Of all the stops on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s upcoming trip to Europe, none is more important than Ukraine. This is a country heading in the wrong direction—as evidenced by the disturbing and rapid rollback of its democratic gains. Much is at stake, for the implications of a Ukraine moving toward a non-democratic, if not authoritarian, system of governance are enormous not just for Ukraine, but also for Europe and the United States. Ukraine is critical to advancing the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Thus, it is imperative for Clinton to convey to Ukraine’s new leadership the United States’ distress over recent developments and its strong hope that this represents just a detour—and not a dead end—for democratic development in the country.

The record, looked at in toto, is sadly clear. Journalists are under growing pressure and are being forced to resort to self-censorship for self-preservation. In some cases, such as in Kolomiya, they are literally under attack, and the licenses of independent TV stations are being threatened by the authorities. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ministry of Internal Affairs are throwing their weight around in ways not seen in years, paying unwanted “visits” to the rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, for example, and detaining a German foundation representative at the airport for ten hours in retaliation, some suspect, for a recent article of his that was critical of President Viktor Yanukovych and his administration team.

The Kharkiv deal with Russia—involving ostensibly lower gas prices in exchange for a 25-year extension of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet presence in Crimea—was rammed through parliament (the Rada) without review or debate in a session marred by egg-throwing and fisticuffs. The budget was passed in one reading, even though it is supposed to be voted on three times, and local elections were postponed from the end of May to a date uncertain (possibly the end of October).

Even the very formation of the government itself rests on a constitutionally questionable basis (the constitution forbids individual deputies of the Rada from defecting from their party to form a majority, which was how the current government was established). Members of Yanukovych’s cabinet such as Education and Science Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk openly undermine national unity by questioning whether the Halychany Ukrainians in the west were truly Ukrainians. In an apparent sop to Moscow, Yanukovych himself in April rejected the notion that the 1932-33 Stalin-imposed famine in Ukraine (known as the Holodomor) was an act of genocide, a position held by all previous Ukrainian governments. Yanukovych’s defenders argue that after years of debilitating battles between the president and prime minister, there finally is unity in the government, agreement with the Rada, and an economic plan for reversing Ukraine’s economic decline. They point to opinion polls showing strong public support for Yanukovych’s leadership in the first 100 days of office (not uncommon during the honeymoon period for previous Ukrainian presidents).

The reality is that the Rada has become a rubber-stamp of the executive branch, and checks-and-balances against the government have been thrown out the window. The judiciary is not strong enough to step in, and the government and president are running amok. Those polling numbers, which reflect relief that the previous Yushchenko team is gone more than anything, will only encourage Yanukovych to strengthen his hold on power. And he still has more than four years to go in his term as president.

Yanukovych must be told directly by Clinton that the track he is on leads into a brick wall. On its current trajectory, Ukraine will lose support and interest from the West, which already is not keen to engage Ukraine, and be left to deal with Russia on its own. Here are some points the Secretary of State should convey:

• Mr. President, you need to remove the heads of the SBU and/or Ministry of Interior – or any local officials – if pressure or attacks against journalists continue. That is the only way the message will get out that the media are off-limits.
• You and your ministers should avoid stirring controversy over issues of Ukrainian identity, language, and culture, especially for those living in the western part of the country; you are only contributing to the country’s polarization.
• Stop allowing officials to harass religious organizations and non-governmental organizations, permit freedom of assembly, and show tolerance for diversity as well as critics (foreign and domestic) of your government.
• Deal with corruption aggressively – including within your own ranks – and not just to settle old scores.

Ukraine is not the West’s to lose—such arguments grossly exaggerate Western influence and insult the people in Ukraine, who will determine their own future—but the United States and the European Union need to wake up to what is unfolding and be prepared to ramp up their engagement significantly. When she visits Poland after her trip to Kyiv for the Community of Democracies ministerial, Clinton should reinforce this message to the Europeans. Yanukovych and his government need to know that the West recognizes the importance of a successful Ukraine—and is serious about offering it the prospect of deeper integration. But Yanukovych must do his part too, and that means getting Ukraine back on the right democratic track.

David J. Kramer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC

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WASHINGTON — The agreement signed last week between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev in which Ukraine will receive cheaper gas in exchange for extending Russia’s Black Sea Fleet presence in Crimea through at least 2042 has set off a firestorm of criticism. The rapid ratification of the agreement within five days of its signing by the Ukrainian parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada and in which Yanukovych’s coalition has a majority) will only stoke the opposition. For a deal of such consequence and implications, it was irresponsible of the Rada to have taken up the issue so quickly, without proper review, especially given the agreement’s lack of transparency. There are far more questions than answers about the deal at this point, but most disturbing is the divisive impact it already is having on the Ukrainian polity. This was on display for all to see in the Rada Tuesday as fights broke out, smoke bombs were set off, and eggs were hurled at the rostrum. Ukrainian politics have been known to be raucous, but this far surpassed anything in the recent past.

