German Marshall Fund Blog » Zsolt Nyiri

As Europe Looks West, the United States Gazes across the Pacific

Zsolt Nyiri — Wed, 14 Sep 2011 13:29:02 +0000

WASHINGTON—Despite economic worries and domestic political preoccupations, perceptions in the United States and Europe of each other appear to be in better shape now than they were during the presidency of George W. Bush. Americans and Europeans have generally favorable opinions of one another and majorities on both continents believe they share enough common values to be able to cooperate effectively on international problems.

But this year’s annual Transatlantic Trends survey also finds that while many of those polled in 12 member states of the European Union (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) still believe the United States is most important for their national interests, Americans see Asia as important. When asked which was more important in terms of their country’s national interests in the most recent Transatlantic Trends survey, 52% of those polled in the European Union picked the United States over the countries of Asia such as China, Japan, and South Korea, while about 51% of Americans polled chose the countries of Asia over the European Union.

For several years, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been speculating on how the transatlantic community will react to the rise of Asia. Would Asian competition move the United States and Europe — currently the two largest economic centers — closer together or pull them apart? At a time when U.S. unemployment remains high, the eurozone continues to suffer, and China’s growth is over 9%, this question is timelier than ever. Based on the results of this year’s Transatlantic Trends, it seems Americans have made up their minds to orient toward the Orient.

Asia is especially important in the minds of young Americans. Around three-in-four Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 feel that Asia is the more important region for U.S. national interests. With each older age cohort, the importance of Asia decreases, so that only about one-in-three Americans over 64 think of Asia as the more important region for U.S. national interests. Younger Americans are also more likely to see China as an economic opportunity rather than as an economic threat. Fifty-two percent of those aged 18-24 consider China an economic opportunity for new markets and investments, while 72% of those between the ages of 55 and 64 see China as threatening their jobs and economic security. Similarly, more than half of Americans older than 54 perceive China as a military threat, but only one-third of those between the ages of 25 and 34 and 40% of those younger than 25 do.

The rise of Asia divides Europeans too — but by nationality rather than by age. While over half of those polled in Italy, Romania, Germany, Britain, and Poland name the United States as more important than Asia, half of those surveyed in France and more than half of the respondents in Spain and Sweden see Asia as more important for their national interests. Europeans are also more likely than Americans in general to see China as an economic opportunity. The majority of Germans, Dutch, Romanians, Swedes, and British see China as an opportunity. On the other hand, majorities in France and Portugal still see China as an economic threat, though their numbers have decreased over the past year

What does all of this mean? Although Barack Obama rehabilitated the image of the United States in Europe, Europe has so far failed to reinvigorate its image in the United States, particularly among younger Americans who do not necessarily have strong links to European ancestry or positive memories of Cold War-era alliances. For transatlantic relations to thrive in the future, Europe needs to do a lot more to capture the imagination of a new generation of Americans.

Zsolt Nyiri is Director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington.

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Finding fault (lines): When transatlantic leaders disagree with their publics

Zsolt Nyiri — Fri, 18 Mar 2011 16:01:35 +0000

WASHINGTON — In every democracy, public opinion informs the decisions that the government makes, but what if policy professionals disagree with the public over important issues such as Turkey’s admission to the European Union? And what if policymakers in Europe and the United States do not see eye-to-eye on common transatlantic challenges, such as the environment or the rise of China? Without finding a common ground with each other and the public, policymakers look out-of-touch with their constituents and thus have trouble mobilizing them to action. Transatlantic tensions also tend to build when policymakers on the two sides of the Atlantic do not agree on important matters.

The transatlantic public’s views on a range of issues are well-studied. Transatlantic Trends has been gauging public attitudes on foreign and economic policy in the United States and Europe since 2002. But, until now, there has never been a comprehensive pulse-taking of policy professionals on both sides of the Atlantic to discover how they see the world. To fill this vacuum, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Compagnia di San Paulo have conducted Transatlantic Trends: Leaders, a poll of opinion and policy leaders in Washington, DC, and Brussels drawn from the legislative branch, the executive branch, business and labor organizations, journalists, and members of non-governmental organizations. This first-of-its-kind poll, which asked leaders the same questions asked of the public, provides a unique opportunity to compare, in a systematic way, how transatlantic leaders and the public think and to see where these opinions overlap and diverge.

