WASHINGTON – When it began last March, the Syrian revolution appeared to be a textbook example for a peaceful uprising by a people united against state brutality. For weeks, videos documented the determination of the mostly youthful protesters, chanting their demands for freedom and political participation only to be faced with bullets, arrests, torture, and execution.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reacted with a series of gestures whose insincerity was swiftly revealed. A few hundred prisoners were released while thousands more were arrested, with many dying in custody. The decades-old state of emergency was lifted but the regime, in the name of a “security solution,” went on ruthlessly crushing the protests.

Publicly, the Syrian government asserts that “foreign powers” are instigating an insurgency in Syria to punish it for its support of what it calls the anti-Israel “resistance.” In private meetings with non-Sunni regional leaders, the regime promotes the notion that this is also a conflict between a “hegemonic Sunnism” (about three-fourths of Syrians are Sunni) and historically persecuted minorities. But support for the revolution cuts across all socio-economic strata and ethnic or religious groups. Conversely, the Assad regime has resorted to the Alawi community (approximately one-eighth of the population) as a primary pool for support; still, it neither encompasses this community in its totality, nor is limited to it.

The Syrian revolutionaries’ commitment to nonviolence was premised on expectations that they would be able to divide the security apparatus through insubordination and defections and that the world community would act to stop the massacres. Neither expectation was realized.

The revolutionaries have underestimated the ability of the regime to leverage ethnic and religious community cleavages. Recruits from the Alawi community are playing a key role in the repression. Defections are happening, but remain at about 10 percent of the military. The defectors, with no unified leadership, are unable to defeat the regime, but are used by it as proof of being engaged in combating “armed gangs.”

Even more dramatically, the international community was unable to provide the revolutionaries the support they needed. Most observers remain wary as to the implications of regime change in Syria, and indeed the revolutionaries have yet to offer a convincing post-Assad scenario to alleviate these concerns (including those of the regime’s internal constituencies). The Arab League was able to overcome substantial differences between its members on ways to manage the Syrian crisis, but as a result provided a watered-down plan that failed to satisfy the revolutionaries, and was still rejected by the regime. Meanwhile, the transatlantic alliance, the sole plausible agency for decisive support, is hamstrung by the economic crisis and a sharp decline in public tolerance for military interventions. Many strategists compare the case for Western intervention in Syria unfavorably with Libya: the latter, they argue, was “low-risk and high-reward,” whereas the former is precisely the reverse. Finally, Assad continues to be of significant value for both Iran and Russia.

All this has emboldened the Syrian regime; it is asserting that it will regain its international standing once its “security solution” is complete. Yet, with all its lethal superiority, it has been unable to achieve military victory. It has, however, managed to seriously undermine the revolutionaries’ initial commitment to nonviolence and inclusiveness. Against the protestations of many militants, the Syrian revolution has in large part become an armed uprising. This in turn allows the regime to “expose” the revolution as a violent sectarian insurgency, in order to justify resorting to even harsher measures, including arguably engineering violent sectarianism. The Assad regime’s actions may not secure its survival, but they will ensure the unraveling of Syria as a nation-state, with deadly repercussions across the region.

Russia and China’s veto of the latest UN Security Council resolution amounts to a green light for the escalation of the Syrian regime’s homicidal campaign — or, in the words of Qatar’s foreign minister, “a license to kill.”

The only way to stop Syria from sliding into an abyss now is for the transatlantic alliance to assert moral and political leadership. The Arab League’s original plan — that Assad should delegate his authority to a deputy ­­— had succeeded in trimming the demands of the rebels to yet another token action, but still ran afoul of concerted opposition by Russia and China. The League should now be encouraged to propose a bolder, more principled plan to serve as a baseline.

Obviously, it would be preferable to see this conflict addressed at the highest levels of the United Nations, but given the entrenched positions of Moscow and Beijing, that is unlikely. However, the Arab League’s position would also provide a mandate on its own for the transatlantic alliance to investigate next steps. It would also be worth preserving silence as to which steps are would be categorically excluded since the Syrian regime’s killing machine has been reinvigorated by statements of restraint from Washington.

The Assad family’s decades-long stranglehold on power has been largely based on a fear-instilling aura of power. The Syrian revolutionaries have broken through the wall of fear. Their ultimate success depends on denying the regime the ability to re-erect it. They will not be able to succeed without Western help. 

Hassan Mneimneh is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

Image by Syria Press. 

WASHINGTON — World and Afghan leaders convened in Bonn earlier this week, a decade after that city hosted the first major conference to chart Afghanistan’s future following the ousting of the Taliban. Key priorities on the Bonn 2011 agenda naturally included the ongoing security transition to Afghan forces, reconciliation with the Taliban and armed insurgent groups, and the continuing international commitment to Afghanistan. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the country’s political and human development — particularly women, health, and corruption — and the durability of the Afghan economy. But while symbolism overshadowed any substantive developments, the summit’s participation provided a good sense of the ever-evolving strategic contours of the Afghan conflict.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai initiated discussions with an impassioned (if obligatory) plea for continued assistance from the international community. Only the week before, he had unveiled the second phase of the Afghan security transition, which would result in Afghan security forces assuming security responsibility for over 50 percent of the country. This had followed a consultative Loya Jirga, where more than 2,000 representatives agreed unanimously to support enduring relations with the international community, including the United States. Both developments marked important steps as Afghanistan prepares itself for a lighter Western military footprint, and were repeatedly referenced at Bonn.

