BUCHAREST—The landslide victory of former speaker of the Parliament Yevgeny Shevchuk in the December 25 Transnistrian presidential elections came as a surprise to observers in Moldova, Russia, and the West. Shevchuk, who won 74 percent of the vote in the run-off, overcame the challenges of the Moscow-backed candidate Anatoly Kaminski and the incumbent of 20 years, Igor Smirnov, who lost in the first round. Transnistria’s new leader is widely seen as representative of a younger generation, having proposed constitutional reform in 2009 to limit presidential powers. Shevchuk had focused his campaign on fighting corruption and nepotism, which resonated well in a region where people are struggling to overcome economic hardship and where the leadership was often accused of embezzling funds meant for humanitarian purposes. His first order of business after being sworn in as president was to dismiss over 80 state officials, including the heads of government and law enforcement agencies, appointed by Smirnov.

The coming to power of a reform-minded leader represents a long-awaited change in Transnistria, and marks a period of newfound optimism, not just for this disputed region, but also for neighboring Moldova. Although the Moldovan government did not recognize the legality of these elections, its officials are now hopeful of a more constructive dialogue. Moscow also welcomed the shift of power, having lately seen Smirnov as an obstacle to finding a solution to the protracted but frozen Transnistrian conflict. Although Shevchuk was not the Kremlin’s number one pick, he was nevertheless reassured that Transnistria can continue to rely on Russia’s friendly assistance and cooperation.

Shevchuk is also believed to be on good terms with officials in Kiev and is seen as a more progressive figure in Brussels. He was one of the few Transnistrian officials whose five-year travel ban to member states of the European Union was lifted at the beginning of 2008. He is also described by former EU Special Representative to Moldova Kalman Mizsei as a modernizer, and someone who should be welcomed by the European Union.

The election of Shevchuk sets the stage for a new dynamic in the region. Although he shares his predecessor’s stance on Transnistrian sovereignty, there are already clear signals that relations between Transnistria and Moldova will gradually improve. In his inaugural speech, Shevchuk promised to establish good neighborly relations with Moldova and Ukraine and to ensure the free movement of people across the frontier. He also noted that Transnistria needed to modernize and better integrate with regional economies, which would be impossible without better relations with Moldova. It now remains to be seen whether Shevchuk will follow up his rhetoric with concrete actions.

Change will not come quickly, and it is highly unlikely that Transnistria will reunite with Moldova in the near future. But with another round of talks scheduled for February, and with a more reform-minded leadership in Transnistria, Moldova might finally have a serious interlocutor in its efforts at finding a solution to this long-standing conflict.

Dinu Toderascu is Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Bucharest.

CHISINAU/KIEV/TBILISI—Western politicians and policymakers were already looking overwhelmed before the nuclear catastrophe in Japan and the upheavals across the Middle East hit them. Why on earth should they bother with Eastern Europe now, that forlorn and troubled backwater arcing from Belarus to the Caucasus?

The forces pulling and tugging at the West today are indeed formidable. Massive natural disasters and the economic crisis compound the burden on national governments that were already struggling to steer divided and fearful polities. Transatlantic divisions over the use of force to deal with the brutal repression of the democratic uprising in Libya by the thugs of President Muammar Gaddafi are throwing a harsh spotlight not just on the West’s military weakness and lack of political unity, but on its lack of credibility as a protector of freedom and human rights in the Muslim world.

Some are already arguing that the United States and Europe should refocus their strategic energies and dwindling resources on the Middle East. They add that the review of the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy that is currently underway (publication is expected for late April) should redirect funding and political impetus away from Eastern Europe, and toward the southern shores of the Mediterranean—in keeping with a recent “non-paper” initiated by France and a handful of other EU members that pointed out insinuatingly that for every €1.80 spent by the EU in Tunisia, the EU spends €25 in Moldova.

This impulse is understandable, but it is short-sighted and wrong. The West’s choice is not between South and East; it is between supporting the quest for freedom and a decent life elsewhere, or pulling up the drawbridge to keep our riches, material and immaterial, to ourselves. If we opt for the latter—and there are many signs that American as well as European politicians and publics are sorely tempted to turn their backs to the world—we undermine all the values we cherish most. In reality, we preserve them best by supporting them elsewhere. The answer is to do more, not less, both in the South and in the East.

Meanwhile, concerns about Eastern Europe are very real. Belarus has its own Gaddafi, strongman Alexander Lukashenko, whose storm troops ruthlessly suppressed peaceful mass protests against a blatantly manipulated general election just before Christmas; several dozen activists still languish in prison. At the other end of the arc, the authoritarian ruler Ilham Aliyev and his family have held oil-rich Azerbaijan in a stranglehold for two decades.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, citizens may still walk the streets, express political opinions, or vote for a candidate disliked by their president without fearing for their lives. But theirs is an edgy and tenuous stability. The region’s fragile economies have been hard hit by the financial crisis. Corruption is rampant, political reform processes are stagnant or backsliding.