To make matters worse, Yanukovych on Tuesday rejected the notion that the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine was “an act of genocide against one nation.” One can debate the Holodomor, as the famine is known, but Yanukovych’s answer is like pouring oil on an already simmering fire in Ukraine’s polarized politics.

In defending the gas deal, Yanukvoych and his team argue that Ukraine will save between $3-4 billion per year on gas. They claim, with some justification, that gas deals negotiated by previous Ukrainian governments left Ukraine broke and at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Russia. Indeed, Ukraine was paying as much as $330 per thousand cubic meters but will pay closer to $230 under the new agreement. However, the gas deal also raises a series of fundamental questions. As energy expert Ed Chow noted last week in the Kyiv Post, “There is no price discount, but a normal price that Ukraine should have been able to negotiate without undue concessions.” Who will benefit from this lowered price? Will it be the country as a whole or favored oligarchs and industries or, worse yet, shady intermediaries? Was striking a long-term gas deal essential to Ukraine’s efforts to reach a new agreement with the IMF for some $12 billion in Special Drawing Rights? These would have been good questions for the Rada to have asked before ratifying the agreement.

In exchange for lowering the price, Russia received an extension on its Black Sea Fleet presence at Sevastopol, which currently expires in 2017. The country’s constitution forbids the presence of foreign forces on Ukrainian soil (with an exception made for the Black Sea Fleet until 2017. This new agreement will prompt additional challenges in the Constitutional Court, though the opposition shouldn’t hold its breath that it will prevail there given that court’s earlier questionable ruling on the formation of the new governing coalition. It will also boost Russia’s sense that it is recovering its standing in the region, and already Russia’s ambassador to NATO has crowed that the deal spells the end of any prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO (not that those were great any time soon anyway). This, in turn, will reinforce the zero-sum thinking in Moscow that some wishful supporters of the Obama administration’s reset policy with Russia had hoped was subsiding.

It is true that the Black Sea Fleet by 2017, to say nothing of several decades from now under the new deal’s extension, may look more like a coral reef than an imposing military presence (though that could change should Russia acquire the French warship Mistral). But the point for revisionist Russian leaders is that under this deal they will retain their tentacles in Ukraine in a fashion that is stirring up divisions inside that country. This is likely to reinforce the impression among many in the West that Ukraine is hopeless, cutting corrupt deals with Moscow, and simply not worth engaging. This, too, is a key Russian goal — for the United States and the European Union to take a hands-off approach to Ukraine.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, when asked about the deal last week, described it as part of Yanukovych’s “balancing act.” The Ukrainian leader, after all, had had a successful visit to Washington a week before, and his deal with Medvedev was seen as a tipping back toward Moscow. Now, the U.S. and EU governments should be pressing Yanukovych for transparency on this deal and disclosure of all that it entails. Of course, the Rada should have demanded that before its premature vote for ratification, but instead it chose to abdicate its responsibilities.

The “balancing act” Clinton referred to — a debatable point to begin with — has quickly turned into an unhealthy tilting toward Russia, producing undesirable rifts in Ukraine that over time could threaten the country’s viability as a truly strong, independent state. Yanukovych must remember that he is president of all Ukraine; he needs to act like a unifying leader, not a divisive one.

David Kramer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington.

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WASHINGTON — Exactly a year ago, Moldova was a mess.   Two days after parliamentary elections, on April 7, 2009, initial results showed the Communist Party with a lead big enough to maintain control over the legislature and government, if not the presidency.   In a country where freedom of expression had become an ideal, not a reality, and following an electoral campaign tightly controlled by the governing Communists, frustrations boiled over among some protestors, especially youth who took to the streets and ransacked the parliament and presidential buildings.   Three people died in the violence, and others were subsequently subjected to brutal treatment and abuse by police.

Moldova, which hardly ever made news in the West, was on the front page with scenes of chaos and disorder — not the kind of attention most countries desire.   Although the violence quickly subsided, the bad blood between the Communists and center-right opposition meant deadlock in the parliament.   This forced the country to hold another election last July, and the opposition secured victory by pulling together a four-party coalition, aided by the defection from the Communist Party of the former speaker of parliament, Marian Lupu.

Vladimir Filat emerged as prime minister after this second election and cobbled together an impressive, Western-oriented government.   But the Communists maintained enough parliamentary seats to block agreement on a new president.   Under Moldova’s current system, 61 deputies from the 101-seat parliament must agree on a new president, and all 43 Communists opposed Lupu’s nomination.

