Washington — Seasoned NATO observers know to expect few surprises when Chicago hosts the first NATO summit on U.S. soil in 13 years. After an ambitious effort at Lisbon in 2010 ushered in NATO’s new strategic concept, Chicago was always meant to be more about implementation than big or new ideas. Indeed, preoccupation with other things — e.g., the ongoing impact of the financial crisis, the effect of electoral cycles, and evident disagreement between allies on a few fundamental issues — dampens expectations for the “deliverables” to be announced in Chicago.

Watch Video of Mark Jacobson Explaining What to Expect at the Chicago Summit

Measured expectations are understandable. This is a summit that must go smoothly and, thus difficult issues may be deferred. NATO member states wish to demonstrate collectively that the most successful military alliance in history is evolving to meet the challenges of the 21^st century. Collective defense, enshrined in Article 5, which mandates that an attack on one is an attack on the whole, remains the cornerstone of this understanding. Likewise, in the wake of its strategic rebalancing to Asia, the United States will look to reassure its European allies that NATO remains the “indispensable alliance.’” Meanwhile the same European allies will seek to reassure the United States that they have understood its insistence on the need for more and better burden sharing.

Discussions at the summit will focus on three key areas — revitalizing NATO’s defence capabilities, continuing the process of transition in Afghanistan, and strengthening NATO’s valuable partnerships not only in Europe, but across the globe.

Smart Defense is a key component to NATO’s plan for revitalizing its capabilities. According to this concept, member states commit to share resources and capabilities and to collaborate on future acquisitions aimed at eliminating unnecessary duplication and expense. Around 20 Smart Defense projects will be announced in Chicago, but questions will remain of how “new” or how “shared” these programs really are. For example, both the expansion of Baltic Air Policing and development of Allied Ground Surveillance were galvanized by the Smart Defense initiative, and both are welcome, yet some may argue these are hardly “new” initiatives. The Alliance will also announce “interim operational capability” for Ballistic Missile Defense, but the challenge will be maintaining European financial contributions to what will remain substantively a U.S. project.

The key question is whether the announcements in Chicago will indicate a change in NATO’s mindset. Can this new formulation of cooperative defense, burden sharing, and interoperability succeed where earlier, similar initiatives have stagnated? Can the Alliance find ways around longstanding concerns, including over important issues of national versus alliance interests?

On the second day of the summit, 22 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners will join the 28 NATO members for discussions on Afghanistan, NATO’s top operational priority. The discussions will focus on five key issues: NATO’s shift to a supporting role in 2013; training and financial support for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014; and reconciliation and long-term international support for security, economic, and development commitments to Afghanistan. Once more, the messages will be clear, but the details less so. Most immediately, the pre-election promises of the incoming French President Francois Hollande have already required some careful backpedaling to avoid upsetting NATO’s principle of “in together, out together.” And there are more elections to come. Pakistan’s invitation to Chicago also signals a possible warming of this key relationship. But more difficult conversations will be left for the Tokyo Donors Conference on Afghanistan in July.

There has been clear progress in Afghanistan, where, 75 percent of the population is now under the protection of Afghan-led security forces; moreover Afghan forces now lead about 40 percent of conventional and special operations missions. The U.S. strategic partnership agreement and other bilateral pacts have informed Afghans that they will not be abandoned, but that considerable challenges remain, not least receiving the financial commitments that will be required of cash-strapped allies.

Although Chicago is not intended to be an enlargement summit, there will be a meeting of those states aspiring to be part of NATO intended to signal that the door remains open and that nations should be free to choose their own alliances. Expect careful choreography attempting to disguise differences between member states on the pace and nature of any expansion.

Also expect the Alliance to go to considerable lengths to acknowledge how important partnerships beyond the 28 nations have been — not just for operations in Afghanistan, but especially in Libya, where for the first time Arab nations placed their military forces under the NATO command and control umbrella. With an eye towards the future, some nations, the United States in particular, will urge the Alliance to envision NATO as the hub of a global network of partnerships.