In a recent speaking tour through the capitals of Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, I encountered a resilient and creative civil society, as well as many quietly impressive civil servants. Yet these courageous modernizers live on the defensive. They are sustained neither by the region’s weak, divided, and increasingly authoritarian leaders, nor by the West, to which most of them aspire to belong. The result is a creeping strategic and moral vacuum, which leaves Europe’s eastern periphery an easy prey to Russian power plays and zero-sum games: in Transnistria, in the occupied regions of Georgia, in Nagorno-Karabakh, on the Crimean peninsula, and elsewhere.

The United States and the European Union have not been inactive in the region, of course. In fact, there has been a serious push by both Washington and Berlin recently, accompanied by many visits by senior officials, to reinforce ties to Eastern Europe, and to nudge reform along. The EU has made it easier for Georgians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans to get visas for travel to Europe, and it is liberalizing trade with several countries in the region.

Still, Americans and Europeans alike would do well to listen more to critics in the region, both from within and outside governments. The EU possesses a large set of instruments—but it has yet to learn to calibrate them. Local actors say the EU’s demands for regulatory adaptation are often intransigent, overbroad, and unclear, adding to the burdens of an economy in transformation. At the same time, they note bitterly, not enough conditionality is applied to democratic and political reforms. Finally, Brussels is largely—and inexplicably—absent on issues like security sector reform and conflict resolution.

This is where Washington should come in, in tandem with Brussels. Shuttle diplomacy and speeches are better than no shuttle diplomacy and speeches; but it must now put its shoulder to the wheel, and work toward resolution of the frozen conflicts. The United States can use its diplomatic heft, its experience, and its recently improved relations with Russia (the “reset”) to make it clear that the West sees Russian efforts to regain a “zone of privileged interest” in the region for what they are—and is prepared to counter any attempts to roll back or undermine democratic transformations.

There is no time to lose. In 2012, Americans and Russians will elect their presidents; the Germans elect a chancellor. Parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine. More distractions—and more opportunities for those willing and able to take advantage of them.

Constanze Stelzenmüller is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Berlin.

BUCHAREST — Sometimes, democratic progress can be gauged with a ruler. Last Sunday in Moldova, it measured exactly 94.5 centimeters or almost 37 inches—the length of the ballot paper Moldovan voters were issued when they went to the polls for the third time in the last 19 months to elect a parliament. A total of 20 political parties and 19 independent candidates registered for the November 28 parliamentary elections, competing for 101 seats in the Moldovan legislature.

The citizens of Moldova—including those living abroad—acknowledged the importance of these elections with an impressive 59 percent voter turnout. In Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, over 60 percent of those who were registered to vote went to cast their ballots on Sunday. A record number of people voted outside Moldova, too, forming long lines at Moldovan Embassies in Bucharest, Paris, and Moscow, clearly determined to exercise their constitutional right. International observers concluded that yesterday’s early parliamentary elections in Moldova met most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and were administered in a transparent and impartial manner, having been held in a competitive and pluralistic environment.

Twenty-four hours later and after counting all the ballots, the final results placed the Communist Party of Moldova in the lead with 39 percent. Prime Minister Vlad Filat’s Liberal Democratic Party came second with 29 percent and can be considered the winner of these elections, gaining an additional 13 percent on top of their vote in the July 2009 elections. Marian Lupu and his Democratic Party came out third with 12 percent, followed by the Liberal Party, led by Acting President Mihai Ghimpu, with just short of 10 percent. The Alliance Moldova Noastra, the fourth component of the pro-western Alliance for European Integration, did not garner enough votes to pass the 4-percent threshold and will not make it into the next legislature.

Although the Communist Party remains the largest faction in the next parliament with 42 MPs, the decrease in the Communists’ support is noticeable. They have lost eighteen seats over the last three election cycles. The remaining three democratic parties combined will now have 59 seats. This would allow them to appoint the Prime Minister, as well as the next Speaker of the Parliament, but not the President, which would require a three-fifths majority of 61.

Following Sunday’s elections, Moldova is in the same situation it has been for the last year-and-a-half. The previous two parliaments failed to elect a president. Now, since none of the parties represented in the future parliament has 61 votes, there will have to be yet another round of negotiations. Members of the Alliance for European Integration have said on a number of occasions that they would like to preserve the alliance after the elections, despite having conducted separate electoral campaigns. Prime Minister Filat, now heading the second-largest party in the next parliament with 32 MPs, has already invited his former coalition partners, Marian Lupu and Mihai Ghimpu, to discuss the next steps. The leader of the Communist Party and former president of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, also has voiced his willingness to discuss future governing coalitions with Lupu and with Filat as possible partners, but ruled out any potential partnership with the Acting President Ghimpu and his party.

