The latest twist in U.S.-Pakistani relations has come to reveal a deepening rift that is proving increasingly difficult to mend. Last weekend’s killing of Osama bin Laden in the heartland of Pakistan has caused tensions to plummet, but relations have clearly been deteriorating for some time. The current low was initiated by CIA agent Raymond Davis’ killing of two Pakistanis with alleged links to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency. A high-profile diplomatic dispute ensued, eventually leading to Mr. Davis’ release in exchange for $2.3 million in compensation to the victims’ families. Closely following this, U.S. drone strikes hit a tribal jirga in Pakistan’s North Waziristan region, killing several Pakistani civilians and causing tensions to exacerbate. Combined with bin Laden’s killing these events call into question the effectiveness of the Obama administration’s Af-Pak Strategy adopted just two years ago, and with the latest White House report on the state of the war in Afghanistan affirming “there remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency (in Pakistan)”, we may be witnessing the start of a new phase of U.S.-Pakistani relations. Clearly, both Islamabad and Washington have contributed to the current downward spiral and despite the allies’ inherent co-dependency this trend is likely to persist, unless both sides manage to reconcile their strategic interests. However, as long as the Pakistani military remains a powerful political, economic, and social actor, this will prove exceedingly difficult.

Since coming to office President Obama has worked to shift the focus of the so-called War on Terror to Pakistan, recognizing the direct link between a stable and prosperous Pakistan and success in Afghanistan. This acknowledgement has not only translated into increased financial support for the civilian government, estimated at $7.5 billion, but also a military aid package of $2 billion, and increased intelligence sharing between the CIA and the ISI. Moreover, the counterterrorism effort conducted in Pakistan’s tribal areas has become one of the administration’s top priorities. However, despite the Pakistani government’s official support for the strategy, military and intelligence officials widely see it as a breach of sovereignty and thus have become increasingly reluctant to provide the Americans with intelligence support. The unilateral U.S. operation that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden last weekend is a prime example of the strategy. The United States’ decision to conduct the operation without informing the Pakistanis illustrates the growing lack of trust in the partnership. It also raises questions about Pakistan’s complicity in sheltering bin Laden, as it is inconceivable that the Pakistani security and military establishment was wholly unaware of bin Laden’s whereabouts. Born out of a culture dominated by paranoia about foreign influence, particularly India, the military and ISI’s main objective is to undermine Indian influence in the region. In the context of Afghanistan, they are also concerned about the problems posed by ethnic separatism, which they fear will be accentuated by the Hamid Karzai regime in Kabul. Coupled with the conviction that the United States will eventually pull out of Afghanistan, leaving a power vacuum just waiting to be filled, the army and ISI have secured their influence by supporting various pro-Taliban elements such as the Haqqani network. As long as the military remains the most powerful institution in Pakistan, India centric views will continue to dominate strategic thinking, and thus reconciling Pakistani and U.S. interests will remain near impossible.

The Pakistani military’s unwillingness to effectively combat various terrorist elements within its borders has led the United States to employ drone strikes as part of its counterterrorist strategy in the region. While the Pakistani authorities have always taken issue with the strikes, they have only just recently chosen to criticize them publicly. In the aftermath of the March 17th  drone strikes that left a number of Pakistani civilians dead, army chief General Ashfaq Kayani publicly condemned the act, asserting the U.S. had “carelessly and callously targeted” a peaceful meeting of elders. While Kayani reportedly also demanded the United States suspend its drone campaign, the administration has showed no sign of stopping, affirming that the “aggressive counterterrorism operations in Pakistan” will continue. In yet another move further demonstrating Pakistan’s increased self-assurance, the ISI has not only requested better oversight of U.S. intelligence officials operating in the country, but also demanded the U.S. decrease the number of security officials active in Pakistan. Huma Yusuf points out that while simultaneously granting chief of the ISI Lieutenant General Shuha Pasha an uncommon one-year extension, the ISI has gained the upper hand and will continue to use its newly acquired bargaining powers to push its interests through. With the ISI given the opportunity to flex its muscles, the diverging views that continue to cause strains in the relationship are set to exacerbate.

In essence, recent events reflect the constant tug of war between American and Pakistani strategic interests. Although their opposing views are no novelty, the United States has clearly become less tolerant of Pakistan’s inaction as of late, while Pakistan continues to demonstrate an increasing willingness to push the envelope on certain key issues. Ultimately, as long as the civilian government remains weak, the Obama administration will have no choice but to continue to engage directly with the military. Paradoxically, this will only lead to a further weakening of the very government the United States has spent billions of dollars on to strengthen. Clearly, as long as the military continues to hold the reins of power Pakistan will be forced to work against its real national interest, namely that of providing security and prosperity to its population and fighting the terrorist groups that claim hundreds of Pakistani lives every year.