Most broadly, there is significant convergence. Transatlantic leaders and the European Union and American publics feel both U.S. and EU leadership in world affairs are desirable as well as likely to happen in the future. In evaluating the current shape of transatlantic relations, leaders are even more positive toward EU-U.S. relations than the public. The majority of Americans (54%) as well as Europeans (58%) say that the current state of EU-U.S. relations is “good.” Leaders are even more likely to say that relations are good, with 76% of the American leaders and 72% of EU leaders agreeing. While relations are good, leaders say that there is room for improvement; 62% of the leaders in Washington and half of the Brussels leaders (50%) indicate that the partnership should become closer.

But where the survey gets interesting are the fault lines between leaders and their publics. Sometimes transatlantic leaders agree more with each other than with their respective publics. China is a case in point. While majorities of the EU and American publics see China as a threat to jobs and economic security (51% in both cases), around two-in-three of the leaders (65% in Brussels and 66% in Washington) see China more as an economic opportunity for new markets and investment. It would appear that leaders need to talk to their own constituencies to understand better their citizens’ anxieties about China.

Another example of differing opinions between leaders and the public is support for Turkey’s membership in the European Union and its general stature in the transatlantic alliance. The European public has long had doubts about such membership. Only 23% of the European public thinks Turkey’s membership in the European Union would be a good thing. In sharp contrast, overwhelming majorities of the American leaders (71%) and a majority (53%) of European leaders think Turkey’s membership would be a good thing.

At the same time, leaders are in touch with political reality. When asked, 59% of leaders in Washington and 60% of the Brussels leaders said that it is not likely that Turkey will join the European Union. Here, the EU public has a different reading of the likely future and around half (51%) believes that Turkey is likely to join the EU.

These differences between leaders and publics are notable because policymakers living in Washington or Brussels otherwise may be considering policy choices in an echo chamber. Transatlantic Trends: Leaders helps burst that insular bubble, showing leaders where they are diverging from the public. This is a critical new input in the policymaking process. The more information policymakers have from outside the Beltway or the EU Quarter, the more informed their choices will be and the better they will serve their publics.

Zsolt Nyiri is the director of Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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Turkey’s future in NATO: Let shared concerns take center stage in Lisbon

Zsolt Nyiri — Thu, 18 Nov 2010 08:00:13 +0000

WASHINGTON — As U.S. and European leaders gather for the NATO summit in Lisbon, their main focus will be the institution’s new strategic concept. But they cannot afford to ignore Turkey’s precipitous drift out of the NATO orbit and its implications for peace and stability in the Middle East and the West’s relations with Russia and Iran.

Scores of articles have been written in recent months on Turkey’s growing disenchantment with the European Union. Far less attention has been paid to Turkey’s growing disaffection with NATO, the Western security alliance that Turkey has been a member of since 1952. Ankara maintains the second largest army in NATO and plays an active role in the mission in Afghanistan. Turkey’s location—with Russia to the North, the volatile Caucasus to the northeast, and Iran to the east—gives it a pivotal geostrategic role. A growing economy, healthy demographics, and proactive foreign policy suggest that Turkey’s value to NATO will only continue to grow.

But Turkey’s positive role in NATO is anything but certain. Recent Transatlantic Trends surveys show vast differences between Turkish public opinion and that of other NATO members on a number of key foreign policy issues. Asked specifically about NATO’s importance to their own security in 2004, the majority of Turks (53%) found NATO essential—somewhat less but still similar to support in the U.S. (62%) and the EU (64%) at the time. Since then, support for NATO has remained largely unchanged in the other countries surveyed, but Turkish support has eroded drastically to less than one-in-three (30%) in 2010.

According to the polls, Turks are turning East rather than West. Turks who said Turkey should act in closest cooperation with countries of the Middle East doubled to 20% from last year while those who said Turkey should cooperate with EU countries (13%) declined by nine points during the same period. Despite Turkish leaders’ reassurances to Western policymakers, public opinion shifts like this in a democratic country inevitably have consequences.

To counter these trends in Turkey, NATO and Turkey’s leaders should highlight the issues where the Turkish public sees eye-to-eye with other NATO members. They should quietly negotiate the more challenging issues behind the scenes.