Filat has made it clear that a coalition with the Communists is out of the question for him and his Liberal Democratic Party. The Democratic Party of Marian Lupu is only eligible for 15 seats in the next parliament. But Lupu (himself a former Communist) has indicated that he is willing to consider cooperation with the Communists. This gives his Democrats the biggest bargaining power in future post-electoral governing structures. Lupu has publicly declared his aspirations to become the next president of Moldova. Still, the Democrats and the Communists together will only have 57 votes—so they will need the Liberals’ support.

Despite these uncertain coalition prospects (and the possibility of a renewed blockade), these elections do demonstrate that Moldova is striving for democratic maturity. The decrease in support for the pro-Russian Communist Party, as well as the growing number of voters who favor the Western-oriented democratic parties show that Moldovan society is changing. This has not gone unnoticed by the international community there, which is showing support. Only last week, the EU agreed to allocate Moldova 41 million euros to help build state institutional capacity, along with an additional 79 million euros to support Moldova’s business environment, create new jobs, and transfer experience and expertise from European institutions. These are concrete examples that Moldova is on the right track. Now, Moldovan politicians need to realize that lingering political crises are no longer allowed if Moldova’s wish to become part of the European political family is to be taken seriously.

Dinu Toderascu is a Program Officer with the Bucharest Office of the German Marshall Fund

BUCHAREST — Last week, democracy was put to a test in Moldova. The country’s citizens went to the polls on September 5 to vote on a referendum to amend Article 78 of the Constitution so that the president could be elected directly by the people. The referendum had been triggered by the failure—twice—of the Parliament to elect the president, mainly because the Communist Party refused to vote (61 votes are needed for the election of the President, and the Communists are the largest grouping with 48 of 101 seats). In order to put an end to the year-long political crisis, the ruling Alliance for European Integration, comprising four liberal and democratic parties, decided to change the constitution so that the president could be elected by a popular vote.

Yet the referendum failed, because Moldovan law mandates a turnout of at least one-third of the electorate, and only 30.29 % of the voters went to the polls. The failure was a very unpleasant surprise—not least to the organizer of a recent survey, published on the eve of the referendum, which predicted that as many as 73% of voters might go to the polls. The pollster had argued that due to the “peculiarity” of the Moldovan electorate, which—he said—often says one thing but does the opposite, probably around 50% of voters would go to the polls.  Well, it didn’t happen.

The ruling alliance, which includes Prime Minister Vlad Filat’s Liberal Democratic Party and Acting President Mihai Ghimpu’s Liberal Party, were sure that the referendum would pass. Taken aback by its failure, the alliance has admitted that it was mainly due to the four parties’ inability to put forward a coordinated message. Prime Minister Filat also acknowledged that the opposition Communist Party had been very efficient in convincing voters to boycott the referendum and not go to the polls. The Communists, led by Vladimir Voronin, claimed that the low turnout had in reality been a vote of no confidence for the government.

All the same, the referendum was a successful democratic exercise for Moldova, with no influence from abroad. International observers said the referendum had been well organized, noting that what small violations there had been could not have influenced the results.

According to Moldovan law, the failure of the referendum means the parliament must be dissolved and early parliamentary elections held. Members of the ruling alliance agree, and have floated November 21 as a tentative date. President Ghimpu has confirmed that he plans to set the electoral process in motion, but he appears to be in no rush.

So why did the referendum fail? The Communist Party, faithful to tradition, was able to rely on the discipline of its supporters (about 35% of the electorate), who did as they were instructed and stayed at home. On the other hand, and as the ruling alliance itself admitted, the four parties’ uncoordinated campaign before the referendum confused the electorate. Moreover, in their confidence that the referendum would pass, some members of the alliance practically were already campaigning for the presidency, pushing the referendum issue to the sidelines. This mistaken confidence led voters to think that the referendum would pass the low threshold of 33%; as a result, many did not bother to vote. Moldovans living abroad, on whose support the ruling alliance relied the most, also disappointed expectations. Only 3.8% of the Moldovan diaspora actually cast their vote.

This sobering experience should serve as a wake up call for the ruling alliance. If its four leaders want to have a bargaining weight in the next legislature, personal ambitions should be set aside. Moldovan voters need to see that their democratic representatives can speak with the same voice. One thing is certain: the communist support base remains strong. With elections only a couple of months away, it is obvious that they will remain the biggest faction in the parliament. Yet Moldova cannot afford perpetual political uncertainty. The only way to overcome this political crisis is for the members of the future parliament to reach a consensus, elect a president, and bring stability to Moldova for the next four years. The alternative would be a cycle of never-ending parliamentary elections, which might make democracy less appealing to Moldovans.

