WARSAW / WASHINGTON – For hundreds of years, Poland suffered from an overbearing Germany that trampled on the rights of the Polish nation, occupied the country, and, at times, worked to extinguish the Polish nation-state entirely. No wonder that there is a residue of skepticism and caution in Poland when it comes to relations with its big neighbor to the west. A healthy distance and dose of hedging have long been the default position of the country’s foreign policy. Poland’s accession to the European Union has changed all that. Nearly eight years on, Poland is rephrasing its German question, and in a baffling way: how close is too close?

Last week, Poland consented to a European agreement that it did not like in the interest of keeping the continent together. European leaders had agreed on a fiscal compact, a treaty aimed at strengthening the fiscal discipline in the EU countries that choose to sign it, and set governing rules for the eurozone. Prime Minister Donald Tusk faced an uncomfortable choice. On one hand, Poland has declared itself a staunchly pro-European country. In his now-famous Berlin speech last year, Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski spoke of the need for a strong, united, and even federal union. On the other hand, the eurozone was potentially moving ahead without Poland. The plan shaping up ahead of the summit called for meetings of the 17 eurozone countries, excluding Poland from what is seen in Warsaw as a vital decision-making body of a changing EU. Consequently, Tusk threatened Poland might not sign the treaty if this mechanism was not changed.

In Warsaw, eurozone summits are not simply seen as a crisis management mechanism for the euro, but as a nucleus of a smaller club in which most of the key decisions for the EU are made, some in areas beyond the single currency. France is the most active proponent of eurozone-only solutions, and a zero-sum game between France and Poland has developed around the question of a two-speed Europe. Warsaw fears that France wants to undo the EU’s eastern enlargement. Seen from Warsaw, inclusion is a core national interest; Poland did not join the European Union only to find itself sidelined.

The other eurozone members faced a dilemma of their own. No democratic theory stipulates that nonmembers ought to have voting rights in membership organizations. Since voting rights for nonmembers are out of the question, the group considered the PNV principle — “participate, not vote.” But even speaking rights would give nonmembers the opportunity to influence, and maybe even undermine, goals that member states deem essential to sustaining their common currency. Nonmembers should not benefit from the currency union while not contributing to it, and nonmembers should have an incentive to join. But strict exclusion of nonmembers is in nobody’s interest. Some nonmembers are really “not-yet-members.” They are, like Poland, candidate countries working to qualify and waiting for the right moment to join. They have a right to know what’s going on in the club they are aspiring to join. The more the eurozone coordinates to save its currency, the more it will make decisions that affect all 27 EU members. They might pertain to competitiveness, social systems, and taxes.

Keeping Poland in the cold is least of all in Germany’s interest. Poland is the most pro-European country outside the eurozone. Why alienate it? Last weekend, Germany got a taste of what that might mean when Sikorski warned that Germany should not even try to aspire to be a benevolent hegemon. Poland is Germany’s crucial ally for a more federal Europe and a power to help balance the less ambitious Brits and the more confederate French. Poland is essential in order to lead Central and Eastern Europe towards the eurozone and prevent Europe from splitting in two. It has rarely had a more central role in Europe and has never been a more pivotal partner of Germany.

In true European fashion, this led to a compromise, albeit an ugly one. The agreement allows non-eurozone countries to take part in the eurozone summits at least once a year, and whenever issues of competitiveness or the architecture of the eurozone are discussed. Additionally, Herman Van Rompoy, president of the European Council, assured that any summit of the euro 17 will be preceded by a meeting of all EU 27 member states.

An unhappy Tusk contends the agreement still establishes a decision-making format in which Poland does not have a vote, and frequently will not even be present at the deliberations. Nonetheless, Poland decided to join the other 24 signatories (the U.K. and the Czech Republic were the holdouts), marking yet another time that Poland chose “more Europe” when presented with a choice. The Europe Poland is choosing is less and less to its liking, but it is easier to influence the club from the inside than from the outside.

Despite a building relationship with Germany, Warsaw’s support of Berlin’s leadership in Europe is anything but unconditional: “Provided you [Germany] will include us in decision-making, Poland will support you,” Sikorski emphasized in his Berlin speech. Poland knows that it cannot always count on the unwavering support from its western neighbor, especially if Germany had to choose between Poland and France. Tusk’s goal now is to broaden Poland’s alliances within the eurozone, starting with Spain and Italy. Germany will have to earn Poland’s support.