To start, in discussions of the new strategic concept, they should highlight the ongoing commitment of Turkey’s partners to come to the country’s defense if attacked and NATO’s role in helping Turkey respond to nontraditional threats such as terrorism. When asked what should be the top priority for the American president and European leaders, fighting international terrorism remained the top concern for a plurality of Turks (38%). And NATO acting out of area is relatively common ground—supported by a plurality of Turks (48%) and the majority of Americans (77%) and other NATO members surveyed (62%). When asked about Turkey’s role in NATO at a recent speech hosted by GMF in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen did just this by emphasizing concerns over terrorism as common ground for Turkey and NATO.

On the other hand, NATO leaders would do well to quietly negotiate strategies for dealing with Iran. While an Iranian nuclear weapon is seen as a threat by the vast majority in the U.S. (86%) and EU (79%), the plurality of Turks (48%) do not feel threatened. This is not only in public opinion but also reflected by Turkish leaders. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu mentioned recently that “We do not see any threat from any of our neighbouring countries, whether it is Iran, Russia, Syria, or others.”

Propping up support for NATO in Turkey would also help anchor Turkey in Europe at a time when the allure of membership in the European Union is waning. The number of Turks (38%) who think joining the EU would be a good thing has declined 35 percentage points since 2004. Turkey will not join the EU soon, and a drawn-out accession process will only further sour Turkish attitudes about membership. With only 23% of those surveyed in the European Union believed Turkey’s EU membership would be “a good thing,” European leaders should be eager to use NATO as an alternative “anchor” without bucking public opinion in their own countries.

Any significant goals laid out in NATO’s new strategic concept will most certainly be aided by Turkey’s active role in the institution. NATO leadership should actively engage Turkish leaders to carefully plan which issues should be discussed aloud and in full public view and which should be whispered about in the negotiating room. A little strategic communication could go a long way toward advancing NATO’s ability to carry out its strategic concept with Turkey’s full participation.

Zsolt Nyiri is the director of Transatlantic Trends, and Ben Veater-Fuchs is a program assistant for Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington.

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A Common Policy without Common Perceptions?

Zsolt Nyiri — Tue, 05 Oct 2010 16:26:14 +0000

WASHINGTON – Europe’s relationship with China is at a crucial moment, and the United States should be paying attention. With the creation of a unified European foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty, Brussels now has the authority and the tools to build a stronger relationship with Beijing. And officials on both sides appear anxious to do so. The European Union’s foreign minister, High Representative Catherine Ashton, recently visited China, and Premier Wen Jiabao is visiting Europe in early October. Yet, it is still unclear whether the EU will be able to take advantage of opportunities like these to forge closer ties. While European officials seem ready to act, their publics are dubious and divided. And a foreign policy that lacks public support may not be sustainable in the long run.

So Ashton’s challenge is twofold: to build a consensus among European elites on sensitive topics, including Tibet, Taiwan, and Chinese treatment of human rights, and to frame that China policy in a way that garners public support. The 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey* underscores just how difficult the latter will be.

In September, the EU’s leaders stressed that building a strategic relationship with China was important to promote “bilateral trade, market access for goods and services, and investment conditions.” But European publics are sharply divided over whether China presents more of an opportunity of a new market for European exports and investment or whether China poses a threat to European jobs and economic security. While only about one-quarter of the Dutch (23%) and the Romanians (26%) see China as an economic threat, majorities of Italians (57%), Spanish (58%), Polish (59%), French (63%) and Portuguese (64%) feel economically endangered by China. If European publics cannot agree on the basics—whether China is an economic threat or opportunity—how can Ashton begin to promote a common policy that European publics will support?

Strategic partnerships are supposed to be based on mutual interests, but only 39% of EU respondents feel they share enough common interests with China to work together on international problems. Slovaks (24%) and Poles (29%) were the least likely to say they have common interests with China while the Dutch (48%) are the most likely. Such sentiment contrasts dramatically with attitudes in the United States, where the majority (58%) feels they share enough common interests with China to work together.

If the majority of European respondents (52%) feel that China and the EU have such different interests that cooperating on international problems is impossible, it is unclear how Ashton frames a strategic partnership in a way that would garner public support.