Dinu Toderascu is a Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund’s Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation in Bucharest

BUCHAREST — On Sunday, Sept. 5, Moldovans will go to the polls to participate in a Constitutional referendum that would allow for the president to be elected directly by the people, and not by the parliament as it is now. The need to change Article 78 of the Constitution was triggered by the failure twice of the Moldovan Parliament to elect the president (61 votes needed), mainly because the Communist Party refused to vote (they are the largest faction with 48 seats out of 101). In order to put an end to the year-long political crisis, the ruling Alliance for European Integration (AEI), comprising four liberal and democratic parties, decided to change the constitution so that the president is elected by a popular vote.

A recent survey shows that approximately 73% of Moldovans are ready to take part in this referendum, with 91% of respondents intending to vote in favor of changing the constitution. The referendum needs a 33% voter turnout to be validated, as per the recent legislative changes introduced by the parliament. The four ruling parties, including Prime Minister Vlad Filat’s Liberal Democratic Party and Acting President Mihai Ghimpu’s Liberal Party, are in favor of changing the constitution and are inviting voters to go to the polls. They rely on substantive support from Moldovans living abroad. In order to obtain that support, the ruling coalition increased the number of polling stations to include new locations that are outside of Moldovan embassies and successfully appealed to the Central Election Commission to allow voters with expired passports.

On the other hand, the opposition Communist Party led by former president Vladimir Voronin, along with a couple of small, left-oriented parties, are against the referendum and are inviting voters to boycott it.

If the referendum is a success, presidential elections would be held in the fall of 2010, most likely together with early parliamentary elections. The rumored date for both elections is November 14, but it hasn’t been announced officially. It is up to Acting President Mihai Ghimpu to make this date official, after which he must dissolve the parliament. Along with the current legislature, the current executive might also step down, acting as a temporary government until a new legislature is elected, which then should legitimize another, or the same, cabinet.

If the referendum is not validated, which is unlikely, the uncertainty of political situation in the country would continue. Most probably the parliament would not be dissolved until an agreement is reached with the Communist faction in order to change in the parliament the procedure of electing the president.

At the same time, it is clear that the ruling alliance will not have a common candidate for the presidential post. Prime Minster Vlad Filat and the Democratic Party Leader Marian Lupu are not hiding their presidential ambitions. Mihai Ghimpu also stated that his Liberal Party would field its own candidate for this post. Although Communist leader Voronin is not eligible to run for another presidential term, having held two consecutive terms, the Communist Party still has a strong support base (35%) and a communist nominee will certainly create competition for other candidates.

For more than a year now, the current government has made concrete and sound steps in starting, and gradually implementing, the necessary reforms to get Moldova closer to the European Union. The kind of support that the international partners are now offering Moldova is unprecedented, and this should continue. If this referendum needs to be successful in order for Moldova to obtain political stability, then so be it. The Moldovan people deserve a chance for a better life and a realistic perspective toward European integration.

BUCHAREST — On June 5, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a brief but significant memorandum on a joint EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Policy (ERPSC) in the German town of Meseberg. The document proposes to “explore” the creation of a ministerial-level committee to be chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, Lady Catherine Ashton, and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This would be a forum for the European Union and Russia to exchange views on issues of international security and foreign policy; to “establish ground rules for joint EU-Russia civil/military crisis management operations”; and to “exchange views and draft recommendations … on specific issues.” Transnistria is explicitly cited as a possible first test case for “cooperation” and even a “joint EU-Russia engagement.”

Such a move was not entirely unexpected. Since the 2009 Ukraine-Russia gas crisis froze half of Europe, forums for the EU-Russia dialogue have mushroomed. A leaked policy paper from the Russian foreign ministry suggests that Russia, too, seeks rapprochement with the West. And many experts thought that the meeting in Meseberg would produce something that would compensate for the EU’s recent decision to postpone the extension of its visa-free regime to Russia.

The German rationale for this initiative appears to be twofold. The key goal is to resolve the Transnistrian conflict by getting Russia back to constructive engagement, and using pressure on the Transnistrian leadership to compromise. Russian troops could be withdrawn, or put under a joint EU-Russian mandate. More generally, the initiative tests the seriousness of Russian offers of cooperation. A success in Transnistria would (for instance) greatly improve chances for a renewed conventional arms regime in Europe.

But how likely is such a committee to resolve specific security issues? Would it even be able to discuss European and Russian foreign policies straightforwardly? There is no single EU foreign policy; each of the 27 member states has its own foreign policy orientation and its own threat perception, and there is very little agreement among them. In fact, many new members still think Russia remains Europe’s chief external threat. Under these conditions, the conversations in the proposed committee are likely to be as interesting as they will be unproductive. And while it is good news that Germany is seeking an EU framework rather than acting bilaterally with Russia, it remains to be seen whether the slow and bureaucratic EU can successfully broker conflict resolution with Russia in its Eastern neighborhood. Given the cautious language of the memorandum, this  format might well be more symbolic than effective.

