WASHINGTON — Last week in Baghdad, on his maiden overseas trip as U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta pressed Iraqi officials on whether they wanted American forces to remain in the country after 2011.  Until a few weeks ago, Iraq was largely out of the public spotlight and a low priority for most U.S. policymakers and legislators as a result of the successful “surge” strategy undertaken by the United States after 2007 and the joint U.S.-Iraqi decision in 2008 to withdraw all U.S. forces by December 31, 2011.  Today, the process of U.S. withdrawal is well underway, with only about 46,000 military trainers and advisors remaining in Iraq, down from a peak of more than 150,000 just three years ago.  However, signs of Iranian support for radical Shiite militia groups, the need for further training of Iraqi security forces, and differences within the current Iraqi coalition government over the United States’ presence have started to refocus Washington’s attention.

The American presence in Iraq is also being affected by ongoing budgetary battles in the U.S. Congress, as legislators prepare this year’s Foreign Operations appropriations bill. Congress may well seek to drastically reduce funding for ongoing activities in Iraq, where the United States plans to double the size of its embassy to 16,000 personnel, and for which the State Department has requested $6.2 billion. Although that figure seems high (but is merely a fraction of what was being spent just a few years ago), the State Department will be the U.S. government entity responsible for all U.S. civilian efforts in Iraq when 2012 arrives. It also has to fund its own embassy operations and that of its consulates in a high-risk country, one in which nearly a quarter of the Iraqi government’s own budget is spent on security. In May, recognizing these concerns, the four previous U.S. ambassadors to Iraq sent a letter to Congressional leaders in which they stated that the situation in Iraq “remains fragile and potentially reversible,” and failure to properly fund U.S. efforts going forward “puts at risk the investment America has already made to establish a democratic, peaceful, and economically stable government in this most important region.”

Their argument is spot on. Underfunding post-2011 activities in Iraq will hurt the United States in many ways. It will enable Iran to exert more pressure on the Iraqi government by supporting insurgent efforts, and will allow radical anti-American Shiite groups to have a say in the country’s future. The U.S. transition in Iraq will also serve as a bellwether for its mission in Afghanistan, with underfunding sending the wrong signals to stakeholders in that conflict regarding reconciliation, the transition to Afghan control, and reconstruction and development efforts. Finally, it risks further damage to the United States’ reputation for not being able to finish the job. U.S. policymakers and legislators need to prevent Iraq from becoming another Afghanistan or Pakistan, where American abandonment in the late 1980s contributed to the rise of forces that directly threatened the security of the United States and its allies.

The Foreign Operations appropriations bill will probably not be taken up for a few weeks, if not several months.  While this is a telling indictment of how the American public views the importance of U.S. engagement around the world, it does give time for a serious discussion in Congress on how to fund U.S. civilian-led efforts in Iraq and, if necessary, an extended military mission. The fact is that it is in U.S. national and regional security interests for the United States to maintain a robust presence in Iraq and prevent it from falling into the Iranian security sphere.  An enduring U.S. military presence that supports Iraqi Security Forces — if requested by the Iraqi government — will help ensure that Iraq remains a success story, a fledgling democracy aligned with the United States and the West. Congress and the American people have an obligation to prevent Iran from threatening U.S. interests and allies in the greater Middle East, demonstrate that the United States has the stomach to get the job done, and ensure that the battles fought, dollars spent, lives transformed, and souls forever lost in these efforts were not in vain.

Daniel P. Fata is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington. From 2005 to 2008, he served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy.

Photo courtesy the U.S. Army.

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WASHINGTON–A few months ago, I was asked to brief my old boss, former Secretary of U.S. Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on developments in Europe since he left office in December 2006.  While it is impossible to write succinctly about everything that has happened since he left office, with President Barack Obama in Europe this week and Defense Secretary Robert Gates preparing to leave the Pentagon at the end of June, it is only fitting to comment on just how much has changed in Afghanistan, with regard to missile defense, and overall between the United States and Europe during the past four-and-a-half years, both for the good and the bad.