Michal Baranowski  is the Senior Program Officer for Foreign Policy and Civil Society in the German Marshall Fund’s Warsaw office. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is a Senior Fellow and Senior Director for Strategy at GMF’s Washington, DC office.

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WARSAW – Tuesday’s court decision to convict the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to seven years in prison, barring her from electoral politics until 2015, while working on a legislative solution to decriminalize her offense is Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s bet that he can get away with that without harming Ukraine’s European perspective. Though Yanukovych claims that he has no control over an independent judge passing the verdict, few believe that such a politically sensitive case would be left alone by the government in a country not known for its independent judiciary.

The reaction to the court’s ruling in Tymoshenko’s case was swift and strong. Catherine Ashton said, “Justice is being applied selectively in politically motivated prosecutions.” Wilfried Martens, president of the European People’s Party, the biggest party in the European Parliament, called for suspending the signing of an Association Agreement with Ukraine and said the “court process and the decision is shameful for a country that has European aspirations.” Even the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arguably the biggest supporter of Ukraine’s European integration, released a statement admitting that “Ukraine’s image as a country that is undertaking a fundamental pro-European transformation has been tarnished.”

The severity of reaction in Brussels and throughout EU member states suggests that European leaders will hold Yanukovych responsible for what’s been described as a “political trial” and a “violation of democracy and the rule of law” by some of Ukraine’s closest supporters in Europe, heavyweight Polish MEPs Jacek Saryusz-Wolski and Pawel Zalewski. Yanukovych’s move made it very difficult for Ukraine’s friends to argue the case for its closer integration with the EU through the Association Agreement and the deep free-trade agreement to be signed at the end of the year. Yanukovych might have overplayed his hand. Whether or not the EU decides to cancel his planned Oct. 20 trip to Brussels will be the best test.

Tymoshenko’s conviction was received in Warsaw with much consternation, but without surprise. Poland has made closer ties between the EU and Ukraine one of the main priorities of its EU Presidency. Poland hoped the Association Agreement would be a crowning achievement of its six-month stint at the EU’s helm. Over many months, Polish diplomacy has been working to avoid the trainwreck of Tymoshenko’s conviction. Poles know that Tymoshenko is no saint, and made the case to the Ukrainian government that she is using the trial to focus attention both domestically and internationally. Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski met frequently with Yanukovych to make sure that he fully understood the consequences of her sentencing. Instead, Tymoshenko’s trial overshadowed the Eastern Partnership summit that took place in Warsaw two weeks ago, and now the guilty verdict threatens to derail the most important agreement, the free-trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which would confirm Ukraine’s European direction. Yanukovych made it very difficult for Ukraine’s friends to help him.

Yanukovych’s reasons for going through with the trial were both political and economic. The guilty verdict bars Tymoshenko from taking part in the next parliamentary elections, in which she and her supporters would be the biggest challenge for Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. Convicting Tymoshenko also serves as a shot across the bow to other opposition leaders in Kiev, as well as to backbenchers in Yanukovych’s party. The timing of the verdict is even better explained by economics. Yanukovych’s administration is trying to renegotiate the extremely costly gas deal with Russia that Tymoshenko signed and for which she was sentenced. The agreement costs Ukraine millions of dollars in inflated gas prices at the time when Ukraine, facing an economic crisis, can least afford it. The conviction, which characterizes signing the agreement as a crime and an abuse of power, will strengthen Ukraine’s case to renegotiate the deal. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin appeared worried by this turn of events and called the guilty verdict “dangerous and counterproductive.”

The most likely scenario for the coming weeks is for Yanukovych to support a quick change of the law, which would decriminalize Tymoshenko’s offense, leading to her release. Yanukovych’s hope is that that will quiet the European criticism, and he will be able to carry on business as usual. That might not be the case. European leaders are unlikely to accept anything less than Tymoshenko’s swift release, the return of her full rights to political participation, and the cessation of any other trials of opposition leaders. That might be hard for Yanukovych to do without losing face.

