BRUSSELS — The results of the Greek elections are widely seen as heralding a new period of uncertainty for the country, and potentially for Europe. Beyond signalling a repudiation of austerity measures, the outcome in Greece has some potentially disturbing political and security implications, for Athens and for transatlantic partners. A chaotic and polarized Greece will be a more isolated, distracted, and unpredictable actor in international affairs just as new forces of stability are needed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Greek election outcome can be read as a systemic rejection of politics and governance as it has evolved in Greece since the end of the junta and the restoration of democracy in 1974. Voters did not simply rebel against the traditional centrist parties, leading political personalities, and a very unpopular bailout deal with the European Union and international creditors. They also voted to sweep away a system widely seen as corrupt and ill-equipped to deal with the critical problems facing the country. Even sophisticated Greek observers, well aware of the risks of a go-it-alone strategy outside the eurozone, have become skeptical about the curative effects of an austerity plan aimed at restoring competitiveness when there is little productive capacity to revive. The old European-oriented order has few adherents in today’s Greece.

This failure of domestic governance and the collapse of the old political establishment may be at the heart of the current political chaos, in which the formation of a stable coalition is unlikely without new elections. But international issues are also a key part of the Greek equation, and they could well take center stage in the next phase of the Greek drama. Like many of its neighbors, Greece is a sovereignty-conscious society, wary of external influence and perceived manipulation by larger powers. Decades of integration into the European mainstream have weakened but not extinguished these impulses. They are now on full display. The rejection of policies imposed upon Greece by international partners, including sweeping austerity measures, drew voters to new parties on the extreme left and right.

The prevailing discourse is unashamedly populist and nationalist, and the principal objects of Greek rage are foreign. The Coalition of the Radical Left, which took second place in the election and may hold the key to any new government, has put opposition to the international financial plan for Greece at the top of its agenda. Golden Dawn — the neo-fascist party that garnered some 8 percent of the vote and would be entitled to 21 seats in parliament — goes much further, explicitly targeting both international partners and the foreign migrants who have arrived in large numbers over the last decade. The party’s xenophobic and sometimes violent behavior is likely to fuel international concern, and may have an effect on Greece’s standing out of proportion to its real influence. This fraught political landscape will contribute to Greece’s isolation, precisely when closer ties to international partners and investors are needed.

More broadly, the chaotic conditions in Greece will deprive the region of a promising force for moderation and stability, from the Balkans to the Levant. A nationalist mood in Athens will threaten the all-important détente that has prevailed in Greek-Turkish relations for the last decade. At a time when competition over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming more intense, drift or deterioration in this critical relationship would bode ill for crisis management. The recent deepening of Greek-Israeli ties, and the ability of Athens to play a useful mediation role in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, will be impeded by the lack of a credible, focused partner in Athens. Further social instability and even political violence in Athens — all a distinct possibility in the absence of a stable government — could affect the prospects for development and European integration in Greece’s Balkan neighborhood. In sum, Greece’s domestic political woes may grab the headlines, but over time, the geopolitical implications of a more isolated and nationalistic Greece may be even more profound in a region of unquestioned strategic importance for its Euroatlantic partners.

Ian Lesser is executive director of the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Center in Brussels.

BRUSSELS—Full details of the Obama administration’s new look in defense spending, force posture, and strategy are not yet out. But enough has been revealed  to venture some thoughts on the logic of the new approach and the longer-term implications for the United States and transatlantic partners.

The shift to a “one war, spoil and manage” strategy contrasts sharply with a decade of costly and inconclusive engagement in irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq. Enormous efforts were undertaken to adapt the U.S. way of war and to focus it on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with the unfortunate effect of eroding the United States’ capacity to address more serious and potentially more demanding long-term challenges, above all in Asia. Today, much of the U.S. strategic community has come to believe that a disproportionate amount of effort has been devoted to meeting nonexistential threats to the national interest and international security. A strategy re-emphasizing core risks, and conventional rather than irregular warfare, simply makes sense against a backdrop of stark resource constraints.

The need to meet serious conventional contingencies with smaller ground forces could spell a renaissance in nuclear strategy. There are precedents for this in the Cold War experience, when the expense and difficulty of forward defense in Europe compelled a reliance on nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence to fill the gap at reasonable cost. Of course, we are unlikely to see a return to a doctrine of massive retaliation to meet security challenges in Asia, a more competitive relationship with Russia, or an aggressive Iran. But the mix of conventional and nuclear deterrence in U.S. strategy could well change as forces are realigned and forward-deployed forces, in particular, become more exposed to ballistic missile attack, perhaps nuclear-armed. Under these conditions, planners may be tempted to reinforce the nuclear dimension. Not quite a trip-wire strategy, but perhaps a bit closer than many U.S. allies would prefer.