When Gates took office in mid-December 2006, NATO had just assumed command for all the security responsibilities in Afghanistan.  Since then, the multinational, NATO-led force has grown from 35,000 soldiers to more than 130,000 troops on the ground. The Afghans are contributing nearly 200,000 policemen and soldiers in defending their own country versus 50,000 or fewer at the time of the decision.  The international effort involved in training the Afghan National Security Forces is impressive and includes senior leaders from the Polish and British militaries.

In January 2007, Gates approved the plan to pursue a Europe-based U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic as a means of defending Europe from a ballistic missile attack emanating from the Middle East.  Within less than a month, then-Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a vitriolic speech in Munich railing against the United States (and, to a degree, Europe) for all the grief, headaches, and mistreatment it caused Russia regarding the basing of troops in Europe, missile defenses, Kosovar independence, and the push for greater NATO ties with Georgia and Ukraine.  This speech spooked many leaders and parliamentarians in Europe as to whether Russia would return to a belligerent, threatening stance toward Central and Eastern Europe.

Unfortunately, some of the most important differences between the United States and Russia were never bridged, and have not been to this day.  The effect this disagreement had on U.S. relations with Central and Eastern Europe  was significant. Eventually, Poland and the Czech Republic agreed to the missile defense system because both nations shared the United States and NATO view that there was a growing proliferation threat.

Perhaps Russia’s actions against Georgia in the summer of 2008 added urgency to the missile defense negotiation process and demonstrated the extent to which Central and Eastern Europe looks to and expects more from the United States to reinsure their security.  Unfortunately, the timing could not have been worse.  The Bush administration was winding down, the financial crisis had just started to unfold, and, within a few months, the transition from the Bush White House to the Obama White House would begin.

To further confuse America’s Central and Eastern Europe allies, one of Obama’s first major foreign policy announcements was its “reset” of relations with Russia.  A few months later, the Obama administration significantly restructured the previous U.S. missile defense plans, eliminating the need for ground-based interceptors in Poland and radars in the Czech Republic.

So, within two-and-a-half years, Europe was doing more in Afghanistan and the United States was doing less in Europe.  Both Europe and the United States were understandably focusing on domestic economic issues while contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan.   This also contributed to the impression that transatlantic engagement was off the priority agenda.  This led to a sense of disenchantment, bewilderment, and, at times, discussion about reorientation of policies toward Russia or simply away from the United States.

Obama’s visit to Europe, and in particular Poland, comes at a critical time.  Today, overall transatlantic relations are not bad, but there is a perception that they are seen as far less central to American foreign policy priorities.  It is understandable to a degree: most of Europe is in NATO and the EU, NATO has declared that there is no territorial threat to the transatlantic area, and while some EU nations may be facing tough economic times, Europe is the world’s single largest trading bloc.  That said, the United States and Europe recognize that both need each other in order to address today’s economic and security challenges, and one should not forget that the United States and Europe have a common security guarantee to defend one another.

Historically, how the U.S. engages and treats Poland has served as an indication for how the United States approaches all of Central and Eastern Europe, and, to a degree, its relationship with Russia.  During the Obama’s visit, he will announce the U.S. Air Force will send to Poland on a rotational basis U.S. F16 fighter jets.  This sends a strong signal to the Polish people and hopefully others in Europe that the United States does still take its security obligations in Europe seriously.  This will likely ruffle Russia’s feathers, a point not lost on the Central Europeans.  And, in many ways, the degree to which America is willing to irritate Russia as a means of demonstrating its commitment to Central and Eastern Europe, is quite welcome.

And so, as optically and military important as the stationing of fighters or missile defenses may be for Central and Eastern Europe, nothing shiny or metallic can take the place of real dialogue between leaders, parliamentarians, businessmen, students, and ordinary people.  The fact that the German Marshall Fund has opened an office in Warsaw will help on these fronts. But Washington needs to better engage Europe. Europe needs to engage Washington as well.  A lot of good work has been achieved during the past four-and-a-half years, but distance has also developed in the transatlantic relationship.  The threats to our collective economic and national security are real.  Let’s hope Obama’s trip to Europe is the resetting or rebooting of our broad and deep relationship with Europe.