Michal Baranowski is a  Senior Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund’s Warsaw Office .

Photo by the European Commission.

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WARSAW — Poland took over the rotating EU presidency last Friday. Despite the presidency’s diminished role under the Lisbon Treaty, both Polish politicians and European leaders have high hopes for Poland’s six-month stint at the helm of the EU—Herman van Rompuy, president of the European Council, even called it an “historic event.”

At a time when Euroskeptic voices are on the rise in most European capitals and the European integration project is going through its deepest crisis to date, Poland’s public and governing elites remain staunchly pro-European, and optimistic about the future. This pro-European energy, mixed with the ambition to be recognized as a leading EU country, is likely to make the Polish presidency more effective than its predecessors (Spain, Belgium, and Hungary) since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk sees the next months as a test of leadership, and an opportunity for Poland to become a “new engine of the European Union.” This attitude contrasts sharply with other post-Lisbon presidencies that were limited in scope and ambition. Tusk’s pro-European attitude is not merely rhetorical. Poland’s national interest is closely aligned with the strength of European integration. Joining NATO and later the European Union has allowed Poland to escape its volatile history as a medium-sized country torn between ruthless empires, and to anchor itself firmly in the heart of Europe. A weaker EU would be a geopolitical blow to Poland. The country has also greatly benefited from EU solidarity in the form of structural funds. Poland’s public understands the stakes very well; with 80% of Poles favoring EU membership, Poland is one of the most pro-European countries in the Union. Poles want a European Union that is internally strong, open to its neighbors—especially from the East—and able to influence world affairs. The Tusk government will use the next six months to push the European project closer toward this vision.

Poland’s key task will be to prevent Europe from sliding into a deeper political crisis, where narrow national interests take over and weaken the European project. Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski clearly identified the main challenge when he said that “helping to manage the euro crisis on the periphery is our top priority.” The Polish presidency will also work to keep the EU’s enlargement door open, by focusing on completing the EU-Ukraine association agreement, making progress on the association agreement with Moldova, signing an accession treaty with Croatia, and holding the Eastern Partnership summit in the fall. Foreign Minister Rados?aw Sikorski, along with Catherine Ashton, will also push for the creation of a European Endowment for Democracy, a flexible funding mechanism for supporting democratic transition processes in neighboring countries.

The style of this presidency is likely to be more hands-on than its predecessors. Prime Minister Tusk won’t be satisfied with standing back as the Lisbon Treaty would have him do, but will work to provide political leadership during the next six months. Foreign Minister Sikorski is also unlikely to stay in the shadow of Catherine Ashton. He pledged to be her “loyal deputy,” but is likely to play a much more visible role in the EU’s external relations than any other foreign minister since the creation of the post of the High Representative. He has already led a meeting of the EU-Kazakhstan Council on behalf of Ashton, and is said to be deputized to head several key EU foreign policy efforts over the coming months. Finance minister Rostowski recently declared that the “stability of the eurozone is as vital to Poland’s national interest as membership in NATO or the EU.” As head of the council of EU finance ministers, he will play a key role in managing the Greek debt crisis (even though Poland is not yet a eurozone member).

Of course, despite the best-made plans, rotating presidencies often end up focusing on the crisis du jour. The current challenges before the European Union are vast. Last week’s vote in the Greek parliament pushed back the possibility of Greek default, but few believe this will be a lasting solution. Several EU countries are reinstating partial border controls despite the Schengen agreement (which guarantees free mobility across intra-European borders). In the south, Libya has exposed divisions both within NATO and among major European powers. In the east, promising signs are coming from Ukraine and Moldova—but there is no broader vision for completing Europe whole and free. With a volatile situation in North Africa and the Middle East, the coming six months have the potential to be one of the more explosive periods in EU history. All in all, a huge challenge for the largest new EU member state.

Success or failure of the Polish EU presidency will depend on whether it is able to begin reversing the pervasive sense of doubt in the European project and to work out practical solutions to the many challenges standing before the EU. On a more mundane level, it will also be a test for the ability of the Polish administration to effectively manage the thousands of meetings and hundreds of work streams that make up the daily work of the EU. The Poles feel good about themselves these days, and a senior politician recently admitted that “the last couple of years have made us more arrogant.” But this arrogance comes with a deep concern for the success of the European project. This energy, desire to lead, and confidence might now be just the right thing for Europe.

