Pew asserts, “middle class and mostly mainstream.” In Europe, in contrast, the socioeconomic background and educational level of Muslim immigrants and their offspring largely differs from mainstream society. Fierce debates abound about cultural-versus-structural reasons for the difficulties Muslim immigrants have in integrating into European society. The United States has not, and most likely will not, see these debates in the future, simply because of the small size and socioeconomic makeup of the American Muslim community

For years, press commentators have labeled Geert Wilders a one-man show and predicted that the “phenomenon Wilders” would soon flame out. But, in just a few years, the fiery anti-Islam activist has gained an important and unexpected role within Dutch society thanks to his rhetorical skills and immigrant- and Muslim-skeptic sentiment in the Netherlands. If he proves similarly effective in New York and is able to forge a transatlantic alliance of anti-Islamic activists, then the chances for a real constructive dialogue about immigration, Islam, and Islamic extremism will be seriously endangered.

Astrid Ziebarth is a Program Officer, Immigration and Integration, with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

BRUSSELS — As aspiring Middle East peacemakers descend on Washington this week, one absentee has already been noted. Baroness Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief, chose to pass up dinner at the White House and instead pressed ahead with her trip to China, where she inaugurated a new strategic dialogue with her Chinese counterpart. Despite some consternation in Paris, Ashton’s decision reflects a well-founded conviction that China policy is one of the few areas where the new post-Lisbon foreign policy machinery could make a real difference.

The existing obstacles to framing an effective European China strategy have not gone away. The EU struggles to form common policies toward most major powers. Differences among member states persist over how accommodating to be to Chinese sensitivities over Tibet, Taiwan, and human rights. The nature, scale, and relative benefits of trade with China vary considerably across Europe. And Beijing tends to be smarter at maneuvering around the politics of the EU than the other way around.

Still, the conditions for shaping a European China policy worthy of the name are more propitious than they have been for years.

The most important development is that the endemic competition among the “Big 3” to be Beijing’s best friend in Europe has receded. Over the last two years, Germany, France, and the U.K. moved in rapid succession from being China’s favorite to being out on their ear, as meetings with the Dalai Lama, threats of Olympic boycotts, and protests over Beijing’s decision to execute a mentally ill Briton took their toll on the respective relationships. 2010 has been a great deal calmer, but memories of diplomatic freezes, cancelled summits, and state-sponsored protests outside Carrefour supermarkets are still fresh.

The time spent in the doghouse reflecting has been productive. As China’s power has grown in the last few years, it has become clearer to even the largest member states that their individual influence over Beijing is limited and is only going to diminish. While still hesitant, national capitals are now more willing than they were to kick things up a level and see whether a genuinely EU-led approach might be a better option. The newfound assertiveness in Chinese diplomacy – most notably at the Copenhagen climate talks, which left many European political leaders stunned – precipitated a series of separate national policy reviews that came to similar conclusions about the need to strengthen the EU’s hand in China policy. Even the Eurosceptic British Conservative party included a line about it in their manifesto.

In Brussels itself, after a bruising few years, a realistic spirit has descended on officials. The vaulting ambitions for EU-China partnership have been scaled back, and any belief that Chinese foreign and domestic policy could gently be coaxed toward European norms by wise counsel and judicious use of incentives has disappeared. Instead, the talk of “leverage,” “bargaining,” and much else that would characterize a more competitive relationship has become ubiquitous.

But none of these factors would be sufficient were there not also the prospect of using this occasion to draw together the various instruments of the EU machinery. Enter Lady Ashton. EU China policy has for a long time lacked even a notional address. The European Trade Commissioner’s office – the closest department to running point for the EU on China – was clearly an inadequate home for the spectrum of issues that relations with China now encompass. Ashton’s double-hatted position changes that, spanning as it does the role of both Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. There is now a natural home for the formulation and coordination of a China strategy that can draw both on the EU’s economic and foreign policy capacities.

Even the new dialogue format should help. In recent years, the focal points of the relationship were the dysfunctional EU-China summits, which were characterized by an overly expansive Commission-led agenda, and high-level meetings with member states, which were consumed by bilateral trade. Although they came up, subjects such as Iran and climate change tended to be lost in the morass. By contrast, Ashton’s talks with her opposite number, State Councillor Dai Bingguo, at least provide the prospect of addressing some of the overarching issues in the relationship in a more systematic and less cluttered fashion. The comparable U.S.-China senior dialogue did much to set the framework for relations between Washington and Beijing under the second Bush administration – arguably in a more useful manner than the unwieldy structure instituted by the Obama administration.

