PARIS–President Barack Obama’s announcement last June of an accelerated U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan reopened debates in many European countries over when their soldiers should return from that unpopular war. French President Nicolas Sarkozy followed a few days later with an announcement that French troops would be reduced “in a proportional manner and in a calendar comparable to the withdrawal of American reinforcements.” Now, the tables have turned. With last week’s announcement, it was France that reset the transition calendar, arguing that progress in the transition allowed for the withdrawal of 1,000 French troops by the end of 2012. Although many U.S., Afghan, and NATO observers were initially critical, the Obama administration announced only a few days later that the United States also planned to end its combat mission in Afghanistan by mid-2013 and shift primarily to advising Afghan forces.

Both Sarkozy’s and Obama’s calls for a speedier NATO exit from Afghanistan reflect the depth of war fatigue in the West, the unpopularity of the Afghan war, and the relentless budgetary and political pressures leaders face to bring their troops home early. As Obama put it in his June 2011 speech on Afghanistan, “it is time to focus on nation building here at home,” a sentiment shared by many in Europe. The French military engagement in Afghanistan has always been perceived in France as a “war of solidarity” without clearly defined strategic objectives, aimed at repairing U.S.-French relations after France’s refusal to participate in the coalition against Iraq in 2003. Coming just three months before the election, Sarkozy’s announcement reflects a compromise between the Lisbon NATO consensus and his presidential campaign rival Francois Hollande’s promise of ending the French military presence in Afghanistan by the end of 2012. But in fact, both dates are unrealistic considering the unpreparedness of the Afghan security forces to lead coalition forces and the overreliance of the Afghan government on external assistance.

Indeed, the argument that progress has been made in Afghanistan is disputable. Today, in the province of Kapisa, Afghan representatives recognize that their security forces are not ready to assume the responsibilities of the coalition. Growing anti-Western sentiments, stemming from a serious trust deficit between Afghans and coalition forces and combined with the operational unpreparedness of Afghan forces, a weak central government, and the Taliban’s high morale, raise serious questions about the post-2014 role of the United States and its allies. A series of recent incidents in which Afghan troops have turned on their Western allies confirms the failure of the counterinsurgency and “winning hearts and minds” tactics deployed in Afghanistan over the last few years, as well as the flaws in the training mission in the absence of a legitimate central authority.

The coalition’s decade of military engagement in Afghanistan is a story of constant oscillation between three strategies that were never really connected. After a phase of “Americanization” of the Afghan war through the surge, and a phase of “internationalization” with the increase in coalition members’ contributions and assistance, “Afghanization” or the “transition” phase involving the training of local security forces has become the central pillar of the coalition’s exit strategy. But when the strategy becomes about exiting, the strategy of the weak prevails in setting the international calendar and the narrative. In fact, as both the French and American decisions illustrate, the gradual foreign troop reductions have mostly been in response to forces other than security progress in Afghanistan.

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is Director of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 

French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent announcement that French troops would hand over their security responsibilities to Afghan forces by the end of 2013 — a year earlier than the completion of the NATO combat mission — has caused some to declare that the entire Afghanistan operation is at risk. The French decision certainly reflects Sarkozy’s need to address pressing domestic pressure to bring forces home as his presidential reelection campaign begins. But Sarkozy will have to balance this with the need to maintain France’s reputation within NATO. There will be times when alliance interests will need to trump national interest. The decision must also be put into context. It poses little operational risk, and is by no means a repudiation of the validity of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. What the French decision does reflect is the politics that accompany any coalition mission, however undesirable.

From an operational standpoint, there is no doubt that the 4,000 French troops in Afghanistan, mainly in Kapisa province, have made a difference. French forces have shown acuity in counterinsurgency operations, and French trainers, especially gendarmes, have been critical to increasing the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces. But as with all ISAF nations, the French are now looking at what the expected 2014 transition will mean and how they can best support Afghanistan during this process and beyond. For many states, this will mean a shift away from combat to training operations. Thus, the more important question is what role will France choose to play beyond transition and will it reflect the balance between national and alliance interests? While France has signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan to cover security, economic, and political cooperation, it remains unclear what mix of forces France would contribute to a training mission through 2014 and beyond. A firm French commitment at the upcoming NATO summit to provide significant numbers of personnel to NATO and EU training missions would be especially welcome as the planning for a post-2014 Afghanistan continues. Likewise, specified commitments to development projects and expertise to assist the Afghan government in establishing more effective rule of law could have an even greater impact in addressing the strategic vulnerabilities of the Afghan state.