Michal Baranowski is a Senior Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund in Warsaw

Picture : pl2011.eu

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WASHINGTON—Bronislaw Komorowski’s victory in last Sunday’s presidential elections in Poland gives the Warsaw government a rare window of opportunity to advance a packed domestic reform and foreign policy agenda. With a fellow member of the centrist Civic Platform as the head of state, Prime Minister Donald Tusk can finally move to act, without the daily obstructions and veto-threats emanating from the office of the late President Lech Kaczynski. But both will have to fight to keep their victory.

Komorowski won—after a nail-biting election night, and initial exit polls that gave his opponent Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) a clear lead—by a mere six percent, a significant drop from a commanding advantage earlier this spring. Everything changed on April 10, the day a government plane crashed in Smolensk, taking the lives of much of Poland’s leadership, including then head of state Lech Kaczynski. After much deliberation, Jaroslaw, the late President’s twin brother, decided to run for PiS. Shrewdly, he discarded his penchant for divisive policies, and recast himself as a moderate, even on sensitive questions such as Poland’s Communist past. The strategy clearly worked: Kaczynski got an unexpected 47 percent of the vote. This success may well encourage the PiS leadership to continue their political shift from the far right to the center. This could turn them into a formidable opponent in this fall’s local elections, and even more importantly, in the October 2011 parliamentary elections. Some observers even argue that Kaczynski’s narrow defeat buys him time to consolidate the PiS’s position as well as his own.

All this puts considerable pressure on the winners of the election, President-elect Komorowski and Prime Minister Tusk. The challenges of reform are indeed enormous: despite the fact that Poland’s conservative fiscal policies (including a constitutional debt brake) have largely sheltered it from the otherwise devastating impact of the global economic crisis in Eastern Europe, its budget deficit stands at 7 percent, and public debt is nearing the ceiling (55 percent of GDP) which, if breached, would trigger unpleasant spending cuts. Experts are also calling for health care and pension reforms, as well as a more general overhaul of public finances: all likely to be unpopular steps in a country that feels it has already paid a high price for austerity.

On the foreign policy front, Komorowski’s election largely signals continuity—albeit without the nuisance factor. The squabbles between the Prime Minister and the former President ranged from disagreements over ambassadorial appointments or over who would represent Poland at international summit meetings to running a parallel foreign policy through the National Security Council.

One of Mr. Komorowski’s first state visits will take him to Brussels; Poland will hold the EU Presidency in the second half of 2011. However, his main foreign policy focus will be on bilateral relations: in particular, on building better bilateral ties with Russia and Germany. One of the key topics with Berlin will be the disputed status of the large Polish diaspora in Germany (estimated at between one and two million). As for Moscow, Komorowski’s main objective will be to cajole the Russian government into continuing its current constructive stance towards Poland.

On transatlantic relations, Komorowski’s record is one of friendly pragmatism. The President knows and likes the United States; his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama immediately invited him to visit. Nonetheless, there is one highly sensitive issue: the withdrawal of Polish troops from Afghanistan—a mission deeply unpopular at home. During a visit to Afghanistan in June, Komorowski said his country’s soldiers should leave by 2012; the U.S. position is that troop drawdown should begin in 2011. Careful handling and coordination with American and European allies, not least ahead of the Lisbon NATO summit, will be critical.

Bronislaw Komorowski’s greatest challenge, however, will be to become the supreme representative of all Poles, a role all his post-Communist predecessors have struggled to assume. That will mean bridging deep-seated divisions within society–reflected in the presidential poll—and standing above party politics, as the Polish Constitution demands.

One final fact will certainly help Prime Minister Tusk and President Komorowski focus on their tasks: since 1989, no Polish government has managed to win reelection. They have just over a year to break with that tradition.

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WASHINGTON — This past weekend Poland said goodbye to President Lech Kaczynski, his wife, and dozens of members of the political and military elite who died on April 10 in Russia’s Katyn forest. As Poland begins to emerge from a period of national mourning, how is the country faring and what are the opportunities and challenges it now faces?