Many will be tempted to interpret the Obama administration’s new strategy as a shift away from European defense—and perhaps more important, European defense partnerships—in the face of more pressing challenges in Asia. This interpretation is too dramatic. In reality, the shift away from European defense per se has been underway for two decades. This is not just a question of land forces. The U.S. Sixth Fleet has not kept an aircraft carrier battle group in the Mediterranean for many years. Residual U.S. forces in and around Europe are kept there to enable the United States to meet contingencies elsewhere, across the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. Maintaining a capacity to reinforce Europe’s crisis response capabilities on the European periphery, as in Libya, will continue to depend, above all, on mainly bilateral base access and over-flight arrangements. If anything, transatlantic partners will now have an even greater stake in solidifying these strategic ties. The locus of strategic risk may be shifting; the logic of cooperation endures.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser is the Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Center in Brussels.

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BRUSSELS — This week, while protests raged in Athens, the government of Prime Minister George Papandreou survived a critical confidence vote in the Greek parliament. The government can now try to impose further austerity measures. European Union finance ministers have also agreed to seek a new round of assistance for Greece, and have put off, at least for the moment, the looming reality that private investors will have to share in the cost of resolving Greece’s debt crisis. These steps have probably staved off the immediate prospect of a Greek default, or “managed restructuring” of an increasingly costly debt burden. But few observers are confident about even the medium-term outlook.  Europe’s slow and confused response to the crisis holds significant risks for the global economy — risks evident on Wall Street last week. But the geopolitical risks are just as great, and may be felt on both sides of the Atlantic.

Greek society may have reached a breaking point. The additional austerity measures being contemplated come against the backdrop of a shrinking economy and mounting unemployment, with little prospect of relief anytime soon. The progressive de-industrialization of the Greek economy, and declining competitiveness in key sectors such as tourism, do not bode well for recovery. Even Greece’s famed shipping sector is largely based offshore, with limited returns to the domestic economy. Vigorous global growth might help to pull Greece out of its financial morass.  This is a bet on developments far from Greek control. In the meantime, the renewed drive for austerity is unlikely to make for political stability.

Under these conditions, strikes and riots are not the only risks. Greece has a reservoir of anarchist violence and left-wing terrorism harking back to the ideological struggles of past decades.  Terrorist networks along the line of the November 17 group, which targeted Greek and international figures in the 1990s, may have relatively few adherents. Yet Greece is a relatively small society of 11 million, and it does not take much to scare away investors and visitors or to destabilize Greek politics.  At the same time, xenophobic right-wing groups have emerged more recently on the Greek scene, espousing the same violent anti-immigrant rhetoric heard elsewhere in Europe.  Both extremes are capable of turning their anger against business and political elites who have remained largely untouched by the crisis affecting Greek society as a whole. Large-scale privatizations, at what many will inevitably see as fire-sale prices forced on Athens by foreign institutions, will only add to the potential for turmoil and terrorism.

An unstable Greece will have potentially significant implications for the future of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean at a time when transatlantic partners need a stable and capable Southern Europe to help manage revolutions and conflicts to Europe’s south. Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are close neighbors. Athens has historic ties to the Arab world, and increasingly close ties to Israel.  Greek-Turkish relations are vastly improved from the crisis-prone atmosphere of the past.  In the southern Balkans, where there is much unfinished business in terms of development, democratization, and security, Athens has played an active, stabilizing role. An inward-looking, politically unstable, and possibly bankrupt Greece may find it difficult or impossible to play a positive role in these critical regions. The opportunity costs will be high for the neighborhood, for Europe, and for the United States.

In transatlantic terms, the stakes are high. Quite apart from the risk that a Greek default might trigger wider financial panic, mounting debt troubles in Southern Europe threaten the future of the European project as a whole. A decade ago, core actors such as Germany would have seen Southern Europe’s troubles as a threat to the strategic objective of a closer European union. Today, budgetary goals and domestic politics appear to trump geopolitical vision.  The lack of a concerted, systematic response to the debt crisis in the eurozone risks the progressive de-coupling of core and peripheral Europe. A more fragmented Europe will weaken an already fragile transatlantic relationship at a time when greater cohesion is needed to deal with challenges on Europe’s borders, above all in Europe’s Mediterranean “near abroad.”