While it is certainly irksome that the French chose not to use the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) process to work through the timeline on transition in Kapisa, the decision was not a surprise to NATO or Afghan government officials. Indeed, Presidents Karzai and Sarkozy had already agreed to the 2013 timeline in pre-decisional meetings prior to the public announcement. Both NATO and the Afghan government have long expected Kapisa province to transition as part of the third “tranche,” likely to be announced in March 2012. This will give ISAF and Afghan forces plenty of time to fully handover security operations and prepare Kapisa for Afghan leadership. While the pace of the French drawdown has been increased there will still be about 3,000 French troops in Afghanistan at the end of 2012. In short, the French decision is simply a repackaging of the milestones that have been discussed for almost two years now.

Coalitions are, almost by definition, imperfect creatures. They are politically complex and require considerable investment and management to get them to work. Indeed, Napoleon is reported to have said that he’d rather fight against a coalition than as part of one. But it is equally important to recall that it was, in the end, a coalition that defeated Napoleon. The art of leading a successful coalition requires balancing national and alliance interests and an understanding of when to give one way or another. In an age of budget austerity, NATO members must continue to remember that alliances mean shared commitment, shared contributions, and shared sacrifice. In Afghanistan the transition process has also always had an unwritten purpose — to keep the NATO allies and ISAF partners together until the Afghans could lead on their own and it was formulated with an eye towards maintaining sufficient domestic political support in each nation so that force contributions could continue, even if they had to be adjusted over time. Building and maintaining a coalition is not always a pretty process, but it is a necessary one, and in Afghanistan it will be better to win messy than lose pretty.

Mark Jacobson, former Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, is a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

WASHINGTON – As he campaigned for the U.S. presidency in 1952, Republican candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower argued that he would seek to bring “security with solvency” to the American people.  Eisenhower realized that the challenges posed by the Soviet Union could too easily stress America’s finite resources and a strategy to face that threat consider the economic roots of America’s military power and influence in the world. For Eisenhower, economic power was the indispensable source of American global leadership.

In his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, U.S. President Barack Obama seemed to recognize Eisenhower’s insight.  Obama focused largely on the economic challenges still facing the United States — but framed those challenges in the context of recent national security victories and the achievements of the World War II generation.  While Obama did focus on domestic affairs, he both opened and closed his address by praising America’s men and women in uniform — one of the few points drawing bi-partisan applause – and took stock of a broad set of foreign policy and security challenges that face the United States today. He also made clear that the new U.S. defense strategy would also balance security with solvency — saving nearly half a trillion dollars but maintaining the type of first-rate military required to deal with current and emerging threats.

Obama’s address included a call to learn from the shared sacrifice, partnership, and teamwork that the U.S. military demonstrates day after day, to include that shown in the mission to kill Osama bin Laden in May of last year — clearly the most significant national security event of the past twelve months.

Obama was assertive in his description of his vision of America’s role in the world but realistic when considering the complexity of the challenges ahead. In stark contrast to much of the isolationist rhetoric of the Republican primary debates, he argued that America continues to be a strong, ascendant world leader with a “steadfast” commitment to allies around the globe.

Of course, Obama noted the end of the war in Iraq and the determination to transition to Afghan leadership.  He also acknowledged the “wave of change” brought about by the Arab Spring and issued a sharp rebuke to the Assad regime — noting that they would soon discover “that the forces of change can’t be reversed and that human dignity can’t be denied.”   He praised the power of partnerships that have enabled a unified approach to counter the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons but was realistic in his assessment of whether this in and of itself would provide the solution.  Coming a day after U.S., British, and French warships entered the Persian Gulf despite threats from Iran; Obama reiterated that while he hoped for a peaceful resolution, “no options” were off the table.

It is telling that while facing a tough re-election in a poor economy, Obama has chosen to frame domestic problems within the context of foreign policy successes.  It is a clear indication that even while Washington focuses on a Presidential election campaign, the administration will not abdicate the responsibilities the United States has as a global leader.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He has formerly served at the Department of Defense and on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The views expressed are his own.

All In:  The Education of General David Petraeus.  By Paula Broadwell with Vernon Loeb. The Penguin Press, 2012, 394pp. $29.99.

Writing a first book is challenging in its own right, much less doing so as events unfold.  In All In, The Education of General David Petraeus, Paula Broadwell chose to add a third hurdle:  writing the story of an individual, General David H. Petraeus, who has not only accomplished much in a high profile arena, but whose career has not yet completely run its course.  In her 400 page work, based on her in-progress doctoral dissertation on the development of General Petraeus’ career, Broadwell has delivered a solid treatment of the General’s on-the-ground experiences in what was to become his final mission in uniform – command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from July 2010 until July 2011. For many reasons, All In will be one of the must-reads for any serious student of military affairs and international security issues.