Some Alliance members will seek in the post-2014 period to retrench because of global austerity, instead confining NATO’s focus to missions “in area” while deferring “out of area” operations. This would be a mistake. Indeed, the debate over NATO’s relevance after the Chicago Summit will confront a different reality: there is no more “out of area.” Rather, future challenges confronting NATO will most likely emanate from the instability well beyond its familiar field of vision.

Mark Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow in Washington, DC, and Sarah Raine is a Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellow in Berlin, both with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

While traveling in London this past week, I could not help but to be reminded of the enormous sacrifices that have been made by nations in times of war.  It seems as though every street has a memorial to a particular war or regiment, most striking of all is The Cenotaph, an empty tomb that stands in the middle of Whitehall.  Constructed shortly after the First World War, the tomb bears the inscription “The Glorious Dead,” words chosen by Rudyard Kipling to remember those who have given their lives for each of their nations in all wars around the world. Indeed, as we approach the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War it is worth reminding ourselves that wars are difficult to control – even if limited by intent or design.   As Barbara Tuchman reminds us in The Guns of August, it is doubtful that at the outbreak of war in 1914 anyone would have predicted a war that ended with well over 10 million dead by its conclusion. If the experience of the First and Second World Wars is not enough to remind us, then the experience of war in Afghanistan and Iraq – both begun with “limited” objectives and timelines – should shake the world from the belief that wars can deliberately be limited with any degree of certainty.

The current tension between Israel and Iran, including incredibly heated rhetoric calling for pre-emptive actions and assassinations is eerily reminiscent of the period before the summer of 1914, when the sense of “inevitability” of war seized national leaders.  Israel feels that pre-emptive action against Iran may be needed to prevent an existential threat – Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. While Iran has not crossed the point of no return in becoming a nuclear state, Israel may not be willing to risk that its own nuclear capability could deter a nuclear armed Iran.  Indeed, for Israel, a nation whose collective memory includes the Holocaust, Iranian threats of nuclear “extermination” may not seem idle threats.   The point is that the tinder is dry, the flints are primed, and we are on the brink of war in the Middle-East – a war that is likely to go well beyond the borders of Israel and Iran.  The world cannot simply sit and wait for the spark.

It is time for Israel and Iran to talk.  It is time for Iran to recognize the state of Israel and to understand that acquiring a nuclear weapon may make Iran less safe.  Iran must allow IAEA inspectors to complete their inspection missions unhindered.  If the Iranian government refuses, then the Iranian people need to truly consider whether it is time to choose between their nation and their leaders. This crisis is bigger than Khamenei or Ahmedinejad and their continued intransigence is threatening the Iranian people.  For their part – the Israelis must weigh the true consequences of pre-emptive war and recognize that such action may be a greater risk to Israeli lives than a nuclear armed Iran.

For the United States, this continuing crisis comes at a time when our nation is tired after over a decade of war in Afghanistan, a tremendously costly struggle in Iraq, and a man-made humanitarian disaster in Syria precipitated by a despicable leader who may have to be stopped through military force.  Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey have correctly explained the potential risks posed by a nuclear Iran as well as the additional risks posed by pre-emptive military action by Israel.  In the end, military action will at best only delay Iran’s nuclear aspirations.  Therefore, these ambitions must be halted through other means. The recent efforts at enhanced sanctions, an effort including European participation, is a strong sign that the world is committed to preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear state, while also avoiding the need for massive military action.   It is not, as some would suggest, a matter of being willing to wage war to back up talk. It’s a matter of knowing when a nation has no choice but to go to war.  We have not exhausted all options just yet.

History is replete with as many examples of prudent military action as it is risks taken on behalf of peace.  Our leaders must remember that we still go to war, as Thucydides wrote over 2000 years ago, out of fear for our own security, justice and honor, and self-interest.   There is certainly enough fear at this point, but it is time to take the edge off rhetoric and move away from the certainty of conflict.  All it will take is one misunderstanding, one accident, or one bungled action for the Middle East to be plunged into a calamity.  As Barbara Tuchman wrote almost fifty years ago, “war is the unfolding of miscalculations.”  Hopefully, someone in Tehran – and in Tel Aviv – is reading Tuchman.

Dr. Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC and previously worked at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.  He has served as both an Army and Navy Reservist and deployed to Bosnia in 1996 and Afghanistan in 2006.