The strategic consequences of the crises affecting Southern Europe are not uniform. Troubles in Portugal may pose fewer systemic risks. But Spain and Italy — both under growing pressure from bond-rating agencies — pose more critical tests by virtue of their scale and location.  Washington may be tempted to treat the crises in Southern Europe as a problem for Brussels to manage. But beyond the eurozone, the stakes are strategic and transatlantic in nature.  Recent comments from U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on the need for a much faster and more comprehensive approach — more money and less hedging from leading European states – are exactly right. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic need to look beyond the financial dimensions of the Greek crisis, and consider the geopolitical risks of inaction.

Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund.

Photo by George Laoutaris

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As events in Syria take an increasingly violent turn, the potential for the Assad regime being driven from power grows by the day. This is not yet a likely outcome – the ability of the Syrian authorities to suppress the uprising is substantial. But a straightforward return to pre-revolt conditions in Syria is probably the least likely case.  Turmoil in Syria could produce significant changes in the strategic landscape across the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, with important implications for transatlantic security interests.  Three possible scenarios illustrate what is at stake.

First, the regime may survive through the repeated use of force, with scant regard for casualties. There are clear precedents for this in modern Syrian history, including the brutal suppression of an Islamist uprising in Hama in 1982.  That episode had little effect on Syria’s external relations. But regional and global expectations are different today, especially in the wake of revolutions elsewhere in the Arab world. Today, Syrian society is more likely to see violent repression as a call to further mobilization. In this sense, there may be no going back to the prevailing order. The maintenance of Alawite minority rule may require measures that are increasingly draconian. They might succeed, but Syria’s opening to the West, which had been gathering way, would be firmly closed. Even critical neighbors like Turkey would be compelled to reassess their relations in the face of wholesale violations of human rights.  Violent repression would lead to an even more isolated Syria, even in the absence of any new economic sanctions.

Second, Syria may head toward chaos. The country’s ethnic and religious cleavages and long submerged grievances are unlikely to make for a velvet revolution. Too many Syrians hold grudges against the Assad regime. A chaotic Syria would also be an isolated Syria, and will pose new security challenges for the region. Violence in Syria could easily worsen an already troubled equation in Lebanon, and spillovers might also be felt in Iraq.  Turkey may have the most to lose in this scenario.  Turkish-Syrian détente, and a burgeoning political and commercial relationship, has been a signature product of Ankara’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy. In the late 1990s, Turkey and Syria came to the brink of conflict over Syrian support for the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency in southeastern Anatolia. Since then, the two countries have come to terms over the Kurdish issue, and relations have expanded rapidly.  Prolonged turmoil in Syria could provoke Syria’s restive Kurdish minority to action, and this would have direct implications for Turkey’s own struggle with the Kurdish issue, and PKK violence.

Whether Syria chooses harsh repression, or spirals into chaos, its regional role will be sharply affected. Syria will be in no position to engage in negotiations with Israel about the Golan Heights or other aspects of the peace process, even if conditions are favorable on other tracks (also unlikely). An inert Syria may not even be in a position to serve as an effective spoiler in Arab-Israeli relations, as it has in the past. A resurgent Syrian role in Lebanese affairs would be difficult to sustain. Iran might be insensitive to the Assad regime’s use of force to quell domestic opposition, but a chaotic Syria would deprive Tehran of an effective ally in the Levant. Ironically, both Iran and Israel will worry about the consequences of a chaotic Syria, and the possible emergence of a very different, Sunni-led regime. This could come about as the result of a military coup, on the pattern of events in Tunisia and Egypt, or of the emergence of Syria’s potent Islamist movement as a political arbiter. The latter could mean an uncomfortable new neighbor for Syria’s traditional allies — and adversaries.

Finally, there is a chance that the turmoil in Syria will lead, sooner or later, to the emergence of a more open, modern, and secular society, and of more democratic governance. Certainly, there are important segments of Syrian society that seek a transition of this kind.  This scenario, too, would be transforming. It could make Syria a real partner for peace with Israel, or at least ensure a stable security relationship across the Golan. It would make Syria an uncomfortable, even impossible partner for Iran – no bad thing from the perspective of transatlantic interests. And it could offer Europe a new partner in a refashioned strategy toward the southern Mediterranean. Without question, the emergence of a more open and tolerant regime in Damascus would transform Syrian relations with the United States, and offer France and others with historic links to Syria, a chance to participate in the reconstruction of the country.  In the meantime, Europe, the United States, and Syria’s neighbors will also need to consider a range of less comfortable but perhaps more likely scenarios.

Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington.

Photo Credit: Maggie Osama

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WASHINGTON — The belated international intervention in Libya serves important humanitarian purposes. But these are not the only concerns shaping the actions of Europe, the United States, and regional partners.  The sudden show of French and British leadership in response to the Libyan crisis also reflects some very tangible security concerns – concerns shared by countries on both sides of the Mediterranean.  The stakes are high, but this Mediterranean crisis is unfolding on Europe’s doorstep, where Europe is capable of leadership and substantial power projection.

First, timing matters.  Two weeks ago, a decision to use airpower to interdict pro-regime forces and isolate the battlefield would have left Muammar Qaddafi on the defensive and politically marginalized. The lesson here is that even with good intelligence and political will, the ability to act rapidly makes a difference. Still, the international response in Libya has been extremely rapid by the standards of past crises, from Bosnia to the Gulf.  The situation on the ground has, perhaps, been stabilized. But to set the clock back to conditions prevailing two weeks ago, airpower must fulfill the additional burden of rolling back Qaddafi loyalists from positions far beyond Tripoli. This is feasible, but cumbersome, and will almost certainly go beyond the kind of intervention many international partners had in mind when they supported a UN mandate.  Having missed the first wave of defections from the Qaddafi camp, Western and regional leaders must hope that the prospect of attrition from the air will help to peel away wavering loyalists, including forces that may now be having second thoughts about support for the regime. One danger is that a prolonged civil war, or chaos in Libya, will attract many of the North African fighters who have gone to Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade, and are now returning to the region.  In short, having opted to intervene, another clock is now ticking. A stalemate will pose new security challenges as well as a risk of spillovers across the Mediterranean.

Second, location matters. North Africa is already well established in the European mind as a place of strategic consequence. Energy, migration, terrorism, and maritime security are all part of the equation.  The political revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt shook European confidence in the stability of the southern neighborhood. In a very real sense, the Mediterranean is Europe’s “near abroad,” and the sense of risk and exposure is high. For years, European defense planners have put possible contingencies in North Africa at the top of their agendas. Even Italy, for all its complicated commercial ties to Libya, has an overriding stake in managing what could become an uncontrolled stream of migrants across the Mediterranean, including tremendous human security costs.  Qaddafi has threatened to attack Italian (and Greek) territory in the past, and actually launched a very inaccurate ballistic missile strike against a U.S. LORAN station on the Italian island of Lampedusa in 1986.  Libya’s past involvement in terrorism in Europe, including the targeting of exiled opponents, is well known.

The outcome in Libya will be felt even more keenly by Libya’s neighbors in North Africa. The last thing a fragile Tunisia and a still unstable Egypt need is a civil war, a humanitarian crisis, or a wounded and aggressive regime on their borders. The need to consolidate and protect the new regimes in Cairo and Tunis only reinforces the logic of intervention in Libya.

Finally, psychology matters. For decades, Libya has acted as a “crazy state,” defying international norms and shifting unpredictably from one international posture to another.  Under stable conditions, this might have been tolerated as eccentricity. But the legacy of Lampedusa, the Lockerbie bombing, and the shooting of police officer Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan embassy in London, is still very much alive. Without dramatic intervention, Europe and the United States faced the possibility of a renewed Libyan campaign of terror against Western and other targets, deliberate migration, energy and environmental crises in the Mediterranean, and other possible threats.  This would have meant a protracted strategy of containment. And if Qaddafi remains in place, despite the coalition air campaign, such a strategy may yet be required.   With American support, it is a strategy Europe can and should lead.

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WASHINGTON — Even if Muammar Qaddafi manages to hold on to power in Tripoli—and this looks unlikely—there will be no going back to the old order in Libya or the region.  The situation in Libya contrasts sharply with Tunisia and Egypt, where popular opposition confronted an entrenched leadership, and a disciplined military stepped forward to resolve the leadership crises. In Libya, armed factions are competing for power in a winner-take-all struggle, and there are few opportunities for compromise.  Libya looks set for a protracted period of turmoil, and the strategic implications for North Africa, the Mediterranean, and transatlantic partners could be profound.

In the near-term, dealing with the movement of people will be at the top of the agenda.  Much attention has been given to the dramatic migration across the Mediterranean affecting Southern Europe. This challenge comes at a time of economic stringency and a growing north-south divide within the European Union itself, all of which complicate the task of managing these new flows.  But Libya’s North African neighbors already face an even greater challenge in this sphere, with porous land borders, migration pressures from their own south, and with very limited resources to manage the human security consequences. Tunisia has already witnessed an exodus of perhaps 100,000 people across its borders. Egypt is facing a similar refugee influx.

