The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia briefly catapulted the tiny Caucasian republic onto newspapers’ front pages worldwide before swiftly returning it to its former status as an international affairs backwater. So few paid attention when, on October 15, the Georgian parliament overwhelmingly approved constitutional amendments that will transfer most governmental authority from the president to the prime minister by 2013—precisely when President Mikhail Saakashvili’s second and final  presidential term ends.

The president himself contends that this is part of his constitutional reform package aimed at improving the balance of power within the Georgian government. Yet speculation is rampant that Georgia’s charismatic and controversial leader has pulled a move right out of Russian Prime Minister (and former two-term president) Vladimir Putin’s playbook, providing himself with job security and governmental authority once his presidential term concludes.  The final opinion on the new constitutional amendments by the Venice Commission—the constitutional advisory body of the Council of Europe, invited to mentor the Georgian State Constitutional Commission—gently alluded to these allegations, and called for further strengthening the powers of the parliament.

The fact that President Saakashvili’s good intentions are so widely doubted underscores the fragility of Georgia’s democratic transformation since the 2003 Rose Revolution. The president has tried to reassure critics that he remains committed to his country’s reforms, and that Georgia under his leadership has achieved significant gains in terms of economic development, press freedom, and the fight against corruption. But, in fact, there has been a decline in press freedom according to Reporters without Borders’ 2010 Press Freedom Index, and a high level of corruption persists according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The use of excessive force to quell anti-government demonstrations in 2007 and 2009 has not helped to reassure the skeptics, and the domestic political climate remains charged.

Serious unresolved issues remain between Georgia and Russia. The October 18 withdrawal of Russian troops from the Georgian village of Perevi is a step in the right direction. Still, the EU-brokered ceasefire agreement is yet to be fully implemented, as over 3000 Russian troops continue to be stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the build-up of Russian hardware in the breakaway regions only further exacerbates the tension. In Russia’s  Northern Caucasus region, too, violence is on the upswing, and threatens to destabilize the entire region.

It therefore came as something of a surprise when President Saakashvili unveiled a vision for a united Caucasus region in his speech at the United Nations’ General Assembly meeting in September. Calling Georgia “a laboratory for political reform and social transformation,” Saakashvili appealed for solidarity among the nations of the Caucasus. Unfortunately, the Georgian government decided at the same time to introduce a 90-day visa-free entry for residents of the Northern Caucasus. This decision, as much as the speech itself, has done little to improve relations with Russia, who sees it as giving potential freedom of movement to terrorists and possibly reigniting clashes in a conflict-prone region.

Constructive engagement by the European Union and the United States in the region is now, more than ever, the key to preventing conflict and promoting real political and economic breakthroughs. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Tbilisi in July—when she referred to the Russian troop presence in Georgia and the two breakaway regions as an “occupation”—reassured those who worried that Washington’s “reset” of relations with Russia had come at the expense of a downgrading of relations with the smaller countries on Russia’s periphery. An important further step by Washington would be to finally nominate U.S. ambassadors to key countries in the region, like Azerbaijan and Turkey. Meanwhile, the European Union’s Eastern Partnership (created in 2009 as a framework for economic, social, and political programs in the EU’s eastern neighborhood), its Monitoring Mission in Georgia, as well as continued efforts towards free-trade zones and visa liberalization, could all help to stabilize the region around Georgia.

As for Russia, the Obama administration’s “reset” policy has enabled a more constructive dialogue with Moscow, for example on Russia’s entry into the WTO. Georgia, however, is a member of the WTO, and therefore holds a veto power. What might be an acceptable deal for both sides? Illusions about Russian withdrawal from Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a full return to mutual respect for the internationally recognized borders are perhaps unwarranted. Still, there is room for maneuver. One possibility could be the return of international monitors along the countries’ borders.

This is not an opportunity the international community—or, for that matter, Georgia—can afford to mishandle.  Georgia, with its vibrant and Western-looking civil society, still has the potential to be—if not George W. Bush’s “beacon of liberty for the region”—at least an exemplar of genuine political transformation. But for that to happen, the United States and Europe must enhance their roles in Georgia’s volatile neighborhood.  Saakashvili, for his part, must also prove his commitment to the democratic promises of the Rose Revolution. One thing is certain: emulating Vladimir Putin is not the way to do it.

Dakota Korth and Mark Cunningham are Senior Program Officers with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC, and Bucharest, respectively.

BUCHAREST — On June 5, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a brief but significant memorandum on a joint EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Policy (ERPSC) in the German town of Meseberg. The document proposes to “explore” the creation of a ministerial-level committee to be chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, Lady Catherine Ashton, and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This would be a forum for the European Union and Russia to exchange views on issues of international security and foreign policy; to “establish ground rules for joint EU-Russia civil/military crisis management operations”; and to “exchange views and draft recommendations … on specific issues.” Transnistria is explicitly cited as a possible first test case for “cooperation” and even a “joint EU-Russia engagement.”

Such a move was not entirely unexpected. Since the 2009 Ukraine-Russia gas crisis froze half of Europe, forums for the EU-Russia dialogue have mushroomed. A leaked policy paper from the Russian foreign ministry suggests that Russia, too, seeks rapprochement with the West. And many experts thought that the meeting in Meseberg would produce something that would compensate for the EU’s recent decision to postpone the extension of its visa-free regime to Russia.