Nonetheless, the mere fact that Russia and the European Union would be willing to sit together to, “establish ground rules for joint civil/military crisis management operations,” would take the relationship to a new, unprecedented level.  The EU has undertaken a number of such operations, including in Kosovo and Georgia. Over the last 20 years, Russia has also deployed “peacekeeping” troops in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.  However, Russia’s activities often violated all of the three chief principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and non-use of force. Had the international community confronted Russia about this before 2008, the Russo-Georgian war might have been avoided.  In the case of Transnistria, Russia has broken every treaty it has signed since 1994, refusing to withdraw its troops despite Moldovan requests. Given this background, it would indeed be interesting, under the circumstances, to watch the EU and Russia develop joint “ground rules” for crisis management.

Possibly, Russia is genuinely willing to cooperate on Transnistria in exchange for economic advancement. But the real test would, of course, be an EU-Russian cooperation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Perhaps even the Northern Caucasus?) But that would require rather more than a bilateral memorandum and an EU committee—particularly now when European interest in the conflicts in its Eastern neighborhood seems to be on the wane.

One sign is the recent proposal by Catherine Ashton’s office to abolish the posts of special EU envoys for the Southern Caucasus and Moldova while maintaining similar positions for more distant regions:  Sudan, the Great Lakes region in Africa, and Central Asia. The special envoys to Moldova and Southern Caucasus, mandated to speak on behalf of the EU in negotiations for the conflicts in these regions, were almost permanently present on the ground and were able to interact with all the relevant local parties. Other existing EU programs for the region, including bilateral and regional ones, avoid addressing the conflicts head-on. With the abolition of the special envoys, the EU will lose the little political clout it has had in these conflicts. And certainly it will become increasingly difficult to hold meaningful joint civil/military operations with Russia in those crises that are closer to home.

If Germany is serious about its commitment to solving the conflicts in Europe’s neighborhood, it could use its economic leverage over Russia, and Russia’s thirst for economic advancement, as a stick, rather than having the EU offer a carrot. After all, the conflicts in Europe’s Eastern neighborhood remain a major cause of human, drug, and weapons trafficking to Europe, and a significant reason for economic retardation in a region where the EU has real economic interests. Perhaps more importantly in the short term, these conflicts remain a means by which Russia controls and manipulates oil and gas flows to Europe itself, as Germany well knows.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Sea Trust and the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bucharest

WASHINGTON – In his new national security strategy, Barack Obama defined his tenure as a transitional presidency that will leave Cold War thinking behind in order to adjust U.S. policy to the realities of a multipolar world. But as far as Russia is concerned, not everyone seems to be convinced that the Cold War really is over. Ron Asmus recently wrote in GMF ‘s Transatlantic Take series about the “specter of Finlandization” as shorthand for “a Russian policy that seeks to limit the foreign policy choices and sovereignty of countries on its borders.” Asmus seems to think that there is an explicit Russian grand strategy to pressure its Western neighbors into choosing neutrality over a Westward course that might culminate in NATO or EU membership.

It is certainly true that Russia’s relationships with too many of the countries in its Western neighborhood are still tense, but Asmus’ bleak analysis risks missing some significant developments. To begin with, countries in the region have increasingly chosen to determine their future through democratic elections. That was the case in Ukraine, where – not to everybody’s pleasure – Victor Yanukovich won an election that was widely considered to be the country’s most democratic. In Moldova, the communists lost their majority for the first time since independence in democratic and free elections. It is only fair to recognize that Russia established relations with all the candidates and accepted the results of both elections; so should the West.

Asmus does not explain what “Finlandization” looks like for individual countries in Europe’s Eastern periphery; in fact, he doesn’t name examples for countries that have been forced to choose “Finlandization.” Instead, he suggests that President Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security alliance is merely a tool for a Moscow policy which seeks to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in the neighborhood. Actually, it might be argued that Medvedev’s initiative (with a push from the Obama Administration’s “reset” policy) has opened the way to more engagement and discussions between Russia and its partners, including resumption of talks in the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE’s Corfu Process.

Russia has done a great deal to improve relations with Poland, from an op-ed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin pact in the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza, followed by the screening of a TV documentary on the Katyn massacre, and culminating in a general outpouring of empathy and emotion after the plane crash that killed Poland’s leadership in Smolensk. Unnoticed by many, Russia finally settled a 20-year-old border dispute with Norway on terms that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin were willing to accept.

Obama’s “reset” has been a success as well, establishing a new level of confidence between American and Russian leaders – as evidenced by the New START treaty, as well as Russian support for a UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against Iran (producing an unprecedented outburst by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Moscow). Russia is facilitating the supply of ISAF troops in Afghanistan through her airspace and rail system; even cooperation on missile defense no longer appears impossible. A bilateral U.S.-Russian presidential commission, working in 16 subcommittees, is contributing to pragmatic solutions and confidence-building. Finally, Moscow recently reaffirmed its commitment to a “modernization partnership” with Germany.