Of greater significance at the summit, however, was the high-level official representation from the transatlantic community, which clearly indicated the West’s continued commitment to Afghanistan at a time when economic and political challenges at home might suggest looking inward, rather than at important challenges farther afield. While leaders generally avoided addressing the specifics of any long-term commitments to Afghanistan — such as a notional U.S. security agreement until 2024 — U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did emphasize that “2014 doesn’t mean that the Afghan Security Forces are totally on their own,” a sentiment that was echoed in the joint statement issued at the conference’s conclusion. The United States and its NATO allies also made specific promises to help with Afghanistan’s reconstruction and institutional capacity.

Perhaps just as consequential as the West’s reassurances was Pakistan’s absence. Its boycott was the result of last month’s NATO strike in Mohmand, which resulted in over two dozen of its soldiers being killed. That clash and Pakistan’s response — coming soon after the assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, blamed on Pakistan-based militants — have further eroded the pretense of its being a supportive ally in efforts to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. Tuesday’s attack in Kabul on the Shi’a holy day of Ashura, which resulted in over 55 deaths and was claimed by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, also points to a dangerous new strain of sectarian violence spilling over from Pakistan.

Finally, the high-level presence of other regional actors — Iran, India, and China — proved a good indicator of the importance these powers accord to Afghanistan irrespective of the United States’ and NATO’s presence there. Karzai singled out Iran’s position at Bonn as a particularly positive indicator of Tehran’s intentions toward Afghanistan, but Iran’s statement also underscored the difficulty of reconciling its cooperation on Afghanistan with growing U.S. and European concern over its clandestine nuclear development. The delegation from India, which recently signed a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, highlighted the continuing challenge Afghanistan faces from cross-border terrorism. Meanwhile, China’s foreign minister stressed the need to bolster Afghanistan’s sovereignty and autonomy, a careful message that conveniently lends itself to contradictory interpretations: Afghanistan’s independence from U.S. influence and security provisions on one hand, and its ability to counter Pakistani proxies on the other.

The Bonn summit may not have led to any concrete breakthroughs. The conference conclusions were not unexpected, and indicated a shared commitment to upholding the Afghan constitution, political institutions, and human rights; supporting Afghan security (including on counterterrorism and counternarcotics) after 2014; promoting Afghan-led political reconciliation under strict conditions; bolstering economic growth with international assistance; and facilitating regional normalization and integration. While such lofty ambitions may not necessarily result in the eradication of Afghanistan’s daunting challenges, they will help shape the country’s uncertain future. The responsibility for a stable and secure Afghanistan rests ultimately with its people, and the summit was simply a demonstration of continued faith in the country’s future. But, as they say, half of winning is just showing up. And at Bonn, the international community — with one notable exception — did.

Dhruva Jaishankar is Program Officer and Javid Ahmad is Program Coordinator with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

AUSTIN, Texas — Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s landmark visit to Burma this week heralds the potential for breakthroughs on two fronts — accelerating democratic reforms in one of the world’s worst tyrannies and realigning the strategic order of Asia.  Accomplishing both of these objectives is possible and represents a best-case scenario.  Yet optimism should be tempered, and it would be prudent to recall previous such gambits that failed, such as then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s champagne toast with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in 2000.  Eleven years later, the North Korean regime remains ensconced in power, and that country remains as despotic, irresponsible, and isolated as ever.

Clinton’s visit might produce a more agreeable and substantive outcome, especially considering that the Burmese government has already taken some notable steps, including lifting many restrictions on Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who welcomed Clinton’s visit and met with the Secretary of State.  Yet the aftermath of the trip should be evaluated not just by the optics emanating from Naypyidaw and Rangoon, but also by other less visible but potentially more revealing indicators. Burma experts such as Jean Geran and Joshua Kurlantzick have already highlighted some of the most salient ones, such as the release of the estimated 1500 remaining political prisoners, an end to the ongoing brutalization of ethnic minorities, and a substantial reform in civil-military relations so that the military becomes genuinely accountable to the civilian government.  Any of these would represent significant steps, and whether or not they are taken will reveal much about the capability and intentions of President Thein Sein.

Burma is not merely a humanitarian concern or a regional problem confined to Southeast Asia.  It is in the crucible of the emerging “great power” maneuvering of China and India.  It is an ally and client of North Korea, whose opaque weapons trade with Burma raises profound security concerns.  And it stands at a pivot point for the global economy, sitting on considerable natural gas reserves and at the maritime crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, where the Malacca Strait serves as transit route for one-quarter of all global traded goods and one-quarter of all sea-borne petroleum.

