WASHINGTON — The Turkey of today has far more tools at its disposal than ever before to advance its agenda as a leading regional power. Having sought the role of regional mediator over the last decade, Turkey’s litmus test of leadership comes in Syria, beginning with how Ankara deals with a Bashar al Assad regime that still enjoys support from Beijing, Moscow, and, most critically, Tehran. Having just hosted and wrapped up the “Friends of Syria” group’s second conference in Istanbul with a list of recommendations and declarations, but with few concrete decisions, all eyes are now on Turkey.

Today, Turkey is the first among equals of Syria’s neighbors and is in the best position to coalesce international support for or against Damascus. Having called for regional solutions for regional problems, Ankara has been rhetorically leading the way against Damascus since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly called for Assad’s removal in November. And there can be little doubt that the United States, Europe, and the Arab Gulf states are eager to see Turkey leading efforts against Syria. For its part, Turkey has acted with extreme caution — some would say uncertainly — perhaps because the complexity of the crisis has caused Turkey’s normally confident leaders to doubt their own vision and capacity. Syria is likely to be their foreign policy crucible.

Given the implications for Turkey’s own security interests along its 900 kilometer border, and the fear of the civil war spiraling into a broader regional conflict, Ankara has been cautiously monitoring the situation and been out in front of the humanitarian relief efforts without committing itself to any future course of action. Only last month did Turkey close its embassy in Syria and order the withdrawal of all diplomatic staff. The same week as the second meeting of “Friends of Syria” group, Turkish Airlines announced the cancellation of flights to Damascus and Aleppo starting from April 1.

At the same time, Turkey has moved far beyond private criticism by leading the push for international action and sanctions against Damascus and reacting furiously to Russia and China’s United Nations Security Council vetoes. Ankara is publicly hosting Syrian opposition leaders along with insurgents that have based themselves across the border, and has reportedly been secretly arming the same forces. And it has already prepared unilateral sanctions that go far beyond what any Western power has thus far attempted and was the force behind the “Friends of Syria” international conferences held in Tunisia and most recently in Turkey.

The lack of coordination and training among Syrian opposition groups has not engendered confidence in Ankara, which fears instability far more than another neighboring dictator. Turkey’s fears about Syria’s territorial integrity and the possible implications for Ankara’s own Kurdish population have further discouraged any bold moves. Ankara’s best hope is that Assad can be transitioned out by a regime that fears for its own future so as not to allow the country to deteriorate into chaos. Turkey has tried desperately to use all of its accrued leverage with Damascus — offering its good offices to broker a compromise and eventual asylum to Assad — to no avail. Kurdish and sectarians divides within Syria remain one form of potent leverage against a Turkish government that fears instability more than the brutal crackdown across the board.

For Turkey, leading on Syria and getting it right is critical. But Syria is a complicated challenge because of the interaction between domestic, regional, and international factors, which present Ankara with a nightmarish set of moving parts. Turkey may not lack the political and physical capacity to address a wide range of issues attached to Syria, but it appears to lack strategic imagination. Being able to mobilize the international community in favor of a fractured Syrian opposition is no easy task, but ultimately this will determine the regional contours for Ankara as it seeks a stable and possibly more democratic Syria. As Ankara continues to cautiously weigh its options Assad’s ongoing onslaught on his own people will force Turkey to put its force behind its rhetoric or admit its own shortcomings as a regional leader.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington DC.

WASHINGTON, DC– One year ago this week, a magnitude-9.0 earthquake and ensuing tsunami devastated the northern Tohoku region of Japan, causing the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. Many observers have pointed to 3/11, as it is now called, and its aftermath coming after two decades of slow economic growth as further reasons to write off Japan, in addition to the country’s adverse demographic trends, unfavorable immigration policies, strong unions, unsustainable social spending, and stagnant bureaucracy. Yet there is room for optimism about the country. Japan has continually defied its critics with its remarkable ability to regenerate and reinvent itself. While the Japanese public and broader society have proved incredibly resilient in the face of disaster, the real tragedy is that their efforts continue to be stifled by an ineffective political leadership that remains stubbornly resistant to change despite the shifting of both literal and figurative tectonic plates.

In spite of the 3/11 disaster, and amidst  economic and political upheaval in many parts of the world, the fact is that Japan remains remarkably stable. As the world’s third largest economy, and one of the oldest democracies in Asia, it continues to boast an open yet mature society. Stability and strong human ties, or what Japanese call kizuna, remain a driving force for the country’s recovery. In fact, Japan’s economy and society appear much more stable than that of Europe, and it remains less socially or politically polarized than the United States, giving it some inherent advantages for regeneration.