All In is not a comprehensive biography of General, now Director, Petraeus, nor is it a comprehensive history of the war in Afghanistan.  Those who seek either will come away disappointed.  Nor is All In the cocktail party circuit “tell-all.” Indeed, Broadwell does a proper job in relaying the personal stories of the key players without betraying confidences or gossiping. In doing so, she does a valuable service to future writers by capturing insights that otherwise would be lost to history with the passage of time.  While writing All In, Broadwell benefitted greatly from the labors of veteran journalist Vernon Loeb, whom she credits on the cover.  The voice, however, is unmistakably that of Ms. Broadwell, and despite a few areas where editors could have reduced repetition and smoothed out transitions, All In is eminently readable, engaging, and will provide an excellent bridge for future scholarly treatments and more detailed assessments of various aspects of Petraeus’ career (e.g. Iraq) and the still-ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Broadwell tells the story of how General Petraeus became, as the late Richard Holbrooke candidly told a small group of civilians shortly before his death, “the greatest operational commander of our time.”  All In is the story of those who shaped Petraeus’ thinking as a young officer and a story of a General whom the nation called to be the face of two unpopular wars – Iraq in the beginning of 2007 and Afghanistan in the summer of 2010.   Likewise, this is the story of the challenges and successes that some of Petraeus’ protégé’s have faced during that latter conflict. Specifically, Broadwell follows three of the 101^st Airborne Division’s Battalion Commanders and traces the outlines of military operations in 2010 and 2011 in Afghanistan, particularly those in Kandahar and Helmand.  Broadwell chronicles the often vicious fighting against Taliban insurgents and her blow by blow description of battles in the Arghandab bring the reader into the situation as experienced by the commanders on the ground. Broadwell also chronicles the exploits of two members of the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) and brings the reader into the struggle to prod the U.S. military to overcome its endemic aversion to small wars and insurgencies.  While she does not address head-on the issue of whether “too much” has been attempted in Afghanistan as a matter of policy, her telling of the story does remind the reader not all in uniform were “true believers” in the value of COIN and that, indeed, some were simply dismissive of any complex and nuanced notions of conflict.

Broadwell’s style may remind readers of James Kittfield’s Prodigal Soldiers (1995) – a story of U.S. military leaders who sprang from the experience of the Vietnam War. Broadwell alternates between Petraeus’ command in Afghanistan and the career that shaped him prior to the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan. She describes his relatively unassuming childhood where Petraeus’ father taught him that results and not excuses are what matter.  She also chronicles his experiences as a junior officer and field grade leader, and the story is fascinating enough that the reader is left wanting more about what truly shaped and drove a young David Petraeus into such a tenacious and effective leader.  Clearly, one of Petraeus key strengths as a leader was not only finding mentors, but also in seeking out junior officers (and civilians) to mentor himself and providing them opportunities to grow into even stronger leaders.  Additionally, All In gives the reader an understanding of the importance Petreaus placed on building the right team as well as the challenge of ensuring that these teams did not tell him simply what they thought he wanted to hear.

Broadwell uses her study to demonstrate how Petraeus’ experiences – not simply in Iraq, but more importantly over a lifetime of assignments around the world shaped his analytical and decisonmaking processes in Afghanistan.  Perhaps the most important take away during his career was that Petraeus felt that the enemy should not be allowed to define the rules of the fight:  “when the enemy defined their rules, we just changed ours,” a young Lieutenant Colonel Petraeus explained to one of his subordinates during training exercises. Broadwell deliberately focuses much more on the operational nature of his command in Afghanistan and his interaction with his former protégé’s than with Petraeus’ dealings with peers, subordinate general and flag officers, senior civilian officials, and the Afghan military and civilian leadership.

While there is some discussion of non-U.S. NATO forces, All In focuses on the U.S. military, almost exclusively the U.S. Army.  Broadwell’s measurement of his handling of sensitive issues such as air and ground rules of engagement, civilian casualties, and the Afghan Local Police program illustrate that Petraeus practiced what he preached in terms of understanding that “people are the center of gravity,” whether those under your own command or those you seek to protect from the insurgents.  While it is understandable that there is not more of a discussion of General Petraeus’ interactions with often difficult Afghan senior officials and the complexities of Alliance politics, this does mean that the reader misses seeing how truly skilled Petraeus was as not only a soldier, but, in perhaps a way not seen since Eisenhower or Marshall, as a diplomat.  Likewise, there is only scant discussion of the challenges Petraeus faced in dealing with a dysfunctional U.S. Embassy that had a critical role to play in the stabilization and development dimension of the COIN campaign.