Daniel P. Fata is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington. From 2005-2008, he served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO.

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WASHINGTON — More than a decade has passed since NATO last updated its Strategic Concept, an official document intended to reinforce the founding treaty by updating the military alliance’s key priorities.   A new initiative is underway, led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a group of “wise men,” to assess the strategic environment NATO finds itself in and propose recommendations for what the Alliance should focus its energies and resources on going forward.   The new Strategic Concept is expected to be unveiled in November in Lisbon, at the next NATO summit.

Efforts by the wise men to undertake such a review should be applauded.   However,   the review should address one critical, overarching question that will determine whether NATO remains relevant among the Alliance’s citizenry but also militarily capable of defending the transatlantic space: Are the Allies truly up to the task of developing a new strategic vision that not only reflects the realities of today’s security situation but also requires Allies to do whatever is necessary — in terms of money, deed, and burden-sharing — to ensure that NATO, the most successful military alliance in world history, is not an organization that exists in concept only in the 21st century?

Since the 1999 Strategic Concept update, a good deal of change has taken place at NATO and in the broader transatlantic relationship.   NATO membership has expanded by 25 percent (bringing in nine new member states), and the Alliance has become more operational than ever, with Kosovo, Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) as some of its most complicated, sustained, and high risk missions.   NATO also invoked for the first time in its history the Article 5 mutual defense guarantee following the events of September 11, 2001.

Despite these changes and efforts early in the decade to modernize allied armed forces, overall defense spending by the majority of Allies has declined since 1999 to dangerously low levels (all the more exacerbated by the current global financial crisis). At the same time, new security threats by both state and non-state actors have emerged to challenge NATO’s member states.   Political will has proven difficult to muster for not only reaching consensus on decisions but also for agreeing to have discussions at the North Atlantic Council, the decision-making body of NATO, on issues of strategic importance.   And it is not yet clear that, post-Afghanistan, Allies will have the stomach or treasure to undertake another expeditionary operation at great distances in which expensive military capabilities will be required and the risk of casualties could be significant.

During the past decade, NATO has developed robust relations with countries outside the traditional North Atlantic territory (including Australia, Japan, and countries in the Middle East and Asia), which some Allies view it as a welcome development while others see it as NATO   going beyond its original writ.   NATO also has had an on-and-off relationship with Russia that has generated real internal tension among the newest of Allies and those who are not as geographically proximate to Moscow.   Allies have not reached consensus among themselves as to what kind of relationship they want to have with Russia, particularly with a Russia that has declared NATO as a danger to its national security.

While these issues are significant and should be resolved before Allies put their signatures on the final document, the Strategic Concept drafting process will not stop; there is too much political risk to do so.   The final document, though, must reflect today’s reality or risk losing legitimacy.   It should not be overly ambitious; it should identify no more than three key priorities, and it should be seen as an interim document until the greater issues of Afghanistan, Russia, and the financial crisis are resolved.

In the six months before acceptance of the final document, Allied governments and NATO officials should consider some of the following questions:

• How important is the Strategic Concept to today’s NATO?
• Is the overall concept of a strategic document outdated? Should there be something akin to a “National Security Strategy” rather than a “Strategic Concept”?
• Should there be a mechanism to force Allies to adhere to the commitments made in the Strategic Concept? If not, is this exercise really worth doing? If so, what should the mechanism be?
• Should NATO abolish the consensus rule for decision-making?
• What is the capacity of the Alliance to identify, manage, and resolve the full range of modern crises that could challenge a nation, a region, or the Alliance as a whole?
• What will happen to the Alliance’s strategic deterrent capabilities if there are no longer nuclear weapons in Europe?

An Alliance as successful as NATO deserves thoughtful discussion and debate about where it needs to go in the future, and that needs to be grounded in today’s reality, not in some conceptual mindset.   For those that believe NATO’s best days are ahead of it, such debate must begin now.

Daniel P. Fata is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington. He served as the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO from September 2005-September 2008. He is also a Vice President at The Cohen Group.