During times of national tragedy, citizens expect their leaders to put aside their differences for the common public good and make necessary structural reforms. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Democrats and Republicans in the United States cooperated to great effect to push through long overdue intelligence and security reforms, including the creation of the Director of National Intelligence position and the Department of Homeland Security. Conversely, in the face of economic crises in 2008 and 2011, U.S. and European governments have done only the bare minimum necessary to avert a complete meltdown.

The Japanese government’s response to 3/11 has resembled the latter, with its leadership failing to use the disaster to set the country on a different trajectory. Part of this had to do with erratic behavior on the part of former Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his weak political standing, but larger bureaucratic and structural impediments have also been revealed over the past year. At one level, 3/11 has narrowed Japan’s policy options and led to greater convergence between the two major political parties, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Both now lean toward a consolidated U.S.-Japan security partnership, and pro-growth and pro-globalization economic policies. However, this “reluctant consensus” is disputed both within and between various political factions, meaning that necessary reforms are less likely to be implemented now that the immediate crisis has passed.

It is often noted that the Japanese kanji character for “crisis” holds the double meaning of “opportunity” and “danger.” The danger is that after the one-year anniversary of 3/11 passes, complacency and depression may replace resolve and national unity. The political incentives to become further insulated and isolated run opposite to Japan’s national interests. Growth through closer ties with the developing world and greater competition at home offer Japan a brighter future, and bold political leadership is necessary to pursue that path. Without such leadership, Japan risks another decade of relative decline even in the absence of another tragedy. In isolation, 3/11 did not change Japan. What it did was expose the Japanese state’s shortcomings by contrasting the resilience of its citizenry with the impotence of its government.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Washington DC and co-author of the report from which this Transatlantic Take was taken, “The Shifting Tectonics of Japan One Year After March 11, 2011.” 

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WASHINGTON – The emergence of a “new” European Union, in the wake of a sleepless and tumultuous summit held 20 years after the treaty that led to the creation of the political union and the euro currency, was met with ambivalence in Turkey. The irony of Europe’s perennial “sick man” being the most dynamic actor and economy has been widely noted at the same time as Turkey’s own aspirations for membership have waned in recent years. While analysts argue over a common framework for the phenomena sweeping the Mediterranean, commentators across the board have acknowledged that Turkey has been the unambiguous winner of the “Arab Spring” and the “European Fall.”

Since the beginning of the eurozone crisis, Turkey has offered itself as an antidote to an ailing Europe trying to gain strategic leverage to little avail. Echoing a recent refrain, “Hold on Europe, Turkey is on its way,” Turkish leaders have had little sympathy for Europe’s problems. On the final day of the European Summit, the Turkish president, Abdullah Gül, speaking at the World Policy Conference in Vienna, said that “negligence” is to blame for the financial crisis roiling the European continent, contrasting the EU’s malaise with Turkey’s economic and political dynamism. Seen from Ankara, there is a deficit of political leadership in Europe that has resulted from the bad governance that permeates all aspects of the present crisis. Perhaps if Turkey was on the inside of the EU, it might not have such a harsh view, but its own relations with Brussels have always been complicated.

Turkey, with its combination of economic pragmatism and soft-power appeal as a Muslim-majority secular democracy, has fared much better than a depressed and divided Europe in global affairs, particularly in its own neighborhood. Shedding its former policies of disengagement in its region, Ankara has become the most active European participant over the last decade and, given its close geographic proximities to the “hotspots” of 2011, has become Europe’s most valuable partner in the region.

At a moment in which European leadership is being questioned, Turkey’s newfound swagger and emergence as an international leader should be welcomed as signs of the effectiveness of Europe’s soft-power appeal in institutionalizing and encouraging a more responsible partner in regional stability and long-term democratization. Double standards and contradictions, motivated by domestic, economic, or geopolitical interests nonetheless remain in the foreign policies of Turkey and other European countries. To the extent that Europe is defined as a set of principles and value, the very challenge with Turkey is applying these standards consistently and universally in constructing a viable partnership that is consequential, flexible, and mutually beneficial.