In writing All In, Broadwell had tremendous access not only to Petraeus, but to those who were working or had worked with him. She interviewed over 150 individuals to include not just the General’s closest advisors, but former mentors and subordinates. The challenge Broadwell faced, of course, was not just filtering the subjectivity of those she interviewed, but to seek objectivity in her own analysis.  The pride she has in her mentor/subject, his protégés, and her belief in the mission in Afghanistan most certainly shines through. While some will choose to disagree, this does not detract at all from the quality of the book.  In many ways it lets the reader understand how many of those who have served in the U.S. military feel about serving under such a uniquely capable set of military leaders such as Petreaus, McChrystal, Mattis, Stavridis, McRaven, and Rodriguez.

No doubt, for Ms. Broadwell, it was hard not to be proud of the camaraderie, professionalism, and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice that she witnessed while conducting her interviews.  In the end, the strength of this book indeed lays in both Broadwell’s ability to empathize with her subject matter and that her access uniquely gave her the ability to obtain the views of participants as events happened or shortly thereafter when the emotion was often still raw.  Indeed, for this alone, All In will stand the test of time and prove invaluable to future scholars and students of history.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He served as the Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Representative and an advisor both Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal from 2009-2011.

BRUSSELS—Full details of the Obama administration’s new look in defense spending, force posture, and strategy are not yet out. But enough has been revealed  to venture some thoughts on the logic of the new approach and the longer-term implications for the United States and transatlantic partners.

The shift to a “one war, spoil and manage” strategy contrasts sharply with a decade of costly and inconclusive engagement in irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq. Enormous efforts were undertaken to adapt the U.S. way of war and to focus it on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with the unfortunate effect of eroding the United States’ capacity to address more serious and potentially more demanding long-term challenges, above all in Asia. Today, much of the U.S. strategic community has come to believe that a disproportionate amount of effort has been devoted to meeting nonexistential threats to the national interest and international security. A strategy re-emphasizing core risks, and conventional rather than irregular warfare, simply makes sense against a backdrop of stark resource constraints.

The need to meet serious conventional contingencies with smaller ground forces could spell a renaissance in nuclear strategy. There are precedents for this in the Cold War experience, when the expense and difficulty of forward defense in Europe compelled a reliance on nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence to fill the gap at reasonable cost. Of course, we are unlikely to see a return to a doctrine of massive retaliation to meet security challenges in Asia, a more competitive relationship with Russia, or an aggressive Iran. But the mix of conventional and nuclear deterrence in U.S. strategy could well change as forces are realigned and forward-deployed forces, in particular, become more exposed to ballistic missile attack, perhaps nuclear-armed. Under these conditions, planners may be tempted to reinforce the nuclear dimension. Not quite a trip-wire strategy, but perhaps a bit closer than many U.S. allies would prefer.

Many will be tempted to interpret the Obama administration’s new strategy as a shift away from European defense—and perhaps more important, European defense partnerships—in the face of more pressing challenges in Asia. This interpretation is too dramatic. In reality, the shift away from European defense per se has been underway for two decades. This is not just a question of land forces. The U.S. Sixth Fleet has not kept an aircraft carrier battle group in the Mediterranean for many years. Residual U.S. forces in and around Europe are kept there to enable the United States to meet contingencies elsewhere, across the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. Maintaining a capacity to reinforce Europe’s crisis response capabilities on the European periphery, as in Libya, will continue to depend, above all, on mainly bilateral base access and over-flight arrangements. If anything, transatlantic partners will now have an even greater stake in solidifying these strategic ties. The locus of strategic risk may be shifting; the logic of cooperation endures.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser is the Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Center in Brussels.

BERLIN — When President Barack Obama unveiled a new national defense strategy last week, which confirmed the United States’ intent to play a sustained role in shaping a rising Asia, he noted that “the tide of war is receding.” This observation will have done little to reassure a skeptical Beijing that the strategy is aimed at managing, as opposed to containing, the rise of China. Beijing will note with ire its bracketing, in one part of the strategic review, with Iran: a country with whom the United States has had no diplomatic relations for three decades and with whom the risk of conflict (even if by proxy), remains all too real. Nor will it be pleased by the U.S. commitment to “invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India,” a country whose potential Beijing would prefer to see checked. Seen from Beijing, the administration’s repeated assurances that the United States does not view China as an adversary will be even harder to believe now.

Nevertheless, as Beijing waits to discover the full details of the U.S. realignment and to calibrate its reaction accordingly, a few ironies are already clear. Firstly, despite the fanfare with which the announcement was made, it should be no surprise that Washington plans to pay close attention to Asia. In fact, the realignment reinforces an underlying trend of increased U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, which has been quietly gathering momentum since the 1990s. The wars that followed the 9/11 attacks may have constrained some of this focus, but the ultimate direction of U.S. defense policy has been clear for a while. Likewise, the intention to cultivate India as a long-term strategic partner has roots stretching back across administrations long before Obama’s tenure.