The German rationale for this initiative appears to be twofold. The key goal is to resolve the Transnistrian conflict by getting Russia back to constructive engagement, and using pressure on the Transnistrian leadership to compromise. Russian troops could be withdrawn, or put under a joint EU-Russian mandate. More generally, the initiative tests the seriousness of Russian offers of cooperation. A success in Transnistria would (for instance) greatly improve chances for a renewed conventional arms regime in Europe.

But how likely is such a committee to resolve specific security issues? Would it even be able to discuss European and Russian foreign policies straightforwardly? There is no single EU foreign policy; each of the 27 member states has its own foreign policy orientation and its own threat perception, and there is very little agreement among them. In fact, many new members still think Russia remains Europe’s chief external threat. Under these conditions, the conversations in the proposed committee are likely to be as interesting as they will be unproductive. And while it is good news that Germany is seeking an EU framework rather than acting bilaterally with Russia, it remains to be seen whether the slow and bureaucratic EU can successfully broker conflict resolution with Russia in its Eastern neighborhood. Given the cautious language of the memorandum, this  format might well be more symbolic than effective.

Nonetheless, the mere fact that Russia and the European Union would be willing to sit together to, “establish ground rules for joint civil/military crisis management operations,” would take the relationship to a new, unprecedented level.  The EU has undertaken a number of such operations, including in Kosovo and Georgia. Over the last 20 years, Russia has also deployed “peacekeeping” troops in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.  However, Russia’s activities often violated all of the three chief principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and non-use of force. Had the international community confronted Russia about this before 2008, the Russo-Georgian war might have been avoided.  In the case of Transnistria, Russia has broken every treaty it has signed since 1994, refusing to withdraw its troops despite Moldovan requests. Given this background, it would indeed be interesting, under the circumstances, to watch the EU and Russia develop joint “ground rules” for crisis management.

Possibly, Russia is genuinely willing to cooperate on Transnistria in exchange for economic advancement. But the real test would, of course, be an EU-Russian cooperation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Perhaps even the Northern Caucasus?) But that would require rather more than a bilateral memorandum and an EU committee—particularly now when European interest in the conflicts in its Eastern neighborhood seems to be on the wane.

One sign is the recent proposal by Catherine Ashton’s office to abolish the posts of special EU envoys for the Southern Caucasus and Moldova while maintaining similar positions for more distant regions:  Sudan, the Great Lakes region in Africa, and Central Asia. The special envoys to Moldova and Southern Caucasus, mandated to speak on behalf of the EU in negotiations for the conflicts in these regions, were almost permanently present on the ground and were able to interact with all the relevant local parties. Other existing EU programs for the region, including bilateral and regional ones, avoid addressing the conflicts head-on. With the abolition of the special envoys, the EU will lose the little political clout it has had in these conflicts. And certainly it will become increasingly difficult to hold meaningful joint civil/military operations with Russia in those crises that are closer to home.

If Germany is serious about its commitment to solving the conflicts in Europe’s neighborhood, it could use its economic leverage over Russia, and Russia’s thirst for economic advancement, as a stick, rather than having the EU offer a carrot. After all, the conflicts in Europe’s Eastern neighborhood remain a major cause of human, drug, and weapons trafficking to Europe, and a significant reason for economic retardation in a region where the EU has real economic interests. Perhaps more importantly in the short term, these conflicts remain a means by which Russia controls and manipulates oil and gas flows to Europe itself, as Germany well knows.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Sea Trust and the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bucharest

WASHINGTON – In his new national security strategy, Barack Obama defined his tenure as a transitional presidency that will leave Cold War thinking behind in order to adjust U.S. policy to the realities of a multipolar world. But as far as Russia is concerned, not everyone seems to be convinced that the Cold War really is over. Ron Asmus recently wrote in GMF ‘s Transatlantic Take series about the “specter of Finlandization” as shorthand for “a Russian policy that seeks to limit the foreign policy choices and sovereignty of countries on its borders.” Asmus seems to think that there is an explicit Russian grand strategy to pressure its Western neighbors into choosing neutrality over a Westward course that might culminate in NATO or EU membership.

It is certainly true that Russia’s relationships with too many of the countries in its Western neighborhood are still tense, but Asmus’ bleak analysis risks missing some significant developments. To begin with, countries in the region have increasingly chosen to determine their future through democratic elections. That was the case in Ukraine, where – not to everybody’s pleasure – Victor Yanukovich won an election that was widely considered to be the country’s most democratic. In Moldova, the communists lost their majority for the first time since independence in democratic and free elections. It is only fair to recognize that Russia established relations with all the candidates and accepted the results of both elections; so should the West.

Asmus does not explain what “Finlandization” looks like for individual countries in Europe’s Eastern periphery; in fact, he doesn’t name examples for countries that have been forced to choose “Finlandization.” Instead, he suggests that President Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security alliance is merely a tool for a Moscow policy which seeks to re-establish a Russian sphere of influence in the neighborhood. Actually, it might be argued that Medvedev’s initiative (with a push from the Obama Administration’s “reset” policy) has opened the way to more engagement and discussions between Russia and its partners, including resumption of talks in the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE’s Corfu Process.