Clinton’s visit therefore demonstrates a convergence of interests and democratic values. Burma’s tentative steps to come in from the cold also offer an intriguing insight: sometimes a shifting balance of power can induce democratic reform.  This was partially the case in 2005 when Vietnam’s concerns over growing Chinese hegemony in the region prompted the Vietnamese government to make significant improvements to its treatment of religious minorities.  Vietnam took these steps to improve its relationship with the United States, which it perceived as a potential balance to China.  It is possible that a similar dynamic is at play in Burma today.  While some in the Burmese leadership might have genuine democratic sympathies, the main impetus for the democratic reforms comes from a calculated desire to distance Naypyidaw from China’s increasingly restrictive orbit and energy mercantilism, and to forge new partnerships with the democracies of the Indo-Pacific and the Western world.  In short, if the Burma opening works, it will be a success for balance-of-power realists and human rights advocates alike, and might suggest a new paradigm for international relations theorists and policy practitioners in which maintaining a stable balance of power can serve as a lever for promoting human rights and democracy.

Burma’s opening may have other geopolitical ramifications.   If it continues on a path of adopting political and economic reforms in tandem, it will also demonstrate the limited appeal of authoritarian capitalism of the kind embraced by Beijing and Moscow.  India is also taking notice.  Given the erratic swings in its Burma stance, New Delhi may still be internally conflicted over whether to privilege material interests or democratic ideals in its foreign policy.  A reformed Burma would help resolve these tensions in Indian policy by serving a reminder that, in the long run, the sacrifice of ideals can also undermine a nation’s interests.  Finally, Burma’s steps toward greater liberty may offer a small encouragement to the transatlantic community, dispirited by the eurozone’s travails, that democratic capitalism retains its vitality and enduring appeal.

William Inboden is a Distinguished Scholar and Assistant Professor at the University of Texas and a non-resident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by the U.S. State Department

WASHINGTON—The Greek bombshell decision to hold a referendum on the last week’s celebrated eurozone bailout package will ensure that the G20 Summit starting on Thursday in Cannes will be hijacked by Europe’s troubles. A source of turbulence in the world economy, Europe’s problems are the world’s problems and should be on the G20 agenda. But the euro crisis risks distracting the G20’s focus from its long-term imperative: ensuring sustained global economic growth.

The International Monetary Fund forecasts a decent 4 percent global growth this year. But that forecast has been repeatedly slashed throughout the year as Europe has failed to contain its crisis and U.S. fiscal plans remain hazy. The IMF now projects Europe will grow by only 1.6 percent and United States by 1.5 percent in 2011. Emerging economies are the silver lining, projected to expand by 6.4 percent this year.

The problem is that emerging market growth has short coattails. Despite bullish forecasts by Wall Street analysts, emerging economies have failed to generate a global “supercycle” of widespread growth and prosperity. Instead, they are hostage to the transatlantic economic morass that slows their exports and rocks stock markets.

But emerging economies could still ride to the rescue. Armed with $3.2 trillion in reserves, China could help bail out Europe. With $4 trillion in assets under management, emerging market sovereign wealth funds could invest in high-growth projects around the world. And by propelling domestic consumption all the while ceasing to manipulate their currencies, East Asian nations, China in particular, could stimulate export-led growth in the United States, which in turn would significantly accelerate global recovery.

But such fixes are neither easy nor likely.

In search of cash to fund last week’s €1 trillion rescue package, Europeans have extended the begging bowl to Beijing. China does have a stake in a solvent Europe, which is its main export market and where China already holds €600 billion of sovereign debt. But the Chinese are unlikely to tap their coffers without clear details on the use of the cash, Europe’s granting of market economy status to China, and, possibly, the silencing of European criticism of Beijing’s human right violations.

Moreover, Beijing’s pockets are not bottomless. After its short-term trade and sovereign debts and funds channeled to its sovereign wealth fund are subtracted from its reserves, China may have no more than about $500 billion available for a European rescue package.

Before the Greek announcement, India, Russia, and Brazil expressed willingness to jump on board and channel funds to Europe via the IMF — provided Europeans swallow a bitter pill: the humiliating use of funding facilities designed for poor economies and, perhaps, the relinquishing of some of their IMF powers.

Sovereign wealth funds are also not about to ride to the rescue. Already chastised at home for their multibillion investments in Bank of America and Citigroup that have gone sour, emerging market sovereign wealth funds are looking for surefire bets rather than extending lifelines to rich nations.

If there is a prescription for long-term, sustained growth, it is global rebalancing. In an ideal world, the United States would export more and Asia would consume more. But today, all countries are looking to grow by exporting, which is sparking currency wars and protectionist posturing. Lacking enforcement tools, the G20’s rebalancing agenda is toothless. And Washington’s calls on China to increase domestic consumption, tighten intellectual property protections, and cease currency manipulation fall on deaf ears.