Secondly, the perception of increasingly “assertive” behavior by China in recent years has played its part in crystallizing a stronger U.S. response. The danger is that this in turn bolsters the position of hard-liners in Beijing, including elements of the military, thereby further increasing their influence in foreign and security policymaking. Thirdly, China’s bracketing with Iran as nations pursuing asymmetric means to counter U.S. power projection capabilities is likely to encourage Beijing to mistakenly identify common cause with Tehran. Indeed, a Global Times editorial the day after Obama’s announcement argued, “The U.S. strategic adjustment highlights Iran’s importance to China. Iran’s existence and its stance form a strong check against the U.S.” And finally, as Washington complains about the pursuit of these asymmetric measures, its increased presence in the region is likely to make such activities even more attractive. China will continue to pour resources into access denial, focus on the development of longer-range capabilities, and continue their advances in electronic and cyber warfare.

Yet, for the United States to retain its primacy in Asia whilst ensuring the rise of China within a rules-based international environment, there is no alternative other than pouring more resources into Asia. Ultimately, anyone judging China’s strategic intentions purely by observing the nature of its military build-up would not likely be persuaded by Beijing’s commitment to rise peacefully. For the many U.S. allies and partners in Asia struggling to manage the security implications of their burgeoning trade relations with China, this demonstration of U.S. commitment to the region provides significant reassurance. At the same time, the strategy will also generate tensions with U.S. partners in Asia. More will be demanded of them, which will have financial implications and might require deft political handling domestically. Equally, as South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo has been quick to point out, the United States’ decreased appetite for boots on the ground does not sit easily with a military strategy that presently envisions the deployment of 690,000 American soldiers on the Korean Peninsula in the event of war.

In the struggle to manage the consequences of China’s rise, U.S. military might and strategy will be crucial, but these will not be the only tools required. While a more coherent diplomatic strategy for Asia appears to be emerging with, for example, U.S. participation in the East Asian Summit, U.S. trade policy in Asia remains woefully underdeveloped, the administration’s recent push on the Trans-Pacific Partnership notwithstanding. Ultimately, as intriguing as the consequences of this strategy may be for the broader region, for the moment at least, the Pentagon review remains just a paper. Even once key details are made clear, a lot can happen on the road between intent and reality.

Sarah Raine is a Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellow with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin

WARSAW—The new strategic defense guidance from the Obama administration aims to refocus the U.S. defense posture on the increasingly competitive security environment emerging in the Pacific. It also (despite the Pentagon’s protestations to the contrary) appears to put an end to the era of large-scale counterinsurgency and stability operations. Last but not least, it implies a strategic shift away from Europe. It thus brings the United States and Europe to a decisive point in their relationship: they will need to reframe the division of labor in the security dimension of the transatlantic alliance.

The Obama administration’s planned $489 billion defense cuts over ten years means that any buildup of U.S. capacity in Asia will have to be offset in part through further reductions in the U.S. presence in Europe. Cuts may even be double that if Congress fails to reverse massive automatic budget reductions by 2013. Moreover, under the “one war, one spoiling action” formula espoused by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the United States’ role in NATO may shift from that of ultimate European security provider to more of an enabler of European defense.

The implications for Europe are significant. Simply put: if the United States is engaged in a conflict on the other side of the globe, a contingency that could develop in or near Europe would require Europe to be ready to respond first. The “burden-sharing” debate has thus been redefined. Of course, the United States retains a strategic interest in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. But it will have to come to a much more explicit understanding with Europe about respective regional interests: where do they intersect/diverge? Is it possible, and if so under what circumstances to generate a credible sense of shared responsibility? And what assets and capabilities can Europe bring to the table — particularly if U.S. assets are needed elsewhere? The United States might opt for issue-based cooperation with individual countries or with regional groupings within the NATO framework. This could balance near-term the tilt of U.S. strategy towards Asia and create a pathway for the United States and Europe to maximize their shrinking capabilities on the continent and preserve the mutuality of their defense commitments. But will that be enough security for Europe? Does the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) have an answer to this question? And is anyone even asking that question in Brussels or national capitals?

One thing is clear at any rate: At a time when 40 cents of every dollar Washington spends is borrowed, Europe can no longer expect that the United States will remain its sole security provider. As long as the EU does not provide persuasive assets and capabilities that justify the as yet-elusive pursuit of an EU-NATO partnership, security cooperation under the NATO umbrella is the more realistic way to maintain transatlantic security relations. Admittedly, that would mean a partial renationalization of security, but it would offer real capabilities by willing players. An example of the latter is the recent Franco-British military cooperation treaty, which provides not only for nuclear sharing, but also for the creation of a joint strike force and the joint use of aircraft carriers. Central Europe might see similar arrangements, e.g. including Germany, Poland, Scandinavia, the Baltics, and Romania. Combined with NATO’s deterrent capability, European forces thus configured could really pull their weight — until such time when CSDP can actually be made to work.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Director of the GMF Warsaw Office.