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WASHINGTON —  On December 1, 2009, President Barack Obama announced the United States will increase its military commitment as well as civilian engagement in Afghanistan.   The President’s announcement has already resulted in the allocation of more than 5,000 additional European troops and trainers for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort.   Not surprisingly, Europe, like the United States, expects results from this increased commitment.   In order to maintain this increased but always politically fragile Allied support, the coalition must demonstrate a real commitment to the “Afghanization” of the ISAF military effort.

Building Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity is a key factor not only in the success of the mission on the ground but also in allowing for a handoff of the lead security role from NATO to the Afghans.   The Afghan army and police need to be fully developed and leading the fight on the ground against the Taliban and other warring elements.   If this is not done, then the political challenges for some European governments to maintain a commitment on the ground in Afghanistan will become nearly unmanageable, and the war in which the coalition and the Afghans currently are waging will drag on.  

Today’s coalition effort suffers from a perception problem by Afghans that NATO is an outsider and occupier, has little regard for Afghan lives, and does not trust Afghans as equal partners. Having traveled to Afghanistan many times during the past three years, I have had the opportunity to talk with Afghan civilians as well as others on the ground about these perceptions.   Unfortunately, these are real and serious concerns of many Afghans. Fortunately, most senior American officials and officers on the ground in Afghanistan take these issues very seriously and are doing what they can to change these perceptions.

Steps need to be taken soon, beyond what is already in place, to begin an Afghanization of the ISAF mission while the capacity of the ANSF is being increased.   To be clear, ISAF and the ANSF have been working closely for years, and their achievements on the battlefield are impressive.   Afghan units have taken the lead in many engagements throughout the country, and plans are in place for the transition of certain areas from ISAF to ANSF control.  

Afghanization would include the following: making Afghanistan a member of the ISAF coalition; making a senior Afghan military officer one of the deputy commanders (DCOMs) in the ISAF command structure; providing other command structure slots for Afghan officers in the ISAF mission; and having Afghan soldiers provide force protection outside of NATO bases (this would allow protection of ISAF forces by a new and fellow ISAF member). Certainly these tasks are not as easy to implement as they may seem. Challenges and risks do exist in undertaking these steps. However, if our collective effort with the Afghan government and military forces is to succeed, a better integration between ISAF and the ANSF is required.

The overall goals of this initiative are three-fold: demonstrate to the Afghan people that the West trusts the ANSF and the Afghan government as equal partners in this war and that it does not want to be viewed as occupiers; provide for greater military cohesion (and development of trust) between NATO, its partners, and the ANSF; and establish a mechanism for an efficient transition and handoff of lead security responsibilities from NATO to the ANSF in a few years. And so while the Afghanization idea has important military value, arguably it may be equally important as a political and a strategic communications tool as well.

The fact that no NATO ally has yet left the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is often greatly overlooked and underappreciated by most.   To maintain this allied commitment, progress on the ground by Afghans in the fields of security, governance, and reconstruction must occur quickly.   In a few weeks, ISAF partners will meet in London to discuss how better to begin a transition of security responsibilities from NATO to the Afghans.   If this initiative is to succeed, it will require support from the top. Only then will the outcomes of the London conference include the necessary endorsement to begin the Afghanization of the ISAF mission.

Daniel P. Fata is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

(Editor’s note: This post was updated to  correct an earlier version.)  

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WASHINGTON, DC — On the eve of this week’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO Ministerial meetings, in addition to a NATO-Russia Council gathering, Russian officials unveiled their long-awaited proposal for a new European Security Treaty.   The Medvedev proposal, as it has become known, has been the subject of considerable debate within NATO and among OSCE member states.     Some argue that it represents an important opportunity to engage with Russia on addressing security needs in Europe.   Others counter that instead of focusing on the Russian proposal, emphasis should be on revitalizing existing security arrangements, not their replacement or total overhaul.