Today’s economically interdependent, realpolitik world offers two lessons. The first is that while economics may be global, economic fixes are local. The Greece ordeal is an exclamation point to that. Going forward, Europe and the United States must look deep within, much like emerging markets had to do in facing up to their crises. The cost of the Eurozone’s common currency is greater fiscal integration and truly tough-love enforcement regime; the price for future economic dynamism is flexible labor markets and curtailed welfare states. In the United States, the Congressional budget super committee must free the world’s leading economy from its historic debt load. And, rather than waiting for China to appreciate its currency to spur imports, Washington must take charge of its trade agenda — deepen market access in Asia-Pacific, India, and Brazil, and buttress the 30 million-strong army of the United States’ small and mid-size enterprises.

The second lesson is that getting to growth in the interdependent modern world takes far more give-and-take. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging market economies must understand that advanced nations’ recovery and global rebalancing are in their economic self-interest. By paving the way to growth, they would show they global leadership they covet — which, after all, is not about shiny seats in international institutions, but about stepping up to the plate at the world’s hour of need. Besides, now that Greece stripped away any first-mover advantage the Eurozone sought in G20 with last week’s bailout plan, the cash-rich emerging white knights have already gained new powers.

Kati Suominen is Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington. Her latest book is Peerless and Periled: The Paradox of America’s Leadership of the World Economic Order (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

BRUSSELS—Yes, “Europe will be the focus of the Cannes Summit.” Although anticipated, the blunt statement from European Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy seemed both redundant and inspiring. Redundant, because a €1 trillion commitment needs implementation and global coordination that only the G20 can offer. Inspiring, because this crisis serves as the needed impetus to drive collective aspirations by the G20 for attaining sustainable growth.

Reflecting on the goals of the French presidency of the G20 and its original ambition, however, one wonders about the fate of other crucial issues, such as the reform of international financial institutions (IFIs), food security, and international development.

The past two summits demonstrated near irreconcilable disagreements between main players on long-standing agenda items ranging from addressing financial regulatory reform, to tackling macroeconomic imbalances and the way forward for multilateral trade. Finding agreement on issues involving structural adjustments is by no means a short order. But measurable progress on items long identified as a priority by the G20 is inherently related to the group’s shelf-life and its ability to move from a temporary crisis-fighting mechanism to an enduring forum capable of shoring up market confidence and providing political leadership and vision to tackle global economic challenges.

Deliberation over the crisis du jour in Toronto and Seoul threatened to hijack both of those carefully laid out summit agendas. “Stimulus vs. austerity” debates prior to the Toronto summit sidelined anticipated agenda items related to the reform of IFI governance structures and a global bank tax, and competitive devaluation of currencies brought “currency wars” to the forefront of discussions in Korea. This is a trend that observers predict will continue in Cannes as leaders continue to grapple with implications of the euro rescue fund and the unexpected announcement of a Greek referendum on last week’s agreement.

Although Europeans used the argument of a possible hijacking of the G20 summit to raise the stakes of sealing a deal on the Eurozone’s rescue fund, given the rap sheet of previous summits, there is little doubt that this will be the case from the start. French diplomats even warned against the possible “cannibalization” of Cannes.

In anticipation, President Obama has announced that he will meet Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy, chair of the G20, bilaterally. Yet, at a time when Europe is calling on the rest of the world to contribute to the recovery of its economy for the preservation of global wealth, the French president is scheduled to meet with the Chinese president first, the U.S. president second. Cannes’ focus may be Europe, but Europe’s focus in Cannes will be the rest of the world.

After consecutive summits with subpar performances, the G20 is past due to repeat the early successes of delivering on its commitments. The creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), raising the IMF’s lending resources, and boosting the capital base of MDBs and the IMF by $1.1 trillion demonstrated concrete results. This first propelled the G20, ahead of its institutional competitors, to prominence as the much proclaimed post-modern vehicle for getting things done. But without tangible results, pledges for taking coordinated action on long-standing agenda items are in danger of falling on deaf ears, and will continue to harm the G20’s credibility.

Naturally, the forum should and will continue to serve as a platform to address pressing crises . However, Cannes provides an opportunity for the G20 to go one step further. By striking a delicate balance between devoting time to short-term imperatives, i.e the eurozone crisis, and exhibiting strategic foresight in making strides toward implementing previously identified commitments, such as bolstering the authority of the FSB, injecting political leverage into the reform efforts of IFIs, and promoting its development agenda, the G20 will continue to build its credibility.

While its current informality is the source of its flexibility, the G20 needs to find a way to address short-term shocks without sacrificing its capacity to deliver on its standing commitments. And despite the creation of the troika of hosts, instituting a mechanism to ensure the smooth transition of working groups and structures from one host-country to the next may facilitate the process of sticking to its check-list by prioritizing pledges.

Michael Froman is right when saying that the G20 has been promoted to become the leading forum to review challenges facing the global economy. But in any era of “messy multilateralism,” as characterized by Richard Haass, establishing its reputation as an effective and legitimate body that is capable of achieving results by transcending divides between established and emerging economic actors hinges on the group’s ability to start thinking and acting in the long term.

In an ironic way, it’s a conundrum Europe has been facing in building its economic and monetary union for the past 30 years…

Guillaume Xavier-Bender is a Program Associate with the Economic Policy Program of the German Marshall Fund in Brussels. Roman Balin is a Program Coordinator for the German Marshall Fund’s Immigration and Migration Program in Washington, DC.

