BRATISLAVA/BERLIN—The news travelled fast last weekend in Belarus and beyond that Andrei Sannikov and Dmitry Bondarenko had been freed. Initially, it appeared incredible that Europe’s last dictatorship had decided to release two of its most outspoken domestic critics. But Sannikov, who had opposed Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko in the 2010 presidential elections, and his long-time aide, Bondarenko, were welcomed by dozens of their supporters in Minsk. Who exactly are these two men, how did they draw the ire of Lukashenko, and why were they released now?

Sannikov and Bondarenko make for an unusual pair. Sannikov — a soft-spoken, polyglot intellectual — made his name in diplomacy as the chief negotiator of his country’s nuclear disarmament after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He resigned as deputy foreign minister in 1996 to protest Lukashenko’s dictatorship, and joined the democratic opposition, where he soon emerged as one of the key leaders. Bondarenko — a former athlete (swimmer) who served at the Soviet special forces — directed a popular radio station, which was later taken off the air for its criticism of the government. He joined the democracy movement, organized non-violent protests, and inspired a generation of young activists.

Their paths crossed in 1997, when both were among the initiators of the Charter 97 declaration. One year after a controversial referendum had paved the way for Lukashenko’s dictatorship, the declaration — which had some 100,000 signatories — called for “devotion to the principles of independence, freedom and democracy, respect to the human rights, solidarity with everybody, who stands for the elimination of the dictatorial regime and the restoration of democracy in Belarus.” As an offshoot, Sannikov and Bondarenko also initiated charter97.org, a news portal that has since become the centerpiece of the independent media movement in Belarus.

Ten years later, the pair co-founded European Belarus to support democratic reforms, respect for human rights, and European integration. It was as a candidate of this movement that Sannikov decided to run in the 2010 presidential elections. Helped by Bondarenko and a committed team of young activists, he collected over 150,000 signatures in support of his candidacy, crisscrossed the country to speak to packed halls, and appealed to many more during the limited air time allotted to him. Tireless campaigning eventually made him the leading opposition candidate. Hopes were high that after the unusually open pre-election atmosphere, the Belarusian regime would also permit some liberty on polling day.

Those hopes were brutally smashed by Lukashenko. The ballot was rigged much like earlier elections, with an improbable 80 percent of the votes going to the dictator. When Sannikov, Bondarenko, and other democrats responded by leading tens of thousands in peaceful protest, police attacked them mercilessly. Protestors were beaten, arrested, and put on show trials. Sannikov was handed a five-year prison term and Bondarenko two. But worse was still to come. For 16 months behind bars, Sannikov and Bondarenko endured grueling physical and psychological duress, judging from the little we know. The Belarusian terror apparatus tried to make them admit their “guilt,” inform on their friends and, in the case of Bondarenko, agree to collaborate with the KGB. Their lawyers and families were prevented from making regular visits, Sannikov almost lost his 4-year-old son to state custody, and Bondarenko was denied rehabilitation after a spinal surgery in prison. When the prisoners did not relent, the pressure increased until Sannikov, to protect his family from state threats, signed a clemency request, which Bondarenko followed out of solidarity. Yet it still took several months before both were freed.

The pictures of the two after their release show them to be physically worn, but their statements reflect their remarkable mental strength and courage to continue their struggle. Their efforts remain necessary since, as both acknowledged, about a dozen political prisoners remain in custody, while others, including Sannikov’s wife, have a suspended sentence of imprisonment or are banned from travelling abroad. Hundreds, including Bondarenko’s daughter, are also awaiting their safe return from political exile. And even after these basic conditions are met, the democratic structures Lukashenko abolished must still be reinstated.

Europe’s support will be critical for Sannikov, Bondarenko, and their fellow democrats in Belarus. The EU should start by acknowledging that their release was the first success of its shift towards a tougher policy. After years of indifference, wavering, and often naïve engagement with the Lukashenko regime, Europe has begun to define a principled position in support of Belarus’ beleaguered democrats, and has shown readiness to impose harsh political and economic sanctions on Minsk. It must now continue its pressure on Lukashenko. Only then will the sacrifices of Sannikov, Bondarenko, and others pay off for Belarus.