Moldova today is a completely different place.   During a recent visit to Chisinau, we found many people more optimistic and positive about their country’s future.   The media landscape has changed dramatically, with a plethora of news outlets offering various points of view.   State television, the only channel that still covers the entire country, is now run by a new and democratically-oriented team, and for the first time in eight years it is not subject to any political pressure.

We visited Moldova immediately after Filat and his team had returned from a Brussels donors conference at which an unprecedented $2.6 billion in loans and grants was pledged for the country; of that, the United States is providing $262 million through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.   Western officials speak positively these days about Moldova’s prospects and are impressed with the new government’s work plan,”Rethink Moldova: Priorities for Mid Term Development.”

In that plan, the government proposes to focus on three pillars for medium-term development: responsible governance, economic recovery and development, and investments in human capital.   Among the specific priorities defined in the document: creating an effective civil service and a modern education system, fighting corruption, supporting small-and medium-sized enterprises, implementing decentralization reforms, and wooing investments in agriculture.   One immediate area the government should focus on — and which would produce decent jobs — is road construction.   Those who have driven on Moldova’s roads would applaud such an investment.

For the first time, one hears talk about possible membership in the European Union, albeit still years away.   Nevertheless, there is a serious way forward between Moldova and the EU for completing a free trade agreement, association agreement, and visa liberalization over the next year or two.   Such achievements would more solidly anchor Moldova into the European community of nations.

But the country is not out of the woods yet.   Ineffective and corrupt rule has taken a toll.   Moldova, a tiny country of roughly 3.5 million people with a million more living abroad out of economic necessity, remains the poorest country in Europe and will need all the help it can get.   Russian troops continue to occupy its separatist region of Transnistria, east of the Dniester River, against the Moldovan government’s request for them to leave and in violation of commitments Russia made at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s   Istanbul Summit in 1999.
The most immediate and serious challenge is the prospect of new elections.   Because the parliament failed last year to choose a president, it will have to be dissolved under the constitution sometime after June 16 and new elections will be held.   Various attempts to avoid early elections have triggered disagreements within the current governing coalition but also run contrary to the recommendations of the Venice Commission, which advises countries on complying with their own constitutions and with democratic processes.

While the timing of elections is still up in the air, they could be disruptive to the current team’s flow, and the Communists’ return to power cannot be ruled out completely.   Needless to say, that possibility would be a setback to the country’s reform program and Western orientation.   It also underscores the urgent need to help Moldova stay on a path toward greater integration with Europe.   The current coalition is young and fragile, yet it could become more united if faced with the threat of the Communists’ return to power.

The West has a real stake in Moldova’s future.   A successful Moldova would become an important, if small, puzzle piece toward a Europe whole, free, and at peace and could become a model for other small countries in the region.     It would send an important signal to Europeans that countries in Eastern Europe can change for the better.   Finally, it is a country eager, if not desperate, for outside help where a small contribution can go a long way.   For all these reasons, Moldova deserves our continued attention and support.

David J. Kramer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Washington, DC, office. Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust and GMF’s Bucharest office. Pavol Demes directs GMF’s Bratislava office.

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WASHINGTON — Ask most Americans and Europeans to identify Vladimir Filat or find Moldova on a map and you’re likely to get a blank stare. Both, however, are worth getting to know. Filat is the new prime minister of Moldova, a small country of four million people that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union nearly 20 years ago and borders Ukraine and Romania. Despite its size, Moldova is an important piece to the puzzle of trying to achieve the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Filat is in Washington this week to sign an agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation for $262 million in aid and to meet with senior U.S. officials, including Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. His arrival marks the first official visit of a Moldovan prime minister to the United States in memory and represents a historic change after eight years under the previous backward Communist government.

Filat’s visit to Washington needs to be followed by serious Western engagement to help Moldova integrate into the Euroatlantic community and end its isolation from the West. Moldova badly needs outside assistance and this new government is clearly looking Westward.

For years, Moldova has held the unfortunate distinction of being Europe’s poorest country, known for problems of corruption, trafficking in persons, and the separatist region of Transnistria. Following violent protests in the immediate aftermath of last April’s parliamentary elections, Moldovans went to the polls again last July and dealt Communist leader Vladimir Voronin and his party a major blow.

The new government, which assumed office on September 25, has progressive, reform-minded, democratic leadership, marking a true generational change. The 40-year-old Filat sits at the top alongside Mihai Ghimpu, Marian Lupu, and Serafim Urechean, all of whom signed the Alliance for European Integration this past August. Still, the Communists have enough parliamentary seats to block election of a new president; to choose a president, one needs 61 deputies in the 101-seat parliament and the Communists have 48 seats. The resulting stalemate has forced Moldova yet again to schedule elections for later this year, underscoring the need to help the pro-reform, democratic forces sooner rather than later.