Russia has done a great deal to improve relations with Poland, from an op-ed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin pact in the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza, followed by the screening of a TV documentary on the Katyn massacre, and culminating in a general outpouring of empathy and emotion after the plane crash that killed Poland’s leadership in Smolensk. Unnoticed by many, Russia finally settled a 20-year-old border dispute with Norway on terms that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin were willing to accept.

Obama’s “reset” has been a success as well, establishing a new level of confidence between American and Russian leaders – as evidenced by the New START treaty, as well as Russian support for a UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against Iran (producing an unprecedented outburst by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Moscow). Russia is facilitating the supply of ISAF troops in Afghanistan through her airspace and rail system; even cooperation on missile defense no longer appears impossible. A bilateral U.S.-Russian presidential commission, working in 16 subcommittees, is contributing to pragmatic solutions and confidence-building. Finally, Moscow recently reaffirmed its commitment to a “modernization partnership” with Germany.

Surely, all this is progress, or at least a sign of a new attitude in the Kremlin? Given all the advancements made in the Western relationship with Russia, the question remains why there is a “specter of Finlandization” around and why one would want to beat Russia with a new strategy of enlargement?

True, Western enlargement policy has been a great success – a large number of former Warsaw Pact states today are members of the EU and NATO. Even on the European periphery, free and fair democratic elections are increasingly coming to be seen as the desirable standard.

But what could a new enlargement strategy provide – and without putting the progress made with Russia at risk? There is no doubt that the West is committed to “to advance our shared goals, especially in promoting democracy and prosperity in Eastern European countries” as the new American security strategy puts it. But Ukraine has just democratically voted for a president who is not interested in NATO membership. In the case of Georgia, where an increasingly irresponsible president confronts a Russian policy in violation of its international obligations, no easy solution is at hand. When analyzing international affairs, it is essential to assess the “world as it is,” to use again the language of Barack Obama’s new security strategy. On Russia, his approach seems eminently appropriate: “While actively seeking Russia’s cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors.”

Niels Annen is a Senior Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

BRUSSELS — A specter is starting to haunt wider Europe — those countries located between the EU and NATO on one hand and Russia on the other.     That specter is “Finlandization.”   The return of this Cold War phrase reveals much about the changing spirit of the times and geopolitics of European security today. “Finlandization” refers to the policy imposed   on Finland after World War II to pursue a foreign policy of neutrality that took the strategic interests and demands of the Soviet Union into account while preserving a democratic political system and avoiding the adoption of a communist system or becoming a satellite state, as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe.  

While the term is often used in a pejorative fashion, it is historically unfair to Finland itself, a small Nordic country that fought the Red Army to a draw in order to guard its independence and then managed to preserve it for 40 years.   As communism and the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of the Cold War, Helsinki used this new window of opportunity to move westward: it swiftly joined the European Union and created the option to join NATO by meeting all of the Alliance’s criteria in advance, an option it has heretofore chosen not to implement but could do so expeditiously if political currents changed.  

But the phrase is slipping back into modern usage–as a potential future option for those countries in wider Europe.   It is a shorthand way to describe a Russian policy that seeks to limit the foreign policy choices and sovereignty of countries on its borders and preclude their joining NATO or seeking a westward course in what Moscow sees as its sphere of privileged interest.   Moscow has been engaged in a political offensive on this front since the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.   It has recently been focusing on using soft power to tie a country like Ukraine more closely to it and to deny Kiev a Western option.

Moscow is not only seeking assurances from these countries that they will not seek to join the West.   It is also seeking assurances from Western nations that they recognize this alleged sphere of special interest — and potentially give their tacit agreement to such new notions of limited sovereignty.   That is one of the main issues embedded   in a series of Russian policy pronouncements and the European security proposal of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. While no Western leader has yet endorsed this idea as official policy, one doesn’t have to travel very far in the diplomatic corridors before running across diplomats who are asking out loud whether some new and modern version of “Finlandization” might become an acceptable policy for countries whose prospects for Western integration seem to be sinking.    

What has brought this idea back from its Cold War grave?   One factor is the perception that the historic opportunity for democratic enlargement that opened after 1989 is slowly closing. The United States’ preoccupation with the major challenges it currently faces in southwest Asia and the wider Middle East has, rightly or wrongly, contributed to the sense that American diplomacy and power is no longer available to help extend the vision of a Europe whole and free deeper into the post-Soviet space.    Enlargement fatigue, growing Russian opposition, the more complicated nature of some of the candidates — and now the Euro crisis — have all moved enlargement   off the front burner of Western policy priorities.   The combination of Russian assertiveness, European weakness, and American distraction has helped to spawn the view that the historical window for democratic enlargement may be coming to a close and that the West   needs a new, pragmatic compromise with Russia on wider Europe.