Pavol Demes is Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Joerg Forbrig is Director of the Fund for Belarus Democracy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

BERLIN – In politics, this has been a year of extreme weather. The Arab Spring dismantled decades-old autocracies through peaceful protest. The heat of summer scorched some even more brutal and determined rulers, from Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi (whose regime went up in fire) to Syria’s Bashar al-Assad (the flames are still licking at the foundations of his power). Late autumn, finally, dealt a surprise blow to the Russian government, with the largest protests since the ascent of Putinocracy. Yet in Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus, winter reigns all year round.

Only a year ago, things looked a lot more promising in Europe’s last dictatorship, which is sandwiched between the northeastern borders of the EU and Russia. In the campaign preceding the presidential elections, nine opposition candidates challenged Lukashenko, met voters in packed halls, and even debated in the state media. Relationships with the West warmed, an invitation was extended to Belarus to join the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Western leaders flew to Minsk and promised aid in exchange for democratic reforms. For a while, it seemed as if the Belarusian regime might open up after 16 years of iron-fisted rule.

But this democratic experiment was brutally aborted on December 19 of last year. When it emerged that the polls had been grossly manipulated to secure Lukashenko a fourth term in office, tens of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets in peaceful protest. There, they were met with the full force of the police state. Some 700 protesters were beaten and arrested that night, including all of the democratic candidates. Ever since “Bloody Sunday,” as democrats soon called it, things have gone from bad to worse in Belarus.

A witch hunt was unleashed against opposition leaders, human rights activists, and independent journalists. Those that were not thrown into jail went underground or into exile. Show trials were held against some 40 dissidents, with 15 of them remaining behind bars to this day. Those who were released reported physical and psychological torture. Laws that were already strict were tightened to squeeze civil society and the independent media. Citizens are now forbidden even to gather silently. Critics inside the country are intimidated by the KGB; those that left the country live in fear for their relatives and face Interpol arrest warrants for themselves.

Nonetheless, Lukashenko’s regime is weaker than ever, despite the brutality of the crackdown. Last year’s elections gave Belarusians a lasting taste for political openness. The subsequent state terror has politicized even ordinarily docile Belarusians, and protest has become frequent. Official propaganda is so shrill now that many citizens are turning to independent, mostly Internet-based media, whose audience has tripled. Belarus’ economy has effectively collapsed, with the national currency devalued by 189 percent and annual inflation at 104 percent. As a result, independent polls report that only a fifth of the Belarusians still support Lukashenko.

In short, the Belarusian winter first hit the most courageous of Belarusians, then engulfed the entire population, and now Lukashenko himself is feeling the gnawing cold. So will Belarus succumb to permafrost—or is there a possibility of a thaw?

Lukashenko himself is clearly intent on staying at the helm by any means. He has begun to reinforce the pervasive security structures that are now the only remaining pillar of his power. To sustain them, he has launched a desperate search for funds, whether by taking out loans at a staggering scale or by selling the country’s family silver, including gas pipeline operator Beltransgaz. This has proved a boon for Moscow—for the Putin regime, Minsk’s troubles are an opportunity to recapture Russia’s supremacy in the post-Soviet space, to grab strategic assets in Belarus, and to subdue the notoriously unruly Lukashenko.

Europe, for its part, appears helpless and resigned. Neither the EU’s pre-election strategy of political outreach nor its subsequent isolation of Minsk since seem to have yielded any results. For Belarus’ citizens, Europe’s declarations of support must ring increasingly hollow. And European lethargy may waste the last chance in a long time to end Lukashenko’s rule, ensure an independent Belarus, and launch much-needed democratic and market reforms.

The necessary measures to take for Europe have long been on the table and demanded by Belarusian democrats. Political isolation must be accompanied by effective economic sanctions, targeting those exports for which the EU is Belarus’ key market, such as oil products and fertilizers. An embargo will deprive Lukashenko of the funds for his machinery of terror and depress the price investors might be willing to pay for industrial assets. If coupled with a moratorium on loans from financial institutions, such as the IMF or private banks, this would dry up the Western revenue stream that has long sustained the regime. This would force Lukashenko to the negotiating table. There, the EU’s first demand must be the release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners, followed by talks between the regime and the democratic movement on political, economic, and social reform.

