LONDON/ISTANBUL — When disaster strikes, whether it is a hurricane, a flood, or a tsunami, the people affected need assistance—and they need it fast.  If there is a positive byproduct of these catastrophic events, it is the potential to bring people, nations, and countries closer together. So was the case last weekend when Israel faced the worst forest fire in its history.

The fire at the northern forests of the Carmel Mountain, near Haifa, claimed the lives of more than 40 people, scorched nearly 12500 acres of scarce Israeli forest, and destroyed hundreds of houses in nearby populated areas. It took nearly four days and an international force of more than 20 countries to assist the Israeli Emergency Authorities to fight the fire. At the exact time that hopes for peace negotiations are at a standstill, the international operation at the Carmel Mountains created practical, regional cooperation beyond the Middle East conflict. This unique event ought to be maximized.

Among the many countries that contributed to efforts to contain the fire were Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey.  Indeed, Turkey initiated aid to Israel in spite of current strained relations between the two countries. The Palestinian Authority sent additional aid without any expectation of something in return.  These human acts of solidarity emphasize that, in spite of fundamental political disputes and severe mutual mistrust among regional players, regional cooperation is not only a matter of vision, but also a matter of motivation. The Carmel fire and previous regional disasters reiterate that humanity trumps politics every time, and real cooperation at times of crises becomes a matter of political necessity.  Though tragic, this occasion must now serve real diplomatic opportunities.

The first opportunity is already taking place. Eyes are now set toward Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Israeli counterpart, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and whether they can repeat, even modestly, the Turkish-Israeli version of Papandreou–Cem’s earthquake diplomacy from 1999.  Then-Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and late Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s interaction led to a long-term Turkish-Greek rapprochement. They could not have turned a disaster into a diplomatic opportunity without three elements: vision, willingness, and leadership.

The second opportunity is the multilateral one. In 1994, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in order to enhance security around the Mediterranean Sea and to increase cooperation between the transatlantic alliance and several neighboring states — Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The MD offers both bilateral and multilateral consultation fora, training, joint exercises, and coordination to the partner states. Civil Emergency Planning is one of the MD’s priorities. But the MD is far from reaching its potential. The known secret is that political stalemates in the context of the Middle East conflict prevented from the MD from moving forward. A lack of transatlantic leadership was also missing.

Using the MD framework as an enhanced and pragmatic cooperation platform could serve as an assistance tool to be used in future disasters. It could also serve as a confidence-building mechanism between NATO member states and regional players, and between the regional states themselves. If done right, the basket of “beyond the conflict” regional cooperation will become available as well.  Energy security, environmental themes, trafficking, and counter-terrorism are only a partial list of the potential cooperation measures spelled out in the MD.

Reviving the MD also correlates with Turkey’s “zero problems” foreign policy strategy for the region that emphasizes its role as a bridge between the West and the East. The recent tensions between Turkey and the West in the context of Iran could also find a backchannel for reconciliation by promoting the MD.

Only a few weeks ago in Lisbon, NATO committed itself to deepening its cooperation with the Mediterranean Dialogue. The vision is already in place. The practicalities were already demonstrated on Carmel Mountain. It remains to be seen who would demonstrate the willingness and leadership to advance the Alliance’s role in the region through the Mediterranean Dialogue and be better prepared for the next disaster.

Shirley Salzman is a Non-Resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Özgür Ünlühisarcikli is the director of GMF’s Ankara office.

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BRUSSELS — After a 20-month stalemate, direct Middle East peace talks are about to resume this week with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Jordanian King Abdullah, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak meeting in Washington at the invitation of the Obama administration. The talks are a welcome opportunity to set the peace process back on track, but both parties face serious challenges that will need to be overcome if a positive outcome is to materialize.

On the Israeli side, Netanyahu is confronted with a crucial decision on whether to end the 10-month freeze on the construction of settlements in the West Bank, which he announced last November. The moratorium, which expires on September 26, was announced originally in response to strong American pressure, as the Obama administration felt that the continuing construction undermined any prospect for future peace talks. Many Israelis now, including Netanyahu’s coalition partners, are hoping to end the freeze and enable the resumption of construction within settlements blocks, in anticipation of territorial swaps that could be negotiated with the Palestinians.