There is a problem, however.   A return to Finlandization — or some other form of limited sovereignty under a different name — would mark an historical setback.   It would be a direct refutation of some of the founding principles of the Charter of Paris from November 1990 — the document that was supposed to be the cornerstone and a kind of bill of rights of a new post-Cold War European cooperative security architecture.   That document — along with its successors — explicitly  guarantees the right of a country to be able to choose its own domestic and foreign policy path.     It would be the end of a vision that three U.S. presidents have been committed to and worked for since 1989 — the belief in a new cooperative European security structure that abolishes previous concepts of a balance of power, sphere of influence, and limited sovereignty.

Moscow today seeks to halt the further enlargement of Western institutions closer to its borders through a new version of Finlandization.   But what is also clear is that the West no longer has a clear consensus or strategy for what we seek to achieve today with these countries.   We affirm our commitment to the old principles but are unsure how to pursue or operationalize them in a changed political and strategic context.   If we want to ensure that Finlandization remains a historical phrase and not a current one, we need a new strategy of enlargement. As the American saying goes: you can’t beat something with nothing.  

Ronald D. Asmus is Executive Director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center and is responsible for strategic planning at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

BUCHAREST — On May 9, the streets of Moscow will witness a rare and memorable spectacle. In a parade marking the 65^th anniversary of Victory Day – the end of World War II, when Germany surrendered to Soviet commanders – 10,500 servicemen will march through Moscow for this special celebration, accompanied by 150 military vehicles. Former allied troops (British, American, French, and Polish) will march alongside soldiers from former Soviet Union countries. The Russian authorities have promised this will be the biggest and most impressive military show in Moscow in the last 65 years – and they know a thing or two about military shows.

Yet the politics on display may well turn out to be even more remarkable. For the official stands will be shared by old, current, and future allies and enemies, in a panoramic picture of Europe spanning 65 years. Watching the parade will be the Russian leadership – first among them President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. They will be joined by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and a host of other European notables.   The symbolism is, of course, deliberate: peaceful relations between Europe and Russia guarantee peace and stability on the continent. Yet it is also a reminder that the relationship is rooted to a significant degree in natural resources and hard power: Europe’s dependency on Russian gas, matched by Russia’s thirst for technology, furthered by potential sales of advanced military technology, and deepened by talks of a common security architecture.

Moreover, the notion of a “peace in Europe” works only if you firmly ban from your memory the wars and conflicts that took place since the end of the Cold War (from the Balkans to Chechnya to Georgia, to name only a few), and if you define Europe – as the Russians like to do – as contiguous with the territorial reach of the European Union. Even so, it’s hard to ignore the fact that the arc between Northeastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus remains a highly combustible zone, as well as a wellspring for organized crime and illicit trade of all kinds, from people to drugs and weapons, and coming from as far away as the Middle East and Asia.

Also present in the stands will be leaders from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – the club of former members of the Soviet Union. They are meeting at an informal summit a day earlier, with foreign policy cooperation as one of the main issues on the agenda. What this cooperation could look like was exemplified only a short while ago by the recent shift in Ukraine foreign policy toward a more Moscow-friendly stance.  Cooperation between Russia and what it used to call its “near abroad” could translate into progress and development for Russia’s neighboring countries; but for now, it appears to mean control over their military alliances, stimulation of social divisions, prevalence of Russia’s economic interests, and continuation of conflicts throughout the region.

Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia itself remain tied to a history and present that is marked by conflicts generated or catalyzed by the breaking up of the Soviet Union, and whose prolongation obstructs their economic and political development.  Georgian troops, of course, will not be marching in the parade, and Georgian leaders will be nowhere close to the other VIPs. Their absence will remind onlookers of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, which was in no small degree responsible for Russia’s current surge of confidence, and two “solved” frozen conflicts (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) by declaring them independent entities.

Only the absence of the Moldovan president Mihai Ghimpu will remind those who care to notice that this tiny country disapproves of Moscow’s neighborhood policy and is seeking economic and political integration with the West. Perhaps next year’s parade attendance roster may tell us whether it succeeded or not.

Former European enemies standing together to commemorate the end of one of the most terrible and bitter wars in human memory: that is indeed a reassuring sign of the continent’s enduring commitment to peace. Yet there is another, more subtle message in the lineup: authoritarian countries claiming “spheres of influence” have not fostered security, development, and prosperity in the past. And they are not doing so now.

Editor’s note: Corrected the description of the CIS to be the former Soviet Union states.

Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust and the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bucharest

WASHINGTON, DC — On the eve of this week’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO Ministerial meetings, in addition to a NATO-Russia Council gathering, Russian officials unveiled their long-awaited proposal for a new European Security Treaty.   The Medvedev proposal, as it has become known, has been the subject of considerable debate within NATO and among OSCE member states.     Some argue that it represents an important opportunity to engage with Russia on addressing security needs in Europe.   Others counter that instead of focusing on the Russian proposal, emphasis should be on revitalizing existing security arrangements, not their replacement or total overhaul.

Skeptics of the Russian proposal, ourselves included, question negotiating a new architecture with Russia when Moscow currently is not in compliance with existing security arrangements, namely, the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and last summer’s Georgia ceasefire agreement.   If Russia does not abide by these agreements, on what basis can there be sufficient trust and confidence that Russia will adhere to new arrangements?   Furthermore, according to the text released by the Kremlin, “A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in, or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”   Russia is already in violation of this clause through its continued illegal troop presence in Georgia’s separatist regions and forces in the Moldovan separatist area of Transnistria, contrary to the position of the government in Chisinau and the 1999 Istanbul Commitments.  