Belarusian civil society deserves all Europe’s attention and support. The restrictive visa regime must give way to open EU borders for ordinary Belarusians, and opportunities to visit, study, and work have to be boosted. Human rights groups, civic initiatives and independent media need increased, continuous, and accessible assistance. The political opposition needs encouragement, expertise, and funding to develop its strategy for change, and the democratic movement has to be treated as Belarus’ recognized representative in all European and international forums.

Europe has taken first and encouraging steps toward such a shift in policy, including a visa ban and asset freeze against 210 key representatives of the Belarusian regime. It must now move from piecemeal to comprehensive, from half-hearted to decisive. It is the only chance to prevent the looming permafrost in Belarus and give its brave citizens a hope of spring.

Joerg Forbrig directs the Fund for Belarus Democracy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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MINSK—Peace and quiet reign on Independence Square — Christmas trees sparkle in the snow, the traffic is flowing, people are heading home to prepare for the holidays. Yet on Sunday, this square in the center of the Belarusian capital witnessed the largest protests against dictatorial rule in a decade, when thousands of President Alexander Lukashenko’s riot police and army troops brutally cracked down on tens of thousands of peaceful protesters. All normal? Not quite.

Nearly 400 people were arrested after the protests, including most of the nine candidates that challenged Lukashenko in Sunday´s election. Five of the contenders were severely beaten and remain in the custody of the KGB, the country’s secret police. 40 journalists, both Belarusian and international, were beaten or arrested. Key NGOs, including human rights groups and independent websites, had their offices searched on Monday. A manhunt continues against any critical mind or civic activist in Belarus. Meanwhile, the “President re-elect” lashes out against the “bandits” and “diversants” who dared to challenge what he had hoped would be another easy win at the ballots. The question many here are asking themselves now is: Why did a promisingly open election campaign end with such ruthless brutality?

Indeed, the democratic opposition in Belarus had been able to act and speak with unusual freedom in recent months. Several representatives of civil society and the democratic opposition decided to run in the elections. In collecting the 100,000 signatures required to submit a candidacy, they encountered few obstacles. Campaign events by opposition candidates took place with no major impediments. Contenders were able to voice their ideas in the media to some degree, and even participated in a live debate on television. These limited openings provided by Lukashenko´s regime were duly acknowledged in the official assessment by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was monitoring the elections.

Of course, these concessions were largely tactical. Their most important purpose was to appease the European Union, which had made it clear—over months of travel diplomacy—that closer ties between the EU and Belarus depended on a more open presidential election. They may also have been a response to growing political and economic pressure from Russia, Lukashenko’s most important sponsor for the 16 years of his rule. The surge of candidates was explained by the regime as proof that the democratic opposition in this country is divided, weak, and incapable of handling the challenges facing Belarus.

This plan appeared to work—until Sunday night. It began to fall apart when the Central Election Commission published its preliminary results, which gave a highly unlikely majority of nearly 80 percent of votes to Alexander Lukashenko, at an equally unlikely turnout of over 90 percent. When Belarusians poured into the streets to protest against what they saw as a blatant manipulation and fraud, they were met by the batons of the police state.

Western institutions responded swiftly and clearly. The OSCE stated that the elections, despite improvements, fell short of democratic standards; it appealed to the government of Belarus to clarify the fate of arrested candidates, journalists, and civic activists. The President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, condemned the elections and called for an immediate end to the violence against democrats. The EU´s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, reminded the Belarusian government that any deeper relationship “was conditional on respect for the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.” Individual EU countries have followed with similar appeals, as did the United States, with statements by the State Department, members of Congress, and the White House. This broad transatlantic and European consensus will remain an important lever to push for a political opening in Belarus.

Russia’s silence, however, is surprising. After many years of subsidizing the regime in Minsk, Moscow had begun to withdraw its economic subsidies and political support. Over the past months, it even launched an unprecedented media campaign which depicted Lukashenko as psychopathic, corrupt, and responsible for the disappearance of prominent opposition leaders. Yet just before the elections, the Kremlin toned down its criticism and signed a major agreement to establish a common economic space. Belarus will be a test case for Russia´s modernization strategy, its relations with the West, and its approach to its immediate neighborhood.