This past week, the Obama Administration announced its intention to nominate Rick Barton as the nation’s first ever Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.  The announcement marks Washington’s latest run at creating a serious civilian “surge capacity” for managing instability and conflict in fragile states.

Rick Barton, if the Senate chooses to confirm him, would bring impeccable credentials to the job.  Former U.S. Representative to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, first Director of the highly regarded Office of Transition Initiatives at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), former UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, and Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ambassador Barton appears to have spent his life preparing for this job.  The question is whether the U.S. government, after repeated failures to build a comprehensive civilian crisis management entity, will allow him to do the job.

Regrettably, for much of the past several decades, the U.S. government’s ability to generate a credible civilian surge in crisis situations has been a bit of a farce.  In an almost unbelievable period of sustained underperformance since 2004, Washington – both the last Administration and this one; both the State Department and USAID; aided and abetted by both houses of Congress – have systematically undercut attempts to create a serious surge capacity on the civilian side of the U.S. government.  The competent civilian reconstruction partner that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and coalition fighting forces have been requesting for a decade remains – perhaps to be overly generous – a “work in progress.”

A quick review of how we got to this point:  The U.S. government learned quickly in the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions that it lacked the ability to locate and dispatch adequate numbers of competent, highly trained, language proficient reconstruction specialists from State and USAID to help rebuild after coalition forces had initially defeated the opposition.  This is not surprising given that State and USAID together have less than 1 percent – yes, that’s one percent — of DoD’s uniformed and civilian personnel levels.  You will recall the numerous exposes about civilians with only shreds of international experience appearing in Baghdad to “advise” the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government in the immediate aftermath of Baghdad’s fall.

In 2004, the Bush Administration – in what some might consider a rare moment of introspection – recognized the gap in U.S. civilian capacity, and pushed through the National Security Council a new concept:  the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) at the State Department.  This new entity, located in the Secretary’s front office to ensure high impact and visibility, was to serve as the centerpiece of a reinvigorated “civilian surge” capacity, recruiting a “Civilian Response Corps” of stand-by reconstruction experts, ready to deploy on short notice, from across all federal departments.  CRS was also to serve as a focal point for enhanced partnership with multi-lateral and bilateral partners, as a number of TransAtlantic governments were building similar conflict management units.  Befitting the importance of the concept, Secretary Clinton once referred to this new U.S. capability as “an army of peace-builders.”

In reality, it is not much of an “army.”  After seven years, the number of full-time Civilian Response Corps members remains under 200 – not exactly the force envisaged in 2004; not the force likely to encourage military colleagues; and certainly not the kind of force that will have serious impact in one or more major conflict and stabilization crises.

Not only is the civilian surge “army” tiny, it basically doesn’t have any bullets.  Despite repeated requests by both the Bush and Obama Administrations for a modest contingency fund to allow the Civilian Response Corps to act quickly in a crisis, the Congress has not appropriated one penny of operational funding to CRS.  With a few notable successes – observer teams in South Sudan, for example – actual deployments by the Civilian Response Corps have been minimal, mostly consisting of two-week “assessment missions” to U.S. embassies in relatively peaceful countries.  Despite Secretary Clinton’s words of praise for her “army,” she chose not to deploy it to Haiti, despite a major crisis just miles from America’s shore.

U.S. Ambassadors, by and large, have viewed this new organization as a bureaucratic threat, rather than as an asset.  USAID, with its own history of crisis response, feels slighted, as well, by CRS, and has offered only grudging support.  Last year, the Treasury Department – a founding partner in the Civilian Response Corps, and a critical player in economically rebuilding failed states – simply dropped out of the “army,” its first major defection.  Meanwhile, the U.S. military, viewing this farce from across the Potomac River, has, understandably, begun organizing its own version of a civilian response corps, made up of DoD civilian employees.

Now, fast forward to the present.  The Administration’s recent Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), stated boldly that “embracing” conflict prevention and response in fragile states is a “core civilian mission.”  The QDDR proposed the creation of a new Bureau of Crisis and Stabilization Operations – the outfit Ambassador Barton has been tapped to head – to serve as the “locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and instability.”  The question remains whether the new surge in rhetoric, enthusiasm, and bureaucratic structures will – given the tepid performance of the past decade – translate into a capable civilian surge capacity on the ground when the world decides it needs to manage the next conflictive crisis.

It is not too late to rescue a great idea:  The United States, as well as its transatlantic partners, needs  a civilian surge capacity more than ever, both when confronted with instability in fragile states or when transitional opportunities arise, as in the birth of “Arab Spring” democracy movements in the Middle East.  It is past time to end the timidity and half-measures of the past several decades, and build a serious cadre of highly trained, on-call, conflict and stabilization technical specialists.  Before we have another repeat of the post-invasion Iraq fiasco, the Administration and Congress need to reach an agreement fully to staff, fund, and empower the new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the still-nascent Civilian Response Corps.