Arguing for a partnership based on shared values would only make matters worse. Only 29% of Europeans feel they share enough common values with the Chinese to work together and 63% feel that they have such different values that it is impossible to work together.

Alternatively, waiting it out until public concern about the economic crisis begins to recede and hoping this leads to more convergence of opinions is unlikely to help. Views on China as an economic threat or opportunity are largely unchanged since the last time GMF asked this question in June of 2007—before news of the economic crisis began to shape public opinion.

To be successful, Ashton will have to focus on issues where European publics not only have a clear opinion, but where most already see eye-to-eye on China. A strong majority of EU respondents (68%) say it is likely that Beijing will exert strong leadership in world affairs five years from now. And this belief is common across the EU—solid majorities feel this way in all EU countries surveyed with the exception of Poland (41%) and Romania (47%). Seeing China as a major international player in five years is especially pronounced among the British (81%), Germans (80%), Spaniards (78%), and Italians (77%).

So Ashton faces an uphill struggle to fashion a coherent European policy toward China, especially one that enjoys public support. If nothing else, most Europeans can agree that China will play a leading role in future world affairs. Europeans need to realize that they can’t afford to not have a strategy for dealing with the world’s second largest economic power—even if European values and interests are perceived as different. European leaders must create a narrative that brings the public together. Emphasizing China’s future and current power should be the starting point.

Zsolt Nyiri is the director of Transatlantic Trends, and Ben Veater-Fuchs is a program assistant for Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC.

* Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. This year, the interviews were conducted between June 1 and June 29, 2010, in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

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Dark Lining to a Silver Cloud: The Limits of a Popular American President

Zsolt Nyiri — Wed, 15 Sep 2010 11:09:36 +0000

WASHINGTON — The popularity of Barack Obama as a presidential candidate in 2008 rivaled rock stars in Western Europe. His election as president of the United States suggested that he would open a new chapter in the U.S.-European relationship. This is certainly true, to a degree. The desirability of American leadership greatly improved in Europe, together with European approval of the American president, after years of strain under the previous administration. But Europeans’ initial euphoria about the Obama presidency, reflected in early polling data and his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, was a product of his inspirational rhetoric and spoke more for the hope they put in him rather than for any real achievements.

Now, 18 months into the Obama presidency, the European public has issued its first meaningful report card on Obama’s accomplishments. It describes the limits of a still very popular American president.

The new 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey of 11 European Union countries and the United States by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Compagnia di San Paolo, and several European foundation partners, shows that Obama’s overall approval remains high in the EU countries surveyed (78%), despite a slight decline from last year’s 83%. The endurance of his high approval in Europe is good for America’s image. But does this confirm a new era of transatlantic cooperation on today’s most pressing foreign policy concerns such as Iran and Afghanistan? Did this Obama-mania in Europe lead to converging opinions about how to address the specifics of a host of global challenges? Unfortunately, a popular American president might be a necessary first step toward transatlantic convergence, but is clearly not sufficient.

Despite the fact that almost four-in-five EU respondents approve of the American president’s overall foreign policy, his handling of specific foreign policy issues is much less popular. Europeans are especially unlikely to approve of the way the president has been handling Afghanistan (49%) and Iran (49%). This gap between overall approval and the issues presents a puzzle and indicates the limits of a popular American president; he is unable to change entrenched transatlantic differences in public opinion about the most prominent security concerns of today. And while general support is important, America needs the kind of support that is translated into actual deeds, such as troops deployed in dangerous areas. Since the time of the survey, one of the 11 European countries, the Netherlands, formally declared its withdrawal from its four-year mission in Afghanistan.

This continuing transatlantic divide is reflected in the widespread lack of optimism about joint engagements. The United States is the only country in which a slight majority of respondents (51%) feel optimistic about stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, only about one-quarter of EU respondents (23%) are optimistic, down nine points from last year.

The path forward also divides Americans and Europeans. A majority of EU respondents (64%) say their country should either reduce or withdraw troops in Afghanistan while the United States is the only country in which a majority (58%) supports maintaining or increasing troop levels. Working with an immensely popular American president is unlikely to provide sufficient political cover for European leaders to continue their commitment in Afghanistan against such clear public preferences in their own countries.