Still, the responsibility for resolving the current situation rests first and foremost with the Belarusian government. Its legitimacy is shakier than ever. The economic situation is deteriorating, and the country’s citizens have had enough—amply proved by the tens of thousands who risked their health and freedom on the streets on Sunday to voice their discontent despite the risk of massive police crackdown. The disproportionate use of force on election night, and Lukashenko´s shrill public statements afterward, only further illustrates the nervousness of the current regime.

As Independence Square returns to its snowy, peaceful state, the most immediate question is:  What now for the West and Russia? The smallest common denominator—and the most immediate concern—must be the immediate release of the hundreds of prisoners taken during the protests. This would lend credence to recent Western and Russian pressure on Belarus to respect the basic standards of a modern society.  It would signal an effort to restore the credibility of the modest liberalization that began the presidential campaign.  And it would allow the brave democrats who were put behind bars unjustly to spend Christmas at home.

Jörg Forbrig is a Senior Program Officer in Berlin, and Pavol Demes is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Bratislava.

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BERLIN — Rarely has an EU summit been as turbulent as the one on September 16. Viviane Reding, the EU’s justice commissioner, charged France with mass deportations of Roma, violating EU law by, according to a leaked French government document, specifically targeting this group. A fierce dispute ensued between Reding, backed by European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who accused the Commission of overstepping its mandate.

This spat is far from over. In the short term, France appears intent on continuing its controversial policy of sending Roma migrants back to their countries of origin in Central and Eastern Europe, claiming that they are not meeting France’s residency rules. The EU, in turn, may take legal action against France before the European Court of Justice. More broadly, the dispute raises issues about key European principles. And if the EU is to defend these principles, it should stick out this fight and protect Roma rights. How this dispute is resolved, in Brussels and in the national capitals, will leave its mark on Europe.

The Roma are nationals of Bulgaria, Romania, and a half-dozen other EU countries. Their deportations violate their fundamental rights as citizens of the European Union — the freedom of movement inside the EU, meaning the right to live, work, study, or retire in another country. No less important is the freedom to live free of discrimination on any grounds, including ethnicity. Both principles are clearly violated by the expulsion of Roma from France and, previously, from Italy, Sweden, and Denmark, among others. The European institutions, as guardians of EU law, are responsible for defending the fundamental rights of European citizens. In fact, one might ask why it took so long for the EU to speak up for the rights of the Roma.

The Roma, estimated at 10-12 million people, are Europe’s largest minority, and also the one that is most politically and economically disenfranchised. Scattered mainly across the EU’s newest member states, they live in conditions of extreme poverty and segregation. Their situation has deteriorated over recent years as the economic crisis and growing xenophobia have exacerbated social tensions. This in itself presents a serious moral challenge to the EU and its member states. After all, one of the EU’s core values is solidarity. Should not this solidarity, invoked most recently by EU members in economic distress, extend to disenfranchised communities such as the Roma as well?

The situation of the Roma is made even worse by the insistence of member states on the principle of subsidiarity. A safeguard against an omnipotent Brussels, subsidiarity places authority for dealing with a given issue at the lowest level — typically the national level — unless the scale or nature of the problem require European responses. However, the scale of the Roma problem is clearly too much for individual countries, regions, or municipalities to handle, particularly the new Eastern member states with their still-fragile institutions. At times, the simple lack of institutional capacity prevents action and effective use of EU funding to help the Roma. Sometimes, a broader bias against Roma causes inaction. Actors below the EU level need to acknowledge these limitations, and open up to Europe-wide action, coordinated and funded by the EU.

The stand-off between the European Commission and France also plays to fears among smaller and newer EU members that the large West European countries dominate EU politics. These anxieties were rekindled by Sarkozy’s threat to veto Romania’s accession to the Schengen Area of visa-free travel, should the country fail to cooperate in receiving Roma deportees. It falls to the European Commission to take a stand against such bullying. Barroso and Reding must maintain a principled position on the Roma question, pursue proceedings against France–or any other country–if infringements of European principles and regulations continue. EU law should apply to all member countries and citizens.