The transatlantic exposure to fallout from the Libya crisis goes well beyond the issue of energy security. Prolonged violence in Libya, coupled with greater movement of people, will also raise the specter of cross-border spillovers of criminality and political violence. A civil war in Libya would deepen the problems of arms smuggling and human trafficking that are endemic across the region. Groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, already active in Algeria and the Sahel, may find new opportunities for recruitment and organization if Libya becomes a zone of chaos. North African fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, who have been returning to the region, may well see a conflict-ridden Libya as a new theater of action, especially if the struggle for Libya acquires an Islamist dimension. A chaotic Libya could increase the risk of terrorism on both sides of the Mediterranean. A Qaddafi regime in its last days might revive the use of terrorism to lash out at its perceived regional and global adversaries. In the most extreme case, Qaddafi and his entourage might attempt to strike at Italian or other southern European targets, or ships offshore, with ballistic missiles that may remain in the Libyan arsenal.

The strategic stakes are high, and transatlantic partners have a strong interest in helping Libya’s neighbors on both sides of the Mediterranean address the security consequences of a violent and chaotic Libya. First, the United States and European partners should find ways of ensuring that the Qaddafi regime cannot reassert control over the country. A no-fly zone (including suppression of Libyan air defenses) may be necessary. It might also be worth considering the use of airpower to prevent the movement of forces loyal to Qaddafi while the opposition arms and consolidates its position. The preferred option, of course, is to avoid outside intervention altogether. But this must be weighed against the human security costs to the Libyan people, and the international security risks of increasingly violent and unpredictable regime in Tripoli.

Second, Libya’s North African neighbors need help—technical aid and assistance on the ground—in securing their borders against looming spillovers of terrorism and criminality, and an ongoing refugee crisis.  This should be an obvious priority for the European Union as it refashions its Euro-Mediterranean strategy, including the troubled Union for the Mediterranean.

Third, there is a potentially critical role for NATO. The Alliance has had a Mediterranean Dialogue since 1996, but the initiative has struggled to find a practical basis for cooperation with its six southern Mediterranean partners. The security challenges flowing from conflict in Libya offer an opportunity for NATO to put its expertise and capability to use in cooperation with North African partners. Looking ahead, closer cooperation with NATO may contribute to the reform of civil-military relations and the security sector, as in Central and Eastern Europe before the enlargement of the Alliance. Without a UN mandate, some Alliance members may balk at direct NATO intervention in Libya. But there is still a great deal that the Alliance can do through its Mediterranean Dialogue to enhance the security of the region as a whole.

Finally, the Libyan crisis underscores the need for Europe and the United States to think about the Mediterranean as an area of strategic consequence in its own right. The ability to deal with the security implications of the Libyan crisis will be a key test of transatlantic cooperation, including EU-NATO coordination, in a region where—unlike Afghanistan or the Gulf—Europe’s and America’s capacity to act is relatively balanced. An explicit transatlantic strategy for the Mediterranean has never been more essential to European security, successful transition in North Africa, or American interests.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States

WASHINGTON — The failure of the most recent round of talks between Iran and the “P5+1” in Istanbul was hardly a surprise. To date, negotiations with Iran have made no progress in halting Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program, or in changing the dynamics in a deteriorating relationship between Iran and the West. But the experience in Istanbul highlights some important developments with implications for future strategy.

The context for concern has changed.  There continues to be a fundamental asymmetry in Western and Iranian perceptions of the nuclear impasse. Iran is playing a very long game, with an extended time horizon that has been characterized as “strategic patience.” The West, and to an even greater extent, Israel, perceives Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a ticking clock. For those in Iran’s neighborhood inclined to see the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, the question of how fast the clock is ticking is critical. In part, this is a technical issue, and here the trend in recent months has been toward a more cautious estimate of progress in the Iranian program. Even Israeli analysts now talk in terms of years rather than months. While negotiations have evidently failed to halt the Iranian program, and sanctions may only have an indirect effect, covert intervention on multiple fronts has apparently made a difference. This is good news for crisis management, but may do little to change the longer-term nature of the nuclear challenge. In all likelihood, Iran will opt to remain a near-nuclear power for some time to come. But even this nuclear-ready posture may have serious consequences for military balances, doctrines, and the strategic balance across a wide region, from the Aegean to Central Asia.