Surely, all this is progress, or at least a sign of a new attitude in the Kremlin? Given all the advancements made in the Western relationship with Russia, the question remains why there is a “specter of Finlandization” around and why one would want to beat Russia with a new strategy of enlargement?

True, Western enlargement policy has been a great success – a large number of former Warsaw Pact states today are members of the EU and NATO. Even on the European periphery, free and fair democratic elections are increasingly coming to be seen as the desirable standard.

But what could a new enlargement strategy provide – and without putting the progress made with Russia at risk? There is no doubt that the West is committed to “to advance our shared goals, especially in promoting democracy and prosperity in Eastern European countries” as the new American security strategy puts it. But Ukraine has just democratically voted for a president who is not interested in NATO membership. In the case of Georgia, where an increasingly irresponsible president confronts a Russian policy in violation of its international obligations, no easy solution is at hand. When analyzing international affairs, it is essential to assess the “world as it is,” to use again the language of Barack Obama’s new security strategy. On Russia, his approach seems eminently appropriate: “While actively seeking Russia’s cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors.”

Niels Annen is a Senior Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

WASHINGTON — Exactly a year ago, Moldova was a mess.   Two days after parliamentary elections, on April 7, 2009, initial results showed the Communist Party with a lead big enough to maintain control over the legislature and government, if not the presidency.   In a country where freedom of expression had become an ideal, not a reality, and following an electoral campaign tightly controlled by the governing Communists, frustrations boiled over among some protestors, especially youth who took to the streets and ransacked the parliament and presidential buildings.   Three people died in the violence, and others were subsequently subjected to brutal treatment and abuse by police.

Moldova, which hardly ever made news in the West, was on the front page with scenes of chaos and disorder — not the kind of attention most countries desire.   Although the violence quickly subsided, the bad blood between the Communists and center-right opposition meant deadlock in the parliament.   This forced the country to hold another election last July, and the opposition secured victory by pulling together a four-party coalition, aided by the defection from the Communist Party of the former speaker of parliament, Marian Lupu.

Vladimir Filat emerged as prime minister after this second election and cobbled together an impressive, Western-oriented government.   But the Communists maintained enough parliamentary seats to block agreement on a new president.   Under Moldova’s current system, 61 deputies from the 101-seat parliament must agree on a new president, and all 43 Communists opposed Lupu’s nomination.

Moldova today is a completely different place.   During a recent visit to Chisinau, we found many people more optimistic and positive about their country’s future.   The media landscape has changed dramatically, with a plethora of news outlets offering various points of view.   State television, the only channel that still covers the entire country, is now run by a new and democratically-oriented team, and for the first time in eight years it is not subject to any political pressure.

We visited Moldova immediately after Filat and his team had returned from a Brussels donors conference at which an unprecedented $2.6 billion in loans and grants was pledged for the country; of that, the United States is providing $262 million through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.   Western officials speak positively these days about Moldova’s prospects and are impressed with the new government’s work plan,”Rethink Moldova: Priorities for Mid Term Development.”

In that plan, the government proposes to focus on three pillars for medium-term development: responsible governance, economic recovery and development, and investments in human capital.   Among the specific priorities defined in the document: creating an effective civil service and a modern education system, fighting corruption, supporting small-and medium-sized enterprises, implementing decentralization reforms, and wooing investments in agriculture.   One immediate area the government should focus on — and which would produce decent jobs — is road construction.   Those who have driven on Moldova’s roads would applaud such an investment.

For the first time, one hears talk about possible membership in the European Union, albeit still years away.   Nevertheless, there is a serious way forward between Moldova and the EU for completing a free trade agreement, association agreement, and visa liberalization over the next year or two.   Such achievements would more solidly anchor Moldova into the European community of nations.

But the country is not out of the woods yet.   Ineffective and corrupt rule has taken a toll.   Moldova, a tiny country of roughly 3.5 million people with a million more living abroad out of economic necessity, remains the poorest country in Europe and will need all the help it can get.   Russian troops continue to occupy its separatist region of Transnistria, east of the Dniester River, against the Moldovan government’s request for them to leave and in violation of commitments Russia made at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s   Istanbul Summit in 1999.
The most immediate and serious challenge is the prospect of new elections.   Because the parliament failed last year to choose a president, it will have to be dissolved under the constitution sometime after June 16 and new elections will be held.   Various attempts to avoid early elections have triggered disagreements within the current governing coalition but also run contrary to the recommendations of the Venice Commission, which advises countries on complying with their own constitutions and with democratic processes.