But will member states invest Ashton with the requisite authority to pull the task off? The post-Copenhagen angst about China has already faded somewhat and the French complaint this week suggests precisely the sort of difficulty she is likely to face. But a process has been set in motion. Ashton has been tasked with presenting an outline for the EU’s future relations with emerging powers—above all, China—at the EU summit in mid-September. And improving EU China policy will not require a revolution in thinking. A greater level of focus and prioritization; a more open-eyed view of the relationship’s nature and prospects; and a sharper sense of Europe’s objectives and capacities – all this would already constitute a notable success, and is hardly out of reach. For all Bernard Kouchner’s objections, even Paris must admit that Beijing is worth a missed dinner.

Andrew Small is a Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Brussels

WASHINGTON — The 2010 World Cup, which kicks off Friday in Johannesburg, will present a number of intriguing match-ups that will play out on green grass, not on international waters, in conference rooms, or through diplomatic backchannels. But more than that, it will lay bare a narrowing gap between the traditional soccer powers of Europe — Germany, Spain, Italy — and, in one of its few remaining areas of scrappy international underdog-ness, the United States.

The United States has been historically insignificant on the football pitch, save for a startling 1-0 victory over England 60 years ago that sets up Saturday’s anticipated rematch, a quarterfinal appearance in the 2002 World Cup, and a narrow defeat to Brazil in last year’s Confederations Cup final after a shocking win over top-ranked Spain.

But that ground is shifting, and Europe should begin to take notice. Starting from a seed planted when the United States hosted the 1994 World Cup, the United States has slowly nurtured soccer through the still-growing Major League Soccer (MLS), through farming out its best players to European clubs (of the 23 players on the U.S. squad, 17 are currently plying their trade in Europe, including at such storied clubs as AC Milan, Rangers, Everton, and Villareal), and through a generation of children more likely to kick a ball than swing a baseball bat.

Even though a recent New York Times Magazine piece questioned the tenets guiding the soccer development system in the United States — every player is equally important, competition is favored at the cost of skills development, parents bear the cost burden instead of the football club, and university-level sports are a priority — it noted that that system is beginning to change and, given favorable demographics, could bear fruit in a matter of years.

Twelve years ago, the United States Soccer Federation — the sport’s domestic governing body — set up Project 2010, a $50 million development plan that would set the United States on course to be a legitimate contender at this year’s World Cup.

In the sense of its ultimate goal, Project 2010 failed — it implemented a few key training programs but otherwise became less of a guide as 2010 approached. But in the sense of changing attitudes, training, and ability, it made this year’s U.S. World Cup team look much more like it belongs in the tournament. While the U.S. team is not a contender for the crown, it has enough talent and experience to cause trouble along with enough question marks and inconsistency to exasperate its fans. While the United States is favored to get out of the group stage (after England but before Slovenia and Algeria), even that is not a given.

The reality is that the United States should institute Project 2014 or 2018. Like many big undertakings, the initial timeline was too short. Although a few American players are in their prime — including midfielders Landon Donovan and Clint Dempsey and goalkeeper Tim Howard — a crop of young, gifted players are just beginning their careers and need more seasoning, like the dangerous 20-year-old forward Jozy Altidore.

Perhaps what is most surprising about these developments is that American sports fans — long ignorant of “the beautiful game” — are starting to pay attention. Americans have bought more 2010 World Cup tickets than any other nation. Several American cable television channels — including the all-footie Fox Soccer Channel — regularly carry European, South American, and even Australian(!) professional matches. I see England’s Arsenal on national television nearly as often as I see the St. Louis Cardinals baseball club. American college students spending a semester abroad in Europe are returning with an appreciation for, and a rooting interest in, continental football.

While it may be stomach-turning (and admittedly still improbable) to think of the dastardly Americans winning a World Cup in a “European” sport in the next 10 years, fear not, Europe. While soccer is shifting in the United States’ favor, several “American” sports are tilting toward you. Take, for instance, basketball, where European players such as Dirk Nowitzki, Tony Parker, and Peja Stojakovic are now stars in the National Basketball Association. Spain’s Paul Gasol is a big (and tall) reason the Los Angeles Lakers are in the NBA Finals. European players have been standouts in the National Hockey League for years. Even baseball, the most American of American pastimes, has scouts patrolling European baseball leagues from the Netherlands to Italy. Heck, Germany has overtaken even the U.S. women’s soccer team, long the dominant international force, to win the last two Women’s World Cups. You are starting to get us where we feel it, too.

This convergence is the natural effect of globalization — satellite television, cultural exchange, the Internet. But even more than that, this is a period of change in the transatlantic sports relationship that at some level will alter how we view each other. The United States’ respect on the global playing field may wax and wane based on various temporary factors — the president in office, the global economy, the positioning of the U.S. military — but the soccer pitch is another matter. We aren’t asking for you to root for us, only to respect us.

William P. Bohlen is the Director of Communications at the German Marshall Fund.