WASHINGTON—The past three years have been very good for China. No country has emerged from the ashes of the 2008 U.S.-led financial crisis stronger and more influential than China. Beijing’s international reserves are now more than seven times larger than the deployable funds held by the International Monetary Fund.

With such a huge cash stockpile, it is little wonder that Europeans turned to Beijing in recent days for financial help. Containing Europe’s current financial crisis will require a massive amount of money. And Europe hopes that Beijing will ante up the necessary billions to save Europe and, by extension, the world.

China has every reason to throw Europe a financial lifeline. The EU, after all, is China’s largest export market. China is also a significant foreign investor in Europe. And, from a strategic point of view, Beijing certainly views Europe’s dire plight as leverage when it comes to other issues that have long bedeviled Sino-European relations. In short, Europe’s financial crisis has handed China a golden opportunity to increase its global heft. Yet it is highly doubtful China will become Europe’s “savior.”

Despite Western fears over the rise of China, Beijing is not entirely comfortable as a global power. The mainland, to be sure, has not been shy about criticizing the United States for its part in triggering the global recession of 2008/09. Beijing has even gone so far as to broach the sensitive topic of having the Chinese renminbi replace the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. But China, in general, has been careful and coy about stepping out on to the global stage. It is almost as if China’s moment arrived too early — for Beijing and for the world at large. Beijing would like to lead from behind, when it leads at all.

Beijing is reluctant to grasp the mantle of global leadership since that would go against Deng Xiaoping’s famous directive:

“Observe developments soberly, hide our capabilities and bide our time, remain free of ambition, and never claim leadership”

Observe, hide, and bide your time — all of that was possible for China a decade ago, when the global economy beat to the U.S. tune. Then, the global economy was driven by the profligacy of the U.S. consumer. The Chinese pleaded poverty, and for good reason. China’s per capita income — roughly $5,100 in 2010 — is still a fraction of that in the United States or Europe. Sixteen percent of China’s population (some 215 million people) still lives on less than $1.25 a day. The mainland’s energy and food supplies are woefully insufficient for a population that is rapidly urbanizing. With only 8 percent of the world’s cultivated land, China must sustain nearly one-fifth of the world’s population. Decades of pell mell growth has decimated China’s environment. More problematic: roughly two-thirds of China’s approximately 660 cities have less water than they need, and 110 of them already suffer severe shortages. The lack of clean water and the deteriorating environment has become a social and political lightning rod, with the number of pollution-related protests rising steadily over the past decade.

Demographics represent another herculean challenge — China will grow old before it grows rich, placing tremendous pressure on the government to help care for China’s elderly. And income inequality is rising in the People’s Republic, raising the specter of further social and political unrest.

These challenges threaten China’s avowed goal of creating a harmonious society, one economically and politically in unison. This is paramount to Beijing’s chief goal: internal stability. As Kishore Mahbubani, author of “The New Asian Hemisphere,” notes:

“The Chinese mind has always focused on developing Chinese civilization, not developing global civilization. China today is willing to be a responsible stakeholder in the global order, but given these overwhelming domestic concerns, the Chinese leaders have little appetite to lead the world.”

In other words, throwing a financial lifeline to a bankrupt nation like Greece matters less to China than maintaining internal cohesion. The two objectives, of course, are intertwined. China surely understands that it is in its own self-interest not to see Europe implode. At the same time, Beijing risks a domestic backlash if China’s leadership appears to be more concerned about the plight of wealthy Europeans rather than the interests of poor Chinese.

In a sense, the global financial crisis has spawned an identity crisis in China. The country wants to be a global power but on its own terms and timetable.

Against this backdrop, China is most assuredly tempted to ride to Europe’s rescue, knowing that a Chinese Marshall Plan for Europe in 2011 would undermine the economic authority of the United States and subject Europe to the economic humiliation of being under the economic umbrella of the Middle Kingdom. The West, quite frankly, would never be the same. Such a move would confirm the rise of China and usher in a new world economic order.

However, the odds of any of this happening are slim. No matter how tempting, China is not about to become Europe’s “savior.”

Joe Quinlan is a Transatlantic Fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

ROME — According to the newly-released Transatlantic Trends survey, Italy is the European country with the strongest perception of a deterioration of the transatlantic relationship over the last year.  Nevertheless, Italians still largely approve (79%) of U.S. President Barack Obama’s handling of international affairs and believe in greater numbers than in past years that NATO remains essential (63% in 2011 from 54% in 2010). The NATO air campaign in Libya may have reinforced the latter view, although the poll was taken in early June when the rebels’ success was still largely unpredictable. For comparison, the number of Germans who maintain that NATO is essential to Western security has significantly dropped from 70% to 58% between 2004 and today.