Russia also uses other methods short of military force that significantly affect the security of its neighbors, including energy cutoffs, cyber attacks, or bans on other countries’ exports.   Such tactics and behavior clearly run counter to existing security arrangements, to say nothing of the new Russian proposal.   Finally, but not surprisingly, the Russian draft makes no reference to human rights standards and democratization, key issues for the OSCE and NATO.

The idea for a new European security architecture first emerged in June 2008 when newly-elected Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, in a speech in Berlin, called for a “legally binding treaty.” Medvedev warned against “marginalizing and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security, and abandoning the creation of general regional collective security systems.”  

In the 18 months it took to flesh out Medvedev’s idea, it became clear that Russia was interested in creating a new pan-European security architecture to replace Cold War-era institutions such as NATO and OSCE.   Moscow considers today’s institutions incapable of addressing 21st century security challenges.

Many observers suspected the Russian proposal was designed to marginalize the U.S. on European security matters and drive wedges between and among allies in order to increase Europe’s reliance on Moscow.   European leaders, particularly in countries along Russia’s borders and those most vulnerable to Russian pressure over energy supplies, made clear that the U.S. is central to any such discussions.

The Russian proposal also reflects the view in Moscow that NATO and EU enlargement poses a threat to Russia, ignores Russian interests in the region, and increases instability.   In fact, Russia’s western borders have become more stable and secure since the enlargement of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe.   For example, since becoming members of the EU and NATO, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have become more stable, democratic neighbors.   The signing of a border treaty between Latvia and Russia in May 2007 and the visit seven months later by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Riga were simply not possible before Latvia joined NATO.

To be fair, one should not reflexively dismiss all Russian concerns, for Moscow has a point in observing that existing security institutions have struggled at times to address key issues and to determine their role in the changing security environment.     After all, the Georgia-Russia crisis exposed weaknesses in NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.   However, the solution is not to scrap these organizations but to reform them.   The efforts by a group of experts led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to revise NATO’s Strategic Concept, to be unveiled in Lisbon at next year’s NATO summit, are the first steps in correcting that organization’s shortcomings.

In addition, NATO members must engage frequently in strategic discussions on key security challenges.   This is simply not happening today.   Instead, many Allies hesitate to discuss issues such as Iran, missile defense, and Georgia for fear of jangling politically sensitive nerves.   The EU must also spend more time addressing key security issues affecting its member states — Afghanistan in particular.   Furthermore, greater practical cooperation between the EU and NATO is imperative.   The world’s security challenges are too complex and numerous for one organization to focus solely on military issues and another to focus solely on civilian issues.

NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have served and will continue to serve increasingly important roles in managing transatlantic security challenges, but they are certainly not perfect and need to be improved.   That is far different from replacing them or subordinating them to a larger superstructure.   Cooperation and dialogue among the allies and with Russia must increase.   If Moscow were to respect   the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes — principles already enshrined in existing arrangements — pan-European and transatlantic security would be greatly improved.

Written by Daniel P. Fata and David J. Kramer, who  are Senior Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

BRUSSELS — President Obama’s shelving of the Bush administration’s missile defense plans makes sense in addressing the immediate Iranian threat. It has nevertheless created a crisis of confidence in Central and Eastern Europe.   The crisis’ roots lie in policy mistakes made over the course of the past decade. One was assuming that the issue of whether these countries belonged in the West would be resolved when these countries joined NATO and the EU. We assumed that Russia would accept that they were gone from its shrinking sphere of influence and stop interfering in the region.   But it hasn’t.   It has merely changed tactics, and is now recycling the idea of a Russian “sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe under the new label of “zone of special interest” €“ which of course also means lesser security.

Another mistake was not fulfilling our pledges on Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.   I sat at the table in the mid-1990s as Washington promised Warsaw that NATO would have a corps-size reinforcement capability to provide for its security. That never materialized. Attempts to develop contingency plans have also been blocked.   In fact, the Alliance has decayed in its role as the key crisis manager in Europe €“ as became evident during the Russo-Georgian war in August of 2008.     In private, Central and East European leaders are no longer certain that NATO would be capable of coming to their rescue if there were a crisis involving Russia.

Enter missile defense.   The Poles and Czechs bought into George W. Bush’s plans for missile defense because they were seeking additional security through an American military presence on their soil: in other words, insurance. That is why the plans assumed so much political significance in the region €“ and why abandoning them creates a crisis.

There is a fix to the problem.   Address the region’s concerns through the front door of NATO and not the back door of missile defense. We need a package of political, economic and defense measures that provide strategic reassurance. If we get that right, we can get this relationship back on track. If we don’t, the crisis of confidence in the region will deepen.

NOTE: This is an informational compilation. GMF does not endorse, either explicitly or implicitly, the content contained herein.

NEWS

In Wake of Georgian War, Russian Media Feel Heat

Washington Post (U.S.), Philip P. Pan, 15 Sep 2008

Summary: “The message to the 30 or so media executives at the gathering was clear: With Russia occupying parts of Georgia and locked in perhaps its most serious conflict with the West since the Cold War, they should be especially vigilant against reporting anything that the government might find objectionable.”