Despite claiming to have a shared set of strategic interests Pakistan’s obsession with India will continue to undermine U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. With the country’s most powerful institution dedicated to keeping India in check it is difficult to envision how a strong and sustainable alliance will ever come to fruition. While recent events have led both the United States and Pakistan to become more publicly critical of one another, it has also put their radically different strategic views in the spotlight. Ultimately, as long as the United States stays committed to Afghanistan, Pakistan will remain an indispensable partner. However, with recent revelations indicating that the allies are further removed from each other than ever before, the Obama administration must think of new ways of addressing Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance in the hope of altering its strategic outlook.

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BRUSSELS — As the ballots were counted following Sweden’s election last Sunday, it became clear how historic a day it was in Swedish politics. The governing liberal/moderate alliance (consisting of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Center Party) became the largest coalition in parliament, gaining a total of 49.3% of the popular vote, while the red-green opposition (consisting of the Greens, the Social Democrats and the Leftist party) only managed 43.7% of the vote. Despite conceding majority rule, this constituted a victory for the alliance; it is not only the first time in Swedish history that a liberal/moderate government has been reelected, but it also was the Social Democrats’ worst election since World War I. Despite these two milestones, the success of another political party has come to dominate headlines. The Sweden Democrats, a far right populist party, gained 5.7% of the popular vote, potentially making them kingmakers in parliament. This outcome, coupled with the lack of a clear majority in parliament, lends an air of uncertainty to the future of Swedish politics. So what options are now available to the alliance and what effect might the results have on their ability to govern effectively?

Acknowledging the instability caused by Sunday’s election, Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (leader of the Moderate party) has said openly that he will seek the support of the Greens in an attempt to gain a majority in parliament. Notably, he has not proposed to form an official coalition with the Greens, but rather hopes to secure their support on certain key issues. The Greens however, maintain that their voters have not given them the mandate to support an alliance-led government. Instead, they have urged Reinfeldt to seek broader support by inviting all the left-wing parties for talks. It is highly unlikely that the alliance will go ahead and negotiate with all the opposition parties, even though by doing so they would weaken the Sweden Democrats, which both coalitions hope to do.

So what is Reinfeldt’s next step? Likely, one of two scenarios. First, even though the Greens have been less than welcoming of Reinfeldt’s call for support, they may be forced into a corner on the issue. If they refuse to support the alliance, they may be perceived as indirectly strengthening the Sweden Democrats’ position in parliament, of which no party wants to be accused. In order to avoid this situation, the alliance may go so far as to offer the Greens a ministerial post. The second scenario, which is perhaps more likely, is for the alliance to form a minority government. Although far from being an optimal outcome, Sweden has a long history of minority government rule, with 72% of its former governments consisting of minority parties/coalitions.

Governing with support from the Greens would enable the alliance to implement large parts of their political program relating to economic and tax policy. Notably, a large part of their core policy proposals are within the area of economics, so collaborating with the Greens would not significantly weaken their ability to implement policy. However, on issues relating to the environment and the welfare state, it will prove more difficult for them to pass their proposed legislation. On the other hand, should the alliance form a minority government, even greater challenges will present themselves. The alliance has affirmed that under no circumstances will it seek the support of the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, the red-green coalition has asserted that it will continue to work in partnership over the next four years. Sweden’s involvement in Afghanistan is one of the alliance’s main policies, and is sure to be met with resistance by all opposition parties. Both the red-green coalition and the Sweden Democrats firmly oppose Sweden’s engagement in the conflict, making it next-to-impossible for a minority government to keep troops in the region. On the whole, it is clear that a liberal/moderate minority government would face great difficulties in parliament.

So what do the next four years hold for the alliance? The lack of a clear mandate has presented them with significant challenges. In order to ensure a stable government, while simultaneously avoiding a situation where the Sweden Democrats become kingmakers in parliament, the Greens should consider Reinfeldt’s request for support. If not, Sweden runs the risk of following in the footsteps of those European countries that already have extreme right-wing parties in parliament. Clearly, neither coalition wants to tread in those murky waters.