Germany is the quintessential example of how a high level of U.S. presidential approval by the German public masks a very genuine division about real issues. Despite an 87% approval rate for Obama’s general handling of international policies, only 40% approve of his handling of Afghanistan, and 67% would like to see German troops reduced or withdrawn altogether. German optimism about stabilizing Afghanistan was halved from last year to 10%–the lowest in the survey.

Are these transatlantic divides here to stay? It appears so. The division goes beyond policy and is found in deeply rooted values and attitudes toward the use of military force. When asked whether war is necessary to obtain justice under some circumstances, three-quarters of Americans (77%) and only one-quarter of EU respondents (27%) agree. These numbers have remained fairly constant over the past several years—unaffected by the person in the White House.

Since values don’t change quickly, can these structural divisions be overcome? Obama’s popularity certainly has created the space for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to work together more openly. But European leaders will find it increasingly difficult to work with the Obama administration on key security issues such as Afghanistan as European public opinion continues to reflect disapproval and growing skepticism of the administration’s policies. Image and popularity are important, but they have their limits.

Zsolt Nyiri is the director of Transatlantic Trends, and Ben Veater-Fuchs is a program assistant for Transatlantic Trends at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC.

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Where Public Opinion and Military Assessment Meet and Where they Diverge: U.S. and NATO Troops in Afghanistan

Zsolt Nyiri — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 18:42:16 +0000

WASHINGTON – Transatlantic Trends, a recent survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) reveals that President Obama’s popularity in Europe has not made U.S. foreign policies equally popular. The war in Afghanistan, for example, remains widely unpopular among Europeans and the war now seems to divide Americans and their political and military leaders more and more.

The top military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, warns in a recent report that Afghanistan needs more troops to counteract Taliban resurgence. His assessment was also endorsed by other military heavy-weights, including Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen. McChrystal’s main point is clear – he believes the United States and NATO will most likely lose the war against the Taliban unless additional troops are added to the current ones. While he reports “success is still achievable,” General McChrystal also admits that the “situation is serious.” The latter is one thing that he and the publics of the 12 European NATO allies would agree upon: things are not going well in Afghanistan.

According to GMF’s annual Transatlantic Trends survey, only around one-in-three Europeans (including Turks) feel optimistic about the prospects of stabilization in Afghanistan. Germans were the least positive with just over one-in-five (23%) expressing optimism while Romanians were the most optimistic, relatively speaking, with 44% expressing such views. There is a clear transatlantic divide here as Americans look at Afghanistan much more optimistically and the majority (56%) feel positive about the future of the country. But how about the people of Afghanistan? While Transatlantic Trends did not poll there, their opinions seem to be closer to Europeans than to Americans. A poll taken by ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD in early January 2009 reveals that only 40% of Afghanis think that things in Afghanistan, generally speaking, are going in the right direction. This reflects a 14-point decline since September 2007.

It is also important to note that stabilizing Afghanistan is not a priority for either Americans or Europeans under the current economic conditions. Only 4% in Europe and seven in the United States think that Afghanistan should be the top priority for the American president and European leaders.

While the European public and American military leadership share this gloomy assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, their preferred solutions diverge remarkably. Only 7% of Europeans polled would like to see an increase in the number of troops in Afghanistan, with Turkey showing the “highest” level of support for the increase (14%), followed by the U.K. (11%). Americans, on the other hand, showed stronger support for the increase, a little less than one-in-three (30%) would like to see the number of troops increased. But America is divided on this question deeply along party lines, a division that runs as deep as the transatlantic divide itself. Eighteen percent of the self-identified Democrats versus 35% of Republicans would like to see the number of troops increased.

This common perception of a bleak situation in Afghanistan coupled with low public support for more troops indicates that U.S. foreign policy has reached a major crossroads. If Obama would like to maintain his massive popularity among the U.S.’s main military allies as well as his own constituency and military leadership, he needs to find a solution that will strike a cord with all of these.

Transatlantic Trends 2009 is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo in Turin, Italy, with additional support from the FundaÃ§Ã£o Luso-Americana (Portugal), the FundaciÃ³n BBVA (Spain), and the Tipping Point Foundation (Bulgaria). It measures broad public opinion in the United States and 12 European countries and gauges transatlantic relations through interviews with more than 13,000 people. For the eighth consecutive year, participants were asked their views on each other and on global threats, foreign policy objectives, world leadership, and multilateral institutions.

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