Even more disturbingly, the current Roma dispute reflects a growing influence of right-wing extremists on politics in Europe. These groups work hard to fan anxieties about the future, prosperity, migration, and cultural diversity among Europeans. Such issues have long been neglected by political elites. Under pressure by the Dutch Freedom Party, Hungary’s Jobbik, the Front National in France, or the Sweden Democrats, mainstream parties are trying to regain lost ground by shifting to the right. Sarkozy’s move against Roma migrants comes at a time when he is looking toward re-election in 2012. It is unlikely that this trend will easily find correctives in national politics. Instead, European institutions have to make clear that this political radicalization, and the search for scapegoats such as the Roma, are unacceptable.

In all these respects, the current conflict questions the very foundations on which the EU was built. It is for Brussels now to take a decisive stance in defense of these European values, for the benefit of all Europeans–Roma and non-Roma alike.

Joerg Forbrig is Senior Program Officer for Central and Eastern Europe and Astrid Ziebarth is a Program Officer for Immigration and Integration at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin.

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BERLIN — Hungarians made a resounding statement in April’s parliamentary elections. The governing Socialists took a severe beating, the conservative Fidesz of Viktor Orbán won an absolute majority, and the rightwing extremists, Jobbik, emerged as the third major player in parliament. Many observers pointed to discontent with runaway corruption and the global economic crisis, which hit Hungary earlier and harder than others in Europe, as the main reason for this sharp swing to the right. That analysis prompts two further questions: Will the massive protest vote spread across post-communist Europe and undermine its new democracies? Or does the Hungarian result signal some broader trend spanning “New” and “Old” Europe alike?

When the global economic crisis came crashing down on Europe, the continent’s East, until recently a boom region, with comparatively new democratic institutions, seemed particularly vulnerable. Gloomy predictions of violent mass protests, collapsing governments and extremist takeovers abounded. None of these doomsday scenarios has materialized to date. But, perhaps the day of reckoning is approaching, given that elections are scheduled across New Europe this year?

At this point, however, data does not support predictions of a political landslide for the right. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, where elections are scheduled for May and June, Social Democrats are solidly ahead in the polls, and their center-right opponents have neither achieved the unity nor the public support of Hungary’s Fidesz. Poland, with presidential elections in June, can expect a heated campaign, in which conservative Jaroslaw Kaczynski will try to catch up moderate Bronislaw Komorowski’s commanding lead. But, whoever becomes head of state, the balanced politics of the centrist government is not in danger.

Nor do the polls indicate that voters across the region are flocking en masse to extremists of the left or right. Czech communists and Slovak nationalists have long been in their countries’ parliaments, the former as an isolated fringe, the latter as a junior partner in the current government. Neither, however, is growing in political influence. On the whole, therefore, New Europe shows no inclination of following in Hungary’s footsteps. Instead, the region’s politics and democratic institutions are holding surprisingly stable.

Europe-wide, by contrast, the Hungarian vote is a sign of fundamental changes in the political landscape. It marks a further chapter in the demise of traditional social democracy, following worst-ever returns for the German SPD in last September’s national election and likely preceding yet another rout for Britain’s Labour Party in early May. This weakening of the moderate left, once a bulwark of European democracies, will have massive repercussions for political processes, institutions and culture on the continent. Among others, it heralds fragmentation in European party systems, complicating and drawing out coalition building and making continuity of governance more difficult. Unmediated ideological positions and appeals to the fringes will become more popular in electioneering.

Even more worrying is the rise of radical parties across Europe. As Jobbik collected nearly one-fifth of all votes in Hungary, a right-wing presidential candidate garnered 16 percent in neighboring Austria. Similar levels of electoral support were recently registered for the Front National in France, and can be expected for the far-right Freedom Party in the Dutch elections in June, according to the polls. Populists and extremists on the right (and to a lesser degree on the left, as with Germany’s Die Linke) are gaining traction throughout Europe. This shows just how much better the radicals are than the established political parties at responding to the growing anxiety of ordinary people in Europe over the economic crisis, globalization, and social justice on one hand, and about cultural diversity, migration, and minorities on the other. Fanning these fears, however cynical it may be, has been a successful electoral strategy for parties on both fringes of the political spectrum.