Now that Europe has come closer together, the question of what to do about Turkey’s eternal quest for membership will gain further traction and the example of Britain might offer an interesting opportunity for another strategically important yet Euroskeptic regional power in Ankara. Rather than seeing Turkey’s growing international role as a challenge or mere hubris, it should be taken as an opportunity to reinforce Turkey’s European credentials, which makes it a unique and flexible potential new member.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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ISTANBUL— Even in an otherwise remarkable year for the broader Middle East, the most recent developments have underscored the degree to which the strategic realities of the region have changed. The death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was the latest consequence of the tumultuous Arab Awakening. The United States’ announcement of a final withdrawal from Iraq by the year’s end has raised further questions about the West’s traditional leadership and influence across the region. And Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an’s high-profile blitzkrieg from Somalia to various post-Arab Spring capitals and the United Nations highlighted the role that Turkey — one of the region’s strongest democracies — is now playing in shaping the regional agenda. Yet twin disasters last week in the form of terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on the Turkish border outpost in Hakkari, which resulted in over 24 deaths and 18 injuries, and the 7.2 earthquake in Ercis and Van have raised important questions about the fragility of the Turkish model.

The timing of the Hakkari attacks could not have been more provocative. They occurred on the same day as a major constitutional debate among political parties in Ankara, a day after five policemen and three civilians were killed in a nearby border town, and three days after Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited troops in the region to boost morale. The deadliest PKK assault in several years, it appears to have involved over 100 terrorists in a carefully orchestrated set of maneuvers. On the same day that the United States announced the withdrawal of all troops from Iraq by the end of the year, Turkey launched a massive cross-border operation against Kurdish strongholds in the north of that country.

This dangerous escalation of the Kurdish problem threatens the security of an important border region, while dragging one of the region’s last stable powers into region-wide instability. While embracing the so-called Arab Spring and supporting the Palestinian cause, Turkey’s leaders have not accommodated Kurdish assertions of autonomy or freedom. Erdo?an’s government, while preaching the virtues of soft power — whether in the form of economic engagement, visa liberalization, or “zero problems” with neighbors — has also had to rely once again on traditional hard power. All of this makes it hard to imagine Turkey realizing its full potential until it is able to successfully address the Kurdish problem.

Turkey’s approach to the PKK has also complicated its already tangled relations with other states in the Middle East and beyond. Only two weeks earlier, Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, threatened to support the PKK in response to harsh Turkish criticism of his government, a move that now seems particularly ill-advised. Tensions with both Iran and Saudi Arabia have also increased, complicating the delicate balance in Iraq. And Erdo?an’s out-of-the-blue and unsubstantiated accusation only a week before the Hakkari attacks that a German foundation was providing support to the PKK has also strained relations with the European Union. The only silver lining may be that the attacks serve as a reminder to Ankara of the importance of its alliance with the United States, which has offered it concrete intelligence and military support against the PKK for close to three decades.

Turkey now faces serious challenges to both of its primary strategic objectives: advancing regional stability while enhancing its own influence. Its laudable objective of serving as an honest broker in some of the Middle East’s most intractable conflicts inevitably collides with the reality of having to deal with internal challenges to its own stability. Ultimately, stability in the Middle East rests upon how regional players like Turkey answer their own populations’ demands in a responsible and timely manner. Despite the historic 2009 “Kurdish Opening” proclaimed by Erod?an, Ankara has resorted to ratcheting up its rhetoric to respond to populist outrage. While it is too soon to tell what the long-term impact will be on Turkish foreign policy, the domestic damage has already been done, with the rise of nationalist and populist sentiments that conflate the PKK with all Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. Erdo?an’s signature project — rewriting Turkey’s constitution in a way that guarantees ethnic rights and fairness to all of its citizens — has now become that much harder. Unfortunately, overcoming Ankara’s natural disasters will be much easier than the remaining manmade obstacles along the way.

Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Image by Evrim Aydin / Anadolu Agnecy via EPA

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ISTANBUL — When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in Istanbul over the weekend for the fourth meeting of the Libya Contact Group and bilateral meetings with her hosts, she would have sensed the confidence of a new regional power.  Turkey today boasts one of the fastest-growing economies in the world and perhaps the most dynamic foreign policy in the Middle East.  Its recent elections in the midst of the “Arab Spring” only heightened its self-confidence as a global player. And as a G-20 founding member, NATO ally, European Union aspirant, and head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Ankara has transformed itself into a more autonomous actor, seeking greater regional and global influence just as Washington has been trying to draw closer and promote its ally as a success story.