Record $47.9Bln Planned for Defense

The Moscow Times (RUS), 15 Sep 2008

Summary: Spending on arms will rise to a record $47.9 billion next year, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said Friday, as the Kremlin moves to beef up the armed forces after a conflict in Georgia.

Georgia war sparks political battle in Ukraine

Los Angeles Times (U.S.), Megan K. Stack, 15 Sep 2008

Summary: “The war in Georgia is over. But the war over the war in Georgia rages unabated in Ukraine, the former Soviet state that, like Georgia, has drawn the wrath of Moscow by building ties with the West. The collapse of this country’s ruling coalition is widely expected to become official this week, the final gasp of a threadbare alliance that has barely hung together in recent months. The delicate balance was upended by a widening dispute over how to respond to a newly aggressive Russia.”

Putin fails to dispel doubts over Medvedev

Financial Times (UK), Stefan Wagstyl, 14 Sep 2008

Summary: “The key question for many Valdai guests was who really runs Russia. Mr Medvedev emphasised that, as commander-in-chief, he had called the shots in the Georgian crisis and Mr Putin said the same, commenting that “the buck stops with him”. However, the visitors were left with the same impression as most Russians, that Mr Putin takes the big decisions. In a telling remark, Mr Putin referred to Mr Medvedev as “a good guy”, using a Russian phrase that sounded more like a condescending term of endearment rather than a fitting label for the country’s president. In contrast, Mr Medvedev hardly mentioned Mr Putin, perhaps to avoid detracting from himself.”

Medvedev Guests Take Tough Message Home

The Moscow Time (RUS), Nabi Abdullaev, 15 Sep 2008

Summary: President Dmitry Medvedev said Friday in a meeting with a group of Western political and academic specialists on Russia that last month’s military conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated the current absence of a just international order.

Russian Troops Take Down Some Georgia Checkpoints

New York Times (U.S.), Dan Bilefsky, 13 Sep 2008

Summary: “Hundreds of Russian troops retreated from checkpoints across western Georgia on Saturday ahead of a deadline for their withdrawal brokered by the European Union…The partial pullout on Saturday was cautiously welcomed by the Georgian government, but was overshadowed here by news that a Georgian policeman was shot dead from the direction of a Russian position at a post in Ganmukhuri, a village near the separatist enclave of Abkhazia.”

NATO Chief Heads to Georgia

RIA Novosti (RUS), 15 Sep 2008

Summary: NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer will arrive in Georgia on Monday, after making strong statements in support of Georgia that have been met with criticism from Russia.

NATO Envoys Will Offer Their Support in Georgia

New York Times (U.S.), Judy Dempsey, 14 Sep 2008

Summary: “Defying strong opposition from Russia, NATO’s 26 ambassadors will begin a two-day visit to Georgia on Monday in a move by the American-led military alliance aimed at showing support for the Georgian government, despite the risk of increasing tensions with the Kremlin €¦President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia warned last week that Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership would be a destabilizing factor for the Western alliance and in the volatile Caucasus.”

COMMENTARY

Three Hours with Vladimir Putin

The Russia Profile (RUS), Andrei Zolotov Jr., 12 Sep 2008

Summary: Speaking Thursday to the visiting group of Western experts and journalists, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin vigorously defended Russia’s policy over the conflict in the Caucasus, and blamed the United States for pushing Georgia into a war. Yet the tone of his remarks signaled Russia’s willingness to continue engagement with the West, and not a turn to an overall confrontation heralded by numerous observers in the past weeks.

Kaukasische Gräben

Blätter fär deutsche und internationale Politik (Germany), Uwe Halbach, Issue 09/2008

Summary: In this commentary Uwe Halbach notes that although the current conflict in the Caucasus was the sixth war in the region since 1991, it has sent out shock waves like no other before, as Russia €“ for the first time €“ engaged in a military conflict with an independent neighboring country. He goes on to ask about the reasons for the war, and to discuss the implications for Georgia, Russia and the West.

Valdai Club Launches a Diplomatic Marathon

The RIA Novosti (RUS), 12 Sep 2008

Summary: We are currently witnessing the opening moves in a large-scale political game, that will probably last for months, aimed at building a new system of relations between Russia, the U.S. and EU. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the recent meetings of the Valdai Discussion Club in Rostov-on-Don, Sochi and Moscow.

NOTE: This is an informational compilation. GMF does not endorse, either explicitly or implicitly, the content contained herein.

NEWS

Putin tells Britain: relations can only improve when you remove dissidents

The Times (UK), Richard Beeston, 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “Vladimir Putin served notice yesterday that his country’s relations with Britain would never recover while London remained a base for antiRussian dissent €¦The former President stepped aside this year to make way for Dmitri Medvedev but spoke and acted very much like a head of state. At times he displayed anger, particularly when discussing the deployment of US warships off the Russian Black Sea coast.”

Stung by Criticism Over Georgia, Putin Asks West for a Little Understanding

New York Times (U.S.), Ellen Barry, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “More than a month has passed since Russia sent columns of armor into Georgia, asserting its sphere of influence with a confidence not seen since the days of the Soviet Union. But since the first hours of this crisis, Russian leaders have been asking the same question with mounting frustration: Why is everyone blaming us for this?”