While the timing of elections is still up in the air, they could be disruptive to the current team’s flow, and the Communists’ return to power cannot be ruled out completely.   Needless to say, that possibility would be a setback to the country’s reform program and Western orientation.   It also underscores the urgent need to help Moldova stay on a path toward greater integration with Europe.   The current coalition is young and fragile, yet it could become more united if faced with the threat of the Communists’ return to power.

The West has a real stake in Moldova’s future.   A successful Moldova would become an important, if small, puzzle piece toward a Europe whole, free, and at peace and could become a model for other small countries in the region.     It would send an important signal to Europeans that countries in Eastern Europe can change for the better.   Finally, it is a country eager, if not desperate, for outside help where a small contribution can go a long way.   For all these reasons, Moldova deserves our continued attention and support.

David J. Kramer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Washington, DC, office. Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust and GMF’s Bucharest office. Pavol Demes directs GMF’s Bratislava office.

WASHINGTON — Ask most Americans and Europeans to identify Vladimir Filat or find Moldova on a map and you’re likely to get a blank stare. Both, however, are worth getting to know. Filat is the new prime minister of Moldova, a small country of four million people that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union nearly 20 years ago and borders Ukraine and Romania. Despite its size, Moldova is an important piece to the puzzle of trying to achieve the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Filat is in Washington this week to sign an agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation for $262 million in aid and to meet with senior U.S. officials, including Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. His arrival marks the first official visit of a Moldovan prime minister to the United States in memory and represents a historic change after eight years under the previous backward Communist government.

Filat’s visit to Washington needs to be followed by serious Western engagement to help Moldova integrate into the Euroatlantic community and end its isolation from the West. Moldova badly needs outside assistance and this new government is clearly looking Westward.

For years, Moldova has held the unfortunate distinction of being Europe’s poorest country, known for problems of corruption, trafficking in persons, and the separatist region of Transnistria. Following violent protests in the immediate aftermath of last April’s parliamentary elections, Moldovans went to the polls again last July and dealt Communist leader Vladimir Voronin and his party a major blow.

The new government, which assumed office on September 25, has progressive, reform-minded, democratic leadership, marking a true generational change. The 40-year-old Filat sits at the top alongside Mihai Ghimpu, Marian Lupu, and Serafim Urechean, all of whom signed the Alliance for European Integration this past August. Still, the Communists have enough parliamentary seats to block election of a new president; to choose a president, one needs 61 deputies in the 101-seat parliament and the Communists have 48 seats. The resulting stalemate has forced Moldova yet again to schedule elections for later this year, underscoring the need to help the pro-reform, democratic forces sooner rather than later.

The new government has changed substantially the style of politics, communication with the public, and the image of Moldova in the eyes of the international community almost overnight. Neither Moldova nor the West is likely to have a better opportunity under this new government.

Any visitor to Moldova in recent months can witness new hope, energy, and openness in this largely neglected country. The attitude of the new government toward the media and civil society has changed profoundly and for the better. Moreover, Filat and his colleagues are eager to reach out to Moldova’s neighbors, in particular the European Union, with an ambitious program designed to help the country make up for lost time under the previous regime.   It is notable that Moldova has achieved its delayed power-shift to liberal democracy in a period of global economic and financial crisis, which has hit especially hard the most vulnerable economies of Central and Eastern Europe.

Filat and his colleagues, learning from the successes and failures of other post-communist nations (including Georgia and Ukraine), have a great chance to move their country closer to stability and prosperity, but only if the European Union and the United States underpin promises to help this fragile democracy with advice and practical assistance. Only then can Moldova become a true success story.

While repairing the economy and building institutions are the top priorities, solving the Transnistria separatist problem is also important.   Russia has refused to remove its 1,200 “peacekeeping forces” and munitions from the Transnistrian part of the country despite a   pledge to do so under the 1999 Istanbul Commitments. The new government in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital, has called for the departure of the Russian forces, and the West should step up its support for this position based on the principle of host-country consent. The previous Moldovan government paid mere lip service to calling for the removal of Russian forces and nearly signed on to 2003′s ill-fated Kozak Plan, which would have expanded and extended Russia’s presence in the region.

Moldova’s new leaders acknowledge deep and immediate reforms as the only way to progress. They seem willing to embark on these reforms and not wait for – or whine about – the absence of a solid promise of integration into the EU. This makes them the exception in a region where governments regard this promise as the only incentive for reform. This alone should make the EU pay serious attention to Moldova, a new hope in a long-troubled neighborhood. To its credit, and in compensation for sporadic attention paid to the country’s problems, the EU has met the openness of the new Moldovan government with immediate negotiation of an Association Agreement. The country is also fully engaged in the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s instrument for advanced cooperation with Moldova and five other countries in the region.