The survey does not directly explain the reasons causing Italians to be more pessimistic about transatlantic cooperation compared to recent years. Part of the reason may be that extensive media coverage of U.S. politics has Italians perceiving a weakening of Obama’s leadership and a loss of standing among Americans. As their optimism for the future of transatlantic relations in 2009-2010 was mostly fed by confidence in and admiration for Obama as the leader of a “new America” (Italy was among the countries in which the “Obama bounce” after Bush was most pronounced), the fading of Obama’s domestic and international popularity is almost directly translating into skepticism about the future of transatlantic cooperation. Another explanation may be that Italians are currently more worried than others in the European context about the state of the economy, and therefore they are also more sensitive to the lack of a transatlantic coordination on economic and financial issues – a theme that Italian media have also amply covered. Moreover, one should not underestimate the peculiar impact that the publication of documents by WikiLeaks at the end of 2010 had on Italian public opinion.

Attitudes toward Arab Spring

Despite domestic financial constraints and uncertainty about their economic future, Italians seem willing to extend economic aid to countries in transition in the MENA region and actually prefer economic aid over military support or engagement as a way to ensure that the Arab Spring leads to successful democratic transitions. Interestingly, together with the French, Italians are strongly in favor of democracy promotion in the Arab world even if this entailed the risk of greater short-term instability. Italians are considerably more supportive of a democracy agenda in the EU’s southern neighborhood than Americans or citizens of other EU member states.

When it comes to Libya, a plurality of Italians approves of the NATO military operation (47%). However, a majority criticizes the Italian government’s handling of the crisis. The latter is most likely due to the flip-flopping of the government during the first months of the conflict, and to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s reluctance to ask Gaddafi to relinquish power. Italians declare themselves strongly in favor of a full demise of the Libyan leader, but their support stops short of sending arms to the rebels, let alone “putting boots on the ground.”

Afghanistan, Turkey, China

Also, if the majority of Italians remains strongly pessimistic about Afghanistan (61%), this trend is falling, probably thanks also to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, which occurred a few weeks before the poll was conducted. Unlike in the case of Libya, Italians seem supportive of the Italian government’s handling of Afghanistan. However, as with other European societies, they ask for a reduction, or outright withdrawal, of troops from the country within a certain timeline.

On Turkey, a major subject of transatlantic debate in recent years, Italians display less favorable views about the Turkish people than even the French and the Germans, whose governments have made no mystery of their reservations about the country’s future accession to the EU. In fact, Italians seem relatively more positive about the prospect of integrating Turkey into Europe (which enjoys bipartisan support among the political elite) than they are about Turkey as a country, probably more for cultural diffidence than for political reasons. Among other things, they believe that Turkey’s EU membership would help the EU increase its leverage in the Middle East and would help stabilize Europe’s southern neighborhood. They are not particularly concerned about the risk of what some experts have called a “drift” of Turkey toward the Middle East. Italians are also not as cynical and pessimistic as other countries about the outcome of Turkey-EU negotiations, which many believe will be a full membership despite all the uncertainties and obstacles currently undermining the accession process.

Opinions about China, which used to be mainly negative in the past, are improving and are now virtually the same as the views held by the American public. The number of those that look at China as an economic threat (47%) rather than an opportunity (37%) is still higher, but the trend has significantly changed in the last year.

Alignment with the United States

Italians approve of Obama’s Iranian and Russian policies – two areas in which the Democratic administration has wanted to mark a change from Bush. On Iran, Italians are significantly more worried about the risk of nuclearization than citizens of other EU states on average, and even than Americans. Nonetheless, Italians remain very reluctant to contemplate the use of military force to contain Iran’s ambitions. In fact, military spending and the use of force are key elements of difference between the Italian and American public views (the same is true when the larger European public view and the American one are compared) which are otherwise aligned in important ways. Most probably due to historical and cultural issues, most notably Italy’s defeat  in World War II, Italians see the use of military force as generally unadvisable, even in a crisis situation. In this respect, they are very much in tune with German public opinion.

Nonetheless, on a large majority of issues, from the fight against terrorism to attitudes toward the Arab Spring, Italians stand out as strong supporters of U.S. positions and confirm their transatlanticist orientation despite becoming more realistic about the actual prospect for transatlantic cooperation than some years ago. The fact that Italians’ support for transatlantic cooperation has remained high throughout the ten years of the Transatlantic Trends survey testifies to its rooting. Under both center-left and center-right governments, and largely irrespective of the opinions of their leaders, the Italian society remains as the one that looks toward the West and understands that the West has a clear and vital stake in the future of Europe. This is a significant fact and one that is often neglected in the frequent polemic commentary focusing on the vagaries of Italian leaders.

Emiliano Alessandri  is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, and Raffaello Matarazzo is a Researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome.

Photo by ruben i.

WASHINGTON—Despite economic worries and domestic political preoccupations, perceptions in the United States and Europe of each other appear to be in better shape now than they were during the presidency of George W. Bush. Americans and Europeans have generally favorable opinions of one another and majorities on both continents believe they share enough common values to be able to cooperate effectively on international problems.

But this year’s annual Transatlantic Trends survey also finds that while many of those polled in 12 member states of the European Union (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) still believe the United States is most important for their national interests, Americans see Asia as important. When asked which was more important in terms of their country’s national interests in the most recent Transatlantic Trends survey, 52% of those polled in the European Union picked the United States over the countries of Asia such as China, Japan, and South Korea, while about 51% of Americans polled chose the countries of Asia over the European Union.