Although Netanyahu has emphasized that there are no preconditions for the planned talks, Abbas has indicated that a failure to extend the settlement freeze could undermine the negotiations. It remains in Israeli interests to continue its warming of relations with the Obama administration and maintain the momentum of the U.S.-sponsored effort. Netanyahu is likely therefore to extend the freeze on settlement constructions or aim for a compromise solution that might be acceptable to the White House, the Palestinians, and his own coalition government.

On the Palestinian side, recent events underscore the threat posed by Hamas, not just to Israel, but also to the stability of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hamas leaders criticized Abbas for agreeing to participate in the Washington summit and cancelled a scheduled reconciliation meeting with his party, Fatah. They also called upon the Palestinian population in the West Bank to revolt against the resumption of peace talks. These moves closely followed a wave of arrests by the Palestinian authorities of Hamas activists. However, it still remains to be seen how successful Hamas will be in its attempts to sabotage the talks through its provocations.

The peace process is also threatened by regional forces. Political circumstances in the Middle East mean that the talks begin with the region in a state of precarious equilibrium. Actors supported or orchestrated by Iran could take advantage of this opportunity to return Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon to a vicious cycle of violence. This could divert attention from Tehran’s nuclear program and domestic Lebanese politics — which are expected to be shaken by the verdict of an international tribunal investigating the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. If Israel and the Palestinian Authority want to prevent the talks from being held hostage — yet again — by the activism of Hamas and Hezbollah, they ought to identify damage control mechanisms and preventive measures that would help surmount possible provocations.

Finally, assuming the two parties overcome both the settlements issue and possible provocations, and that the talks yield a draft agreement, the status of the Palestinian population living under a Hamas regime in Gaza will still remain unsolved. The resulting complications may be aggravated by widening divisions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which in turn might further consolidate Hamas’s power in Gaza. Only a frank and realistic discussion on all these topics, and a courageous decision in principle by the negotiating parties to pursue a successful outcome, can enable them to overcome what will undoubtedly be a bumpy road ahead.

Shirley Salzman is a Legacy Heritage Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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In the debate about the recent Gaza flotilla incident, a key issue has been given very little attention – the fact that Hamas is turning the Gaza strip into a Sharia state. Decision-makers and strategic thinkers in the United States and Europe should devote more attention to the role of the transatlantic community in preventing this–and from giving Iran a proxy base on the Mediterranean Sea.

The Hamas approach toward the Palestinian population in Gaza underlines the very different, constructive approach practiced in the West Bank by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Since Hamas forcefully took over the Gaza strip three years ago, it has been actively working toward establishing a state based on ultraconservative Islamic religious rules such as the death penalty by execution, severe dress codes for women, and radical Islamic education. Not to mention Hamas’ terrorist practices and the fact that it denies Israel’s right to exist.

The international community, represented by the Quartet (the UN, the EU, the United States, and Russia), has laid out a clear road map whereby Hamas could be transformed into a legitimate partner of the West if it accepted certain conditions: recognizing the state of Israel, renouncing terrorism, and accepting all previous agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority. But in the absence of any positive response from Hamas, the international community has not been able to provide a clear message on how it views the future of the Gaza Strip. As a result, it constantly finds itself in the position of having to react to the actions of others — the provocations by radicals and Israeli responses to them.

Moreover, even the international community’s much-needed efforts to resume peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority also fail to provide a response to the situation in Gaza. The West’s hopes that progress in the peace talks would encourage Hamas to join the negotiation table are likely to be disappointed; in fact, it is more likely to actively attempt to sabotage the talks.

This is why the United States and Europe need to find a strategy that clearly outlines the future of the Gaza Strip that says whether a Sharia state in Gaza is acceptable and how to distinguish between assisting the Palestinian population in the strip, and fighting Hamas’ terrorism. This is particularly challenging when the humanitarian card is now used (and abused) as a political tool by Islamic radicals.

Shirley Salzman is a Legacy Heritage Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Brussels. The views expressed are her own.

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