Share/Bookmark

French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent announcement that French troops would hand over their security responsibilities to Afghan forces by the end of 2013 — a year earlier than the completion of the NATO combat mission — has caused some to declare that the entire Afghanistan operation is at risk. The French decision certainly reflects Sarkozy’s need to address pressing domestic pressure to bring forces home as his presidential reelection campaign begins. But Sarkozy will have to balance this with the need to maintain France’s reputation within NATO. There will be times when alliance interests will need to trump national interest. The decision must also be put into context. It poses little operational risk, and is by no means a repudiation of the validity of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. What the French decision does reflect is the politics that accompany any coalition mission, however undesirable.

From an operational standpoint, there is no doubt that the 4,000 French troops in Afghanistan, mainly in Kapisa province, have made a difference. French forces have shown acuity in counterinsurgency operations, and French trainers, especially gendarmes, have been critical to increasing the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces. But as with all ISAF nations, the French are now looking at what the expected 2014 transition will mean and how they can best support Afghanistan during this process and beyond. For many states, this will mean a shift away from combat to training operations. Thus, the more important question is what role will France choose to play beyond transition and will it reflect the balance between national and alliance interests? While France has signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan to cover security, economic, and political cooperation, it remains unclear what mix of forces France would contribute to a training mission through 2014 and beyond. A firm French commitment at the upcoming NATO summit to provide significant numbers of personnel to NATO and EU training missions would be especially welcome as the planning for a post-2014 Afghanistan continues. Likewise, specified commitments to development projects and expertise to assist the Afghan government in establishing more effective rule of law could have an even greater impact in addressing the strategic vulnerabilities of the Afghan state.

While it is certainly irksome that the French chose not to use the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) process to work through the timeline on transition in Kapisa, the decision was not a surprise to NATO or Afghan government officials. Indeed, Presidents Karzai and Sarkozy had already agreed to the 2013 timeline in pre-decisional meetings prior to the public announcement. Both NATO and the Afghan government have long expected Kapisa province to transition as part of the third “tranche,” likely to be announced in March 2012. This will give ISAF and Afghan forces plenty of time to fully handover security operations and prepare Kapisa for Afghan leadership. While the pace of the French drawdown has been increased there will still be about 3,000 French troops in Afghanistan at the end of 2012. In short, the French decision is simply a repackaging of the milestones that have been discussed for almost two years now.

Coalitions are, almost by definition, imperfect creatures. They are politically complex and require considerable investment and management to get them to work. Indeed, Napoleon is reported to have said that he’d rather fight against a coalition than as part of one. But it is equally important to recall that it was, in the end, a coalition that defeated Napoleon. The art of leading a successful coalition requires balancing national and alliance interests and an understanding of when to give one way or another. In an age of budget austerity, NATO members must continue to remember that alliances mean shared commitment, shared contributions, and shared sacrifice. In Afghanistan the transition process has also always had an unwritten purpose — to keep the NATO allies and ISAF partners together until the Afghans could lead on their own and it was formulated with an eye towards maintaining sufficient domestic political support in each nation so that force contributions could continue, even if they had to be adjusted over time. Building and maintaining a coalition is not always a pretty process, but it is a necessary one, and in Afghanistan it will be better to win messy than lose pretty.

Mark Jacobson, former Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, is a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC.

Share/Bookmark

WASHINGTON – As he campaigned for the U.S. presidency in 1952, Republican candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower argued that he would seek to bring “security with solvency” to the American people.  Eisenhower realized that the challenges posed by the Soviet Union could too easily stress America’s finite resources and a strategy to face that threat consider the economic roots of America’s military power and influence in the world. For Eisenhower, economic power was the indispensable source of American global leadership.

In his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, U.S. President Barack Obama seemed to recognize Eisenhower’s insight.  Obama focused largely on the economic challenges still facing the United States — but framed those challenges in the context of recent national security victories and the achievements of the World War II generation.  While Obama did focus on domestic affairs, he both opened and closed his address by praising America’s men and women in uniform — one of the few points drawing bi-partisan applause – and took stock of a broad set of foreign policy and security challenges that face the United States today. He also made clear that the new U.S. defense strategy would also balance security with solvency — saving nearly half a trillion dollars but maintaining the type of first-rate military required to deal with current and emerging threats.