Still, there are occasional rays of hope. Some Europeans have translated their disappointment with current politics into support for progressive alternatives €“ taking a constructive approach to protest. In the Hungarian elections, the unexpected success of “Politics Can Be Different” went almost unnoticed; this new liberal formation scored 7.5 percent nation-wide. Similar initiatives, proposing a positive alternative to the ossified (and often corrupt) powers-that-be, can be found elsewhere, from Latvia to Slovakia to the Czech Republic. In Britain, the Liberal Democrats are polling strongly, and their gains at the expense of both Labour and the Conservatives may yet balance Parliament. But it remains unclear whether these constructive alternatives, new and inexperienced as they are, will be able to project credibility to compete with the establishment and to win over those that have fallen for the destructive message of the populists and extremists.

Whether European democracy remains open, liberal, and stable, or cedes further to populists and extremists as in sadder periods of the continent’s past, is a choice increasingly facing political leaders and average citizens. To get it right, they should start by acknowledging that Hungary’s turn to the right signals a broader challenge across Europe, and not the unfortunate malfunction of one of its youngest democracies.

Joerg Forbrig is Senior Program Officer for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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BERLIN — This year has been full of celebrations of the peaceful revolutions of 1989, arguably the most important advance of freedom, democracy, and human rights in history. But this year has also seen rapid European rapprochement with (and some might say appeasement of) one of the world’s worst autocrats: Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus. Europe’s embrace reached a new level Monday when Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi paid an official visit to Minsk, the first by a Western head of government in over a decade.

Belarus, Europe’s immediate neighbor to the East, has been ruled by Lukashenko since 1994. For one-and-a-half decades, a fully fledged dictatorship replaced whatever modest democratization had taken place in the early 1990s. An omnipotent presidential administration controls all aspects of life in the country, from mass media that are almost completely under state control to an economy that remains centrally steered and nationalized. A vast police apparatus, including a KGB, instills Belarusians with fear and apathy, while dissidents and civic activists face harassment, beatings, fines, and prison sentences. Several prominent opposition leaders have disappeared without a trace. Elections are rigged, as the OSCE has repeatedly declared. Lukashenko, meanwhile, has abolished presidential term limits and can effectively rule for life.

Last year, the regime in Minsk suddenly appeared to change track. The release of several political prisoners, a slightly freer parliamentary election, permits for a few independent newspapers, and government hints about possible liberalizations of the media and the electoral laws seemed to indicate that democratic change was in the air.

Yet autocrats rarely make such concessions voluntarily. In reality, these moves were prompted by growing geopolitical and economic pressures from the East. Russia’s military campaign against Georgia was read correctly in Minsk as a potential threat to Belarusian independence. Moscow, long a major funder of Lukashenko’s rule, also changed economic gears, demanding stakes in strategic Belarusian businesses, increasing oil and gas prices, and threatening to close its market to Belarusian produce. Add to that the fact that Russia’s ambitious designs for gas pipelines to Europe will, within years, diminish Belarus’ importance as a transit country for deliveries to the European Union — and it was only logical for Lukashenko to begin making overtures to the West.

For European leaders, the writing was on the wall: engage with Belarus and other former Soviet satellites now, or risk that these Eastern neighbors fall back into Russia’s orbit for good.

Cue a veritable race for the attention and goodwill of the once-despised outcast Lukashenko. Travel restrictions against the Belarusian leadership were suspended in October 2008. Europe’s foreign policy community descended upon Minsk, followed by a flurry of business delegations and investment forums; meanwhile, Belarusian officials swarmed westward. Lukashenko himself was received by the Vatican in April (and insisted on introducing the Pontiff to his illegitimate son). In May, Belarus was asked to join the EU’s new Eastern Partnership initiative; in September, Lukashenko received an official invitation to neighboring Lithuania.

It was left to Berlusconi, however, to become the first European leader to board a plane to Minsk.

European leaders have been at pains over the last year to justify all this outreach, arguing that a decade-plus policy of isolation had arrived at a dead end. Not quite. It is true that Europe avoided any political contacts or cooperation with the Belarusian leadership; yet at the same time, trade with the country was thriving and last year the EU surpassed Russia as an importer of Belarusian goods. By filling the coffers of the Lukashenko regime, EU economic engagement effectively neutralized political isolation and helped to sustain the status quo in Belarus.