The crash was a powerful blow to the Polish state. The president died along with the Polish army’s chief of staff and most of the senior military leadership, the president of the Central Bank, the chief of the president’s Chancellery, deputy ministers of defense and foreign affairs, parliamentarians, and many other senior officials. Yet, despite this shock, the country’s institutions have continued to function.

As dictated by the Constitution, the speaker of the lower house of parliament, Bronislaw Komorowski, has taken over the role of president. The deputy president of the Central Bank has assumed leadership, calming the market, and military chiefs have been temporary replaced by their deputies. In other words, the system is working, without panic or chaos.

Nonetheless, the June 20 presidential elections will show the true impact of the tragedy on Polish democracy. Will the shock of the crash lead opponents to rise above the usual bitter partisanship? Will they moderate their tone, for fear of being punished by disapproving voters? Whatever the tone, one thing seems certain: disagreements over the vision for Poland’s future will continue.

Acting President Komorowski is the candidate of Civic Platform, the center-right ruling party, in the upcoming elections. It was Komorowski who addressed the nation first after the disaster; he then quickly assumed the responsibilities of president. Reconciling the two roles of candidate and president will require some skill, but if he does it well, he will be hard to beat. The latest poll shows him more than 20 points ahead of the next candidate. As president, Komorowski would assert his independence but also collaborate with Civic Platform’s government.

President Kaczynski had planned to run as the candidate of the Law and Justice party, the main opposition. The conservative political group’s only other natural candidate is his brother, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who could of course campaign as the torchbearer of Lech Kaczynski’s legacy. Although Jaroslaw Kaczynski is a divisive politician, popular sympathy for his late brother now makes him formidable. Mr. Kaczynski must decide soon whether to run. However, there is no doubt that the crash was a profound personal blow to him; in Warsaw, some speculate that he might take early retirement instead. The unlikely victory of Law and Justice’s candidate would mean extended period of divisive cohabitation with a Civic Platform prime minister.

Smaller parties will have a hard time competing in these elections because they will have only two weeks to collect the 100,000 signatures necessary to register their candidates. The third largest party, the Social Democrats, who also lost presidential candidate Jerzy Szmajdzinski in the crash, lack a natural candidate and might instead support an independent center-left candidate, Andrzej Olechowski.

This tragedy has also done a great deal for Polish-Russian relations, with the Russian leadership making some very significant gestures. The Polish crash investigators have received full cooperation from Russia, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally oversaw the investigation. The Russian leadership also finally authorized the showing of the Andrzej Wajda’s film Katyn, which truthfully and graphically depicts the murder in 1940 of 21,768 Polish officers by Stalin’s secret police, the NKVD. This followed an already historic meeting between Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Putin in Katyn less than a week before the crash. Finally, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev managed to come to Krakow for last Sunday’s funeral, despite the volcanic ash that grounded many other leaders. In his speech at the funeral, Komorowski said that these gestures are “deeply appreciated, and accepted with an open heart and great hope.” Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski even spoke of an “emotional breakthrough.” Does all this already translate into better Polish-Russian relations? Not yet. Many divisive issues remain. But perhaps the default mode has moved from suspicion to gratitude and a beginning of trust.

Michal Baranowski is a Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund in Washington.

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Central and Eastern European leaders’ letter to President Obama provoked a strong reaction throughout the region, showing the depth and potency of the underlying sentiment. The US administration would be wrong to ignore it.

Yesterday a letter written by a group of prominent Central European politicians and analysts was presented at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and was printed in the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza. The letter, addressed to President Obama, argued for a renewal of relations between the US and Central and Eastern Europe based on common commitment to democratic values and common interests in Europe and beyond.

Four years ago Alexandr Vondra, one of the authors, and Ron Asmus wrote about the origins and the future of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe. They questioned whether the region will remain atlanticist in the years to come. They argued that first and foremost this will be determined by America’s behavior and policy. An America that is open to people from the region, whose foreign policy is based on values and commitment to allies was likely to keep this part of Europe firmly in the Atlanticist camp. But an America flirting with realpolitik or unilateralism would soon brew troubles, even in this historically pro-American part of the world.