Obama’s address included a call to learn from the shared sacrifice, partnership, and teamwork that the U.S. military demonstrates day after day, to include that shown in the mission to kill Osama bin Laden in May of last year — clearly the most significant national security event of the past twelve months.

Obama was assertive in his description of his vision of America’s role in the world but realistic when considering the complexity of the challenges ahead. In stark contrast to much of the isolationist rhetoric of the Republican primary debates, he argued that America continues to be a strong, ascendant world leader with a “steadfast” commitment to allies around the globe.

Of course, Obama noted the end of the war in Iraq and the determination to transition to Afghan leadership.  He also acknowledged the “wave of change” brought about by the Arab Spring and issued a sharp rebuke to the Assad regime — noting that they would soon discover “that the forces of change can’t be reversed and that human dignity can’t be denied.”   He praised the power of partnerships that have enabled a unified approach to counter the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons but was realistic in his assessment of whether this in and of itself would provide the solution.  Coming a day after U.S., British, and French warships entered the Persian Gulf despite threats from Iran; Obama reiterated that while he hoped for a peaceful resolution, “no options” were off the table.

It is telling that while facing a tough re-election in a poor economy, Obama has chosen to frame domestic problems within the context of foreign policy successes.  It is a clear indication that even while Washington focuses on a Presidential election campaign, the administration will not abdicate the responsibilities the United States has as a global leader.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He has formerly served at the Department of Defense and on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The views expressed are his own.

Share/Bookmark

All In:  The Education of General David Petraeus.  By Paula Broadwell with Vernon Loeb. The Penguin Press, 2012, 394pp. $29.99.

Writing a first book is challenging in its own right, much less doing so as events unfold.  In All In, The Education of General David Petraeus, Paula Broadwell chose to add a third hurdle:  writing the story of an individual, General David H. Petraeus, who has not only accomplished much in a high profile arena, but whose career has not yet completely run its course.  In her 400 page work, based on her in-progress doctoral dissertation on the development of General Petraeus’ career, Broadwell has delivered a solid treatment of the General’s on-the-ground experiences in what was to become his final mission in uniform – command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from July 2010 until July 2011. For many reasons, All In will be one of the must-reads for any serious student of military affairs and international security issues.

All In is not a comprehensive biography of General, now Director, Petraeus, nor is it a comprehensive history of the war in Afghanistan.  Those who seek either will come away disappointed.  Nor is All In the cocktail party circuit “tell-all.” Indeed, Broadwell does a proper job in relaying the personal stories of the key players without betraying confidences or gossiping. In doing so, she does a valuable service to future writers by capturing insights that otherwise would be lost to history with the passage of time.  While writing All In, Broadwell benefitted greatly from the labors of veteran journalist Vernon Loeb, whom she credits on the cover.  The voice, however, is unmistakably that of Ms. Broadwell, and despite a few areas where editors could have reduced repetition and smoothed out transitions, All In is eminently readable, engaging, and will provide an excellent bridge for future scholarly treatments and more detailed assessments of various aspects of Petraeus’ career (e.g. Iraq) and the still-ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Broadwell tells the story of how General Petraeus became, as the late Richard Holbrooke candidly told a small group of civilians shortly before his death, “the greatest operational commander of our time.”  All In is the story of those who shaped Petraeus’ thinking as a young officer and a story of a General whom the nation called to be the face of two unpopular wars – Iraq in the beginning of 2007 and Afghanistan in the summer of 2010.   Likewise, this is the story of the challenges and successes that some of Petraeus’ protégé’s have faced during that latter conflict. Specifically, Broadwell follows three of the 101^st Airborne Division’s Battalion Commanders and traces the outlines of military operations in 2010 and 2011 in Afghanistan, particularly those in Kandahar and Helmand.  Broadwell chronicles the often vicious fighting against Taliban insurgents and her blow by blow description of battles in the Arghandab bring the reader into the situation as experienced by the commanders on the ground. Broadwell also chronicles the exploits of two members of the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) and brings the reader into the struggle to prod the U.S. military to overcome its endemic aversion to small wars and insurgencies.  While she does not address head-on the issue of whether “too much” has been attempted in Afghanistan as a matter of policy, her telling of the story does remind the reader not all in uniform were “true believers” in the value of COIN and that, indeed, some were simply dismissive of any complex and nuanced notions of conflict.