Skeptics of the Russian proposal, ourselves included, question negotiating a new architecture with Russia when Moscow currently is not in compliance with existing security arrangements, namely, the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and last summer’s Georgia ceasefire agreement.   If Russia does not abide by these agreements, on what basis can there be sufficient trust and confidence that Russia will adhere to new arrangements?   Furthermore, according to the text released by the Kremlin, “A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in, or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”   Russia is already in violation of this clause through its continued illegal troop presence in Georgia’s separatist regions and forces in the Moldovan separatist area of Transnistria, contrary to the position of the government in Chisinau and the 1999 Istanbul Commitments.  

Russia also uses other methods short of military force that significantly affect the security of its neighbors, including energy cutoffs, cyber attacks, or bans on other countries’ exports.   Such tactics and behavior clearly run counter to existing security arrangements, to say nothing of the new Russian proposal.   Finally, but not surprisingly, the Russian draft makes no reference to human rights standards and democratization, key issues for the OSCE and NATO.

The idea for a new European security architecture first emerged in June 2008 when newly-elected Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, in a speech in Berlin, called for a “legally binding treaty.” Medvedev warned against “marginalizing and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security, and abandoning the creation of general regional collective security systems.”  

In the 18 months it took to flesh out Medvedev’s idea, it became clear that Russia was interested in creating a new pan-European security architecture to replace Cold War-era institutions such as NATO and OSCE.   Moscow considers today’s institutions incapable of addressing 21st century security challenges.

Many observers suspected the Russian proposal was designed to marginalize the U.S. on European security matters and drive wedges between and among allies in order to increase Europe’s reliance on Moscow.   European leaders, particularly in countries along Russia’s borders and those most vulnerable to Russian pressure over energy supplies, made clear that the U.S. is central to any such discussions.

The Russian proposal also reflects the view in Moscow that NATO and EU enlargement poses a threat to Russia, ignores Russian interests in the region, and increases instability.   In fact, Russia’s western borders have become more stable and secure since the enlargement of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe.   For example, since becoming members of the EU and NATO, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have become more stable, democratic neighbors.   The signing of a border treaty between Latvia and Russia in May 2007 and the visit seven months later by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Riga were simply not possible before Latvia joined NATO.

To be fair, one should not reflexively dismiss all Russian concerns, for Moscow has a point in observing that existing security institutions have struggled at times to address key issues and to determine their role in the changing security environment.     After all, the Georgia-Russia crisis exposed weaknesses in NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.   However, the solution is not to scrap these organizations but to reform them.   The efforts by a group of experts led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to revise NATO’s Strategic Concept, to be unveiled in Lisbon at next year’s NATO summit, are the first steps in correcting that organization’s shortcomings.

In addition, NATO members must engage frequently in strategic discussions on key security challenges.   This is simply not happening today.   Instead, many Allies hesitate to discuss issues such as Iran, missile defense, and Georgia for fear of jangling politically sensitive nerves.   The EU must also spend more time addressing key security issues affecting its member states — Afghanistan in particular.   Furthermore, greater practical cooperation between the EU and NATO is imperative.   The world’s security challenges are too complex and numerous for one organization to focus solely on military issues and another to focus solely on civilian issues.

NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have served and will continue to serve increasingly important roles in managing transatlantic security challenges, but they are certainly not perfect and need to be improved.   That is far different from replacing them or subordinating them to a larger superstructure.   Cooperation and dialogue among the allies and with Russia must increase.   If Moscow were to respect   the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes — principles already enshrined in existing arrangements — pan-European and transatlantic security would be greatly improved.

Written by Daniel P. Fata and David J. Kramer, who  are Senior Transatlantic Fellows at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

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WASHINGTON — It has been eight years since the United States and a coalition of allies first liberated the Afghan people from the horrific grip of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, its terrorist cohorts. It has been a little more than three years since NATO assumed all responsibility for security operations, known as the ISAF mission, in Afghanistan. Yet despite all the international military effort, sacrifice, and financial commitments that have been made during this time, the security situation on the ground has not improved appreciably nor has any semblance of a functioning Afghan national government emerged. Some, such as myself, remain convinced that all is not yet lost and that the effort the United States and its partners have expended on the ground has not been in vain. However, that could be the case if President Obama does not soon decide on the direction of Afghanistan policy and announce what he expects can be achieved there in the next year.