Over the last five years, GMF’s Transatlantic Trends has shown a steady decline of public attitudes in the region towards the US and its leadership in the world. This decline has been significantly steeper in central and eastern Europe than in the western part of the continent. The belief that NATO is still essential has also sharply declined, even in countries like Poland, where fewer people now hold this attitude toward NATO than in France. Last year’s survey showed intense popularity of then Senator Obama in Europe. In September, when GMF releases this year’s Transatlantic Trends, we will see if these attitudes translated into improved transatlantic relations and whether the new administration has been as warmly received in Central and Eastern Europe, as in Western Europe. Despite these worrying trends, the public opinion data also clearly shows that people in this part of Europe want more rather than less cooperation with the U.S. The two countries where this sentiment is still the strongest are Poland and Romania.

The letter to the President Obama should not be seen as criticism of the current administration. Both the elites and the public in Central and Eastern Europe know that it’s too soon to judge the new US President and understand that he has inherited a very complex set of global challenges. The public opinion surveys also clearly shows that the troubles started well ahead of President Obama taking office. The letter is an invitation to renew relations between America and some of her staunchest allies. Given that this call is firmly rooted in the attitudes of not only elites, but the Central and Eastern Europe public, it should not be ignored. The enthusiastic reaction to the letter’s message throughout the region makes it all the more likely that the administration will hear its message. Modest investment and the course correction suggested by the authors could go a long way in rejuvenating the partnership between Central and Eastern Europe and America.

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One week after  Dennis  Blair, U.S. Director of National Intelligence declared the economic crisis the primary threat to U.S. national security Latvia fell victim to the political instability caused by the economic turmoil. Without a strong, coordinate response  shoring  up Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies, we are risking further political instability in other countries of the region, possibly undermining the legacy of 1989 and EU enlargement.  

After decades of impressive economic growth thanks to policies of trade liberalization coupled with European integration, economies in Eastern Europe have been hit hard by the global economic crisis. Some of them, such as Latvia, are experiencing the sharpest economic contraction since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two weeks before his resignation, the Latvian prime minister announced that  the economy has contracted at an annual rate of 10.5%, with economists predicting a further drop of 10% in 2009. Other countries in the neighborhood are also in deep trouble. Last week, analysts warned of Ukraine possibly defaulting on its sovereign debt, with the interest rate reaching 32% on annual bases. The pattern in CEE is  reminiscent of the 1998 Asian financial crisis – during the good times economic growth was fueled by a credit boom and borrowing in foreign currencies. As the shock hits – this time in the form of the credit crunch – foreign investors’  confidence  has evaporated and the fall of local currencies  has exacerbated  the  viscous  circle. However, unlike during the Asian crisis, this time countries will not be able to count on a  cushion provided by robust growth in other parts of the world. Eastern Europe will not be able to solve their economic problems with export led growth.  

The depth of troubles in Central and Eastern Europe comes  precisely from what was considered the prescription for success over the last twenty years. The ’90s growth  paradigm called for deep domestic reforms coupled with opening to foreign investment in local financial systems.   Local banks were sold to foreign financial  institutions and local companies integrated into the  European  single market. As western credit dries up  and export markets in the rest of the EU stagnates, what used to look like a prescription for prosperity, is seen  now  by some as a formula for failure.

What happened last Friday in Latvia can repeat itself in other vulnerable democracies throughout the region. The impact of economic downturn on politics in this part of the world might not be benign. Populism and protectionism are already on the rise, and this trend is likely only to deepen with the severity of the economic crisis. The worse the situation gets, the easier it is for populist and eurosceptic politicians to make the case that the post-1989 transformation made the countries of central and eastern Europe particularly vulnerable to the economic crisis.  

The transatlantic community, including the EU, IMF, and the  World  Bank, needs to act in a coordinated manner to prevent economic and political turmoil in countries of Eastern Europe. Instability in what now is a very vulnerable region posses a risk to the gains of the last 20 years. As Mr. Blair pointed out during his testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee,”Time is probably our greatest threat.” The longer we let the economic troubles in new Europe brew, the greater the risk that political fallout from the crisis will have long lasting, negative consequences on the region that has been the biggest success story since the end of the Cold War.

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