Clinton’s engagements reflected this new reality. While reaffirming close cooperation with her Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu, on the recognition of the Libyan transitional authority, she reportedly pushed for greater Turkish support for opposition groups in Syria. She expressed the United States’ condolences to Turkey, which had recently suffered its worst terrorist attack in three years, a message that coincided with CIA Director David Petraeus’ first official visit to Ankara. And, in a joint news conference with Davutoglu, she proclaimed Turkey’s role as a regional role model, while issuing warnings about domestic polarization, media freedoms, and minority rights: “Turkish democracy is a model because of where you came from and where you are. That doesn’t mean you don’t have work to do.”

She reinforced that message through her well-publicized audience with the Greek Ecumenical Patriarch, during which she expressed the full support of the United States for the reopening of the Halki Seminary after four decades of enforced closure by the state. Clinton’s praise for the opposition Republican People’s Party – for refusing to take the oath of parliament following the arrest of two of their elected members – also received considerable domestic attention.

Despite the overtures made on this trip, the complexity and dynamism of the U.S.-Turkish partnership means the United States must continue to tend the relationship. Changes both within and around Turkey have necessitated a more reactive foreign policy than what President Barack Obama encountered on his visit two years ago. The “Arab Spring” has already recalibrated Turkey’s ambitions and forced its leadership to rethink the priority it accords democracy in its foreign policy. No longer able to simply criticize Washington for doublespeak, Ankara now finds itself in the same boat as its transatlantic partners in trying to coordinate strategy on the basis of events on the ground they have little control over. For the transatlantic community, Turkey’s newfound swagger makes it both a more valuable asset and a more uncertain partner.

Although there are real causes for concern, as Clinton highlighted, it is clear that Turkey continues to offer the United States numerous opportunities for strategic cooperation and thus remains a critical partner that must be actively and continually engaged. Turkey’s policies and its regional role can complement Washington’s objectives with its shared goals and values. And while turbulence in U.S.-Turkish relations is to be expected in the short-term, the nations’ long-term interests will still converge more than they diverge.

As Clinton’s visit demonstrated, the Turks are accommodating hosts and place a premium on high-level visits. As the Obama administration navigates the intricacies of transatlantic and Middle East relations over the coming year, Ankara should be on its routemap.

Joshua Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

Photo from US Mission Geneva.

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RICHMOND, Virginia — Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Turkey laid to rest any lingering doubts about the vibrancy of the country’s electoral democracy. At the same time, the third consecutive victory for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an and his governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has revived old fears of “democracy without democrats” with a decade of one-party rule instinctively linked by many political commentators to authoritarianism. But as the example of Japan illustrates, one-party rule does not necessarily equate to weakening democracy and can often be a welcome formula for consensus-building, economic success, and political stability.

The pragmatic conservative coalition of big business and bureaucracy established in Japan in 1955 by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) waged fierce political battles internally and through factions rather than through national elections, where it went mostly unchallenged. The Japanese proclivity for factional consensus meant that the powerful Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade formulated policy with the LDP in order to maintain Japan’s economic growth, which in turn kept the regime in power despite the short tenures of individual prime ministers. Much like Turkey’s rapid economic growth over the past decade, Japan in the 1980s grew by strengthening its regional ties despite a troubled history with its neighbors while at the same time preserving its alliance with the West.

The end of the Cold War for Japan did not uproot this underlying domestic political structure even when, in 1993, the LDP suffered its first electoral defeat to the socialists and other predecessors to the current ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Rather, it was the two-decades of stagnant economic growth that eventually undid the LDP and brought the DPJ to power. Despite that political transition, the key to Japanese politics remains consensus-building and pragmatic rule from the center, very much the characteristics of one-party democracy.

Japan and Turkey entered the 21^st century under very differently circumstances. In the latter part of the 20^th century Japan was expected to lead Asia as the continent’s largest and most developed economy, while Turkey was politically isolated in the Middle East with few real partners. But both countries emerged from the Cold War without a strong ideational connection to the West other than an alliance with the United States. Given the interaction between domestic and international politics in democratic systems, the leaders of Japan and Turkey sought to demonstrate their independence from Washington while seeking improved regional relations. As regional leaders, Japan and Turkey have sought to carve out new roles for themselves in their “rediscovered” neighborhoods, with varying degrees of success.

Important parallels extend beyond the nations themselves to their governing parties. The DPJ and AKP are both political movements that represent populist coalitions of conservatives and progressives who initially sought to change longstanding political realities. Although the full implications of their agendas are yet to reveal themselves, both have already succeeded in shifting debates in their countries. The AKP, however, differs considerably in some respects. It remains dependent on Erdo?an’s charismatic leadership for preserving its identity. The Japanese parties, in contrast, enjoy broad-based support and, as such, individual prime ministers matter less. The AKP, long the leading force behind change, also opted in the latest elections for promoting “stability” and “continuity” so as to sustain Turkey’s remarkable economic performance under its stewardship, which has seen nominal per capita incomes triple.