European diplomats also like to argue that, barring closer ties with Europe, Belarus would buckle under Russian pressure. But Lukashenko has long resisted a series of aggressive Russian moves, from offers to join the Russian Federation to peremptory demands that Minsk acknowledge Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russian takeover attempts in the Belarusian economy. Minsk knows well that its independence, and with it the survival of the current regime, hinges on diversified international relationships. To this end, it has reached out to partners as far away and varied as China, Venezuela, Iran, and the Gulf states. But to be successful, Belarus’ strategy also needs the EU. This, in fact, provides Europe with considerable leverage — leverage which it is currently not using.

Unsurprisingly, liberalization in the country has reversed. There are accounts of new political prisoners and trials, police have brutally dispersed several protests over the last months, and the independent media as well as civil society remain under threat. If anything, Europe’s unconditional engagement encourages Lukashenko, who recently (interviewed in Italy’s La Stampa) asserted: “Belarus is not a beggar in European relations.”

Absent tangible results or even prospects for change, Europe’s rapprochement indeed begins to look a lot like appeasement. Yet that would send a fatal signal to Belarus and the world. To Lukashenko and his ilk, it would be tantamount to admitting that, for the EU, state sovereignty, geopolitics, and economic gain trump universal values, democracy, and human rights. But the EU can still choose to do otherwise. That would truly honor the legacy of 1989.

Joerg Forbrig is Senior Program Officer for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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BERLIN — The difference in responses on both sides of the Atlantic to the Nobel Peace Prize for U.S. President Barack Obama could not have been more striking. In the U.S., the prize winner briefly expressed how humbled he was, followed by a short, highly partisan debate, which was as much about the about award as about the awardee; then everyone’s attention quickly moved on to other issues. In Europe, the public approval and interest was immediate, and overwhelming. The Nobel for Obama was the top story in all the news outlets for days, and rare was the public figure who did not feel compelled to congratulate or comment. All of Europe, it seemed, was in a flutter.

So what does all this excitement tell us about the European side of the transatlantic relationship? First and foremost, this intense attention shows how much Europe remains captivated by the new U.S. president, regardless of his achievements after a mere nine months in office. For some “Obamadulators,” the fact that he is not George W. Bush is enough in itself to merit the Nobel Prize. Those with a more measured appreciation of the president’s actions in office cite his speeches in Prague and Cairo, his respect for multilateral institutions, his willingness to reach out even to America’s most intransigent opponents, his courage in tackling numerous global problems at the same time, and the dignity and sobriety of his style.

But the reactions in Europe also illustrate a shift in the relationship that goes far beyond the personal. Obama’s most significant (and least-observed) achievement is that he has fundamentally changed the attitude of many Europeans to the United States. For them, his election alone illustrates America’s ability to re-invent itself, a capacity seemingly lacking in most European countries. Under Obama’s leadership, support among Europeans for U.S. leadership in global affairs has grown from one-third to nearly 50 percent, according to a recent Transatlantic Trends survey. In this light, Europe’s approval of the Nobel Prize for Obama is also an implicit acknowledgement of how much Europe needs the U.S. on the world stage.

But reactions to the award were by no means unanimously positive across Europe. In the East, reactions were much slower and often also more dismissive, from Lech Walesa’s “Too soon!” or the “What For?” of the Slovak daily SME. This reflects a more general caution among Eastern Europeans toward Obama, aggravated perhaps by the impression that America is withdrawing from engagement in this part of Europe. And while the Western Europeans were faster to react and more enthusiastic (in keeping with approval ratings of well over 80%), the general tone in the debate remained very balanced between approval and criticism. For the more sober voices, the Nobel Prize is an encouragement and an expression of hope that Obama will be able to stay his course and succeed; some also expressed concern that the prize had been awarded too early, and would prove a burden. And for the skeptics — they do exist — the award is a reminder to the new U.S. president that he must begin to deliver on his many promises.

All this possibly heralds a certain degree of realism slowly making its way into European opinion on Obama. Even the German media, where the Nobel for Obama was given the most space, could not help but warn of exaggerated expectations. Whether “Still a Dream” (Die Zeit), “Good Hope Award” (Säddeutsche Zeitung), or “Burden, rather than Honor” (Spiegel), there is a growing realization that Obama’s full agenda, at home and abroad, will necessarily also bring disappointments, and disagreements.

What this also means is that a window of opportunity may be closing for Obama in Europe. As the once-massive advance credit Obama had received by European publics wanes, policymakers here will find it harder to convince their publics of the need for unpopular decisions demanded by the U.S. president of his allies in Europe €“ as we know he will.