Broadwell’s style may remind readers of James Kittfield’s Prodigal Soldiers (1995) – a story of U.S. military leaders who sprang from the experience of the Vietnam War. Broadwell alternates between Petraeus’ command in Afghanistan and the career that shaped him prior to the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan. She describes his relatively unassuming childhood where Petraeus’ father taught him that results and not excuses are what matter.  She also chronicles his experiences as a junior officer and field grade leader, and the story is fascinating enough that the reader is left wanting more about what truly shaped and drove a young David Petraeus into such a tenacious and effective leader.  Clearly, one of Petraeus key strengths as a leader was not only finding mentors, but also in seeking out junior officers (and civilians) to mentor himself and providing them opportunities to grow into even stronger leaders.  Additionally, All In gives the reader an understanding of the importance Petreaus placed on building the right team as well as the challenge of ensuring that these teams did not tell him simply what they thought he wanted to hear.

Broadwell uses her study to demonstrate how Petraeus’ experiences – not simply in Iraq, but more importantly over a lifetime of assignments around the world shaped his analytical and decisonmaking processes in Afghanistan.  Perhaps the most important take away during his career was that Petraeus felt that the enemy should not be allowed to define the rules of the fight:  “when the enemy defined their rules, we just changed ours,” a young Lieutenant Colonel Petraeus explained to one of his subordinates during training exercises. Broadwell deliberately focuses much more on the operational nature of his command in Afghanistan and his interaction with his former protégé’s than with Petraeus’ dealings with peers, subordinate general and flag officers, senior civilian officials, and the Afghan military and civilian leadership.

While there is some discussion of non-U.S. NATO forces, All In focuses on the U.S. military, almost exclusively the U.S. Army.  Broadwell’s measurement of his handling of sensitive issues such as air and ground rules of engagement, civilian casualties, and the Afghan Local Police program illustrate that Petraeus practiced what he preached in terms of understanding that “people are the center of gravity,” whether those under your own command or those you seek to protect from the insurgents.  While it is understandable that there is not more of a discussion of General Petraeus’ interactions with often difficult Afghan senior officials and the complexities of Alliance politics, this does mean that the reader misses seeing how truly skilled Petraeus was as not only a soldier, but, in perhaps a way not seen since Eisenhower or Marshall, as a diplomat.  Likewise, there is only scant discussion of the challenges Petraeus faced in dealing with a dysfunctional U.S. Embassy that had a critical role to play in the stabilization and development dimension of the COIN campaign.

In writing All In, Broadwell had tremendous access not only to Petraeus, but to those who were working or had worked with him. She interviewed over 150 individuals to include not just the General’s closest advisors, but former mentors and subordinates. The challenge Broadwell faced, of course, was not just filtering the subjectivity of those she interviewed, but to seek objectivity in her own analysis.  The pride she has in her mentor/subject, his protégés, and her belief in the mission in Afghanistan most certainly shines through. While some will choose to disagree, this does not detract at all from the quality of the book.  In many ways it lets the reader understand how many of those who have served in the U.S. military feel about serving under such a uniquely capable set of military leaders such as Petreaus, McChrystal, Mattis, Stavridis, McRaven, and Rodriguez.

No doubt, for Ms. Broadwell, it was hard not to be proud of the camaraderie, professionalism, and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice that she witnessed while conducting her interviews.  In the end, the strength of this book indeed lays in both Broadwell’s ability to empathize with her subject matter and that her access uniquely gave her the ability to obtain the views of participants as events happened or shortly thereafter when the emotion was often still raw.  Indeed, for this alone, All In will stand the test of time and prove invaluable to future scholars and students of history.

Mark R. Jacobson is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. He served as the Deputy NATO Senior Civilian Representative and an advisor both Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal from 2009-2011.

Share/Bookmark