The negotiations in Istanbul underscored the increasingly concerted European approach to the Iranian nuclear question. Indeed, the European Union has long been in the forefront of Iran diplomacy, and a common stance on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has been one of the few clear-cut foreign policy achievements at the European level.  Baroness Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was a visible presence before, during, and after the Istanbul talks. For American policymakers skeptical about the emergence of a united Europe in foreign and security policy terms, Iran may be a harbinger of more concerted and visible partnership. Certainly, it matters that a cohesive European policy coincides with what may be the top international security priority for the Obama administration – keeping Iran from going nuclear on its  watch. Current Turkish policy on Iran is a less comfortable fit with European and American interests. Ankara’s Western partners are willing to see Turkey (and Brazil) play a facilitation role. But despite Turkey’s active diplomacy and closer relations with Tehran, there is little that Turkey can achieve if the parties at the core of the nuclear dispute are unwilling to envision a grand bargain.  Neither Tehran, nor Washington will be willing to “outsource” diplomacy on such a critical security issue.

European unity and Turkish activism can only do so much. Given the patient, strategic nature of Iran’s quest for global “weight,” the relationship with Washington will always be central to the outcome. Sabotage and the threat of military retaliation may reduce the chances for an Iranian nuclear breakout in the near term.  Over the longer term, the nature of the U.S.-Iranian security relationship is likely to be the determining factor in Tehran’s nuclear decision-making.  The latest round of international sanctions on Iran may well be having an effect on the Iranian economy. But their effectiveness in hobbling Iran’s nuclear program, or changing the calculus about nuclear proliferation in Tehran, is much less clear.  It might even be argued that effective sanctions will reinforce the regime’s perception of economic and military encirclement, fueling the desire for a minimum nuclear deterrent, whatever the cost.  U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue might alter this equation – but a constructive approach is hardly conceivable against the backdrop of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric.

Events in Tunisia show that the stability of even the most entrenched regimes cannot be taken for granted in the Middle East.  Despite obvious differences of scale, and the character of the state and society, the Tunisian case may yet give new hope to those who would like to see systemic change in Iran. In the meantime, transatlantic partners, including Turkey, need to prepare for a an extended strategy of containment vis-à-vis an Iran that may remain poised on the nuclear threshold for some time to come.

Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington.

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WASHINGTON, DC — On January 14, Tunisia’s President Zine al-Abadine Ben Ali fled Tunis for Saudi Arabia, bringing to an end 23 years of repressive, authoritarian leadership. He leaves behind a scene delicately poised between democratic change and chaos. An interim government, led by Prime Minister Muhammad Ghannouchi, faces an uncertain future. The “jasmine revolution,” as it is already being called, raises questions about the future stability of troubled regimes across the Arab world. But the events in Tunisia already have important implications for the region, and may force a change in the way we see the Middle East—and the Mediterranean.

First, the Tunisian revolution was surprising for what it was not: it was neither slow, nor Islamist (yet).  The fall of the Ben Ali regime was rapid. The agents of change were largely but not exclusively young and secular. Political Islam does not seem to have played a significant role, despite the reservoir of Islamist opposition in Tunisia. Of all the North African states, Tunisia was the most obviously middle class and Mediterranean in outlook.  The Tunisian experience reinforces the historic truth that revolutions are usually made by the young, the educated, and the middle class, often under conditions of rapid economic change. The next weeks and months will see an important test of how Islamist movements in Tunisia and elsewhere act in the face of a new political opening. It is worth remembering that the Iranian revolution started as a secular uprising and only later acquired a religious dimension. But Tunisia, with its relatively moderate and cohesive society, is not Iran, and the secular character of the revolution is likely to hold.

Second, events in Tunisia make clear that the prevailing political order cannot be taken for granted anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa. Still, Tunisia may be the exception rather than the model. The situation in Algeria is, in fact, more explosive. There, a decade of political violence has been followed by a decade of doubtful stability and barely hidden unrest.  Despite enormous hydrocarbon wealth, and a history of international activism, Algeria has failed to reform in any meaningful way. Like Tunisia, Algeria has been unable to offer a viable future to masses of unemployed or underemployed young people. Unlike Tunisia, the sheer scale of the problem in Algeria is much larger, Islamism is the leading force of opposition, and the political culture is more intolerant and violent.  A new revolt in Algeria, should it come, holds the potential for another protracted and bloody conflict between extremists and a military-backed state.