The AKP has clearly mastered the game of electoral democracy but will only leave a legacy of liberal democracy if it can carry Turkey across a threshold where transitions between parties can take place smoothly. While commentators continually struggle to compare Turkey with its Middle Eastern or Western neighbors, Turkey has every right to be basking in the glow of its own success and stability amid the revolutions sweeping its region. The outstanding question now is whether the AKP will perpetuate the pattern of advancing its own preferences at the expense of others in Turkey’s deeply divided polity or continue along the Japanese path of consensus-seeking.

Joshua W. Walker is an Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond’s Jepson School of Leadership Studies and a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

RICHMOND, Va.—I grew up in northern Japan, and in the 15 years I lived there, earthquakes were a part of everyday life. We had earthquake drills all the time; and we also had the real thing, regular tremors of varying strength and impact. The 9.0-magnitude earthquake and ensuing 30-foot tsunami on March 11 were the worst in Japan’s recorded history. The devastation it has wreaked, along with the continuing dire threat of escaping radiation from the Fukushima nuclear power plants, has led both Japan’s Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Naoto Kan to call this Japan’s worst crisis since World War II.
The disaster struck an area unknown to most foreigners and Japanese; visitors and locals alike tend to gravitate to the southern half of Honshu Island, where the metropolises of Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokohama are concentrated. In the worst-hit areas near the northern town of Sendai, close to the epicenter of the earthquake, harsh geography and icy temperatures are still complicating the rescue efforts—and continue to produce stories of singular heroism.

Sendai, formerly with one million inhabitants, was the most populated city north of Tokyo (a mega-metropolis of 30 million) on the main island of Honshu. Much like America’s northwest, northern Japan has its own rugged frontier atmosphere. Covering 25 percent of mainland Japan’s landmass, but with only 5 percent of its population, it is famous for its landscapes and food; the locals speak a distinctive dialect of their own. Gatherings such as the G-8 meetings and the Winter Olympics in Sapporo helped to bring the beauties of northern Japan to international attention. Cruel winters and a largely rural culture reinforced a spirit of traditionalism and pride, which we Northerners cherished—especially compared to the ultra-modern comforts of the south.

It was wrenching to have to watch on a far-away television screen as the hometowns of my old friends were uprooted and swept away by the waves, and much of my adopted homeland was destroyed. Yet, seeing Emperor Akihito stoically give his first-ever television address, I was also reminded of my Japanese elementary school, where I learned about another, earlier speech — that of Akihito’s father Hirohito, who was the first Japanese emperor ever to address his nation, and who taught Japan to “embrace defeat” after World War II and the nuclear disasters in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I remembered asking my history teacher then what the secret of Japan’s resilience was. His response came in one word: Bushido. Directly translated, it means “the way of the warrior.” Bushido was the code of conduct which, in ancient Japan, governed the lives of the samurai, or feudal warriors. Its roots lie in Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism; its key ideals were honesty, courage, and honor. Now, as then, the Emperor spoke to the Japanese to reassure them and to remind them of these fundamental national values.

Indeed, this disaster has already brought out the best in Japanese culture. Where Hurricane Katrina in the United States or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti seemed only to further deepen the fractures in divided communities (and were further compounded by looting and slow government action), the northern Japanese have been patiently enduring a chaotic response from their national government, freezing weather, and a continuing threat of dangerous radiation. It is a case-study in dignity and strength.

This past weekend was particularly bittersweet, as it featured school graduation ceremonies throughout Japan, commemorating the next generation’s coming of age—a generation that will be forever shaped by the events of March 11, 2011. Japanese like to point out the double-edged meaning in the two characters that combine to form the word “crisis” in Japanese: “opportunity” and “danger.” The dangers in the current situation are very real. Even if the current crisis is not deepened by further quakes or a worsening of the nuclear contamination, it is a terrible blow to Japan’s shaky economic recovery. It may well reinforce an already existing tendency toward isolation in the country’s foreign and security policy. Yet there are opportunities as well. Having shown the world their resilience in the face of a terrible natural disaster, the people of northern Japan may have the chance to rebuild a stronger nation with the help of both domestic and international allies and enemies alike.

Joshua W. Walker is an Assistant Professor at the University of Richmond’s Jepson School of Leadership Studies and a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund.

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