Europeans have in fact been quick to point out all the pressing international issues on which Obama has yet to achieve tangible results: overcoming the global economic crisis and building a new international financial architecture, tackling the nuclear threats emanating from Iran and North Korea, the war in Afghanistan, climate change, Guantanamo, the Middle East conflict, Russia’s renewed assertiveness. But the real question here €“ to paraphrase a famous quote €“ is not what Obama has done for the Nobel Peace Prize; it is what Europe can do for Obama to help him live up to this award.

Suffice it to say that, as yet, not many answers to this question have been forthcoming from Europe. But Europe can, and should be, more forthcoming on the highly symbolical issue of Guantanamo. Obama will need additional resources €“ troops, police, political leverage, development expertise, and funds €“ in Afghanistan, and Europe should be able to provide these. A nuclear-free world may be a long shot €“ but Europeans (and not just the nuclear powers Britain and France) can provide diplomatic support, and decades of arms control negotiating experience. European ties with Russia could, if appropriately coordinated, aid Obama’s outreach to the Kremlin. These and other actions on the part of Europe might give the president a fighting chance to succeed and justify his Nobel Peace Prize. In that sense, the award comes with a price tag. For us Europeans as much as for Barack Obama.

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BERLIN — The sighs of relief that were audible across Europe after the Irish voted “yes” in a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on Friday may well turn out to be premature. Certainly the overwhelming vote removed the most-hyped obstacle to the Treaty. But that still leaves Poland and the Czech Republic.

In Poland the next bump in the road has turned out to be just a wobble. For a while, it had seemed certain that President Lech Kaczynski would swiftly sign in the wake of an Irish yes. Then “insiders” began suggesting that a few concessions might be in order as a reward for signing, such as oversight rights for the Polish parliament, additional EU funds for Poland, or a weighty portfolio in the new EU Commission. But the fact that an overwhelming majority of Poles supports the Lisbon Treaty appears to have won the day — on Thursday, the President’s speaker announced that the Treaty would be signed on Saturday.

Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic, President Klaus has been finding ever new reasons to delay his signature, the only missing step in the ratification process after both houses of the Czech parliament approved the treaty. His case was strengthened recently when a group of conservative legislators launched yet another appeal to the constitutional court. Chances are that judges will reject the appeal, as they have done with several others before, but the court review and decision will mean a further delay. In a phone conversation on Thursday with Swedish Premier Fredrik Reinfeldt, Klaus dropped another bombshell: he wants a “footnote” attached to the Treaty regarding the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which will become binding for all 27 EU member States once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force — presumably, one that exempts the Czech Republic from its rules. Reinfeldt — in classic Nordic stiff-upper-lip mode — reported that he told Klaus that this was the “wrong message” to send.

The Polish daily Rzeczpospolita reports, drawing on a “source close to President Klaus”, that the Czech President wants a guarantee to be added to the Charter that prevents Sudeten Germans (ethnic Germans who fled the Czech lands after World War II) from claiming compensation or property from the Czech Republic. “We cannot allow some judge from Malta or Spain, who does not know the history of our region and sit on the European Court of Justice, to decide about the rights of Germans to re-claim their property,” Rzeczpospolita cites its source in Prague.

At the same time, public pressure is mounting in the Czech Republic to spare the country another embarrassment on the EU stage after its disastrous presidency earlier this year. Supporters of swift ratification can rely on strong public backing as, according to a recent poll, 53 percent of Czechs would vote yes in a referendum on the treaty. Not surprisingly, legal experts are even discussing ways how the stubborn president could be forced to sign.

In both countries, skeptics and opponents of Lisbon seem to acknowledge that they are fighting a lost cause. In Prague, even Klaus admitted after the Irish referendum that it may be too late to stop the treaty. With both the Czech Republic and Poland, the EU should be forthcoming and encouraging, so that the treaty can enter into force in 2010 as planned.

Otherwise, Lisbon might still fail on the finish line. The U.K. elections next year will likely see a Tory victory, in which case the new government might call a retroactive referendum to annul the Labour-led ratification. If the treaty has not entered into force by then, it may well collapse. That could bring consequences for Europe, both at home and abroad, that no one even dares imagine.

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