Putin denies Georgia link to market woes

Financial Times (UK), Stefan Wagstyl, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “Vladimir Putin admitted on Thursday that foreign capital inflows could fall by up to 45 per cent this year, but rejected suggestions that turmoil in Russia’s financial markets was caused by the conflict in Georgia €¦Mr Putin blamed Russia’s outflow of capital on “speculative” moves by western institutions withdrawing funds because of the “mortgage crisis” in the US and Europe.”

Russia, Abkhazia, S.Ossetia to sign cooperation deals next week

RIA Novosti (RUS), 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “Nesterenko also said that Russia and Georgia’s rebel republics are currently working on draft military cooperation agreements that are aimed at ensuring stability and security for the residents of both regions.”

Ukraine comes to the forefront

The Economist, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “THE first priority for Europe after Russia’s short August war with Georgia was to secure a ceasefire and a genuine pullback of Russian forces (see article). The second was to start fretting about Russia’s other neighbours. And the most significant of these by far is Ukraine. The Russians have been publicly silent about Ukraine in recent weeks, knowing that they hold some strong cards, besides having just defeated Georgia. Ukraine is almost entirely dependent on Russia for its oil and gas, for uranium enrichment, and as a market in which it can sell its own goods.”

Medvedev”would attack Georgia even if on NATO track”

Reuters, Janet McBride, Michael Stott and Christian Lowe, 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Friday that even if Georgia were on a firm path to NATO membership, he would not hesitate to attack it under circumstances similar to last month’s conflict €¦The Russian president balanced his remarks by saying he did not believe the Caucasus crisis had caused a faultline in relations between Russia and the West, which would lead to another long period of confrontation.”

Palin takes tough line on Russia

Financial Times (UK), Edward Luce, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “Sarah Palin, the running mate of Republican presidential candidate John McCain, on Thursday said the US would be obligated to go to war with Russia if it invaded a Nato ally €“ a status she advocated for Georgia, which Russia invaded last month.”

Abkhazia Now Craves Investors’ Recognition

The Moscow Times (RUS), Anna Smolchenko, 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “Abkhazia is looking to attract investors with sandy beaches, 220 days of sunshine every year and an airport that once served as a backup landing pad for the Soviet space shuttle.”

Belgium cancels warship visit to Russia

RIA Novosti (RUS), 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “Belgium has cancelled an official visit by one of its warships to Russia, a source in the Russian Navy said on Friday.”

COMMENTARY

Die Tär bleibt zu

Säddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), Cathrin Kahlweit, 12 Sep 2008

Summary: Kahlweit states: “Moscow is not going to let EU-observers into South Ossetia €“ Brussels has to accept that”. She argues that the mild reaction from Brussels is a “victory of politics over rhetoric”, as “it is smart to not create too much pressure to even keep up the dialogue with the Russians.

Vladimir Putin eats three grapes and keeps Russia’s worst-kept secret

Financial Times (UK), Richard Beeston, 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “He hates the foreign media, bridles at the least provocation and rounds on his opponents like a terrier. But a three-hour lunch with Vladimir Putin at his favourite resort of Sochi reveals that the Russian Prime Minister has a sense of humour, can be charming and can turn his anger on and off at will.”

What Foreign Investors Fear the Most

The Moscow Times (RUS), Alexei Bayer, 12 Sep 2008

Summary: “Foreign investors are feeling the cold Soviet winds as well, and they have pulled about $25 billion out of Russia during the past three weeks, according to French investment bank BNP Paribas. After all, Soviet communism and the stock market make very bad bedfellows. Remember what the value of the RTS index was under Leonid Brezhnev? Zero, of course, because there was no stock value and no stock market under communism. This is what foreign investors fear the most as they watch precariously where Russia is heading.”

NOTE: This is an informational compilation. GMF does not endorse, either explicitly or implicitly, the content contained herein.

NEWS

S. Ossetia Sends Russia Mixed Signals

New York Times (U.S.), Ellen Barry and Alan Cowell, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “The leader of Georgia’s breakaway South Ossetia region, the focus of Russia’s war with Georgia last month, offered conflicting versions Thursday of his country’s relations with Moscow, first saying that he wanted to join Russia but then insisting that he favored independence, according to news reports €¦Although he did not give a timetable, Mr. Kokoity’s declaration was the clearest public statement so far of South Ossetia’s and Russia’s intentions. He would not have spoken so unambiguously without direct Kremlin backing.”

South Ossetia pledge to join Russia

Financial Times (UK), Stefan Wagstyl, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “Eduard Kokoity, president of the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia, on Thursday pledged to unite with Russia by merging with its autonomous republic of North Ossetia.”

U.S. Examined Beginning of War

Kommersant (RUS), Dmitry Sidorov and Alexander Gabuev, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the recent war in Georgia. During the debates high-ranking State Department and Pentagon officials actually admitted that it was Tbilisi that started the hostilities attacking South Ossetia. This said, Washington virtually acknowledged the chronology Russia regards real. However, it would be untimely for Moscow to triumph. American military and diplomats still consider Russia’s reaction “disproportionate” calling on to counter the Kremlin’s “imperial reach”.