James Kunder is a Senior Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by Lafayette University.

WASHINGTON—In a presidential race focused firmly on domestic issues, this week’s Republican presidential debate on foreign policy and national security provides a rare and valuable opportunity for Americans and the rest of the world to hear the candidates revisit the perennial question of “What keeps you up at night?” — and its slightly more frightening follow-on, “What would wake you up at night?” We believe the following subjects should top any candidate’s lists:

Afghanistan: The security situation following the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014 remains far from clear. Afghan forces are currently expected to assume responsibility for security, but questions surround the size and footprint of the remaining international forces (assuming the Afghan government permits any troops to stay). There is little doubt that, without massive international funding, Afghanistan is headed for a disastrous economic recession. What U.S. policymakers intend to do to stave off such a recession and the ensuing challenge to U.S. security remains vague. And we would like to hear presidential candidates discussing what lessons we have learned during the past decade for future counterterrorism efforts — including how to prevent the next Afghanistan.

Greater Middle East: In time, 2011 might come to be seen as the most transformational year for world politics since 1989. But the short-term challenges for the region, with its 750 million inhabitants, as well as for U.S. policy and leadership are huge — and to no small degree uncharted. Depending on with whom you speak in the region, the United States is seen as a declining power, a bully, an ally, or a partner of convenience. Stable long-term U.S. alliances appear to have frayed over issues relating to terrorism, the Israel-Palestine peace process, and the Arab Spring. Iran’s continued defiance of international concern over its nuclear program, in particular, shows how difficult it has become for the United States to forge a consensus not just with its European allies, but also with its Middle Eastern partners. If any issue has the potential for becoming a waking nightmare, it is Iran.

National security spending: Whatever the outcome of ongoing Congressional efforts at reducing U.S. government expenditure by $1.2 trillion dollars, the largest cut is likely to be to defense spending. The real risk is that this will have a devastating effect on the United States’ defense capabilities. Many Americans do not appreciate that only about five percent of the United States’ gross domestic product is spent on defense and foreign affairs, including international development aid. This relatively small amount of money helps secure U.S. freedoms, enables the development of vital technologies, allows the U.S. to provide assistance to people beyond its borders, and permits the United States to protect the freedom of global lines of communication and transport. What the candidates have to say on the topic of defense cuts is therefore not just about saving government money — it lays the groundwork for the future of U.S. foreign and security policy.

Preventing isolationism: Frankly, at a time of overwhelming domestic preoccupations, the very fact of addressing foreign policy and national security in a debate has become an accomplishment in itself. But that is not enough. Faced with a stormy world economy and a slew of foreign policy quagmires, Americans appear to be tempted by isolationism as never before. Yet no candidate can responsibly suggest that drawing up the bridges is a realistic policy option. The United States depends on its trade and other forms of engagement with other countries — much as the world depends on the United States. A number of emerging large economies present opportunities that could translate directly into jobs and growth for the United States. But it’s not all about trade and economic self-interest: The United States’ tradition has been to export values and principles as well as goods. If the candidates are to convince, they must explain to their U.S. viewers why the United States must continue and expand its engagement with the world.

Leaders who cannot explain to the American people, its allies, or the international community at large why the United States must not only remain engaged in the world but play a leadership role would be — if elected —destined to make the United States weaker and more vulnerable, not stronger and safer. What keeps us up late at night is the thought of a United States that appears distracted, disengaged, and uninterested in shouldering its responsibilities as the world’s leading benevolent and democratic power. Promoting U.S. interests and values around the world is not a partisan issue; it is for all Americans, elected and unelected. Therefore, this campaign and this country need to engage in a serious discussion on the United States’ role in the world. Let it begin.

Glenn Nye, a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives (D-VA) and former Foreign Service Officer, and Daniel P. Fata, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy from 2005 to 2008, are Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by Wofford College.

ROME — According to the newly-released Transatlantic Trends survey, Italy is the European country with the strongest perception of a deterioration of the transatlantic relationship over the last year.  Nevertheless, Italians still largely approve (79%) of U.S. President Barack Obama’s handling of international affairs and believe in greater numbers than in past years that NATO remains essential (63% in 2011 from 54% in 2010). The NATO air campaign in Libya may have reinforced the latter view, although the poll was taken in early June when the rebels’ success was still largely unpredictable. For comparison, the number of Germans who maintain that NATO is essential to Western security has significantly dropped from 70% to 58% between 2004 and today.