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The recent leak of classified reports disclosing sensitive information about the military engagement in Afghanistan has once again put Pakistan in the spotlight. While simultaneously suffering from one of the worst floods in recent history, Pakistan is finding itself in a very difficult position. The more than 90,000 documents released by WikiLeaks last month strengthen previous allegations that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency, has direct links to the Afghan Taliban. Although analysts have been making these claims for years, the sheer magnitude and timing of the leak have come to exacerbate strains in Pakistan’s relations with its western allies. Counter-claims by Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States that the documents “do not reflect the current onground realities” paint a picture of a flawed partnership. However, regardless of inconsistencies in Pakistani policies and divergent strategic interests, Pakistan will remain an irreplaceable partner to the West in its efforts to defeat the Taliban.

While reports of the leak have dominated media outlets, a related piece of news has also made headlines. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the Pakistani army, has somewhat unexpectedly been granted a second three-year term. Prior to being army chief Kayani served as head of the ISI from 2004-2007, coincidentally not only the same time period covered by the leaked documents, but also the same years during which Pakistani support for the Taliban grew exponentially. Often publicly praised by the West for his crackdown against militants, Kayani is widely accepted as Pakistan’s main strategic decision-maker. Although criticized behind the scenes for his lack of will to sufficiently deal with the Afghan Taliban and other networks, Kayani’s extension has generally been welcomed by the West and several U.S. officials are known to have close ties with the army chief. Notably, the West’s direct engagement with Kayani undercuts the very government it wishes to see strengthened. However, due to the relative weakness of Zardari’s civilian government, which has become ever more evident in light of its poor response to the recent floods, the West is effectively left with little choice but to deal directly with Pakistan’s military elite.

Since launching the new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan last year, President Obama has worked to fully engage Pakistan in the war effort, acknowledging the extent to which it plays a part in the conflict. This has included billions of U.S. dollars in aid in return for cooperation on counter-insurgency missions in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas and elsewhere. This codependency reflects a reality in which Pakistan is part of both the solution and the problem. However, Pakistan’s strategic interests cannot be sufficiently understood without taking another piece of the puzzle into consideration: India. Ultimately, Pakistan’s dealings with the Taliban stem from its obsession with keeping India in check. As pointed out by Mohammed Hanif, Kayani did affirm earlier this year that India remains the focal point of Pakistan’s military and strategic concerns. As long as Pakistan, and perhaps more specifically its military, continue to perceive India as its main strategic threat, maintaining influence in Afghanistan will remain paramount to them. This situation makes it difficult for the West to reconcile its interests with that of Pakistan’s, while also curtailing its ability to control Pakistan’s involvement with the Afghan Taliban.

 David Cameron made one of the strongest statements on this issue during his recent trip to India, shortly after the WikiLeaks incident. In a question and answer session with Indian journalists Mr. Cameron asserted that “we cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country [Pakistan] is allowed to look both ways…to promote terrorism”. While some may initially have attributed this blunt accusation to Cameron’s relative inexperience in foreign policy, it has since become clear that the content of his remarks were intentional. This change in tone and open critique of the government generated tensions between Islamabad and London that led parts of the Pakistani public to call for President Zardari to cancel his trip to the UK. It should be noted that much of the critique also stemmed from the fact that he left the country in the midst of a national disaster. While the President’s trip did go to plan, another UK visit by ISI officers, was canceled. Arguably, Cameron’s comments reflected the private views of most political leaders. However, the cancelation of the ISI visit demonstrates how difficult it can be for the West to keep a forceful stance on this issue.

 So where is this tangled web of relationships and alliances headed? Despite the inherent dependency between Pakistan and its western allies, the fact remains that the partnership lacks an element of trust. The West strives to balance its strategic interests with its need to engage Pakistan, while Pakistan is conducting a similar balancing act of trying to meet expectations at home while simultaneously cooperating with its western allies. The reality of the situation is that the West has no choice but to partner with Pakistan, as it is instrumental in helping to provide logistics routes, military support along the Afghan border, a base for intelligence gathering and general support in counter-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless, the accusatory nature of the WikiLeaks documents has led to a state of affairs where diplomacy has taken on a hardening tone. Although these incidents are unlikely to cause a shift in policy, it is clear that they have already put a strain on relations. Cameron tried hard to turn this around during his recent meeting with President Zardari, but his remarks have not yet been forgotten. While the West has become more publicly vocal about their grievances with Pakistan, they will continue to cooperate with Pakistan’s power elites as a means of resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. Problematic as the partnership may be it is still intrinsic to Western success in the region. Unless the West manages to devise a strategy that significantly shifts their position in Afghanistan, they will have no choice but to continue to engage with this unreliable ally.

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