WASHINGTON — The official visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the United States this week and the decision by U.S. President Barack Obama to award her the Presidential Medal of Freedom have raised some eyebrows in Washington.  Why roll out the red carpet and present this honor to someone who has been a reluctant partner at best, who takes the Chinese position in its currency dispute with the United States, who has dithered over the European debt crisis and provided uncertain leadership in Europe, and whose government abstained on the UN Security Council vote on actions in Libya, joining both China and Russia in the process?

Granted, the Medal of Freedom was to be awarded in February, long before the Libya abstention, but Merkel had to postpone her trip to receive it. Yet she will still receive a warm welcome in Washington.  Why?

First, on Libya, the U.S. government itself was divided over what to do to confront the possibility of mass murder in Libya, changing its course at the last minute without much warning to the Germans and other European partners. Developments since the initial use of NATO force against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces have tended to reinforce Germany’s concerns and the American public and a good part of the Congress has largely turned against American involvement in this action. Still, Americans expected Germany to be on board in a UN-, NATO-, and Arab League-sanctioned action to prevent another Srebrenica.  In abstaining, Merkel has clearly broken two fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, namely that Germany should never again go it alone and should never again tolerate genocide or mass murder. There is no doubt that she has lost a great deal of credibility in Washington over the past month, not only over Libya but also over her panicky reaction to the Fukushima nuclear disaster and her inept role in the European financial crisis.  The strong Chancellor of her first term has been replaced by an image of a vacillating tactical politician in her second term.

Yet Washington will welcome her with outstretched arms — including half of both the U.S. and German cabinets taking part in events and a lunch hosted by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — because it will celebrate the partner it wants not the partner it has.  Ever the realist, Obama understands that Germany is now clearly the most powerful and important power in Europe.  The United Kingdom may still hold the affections of many in Washington and remains the most militarily capable and reliable American ally in Europe, but Germany is Europe’s emerging power.  Germany’s economic revival and rise stands in sharp contrast not only to the decline of the American economy but to the state of most of the European economies as well. It is now a global economic power ranking second behind China in terms of exports and accounting for roughly half of all European exports to China.  Its private sector is a model for how to upgrade and maintain an industrial base in a global market. Its social welfare state may be creaking but stands in robust contrast to its American counterpart.

Washington had hoped that, following the Lisbon treaty, Europe would emerge as a key partner for an America that is fiscally strained and facing daunting strategic challenges in the Middle East and Asia. While these hopes remain, even the most Europhile Americans are disillusioned with the state of post-Lisbon Europe and have received a clear message from the big European powers — especially Germany and France — that they should deal with them rather than Brussels on key foreign and defense policies. And when Washington looks to these powers, it sees that Germany is the indispensable power in the Old Continent.  It is the key player on Russia policy and is also important for policies in the countries between Russia and the EU. It remains committed to keeping its military contingent in Afghanistan and remains key on Iran sanctions.  It will be the prime player in helping to avert a spread of the European financial crisis to America. As the United States shifts its attention toward Asia and to problems at home, it will need to rely on Berlin to manage European stability.

Yet Washington does not see Germany or its Chancellor filling the vacuum being left by the EU and the United States, but sees no other realistic alternative. It calculates that Berlin will soon realize that the United States will not play the leadership role in Europe it has over the past seven decades and will have no choice but to lead or flounder, so Washington hopes that by treating Angela Merkel as Europe’s leader she will start to act like it.

Stephen F. Szabo directs the Transatlantic Academy in Washington.

Picture by IG BCE

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WASHINGTON — Perhaps the crucial institutional question in the transatlantic relationship has concerned the roles of the European Union and NATO in providing for European security. How much of the transatlantic relationship should be managed through the U.S. €“EU prism, how much through NATO, and how much on a bilateral or”coalitions of the willing” approach?

The Transatlantic Trends survey reveals broad public support in both Europe and the United States for the proposition that the EU should take on greater responsibility in dealing with international threats.   Europeans, however, are divided over whether this should be done in partnership with the U.S. ( the majority view) or independently of the U.S. (a substantial minority at 43%),   While the French are, unsurprisingly, in the lead of those publics favoring an independent role, both the more Atlanticist Germans and Britons have substantial contingents favoring an independent EU role.   So the major lesson of the Iraq war drawn by leaders —  namely that Europe cannot serve as a counterweight to the U.S. —  European publics are less sure and more ambivalent.   What seems clear is that Europeans understand that a more effective EU is needed to carry any weight with the U.S. The soft power view of the EU is also the preferred one of most Europeans.

Alongside this view of the EU is the decline of the image of NATO in Europe.   In the big three European NATO countries —  the U.K., France, and Germany —  the view that NATO is essential has declined precipitously, especially in Germany and the U.K.   This decline has occurred at a time when concerns about terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the direction Russia is headed have all grown.

The EU is gaining credibility with its publics in the peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and reconstruction areas, but does not have much credibility in the harder uses of military power in cases like Afghanistan. This means that NATO will remain the main security institution in Europe for at least the next decade but also that the U.S. will look to the EU increasingly as an institutional partner in the broad soft power areas of international relations.

The devaluation of NATO by the Bush Administration is clearly a big reason for the drop in confidence in the alliance. Given the new relevance of the alliance in dealing with the new threats facing Europe and its expanding role in crisis management and stabilization, it is clear that a new strategic concept that reflects the resolve of a new American administration to re-engage in NATO will be needed to re-establish the centrality of NATO to European security.

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