For several years, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been speculating on how the transatlantic community will react to the rise of Asia. Would Asian competition move the United States and Europe — currently the two largest economic centers — closer together or pull them apart? At a time when U.S. unemployment remains high, the eurozone continues to suffer, and China’s growth is over 9%, this question is timelier than ever. Based on the results of this year’s Transatlantic Trends, it seems Americans have made up their minds to orient toward the Orient.

Asia is especially important in the minds of young Americans. Around three-in-four Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 feel that Asia is the more important region for U.S. national interests. With each older age cohort, the importance of Asia decreases, so that only about one-in-three Americans over 64 think of Asia as the more important region for U.S. national interests. Younger Americans are also more likely to see China as an economic opportunity rather than as an economic threat. Fifty-two percent of those aged 18-24 consider China an economic opportunity for new markets and investments, while 72% of those between the ages of 55 and 64 see China as threatening their jobs and economic security. Similarly, more than half of Americans older than 54 perceive China as a military threat, but only one-third of those between the ages of 25 and 34 and 40% of those younger than 25 do.

The rise of Asia divides Europeans too — but by nationality rather than by age. While over half of those polled in Italy, Romania, Germany, Britain, and Poland name the United States as more important than Asia, half of those surveyed in France and more than half of the respondents in Spain and Sweden see Asia as more important for their national interests. Europeans are also more likely than Americans in general to see China as an economic opportunity. The majority of Germans, Dutch, Romanians, Swedes, and British see China as an opportunity. On the other hand, majorities in France and Portugal still see China as an economic threat, though their numbers have decreased over the past year

What does all of this mean? Although Barack Obama rehabilitated the image of the United States in Europe, Europe has so far failed to reinvigorate its image in the United States, particularly among younger Americans who do not necessarily have strong links to European ancestry or positive memories of Cold War-era alliances. For transatlantic relations to thrive in the future, Europe needs to do a lot more to capture the imagination of a new generation of Americans.

Zsolt Nyiri is Director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington.

WASHINGTON — America’s top military official, Admiral Mike Mullen, returns from China this week after a series of intensive talks. The visit—the first by a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in four years—ought to signify a continued warming in the on-again, off-again military relationship between the world’s sole superpower and Asia’s largest rising power. Yet it did little to reduce U.S. mistrust of China. Some observers might point to specific areas of contention, such as friction over Taiwan and the status of the South China Sea, as sources of enduring U.S. anxiety. But the underlying cause is China’s system of one-party rule.

An autocracy’s rise inevitably and predictably sows mistrust. Without an independent media capable of extracting information from government authorities, a credibility gap exists between stated objectives and actual intentions, which remain opaque. Moreover, autocracy limits opportunities to influence a rising power’s strategic behavior. Pervasive secrecy hinders outsiders from identifying and bolstering moderates among top-level decision-makers. With business and civil society groups relegated to the sidelines of foreign policy and interactions with external powers regulated, there are inherent limits to engaging domestic actors inside an authoritarian state.

Conversely, a democratic government functions as a source of reassurance as a new power rises. Democracy clarifies intentions: a free press guarantees that information about a state’s ambitions cannot remain secret for long. In addition, the combination of transparent governance and decentralized authority creates opportunities for outsiders to shape a rising power’s trajectory. Other states can locate and freely engage domestic actors who might influence the foreign policy of the ascendant state. Thus, democratic government mitigates the mistrust a new power’s rise would otherwise generate.

The transatlantic world can look to its own history for affirmation that regime type matters as nations rise and fall. At the turn of the twentieth century, Great Britain, then the transatlantic world’s dominant power, entered a period of relative decline as the United States and Germany burst onto the global scene. Although both of these emerging giants challenged Great Britain on diverse fronts, the level of mistrust they generated sharply differed.

Democratic government illuminated American intentions and enabled Great Britain to shape U.S. foreign policy from within by cultivating influential friends in the executive branch, Congress, and the business community. As the United States rose to power, the British anticipated their eclipse with relative equanimity.

Autocratic Germany, however, elicited a different reaction from Great Britain. With foreign policy determined behind closed doors by the Kaiser and his advisors, Germany’s naval buildup triggered an outpouring of British mistrust. The result was a maritime rivalry and, eventually, war.

The current leadership in Beijing would like to believe that past is not prologue; they hope that unlike other autocracies, China can rise and reassure. This is wishful thinking. Economic interdependence and references to “peaceful development” and “harmonious society” have failed to curb growing concerns about China’s intentions in Washington and Asian capitals. Europe, too, has begun to express new reservations about the direction of China’s rise.

Beijing needs to recognize that a lack of domestic political reform is becoming a strategic liability. Widespread mistrust of China’s ambitions will handicap its ability to take a leadership role in the international community. Put bluntly, there is no substitute for evidence of greater transparency and liberalism at home. Chinese leaders are right to argue that democracy overnight would prove vastly destabilizing, but gradually embracing rule of law and participatory government would reduce mistrust, while enabling China to address some of its internal problems more effectively.