South Ossetia does not want to join Russia, says Moscow

The Guardian (UK), Mark Tran, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “South Ossetia does not want to become part of Russia, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said today, following a series of contradictory statements from Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian leader.”

Israel Bans Arms Dealers from Visiting Georgia

Kommersant (RUS), 11 Sep 2008

Summary: Israel has ordered to halt all sales of military equipment to Georgia, The Associated Press reported with reference to the sources with Israeli defense community.

Russian Bombers Land In Venezuela for Drills

Washington Post (U.S.), Ian James and Vladimir Isachenkov, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “Two Russian strategic bombers landed in Venezuela on Wednesday as part of military maneuvers, President Hugo Chávez said, welcoming the unprecedented deployment at a time of increasing tensions between Russia and the United States. Russian military analysts said it was the first time Russian strategic bombers have landed in the Western Hemisphere since the Cold War.”

Russia Warns Poland on U.S. Missile Shield

New York Times (U.S.), Judy Dempsey, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov of Russia warned Poland on Thursday that it was “playing a dangerous game” by agreeing to deploy part of the controversial American anti-ballistic missile shield on its territory.”

Medvedev Says State Can Lift Markets

The Moscow Times (RUS), Tim Wall , 11 Sep 2008

Summary: As Russian stock markets suffered a second straight disastrous day of trading Wednesday, President Dmitry Medvedev played down the drastic falls of recent months and pledged that the government would restore the markets to their levels at the beginning of the year.

Russia may use wealth fund to support markets

Financial Times (UK), Rachel Morarjee, Charles Clover and Peter Garnham, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “Russia is considering using money from its national wealth fund and pension fund to support financial markets where necessary in the future, Alexei Kudrin, finance minister said on Thursday as the country’s stock market trod water despite government moves to bolster confidence.”

Georgian Opposition Eyes Presidency

Kommersant (RUS), Olga Allenova and Georgy Dvali, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: The Georgian Defense Ministry yesterday denied information published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper that ministry representatives spoke against the actions of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in South Ossetia at a recent meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Nonetheless, that information bolstered the spirits of the Georgian opposition, which demanded Saakashvili’s resignation. Kommersant decided to measure the depth of the internal division in Georgian society and the presidential prospects of opposition leaders.

COMMENTARY

The weakness of the West: Russia is on the front foot now – but not forever

The Economist (UK), Opinion, 11 Sep 2008

Summary: “The West still sells one thing that is not made in Russia: respectability. That matters to the class that Andrei Piontkovsky, a Russian commentator, calls “global kleptocrats”. They want their businesses audited, lawyered and banked by blue-chip Western respectability-merchants. Dubai, Mumbai and Shanghai may offer that eventually, but not yet. Restricting the sale of respectability while the West still has some in stock would be a powerful sanction.”

The Economist Debate Series: Assetive Russia

The Economist (UK), Anne-Marie Slaughter, 9 Sep 2008

Summary: “A bold Western response should have three components: letting the European Union take the lead, albeit with close coordination with the United States; splitting Russia off from its incipient partners in a global G5 (with China, India, Brazil and South Africa); and using networks of economic, religious, social and cultural actors below the surface of traditional geopolitics to bring home the true costs of Russia’s actions.”

Conflicts Thawing from Within

The Russia Profile (RUS), Sergei Balashov, 10 Sep 2008

Summary: The recent crisis between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia has created speculation over possible further eruptions over the “frozen conflict” territories of the former Soviet Union, namely the regions of Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, instead of continuing the recent trend in conflict resolution, rather than seeing them as a playground for grander, political pursuits between international powers, the troubled regions of the CIS need a new localized approach in solving their impending crises.

Drei neue Staaten

Die ZEIT Online (Germany), Joachim Fritz-Vannahme, 10 Sep 2008

Summary: Fritz-Vannahme argues that there are essentially now three new states in the Caucasus: €˜Core’-Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although the EU officially resists the Russian attempt to divide the country, it has de facto accepted the change in the status quo: “The new map of the Caucasus is being drawn in Moscow. And not in Brussels, let alone in Washington.”  

POLICY INSTITUTE ANALYSIS

Economist Debate: Assertive Russia

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (U.S.), Dmitri Trenin, 9 Sep 2008

Summary: “In responding to the Russia-Georgia crisis, punishing the Russians is an option that is frequently advocated in the West. However, in an Economist Debate, Dmitri Trenin argues that before taking such bold steps, the West should first determine what Russia wants and where it is heading. Additionally, It should use this present crisis to structure a security relationship in Europe that would both include Russia and reassure its wary neighbors.”

Russia’s Next Target Could Be Ukraine

American Enterprise Institute (U.S.), Leon Aron, 10 Sep 2008

Summary: “Russia’s invasion and continued occupation of Georgia was the beginning of a disturbing turn in Russia’s national security and foreign policy. The primary goal of Russian foreign policy is now its reemergence as a super power and control over its former Soviet neighbors. Countries seeking greater ties with the West are in danger of more direct Russian intervention. In particular, the Crimea is Ukraine’s weak spot and may be Russia’s next target.”