With its eccentric and enigmatic leadership, Libya is in a class of its own. But here, too, the prospects for relatively nonviolent, democratic change are not good. The outlook is quite different in reform-minded Morocco, even if many of the demographic and social challenges are similar to those felt elsewhere. Yet even a stable Morocco would be affected by a return to turmoil in Algeria. Across the region, it is notable that the recurrent spark for revolt in recent months has been food insecurity – a key concern in a world of rising commodity prices, pressure on subsidies, and popular anger at perceived economic mismanagement and corruption. This is an issue to watch.

Finally, developments in Tunisia and elsewhere in North Africa may compel American policymakers to adjust their mental maps. Tunisia is at once a Mediterranean, an Arab, and a Middle Eastern crisis. Despite over 200 years of presence, Washington has never had a strong sense of the Mediterranean as a place meriting strategic attention in its own right. This may need to change. Europe has an obvious stake in the future of the southern Mediterranean, not least because of the large North African communities in France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere, and the direct links to European security. As in the Balkans in the 1990s, an effective response sometimes requires a new geographic frame. If the last decade underscored the importance of the Gulf to the future of the Middle East, the next decade may be just as much about the Mediterranean as a place that matters. Strategy toward the Mediterranean—Europe’s near abroad—is likely to be an increasingly important test of European Union foreign policy and transatlantic cooperation.

Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, D.C.

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WASHINGTON — Reflecting on the past year in transatlantic relations, it is tempting to compose a scorecard of successes and failures, or a short list of critical events. Many of these items have been discussed in Transatlantic Take when they were front page news. In truth, 2010 is a hard year to rate in transatlantic terms because there have been few clear-cut outcomes, and many open questions remain. Four defining issues, all unresolved, are emblematic of challenges that are likely to be critical in 2011 and beyond.

First, domestic developments remain the key drivers. Societies on both sides of the Atlantic are troubled, insecure, and, in some cases, insolvent.  Recent experience calls into question the idea that “rich” countries are places of gentle trends and few shocks. In economic terms, we are hardly out of the woods. The deepening financial crises on Europe’s periphery, most notably in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, persistent high unemployment, and depressed housing markets, suggest that 2011 could hold some new and unpleasant surprises. Since the start of the great recession, observers have worried about the implications of prolonged economic stringency for social cohesion and politics. After a few years of such stress, populist movements are becoming a real force on the political scene, upsetting established politics in the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and elsewhere. The results of the American midterm elections also point in this direction. The emergence of a sovereignty-conscious, populist wave could spell revolutionary change across a spectrum of transatlantic concerns, from immigration to the environment, from trade to defense.  The pressures for minimalist, inward-looking, and re-nationalized policies have grown, even as the problems facing Atlantic societies are more evidently global in nature.

Over the coming year, the unresolved crisis in the eurozone could well present core Europe, and even the United States, with the need for a new and very large bail-out. All of this will place in stark relief the question of whether politics—even security—can and should trump economics when it comes to European and transatlantic cohesion. These questions were answered in a very clear way after World War II, and again in the years after 1990. Will the answer be the same today?

Second, containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains foreign policy issue number one, for the Obama Administration and for transatlantic partners.  This is one area where the European Union has developed a truly concerted approach, and a place where transatlantic cooperation gets high marks. The June 2010 Iran sanctions vote in the UN Security Council was a watershed event. The fact that Russia and China approved the measure while Turkey voted “no” was a striking indicator of flux on the international scene.  But Iran appears undeterred in its drive to become a nuclear, or at least a nuclear-ready power, and 2011 might well hold further surprises on this front.

Third, 2010 has been a year of second thoughts for an American foreign policy that seemed headed for ever-increasing attention to Asia .  The experience of the G20 meeting in Seoul, and vocal differences over trade, finance, and climate policy, make clear that Asian partnerships are no easier to manage than those in Europe—and perhaps a lot less predictable.  The risk of conflict on the Korean peninsula, the looming strategic competition with China, and the tremendous and still largely undeveloped potential for cooperation with India will surely keep Asia on the American agenda. But these issues will also be high on the European agenda, and the management of all these challenges will be fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation.

Fourth, it is hard to discuss the lessons of 2010 without mentioning WikiLeaks. The release of a mass of relatively low-grade diplomatic message traffic has galvanized the media and the chattering classes on both sides of the Atlantic. The episode has caused considerable embarrassment and has tarnished the image of American diplomacy. But has the WikiLeaks story raised the general (and generally pretty low) public interest in foreign policy? It will be a good question for the next Transatlantic Trends survey in September 2011. If nothing else, the leaks remind us that international politics are still made by individuals, often with strong personalities and strong views.  These political personalities will face some big and defining questions in 2011. The answers will shape the future of transatlantic relations for some time to come.