Reforms are the engine of development, yet they bear a political cost, one that Moldova cannot pay too soon without seriously risking sliding back to a closed and infertile political system. This is why, in addition to EU action on the economy, efforts also should focus on helping mass media take full advantage of its newly regained freedom, encouraging civil society to become part of policymaking and strengthen its watchdog capacity, and increasing parliamentary control over government actions. Creation of solid elements of a democratic system is the only proof against political backsliding. Moreover, an economically attractive and politically stable Moldova will have more power to negotiate a fair settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and attract those on the other side of the Dniester River.   But Transnistria cannot become an excuse to stop reform.   Moldova simply doesn’t have that luxury — and neither does the West.

David J. Kramer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Washington, DC, office. Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust and GMF’s Bucharest office. Pavol Demes directs GMF’s Bratislava office.

WASHINGTON, DC — On the eve of this week’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO Ministerial meetings, in addition to a NATO-Russia Council gathering, Russian officials unveiled their long-awaited proposal for a new European Security Treaty.   The Medvedev proposal, as it has become known, has been the subject of considerable debate within NATO and among OSCE member states.     Some argue that it represents an important opportunity to engage with Russia on addressing security needs in Europe.   Others counter that instead of focusing on the Russian proposal, emphasis should be on revitalizing existing security arrangements, not their replacement or total overhaul.

Skeptics of the Russian proposal, ourselves included, question negotiating a new architecture with Russia when Moscow currently is not in compliance with existing security arrangements, namely, the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and last summer’s Georgia ceasefire agreement.   If Russia does not abide by these agreements, on what basis can there be sufficient trust and confidence that Russia will adhere to new arrangements?   Furthermore, according to the text released by the Kremlin, “A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in, or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”   Russia is already in violation of this clause through its continued illegal troop presence in Georgia’s separatist regions and forces in the Moldovan separatist area of Transnistria, contrary to the position of the government in Chisinau and the 1999 Istanbul Commitments.  

Russia also uses other methods short of military force that significantly affect the security of its neighbors, including energy cutoffs, cyber attacks, or bans on other countries’ exports.   Such tactics and behavior clearly run counter to existing security arrangements, to say nothing of the new Russian proposal.   Finally, but not surprisingly, the Russian draft makes no reference to human rights standards and democratization, key issues for the OSCE and NATO.

The idea for a new European security architecture first emerged in June 2008 when newly-elected Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, in a speech in Berlin, called for a “legally binding treaty.” Medvedev warned against “marginalizing and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security, and abandoning the creation of general regional collective security systems.”  

In the 18 months it took to flesh out Medvedev’s idea, it became clear that Russia was interested in creating a new pan-European security architecture to replace Cold War-era institutions such as NATO and OSCE.   Moscow considers today’s institutions incapable of addressing 21st century security challenges.

Many observers suspected the Russian proposal was designed to marginalize the U.S. on European security matters and drive wedges between and among allies in order to increase Europe’s reliance on Moscow.   European leaders, particularly in countries along Russia’s borders and those most vulnerable to Russian pressure over energy supplies, made clear that the U.S. is central to any such discussions.

The Russian proposal also reflects the view in Moscow that NATO and EU enlargement poses a threat to Russia, ignores Russian interests in the region, and increases instability.   In fact, Russia’s western borders have become more stable and secure since the enlargement of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe.   For example, since becoming members of the EU and NATO, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have become more stable, democratic neighbors.   The signing of a border treaty between Latvia and Russia in May 2007 and the visit seven months later by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Riga were simply not possible before Latvia joined NATO.

To be fair, one should not reflexively dismiss all Russian concerns, for Moscow has a point in observing that existing security institutions have struggled at times to address key issues and to determine their role in the changing security environment.     After all, the Georgia-Russia crisis exposed weaknesses in NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.   However, the solution is not to scrap these organizations but to reform them.   The efforts by a group of experts led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to revise NATO’s Strategic Concept, to be unveiled in Lisbon at next year’s NATO summit, are the first steps in correcting that organization’s shortcomings.

In addition, NATO members must engage frequently in strategic discussions on key security challenges.   This is simply not happening today.   Instead, many Allies hesitate to discuss issues such as Iran, missile defense, and Georgia for fear of jangling politically sensitive nerves.   The EU must also spend more time addressing key security issues affecting its member states — Afghanistan in particular.   Furthermore, greater practical cooperation between the EU and NATO is imperative.   The world’s security challenges are too complex and numerous for one organization to focus solely on military issues and another to focus solely on civilian issues.

NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have served and will continue to serve increasingly important roles in managing transatlantic security challenges, but they are certainly not perfect and need to be improved.   That is far different from replacing them or subordinating them to a larger superstructure.   Cooperation and dialogue among the allies and with Russia must increase.   If Moscow were to respect   the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes — principles already enshrined in existing arrangements — pan-European and transatlantic security would be greatly improved.

Written by Daniel P. Fata and David J. Kramer, who  are Senior Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.