The survey does not directly explain the reasons causing Italians to be more pessimistic about transatlantic cooperation compared to recent years. Part of the reason may be that extensive media coverage of U.S. politics has Italians perceiving a weakening of Obama’s leadership and a loss of standing among Americans. As their optimism for the future of transatlantic relations in 2009-2010 was mostly fed by confidence in and admiration for Obama as the leader of a “new America” (Italy was among the countries in which the “Obama bounce” after Bush was most pronounced), the fading of Obama’s domestic and international popularity is almost directly translating into skepticism about the future of transatlantic cooperation. Another explanation may be that Italians are currently more worried than others in the European context about the state of the economy, and therefore they are also more sensitive to the lack of a transatlantic coordination on economic and financial issues – a theme that Italian media have also amply covered. Moreover, one should not underestimate the peculiar impact that the publication of documents by WikiLeaks at the end of 2010 had on Italian public opinion.

Attitudes toward Arab Spring

Despite domestic financial constraints and uncertainty about their economic future, Italians seem willing to extend economic aid to countries in transition in the MENA region and actually prefer economic aid over military support or engagement as a way to ensure that the Arab Spring leads to successful democratic transitions. Interestingly, together with the French, Italians are strongly in favor of democracy promotion in the Arab world even if this entailed the risk of greater short-term instability. Italians are considerably more supportive of a democracy agenda in the EU’s southern neighborhood than Americans or citizens of other EU member states.

When it comes to Libya, a plurality of Italians approves of the NATO military operation (47%). However, a majority criticizes the Italian government’s handling of the crisis. The latter is most likely due to the flip-flopping of the government during the first months of the conflict, and to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s reluctance to ask Gaddafi to relinquish power. Italians declare themselves strongly in favor of a full demise of the Libyan leader, but their support stops short of sending arms to the rebels, let alone “putting boots on the ground.”

Afghanistan, Turkey, China

Also, if the majority of Italians remains strongly pessimistic about Afghanistan (61%), this trend is falling, probably thanks also to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, which occurred a few weeks before the poll was conducted. Unlike in the case of Libya, Italians seem supportive of the Italian government’s handling of Afghanistan. However, as with other European societies, they ask for a reduction, or outright withdrawal, of troops from the country within a certain timeline.

On Turkey, a major subject of transatlantic debate in recent years, Italians display less favorable views about the Turkish people than even the French and the Germans, whose governments have made no mystery of their reservations about the country’s future accession to the EU. In fact, Italians seem relatively more positive about the prospect of integrating Turkey into Europe (which enjoys bipartisan support among the political elite) than they are about Turkey as a country, probably more for cultural diffidence than for political reasons. Among other things, they believe that Turkey’s EU membership would help the EU increase its leverage in the Middle East and would help stabilize Europe’s southern neighborhood. They are not particularly concerned about the risk of what some experts have called a “drift” of Turkey toward the Middle East. Italians are also not as cynical and pessimistic as other countries about the outcome of Turkey-EU negotiations, which many believe will be a full membership despite all the uncertainties and obstacles currently undermining the accession process.

Opinions about China, which used to be mainly negative in the past, are improving and are now virtually the same as the views held by the American public. The number of those that look at China as an economic threat (47%) rather than an opportunity (37%) is still higher, but the trend has significantly changed in the last year.

Alignment with the United States

Italians approve of Obama’s Iranian and Russian policies – two areas in which the Democratic administration has wanted to mark a change from Bush. On Iran, Italians are significantly more worried about the risk of nuclearization than citizens of other EU states on average, and even than Americans. Nonetheless, Italians remain very reluctant to contemplate the use of military force to contain Iran’s ambitions. In fact, military spending and the use of force are key elements of difference between the Italian and American public views (the same is true when the larger European public view and the American one are compared) which are otherwise aligned in important ways. Most probably due to historical and cultural issues, most notably Italy’s defeat  in World War II, Italians see the use of military force as generally unadvisable, even in a crisis situation. In this respect, they are very much in tune with German public opinion.

Nonetheless, on a large majority of issues, from the fight against terrorism to attitudes toward the Arab Spring, Italians stand out as strong supporters of U.S. positions and confirm their transatlanticist orientation despite becoming more realistic about the actual prospect for transatlantic cooperation than some years ago. The fact that Italians’ support for transatlantic cooperation has remained high throughout the ten years of the Transatlantic Trends survey testifies to its rooting. Under both center-left and center-right governments, and largely irrespective of the opinions of their leaders, the Italian society remains as the one that looks toward the West and understands that the West has a clear and vital stake in the future of Europe. This is a significant fact and one that is often neglected in the frequent polemic commentary focusing on the vagaries of Italian leaders.

Emiliano Alessandri  is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, and Raffaello Matarazzo is a Researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome.

Photo by ruben i.