The American people, Congress, the allies, the Afghan people, and enemies in Afghanistan and around the world are waiting for the President to show how serious his commitment is toward the Afghanistan mission. Absent President Obama’s strong leadership and commitment, Europe probably will not add more firepower to the fight in Afghanistan, and one could reasonably expect its collective ability to remain on the ground beyond the next 12-24 months to be quite tenuous. In fact, 12 months from now, a perfect storm of midterm U.S. congressional election campaigns, the debate over ISAF mission renewal mandates in the Netherlands and Canada, debates over the FY2010 U.S. defense authorization and appropriation bills, and the one-year anniversary of the release of ISAF Commander General McChrystal’s report will serve as not only as points of reflection on the mission but as opportunities to possibly cut off funding for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

What has frustrated many in recent years is the inability of the United States and its allies to exercise the leverage it holds over the Afghan government in demanding greater performance and accountability from it. The reality is that nearly 90 percent of all funds in Afghanistan originate from the international community, the majority of all security operations are conducted by the ISAF, and President Karzai derives (or at least derived during the past five years) his legitimacy as leader of Afghanistan from the fact that the international community recognized him as such. That said, we know that the Afghan government has repeatedly failed to tackle corruption throughout the country, the government at all levels, and quite likely within the presidential cabinet itself. Given the tolerance of such bad behavior, it is no surprise that some argue that the international community’s efforts are futile.

So what is needed now is a convincing declaration by President Obama that he intends to do what is necessary in Afghanistan. Such a declaration should include the following points: that, along with healthcare reform, Afghanistan is the top priority for his Administration and that he understands the consequences of withdrawal; that significant increases in levels of U.S. troops as well as of civilian experts on the ground are needed and will be dispatched in the coming months; that Europe and the international community have joint equities in Afghanistan and that there should be a collective matching of the total increase in U.S. personnel Washington will make; and that a functioning and stable Afghan state cannot be achieved without the help of a capable partner on the ground, in the form of the Afghan government. President Obama must convey this message so that whoever wins the November 7 runoff presidential election knows how serious the U.S. is in demanding better performance during the next five-year Afghan presidential term.

The President should also announce a list of what is realistically achievable in the next 12 months to demonstrate that tangible progress on the ground has been made. Such indicators should not be purely or largely security-focused, such as stating a certain percentage of territory will be held by the Afghan National Security Forces or that a certain number of Afghan troops and policemen will be trained and fielded. These are important indicators. But they are not the most critical in convincing allied publics and parliamentarians and, more importantly, the Afghan people themselves, that progress is being made in the country. Instead, the criteria for progress President Obama should announce must focus on improving the daily lives of the Afghan people throughout the country. No one indicator would be more telling than if whoever wins the currently-debated Afghan presidential election allows for the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of senior members of the Afghan government who are known to be involved in corrupt practices. This would send a signal to the world and to the Afghan people that its government is committed to the creation of a functioning, rule-of-law state that serves the people, rather than preying upon them.

As many have noted, the consequences for the international community’s premature withdrawal and failure are real and staggering. However, the United States and the world cannot bring about a stable Afghanistan if the Afghan leadership does not play a constructive role, which has been the Achilles heel of our collective efforts thus far. The President should not hesitate in stating that the U.S. and the international community cannot want a functioning and law-abiding Afghanistan more than the Afghan leadership wants it and, therefore, all international efforts can only succeed if the Afghan government dramatically changes the way it operates and prioritizes what is important for the Afghan people. Some may argue this could be the President’s exit strategy: that if the Afghan government does not prove to be a capable and willing partner on the ground then the international community’s efforts are doomed to fail. Looking at it another way, demanding accountability from the Afghan government and exerting the leverage we collectively have on the government is the only prudent course of action.

President Obama has an opportunity to refocus not only America’s efforts in Afghanistan but also the Afghan leadership’s commitment toward this grand project. This will require a convincing announcement by the President that Afghanistan is a priority for him and his administration. Such a decision must come soon.

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