The new government has changed substantially the style of politics, communication with the public, and the image of Moldova in the eyes of the international community almost overnight. Neither Moldova nor the West is likely to have a better opportunity under this new government.

Any visitor to Moldova in recent months can witness new hope, energy, and openness in this largely neglected country. The attitude of the new government toward the media and civil society has changed profoundly and for the better. Moreover, Filat and his colleagues are eager to reach out to Moldova’s neighbors, in particular the European Union, with an ambitious program designed to help the country make up for lost time under the previous regime.   It is notable that Moldova has achieved its delayed power-shift to liberal democracy in a period of global economic and financial crisis, which has hit especially hard the most vulnerable economies of Central and Eastern Europe.

Filat and his colleagues, learning from the successes and failures of other post-communist nations (including Georgia and Ukraine), have a great chance to move their country closer to stability and prosperity, but only if the European Union and the United States underpin promises to help this fragile democracy with advice and practical assistance. Only then can Moldova become a true success story.

While repairing the economy and building institutions are the top priorities, solving the Transnistria separatist problem is also important.   Russia has refused to remove its 1,200 “peacekeeping forces” and munitions from the Transnistrian part of the country despite a   pledge to do so under the 1999 Istanbul Commitments. The new government in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital, has called for the departure of the Russian forces, and the West should step up its support for this position based on the principle of host-country consent. The previous Moldovan government paid mere lip service to calling for the removal of Russian forces and nearly signed on to 2003′s ill-fated Kozak Plan, which would have expanded and extended Russia’s presence in the region.

Moldova’s new leaders acknowledge deep and immediate reforms as the only way to progress. They seem willing to embark on these reforms and not wait for – or whine about – the absence of a solid promise of integration into the EU. This makes them the exception in a region where governments regard this promise as the only incentive for reform. This alone should make the EU pay serious attention to Moldova, a new hope in a long-troubled neighborhood. To its credit, and in compensation for sporadic attention paid to the country’s problems, the EU has met the openness of the new Moldovan government with immediate negotiation of an Association Agreement. The country is also fully engaged in the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s instrument for advanced cooperation with Moldova and five other countries in the region.

Reforms are the engine of development, yet they bear a political cost, one that Moldova cannot pay too soon without seriously risking sliding back to a closed and infertile political system. This is why, in addition to EU action on the economy, efforts also should focus on helping mass media take full advantage of its newly regained freedom, encouraging civil society to become part of policymaking and strengthen its watchdog capacity, and increasing parliamentary control over government actions. Creation of solid elements of a democratic system is the only proof against political backsliding. Moreover, an economically attractive and politically stable Moldova will have more power to negotiate a fair settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and attract those on the other side of the Dniester River.   But Transnistria cannot become an excuse to stop reform.   Moldova simply doesn’t have that luxury — and neither does the West.

David J. Kramer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Washington, DC, office. Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust and GMF’s Bucharest office. Pavol Demes directs GMF’s Bratislava office.

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WASHINGTON — It would be understandable if the Poles started to develop a complex about the Obama administration’s treatment of their country.   To mark the 70th anniversary commemoration of the Nazi invasion of Poland on September 1, the White House originally planned to send former defense secretary William Perry as the representative for the U.S., only to decide at the last minute that sending someone actually in the government would be more appropriate.   In the end, it was National Security Adviser James Jones who was dispatched to Europe. Surely, two staunch allies like Poland and the Czech Republic would have deserved being honored by the Secretary of State or the Vice President?

Worse, the Obama Administration decided to unveil its decision to “discard” (to quote Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) the Bush Administration’s plans for missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic on September 17, the day marking the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland.

Whereas Warsaw and Prague felt betrayed by the missile defense decision, Tehran and Moscow smelled victory.   That should tell the White House that, at a minimum, its rollout of this decision was handled badly.     Calling the leaders of Poland and the Czech Republic in the middle of the night to inform them of the decision (and the Polish prime minister reportedly refused initially to take the call from President Obama) reflects cavalier treatment of two NATO allies, whose governments had stuck their necks out on politically unpopular positions at the request of the Bush administration to help confront a rising threat from Iran.   Warsaw and Prague deserved better treatment, and the Administration should move swiftly to repair the damage.

Moreover, despite claims by the White House that Russia was not a factor in this decision, Moscow will conclude from this experience that loud complaining and bully tactics (such as threatening to station Iskander missiles within reach of Poland and the Czech Republic) worked.     The perception in Moscow is that Obama backed down and showed weakness.  ”The Americans have simply corrected their own mistake, right?” said Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO. With this victory under their belts, Russian leaders are likely to ask for more. Need proof? Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called for more concessions from the United States, including membership in the WTO and lifting trade restrictions against Russia.

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