For its part, Washington should keep in mind the limits of conventional confidence-building efforts. Military exchanges such as Admiral Mullen’s visit have an important purpose. They put in place a network of relationships that could prove important to successfully deescalating a military confrontation between Washington and Beijing. They will not, however, dispel the mistrust that overhangs the U.S.-China relationship.

While continuing to engage China militarily, the United States should emphasize that real reassurance requires domestic political reform at home. America’s partners in Europe should echo this message in their human rights dialogues with China. The West cannot force China to democratize, but working in concert, the United States and Europe can inform Beijing’s internal debates about political liberalization and thereby support gradual reform. Although periods of flux in the hierarchy of nations often end in war, China’s ascendance is not destined to culminate in conflict. The only way for China to rise and reassure, however, is to institute gradual political reforms at home.

Daniel M. Kliman is a Transatlantic Fellow for Asia at the German Marshal Fund of the United States.

Picture by Burns

ABBOTTABAD, Pakistan— For at least a handful of Chinese soldiers, the television footage of Abbottabad around the Osama bin Laden raid was familiar. In December 2006, the city was the site of an extensive set of joint Sino-Pakistani counterterrorism exercises. The “large-scale intelligence gathering,” “ambushes,” and “search and destroy missions” unfortunately failed to get anywhere near the world’s most wanted terrorist, who is believed to have set up house in this Pakistani garrison town earlier that year.

It is understandable that the Sino-Pakistani relationship provokes suspicion. And since the U.S. Navy Seals conducted their more efficacious mission here, speculation has been rife that China is primed to take advantage of the deterioration in U.S.-Pakistani ties. Beijing’s expressions of solidarity with Islamabad, coupled with announcements that it will expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 fighter jets and may assume operational control of the port at Gwadar, have given some the impression that Chinese support is now a plausible back-up plan for Pakistan. This has been reinforced by certain Pakistani politicians who have been keen to demonstrate, both to the West and to their own public, that even in the tightest of spots they still have a reliable (and generous) friend.

Indeed, China has privately assured Pakistan that it would protect it from any international sanctions push that might ensue.  Beijing is also pressing ahead with initiatives on the ground, despite countless slowdowns and security challenges. Chinese companies likely will assume responsibility for Gwadar following the resolution of a legal case against its current Singaporean operator. Work continues on the expansion of the Karakoraum Highway connecting the two countries. And major power projects, including the controversial Chashma nuclear power plants and an assortment of hydro-electric dams, are expected to proceed. Military cooperation, too, will remain at the core of the relationship. China’s desire for Pakistan to maintain a strategic balance with India means that aside from conventional arms supplies and the joint development of frigates and jet fighters, Beijing is willing to provide continued support to the most sensitive elements of Pakistan’s weapons programs, such as ballistic missile technology. China hopes this support will engender a stable, economically capable Pakistan that can act as both security balancer and trade corridor, though no one in Beijing is holding their breath.

But although the scope of Sino-Pakistani ties is undeniable, there is also a mutual appreciation of their limits. Beijing has made it clear that it sees more risk than opportunity in the worsening U.S.-Pakistani relationship. And despite the rhetoric, expectations in Islamabad of the level of Chinese support are realistically modest. While China is willing to fund tangible projects in Pakistan, it has been consistently reluctant to provide direct financial assistance on a serious scale. Beijing is already frustrated with the current level of assistance it feels it needs to provide; Chinese “investments” in Pakistan are effectively bilateral aid, financed through state companies and banks with no expectation of an economic return.

The widespread impression that bin Laden was living under protection from elements within the Pakistani state has also played into growing Chinese concerns over extremist sympathies among Pakistan’s security services. And this has all come at a time of marked pessimism in Beijing over Islamabad’s future trajectory and the implications of the security situation in the country for its ambitious economic projects. The outstanding obstacle to closer Sino-Pakistani ties is not Washington but Pakistan’s own internal problems. As one Pakistani security analyst said, “China’s message to us at the moment is: ‘We’ll support you, but get your own house in order and don’t do anything stupid.’”

The assault on bin Laden’s compound did yield one clear dividend for China — the chance for a good look at a downed U.S. stealth helicopter. Otherwise, Beijing’s reaction has been more one of apprehension than glee. China does not want its ties with Pakistan to become a source of tension in its relationship with the United States. It is concerned that any withdrawal of U.S. financial support would either weaken Pakistan or leave China with the task of bailing it out. Even if China did offer Pakistan a guaranteed annual budget line of billions of dollars to break off security ties with the United States, decision-makers in Rawalpindi would quickly decline the offer. Aside from other strategic considerations, the military has no desire to become dependent on equipment from Beijing, which is not seen as a technological match for what it gets from the United States. And the broader Pakistani elite, which has minimal cultural and educational ties with China, does not want to be stuck in Beijing’s camp either. There are plenty of reasons for the decline in U.S.-Pakistani relations. The specter of China’s checkbook is not one of them.

Andrew Small is a Brussels-based Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program.