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WASHINGTON — Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a formal end to the American combat role in Iraq. Although a very substantial military presence of around 50,000 troops will remain for training and more limited counterterrorism operations, the shift in mission marks a turning point in the almost eight-year-long U.S. engagement. As America heads for the exits, its international partners will retain a heavy stake in the end game and the future of Iraq. The potential consequences encompass transatlantic relations as well as regional stability. Obama’s long-anticipated announcement is a good moment to take stock of the implications.

First, a progressive disengagement from Iraq is a political as well as a strategic imperative for the Obama administration. With very difficult mid-term elections looming, and an economy delicately poised between recovery and renewed recession, the opportunity to take at least one external problem off the agenda is welcome. Not that the disengagement can be accomplished overnight – far from it. But as a matter for political debate, Iraq is a waning issue. Having inherited an unpopular conflict, the current administration can at least claim that it has done no further harm to American interests or regional security.  The prospects for a “least harm” exit in Afghanistan, and a reconfiguration of the NATO efforts there for counter-terrorism more narrowly defined, may also be influenced by the perceived success or failure of the end game in Iraq.

Second, disengagement from an active combat role in Iraq will have implications for American policy vis-à-vis the two central policy challenges in the Middle East—Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On Iran, the administration faces the unwelcome possibility of a nuclear break-out that may demand a military response. More likely, the United States may be compelled to engineer a new, long-term strategy of containment in the Gulf. Operationally, and politically, this will require a clearing of the decks, shedding the baggage from the Iraq War that has hobbled American policy for almost a decade.  How will this be seen from Tehran? The Iraq War swept away Iran’s leading geopolitical competitor and security concern. It is most unlikely that Iraq itself will pose any direct threat to Iranian security for decades to come. On the other hand, competition with Iraq historically provided a leading spur to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. (Tehran almost certainly shared the international misjudgments about Iraq’s WMD capabilities.) It is entirely possible that Iran’s progress toward a deliverable nuclear arsenal might have been more rapid if Saddam Hussein had remained in place.  In this respect, among others, the United States and transatlantic partners are only beginning to reckon with the longer-term geopolitical consequences, positive and negative, of a weak and unsettled Iraq.

Given the long history of disappointments in the peace process, it is hard to be optimistic about the recent resumption of direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. But it is an important step, and some observers argue convincingly that circumstances this time might just be propitious for a comprehensive settlement—the ultimate diplomatic prize for any American administration. Relative stability in Iraq will allow key regional actors, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to take risks for peace that might seem unacceptable against a backdrop of chaos or renewed violence on their borders. More generally, a smaller U.S. military footprint in Iraq will offer fewer targets for extremists and may lower the pressure for radicalization across the board. All of which will affect security on Israel’s borders and the climate for negotiation.

Third, the disengagement from Iraq will touch directly on Turkish interests, and will be central to the future of a troubled U.S.-Turkish relationship. Many Turks are convinced that U.S. strategy in the Middle East has worked against their country’s security interests. Public perceptions on this score are well documented in leading opinion surveys, including GMF’s Transatlantic Trends (the 2010 findings, to be released Wednesday, are especially revealing. See www.transatlantictrends.org on Wednesday). Conditions in Northern Iraq and cross-border attacks by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) are at the heart of Turkish concerns. Ankara needs continued American assistance—intelligence and equipment—to support its operations against the PKK. At the same time, the United States needs access to Turkish ports and Incirlik Airbase to facilitate the removal of heavy equipment from Iraq. If Turkish cooperation is not forthcoming, there are logistical alternatives. But, as in 2003, the consequences for bilateral relations can be significant, especially against a backdrop of highly visible Turkish-U.S. differences over Iran and Israel. Fortunately, there is every sign that Washington and Ankara are on the same page when it comes to cooperation in the Iraq endgame. It will be a key test of strategic coordination for the two transatlantic allies with the most direct stakes in the future of postwar Iraq. Finally, beyond the ongoing challenge of Afghanistan, a concerted approach to the disengagement phase in Iraq will send a strong signal that NATO allies can work together on other contingencies outside the European space. Missions of exactly this kind are likely to feature more prominently in NATO’s new strategic concept to be announced at the Lisbon summit in November.

Ian Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC

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