WARSAW—Monday’s disclosure that North Korea was preparing a long-range rocket launch and possibly an underground nuclear bomb test put ballistic missile defense (BMD) where it belongs: squarely atop the transatlantic agenda.  Although we learned Friday that this particular missile launch was a failure, Pyongyang’s determination to proceed has underscored the enduring nature of the threat inherent in the proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

Missile defense has been a powerful, if not much publicized, undercurrent in U.S.-European relations ever since U.S. President Barack Obama abandoned the Bush administration’s plan to deploy radar in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland, planning instead for a new phased adaptive approach.  The decision to scrap the original plan was then widely interpreted in Central Europe as a concession tied to the U.S. reset with Russia.  This region views missile defense as not just a matter of technical feasibility or geostrategic considerations, but as an important symbol of the state of relations with the United States. But, in reality, BMD is a global strategic concern today—and it should be treated as a keystone for rebuilding the flailing U.S.-European relationship.  This is an opportunity to strengthen transatlantic relations that should not be missed.

The recent incident in which Obama, during a visit to South Korea, was overheard (via an open microphone) telling Russian President Dmitri Medvedev that he would have more “flexibility” on missile defense after the election, has inflamed concerns along NATO’s Eastern periphery.  Clumsy as it was, this open mic moment confirmed what should have been a given: that the remainder of the year will be a time in which the United States and Russia will negotiate a host of technical and political issues against a backdrop of broader security concerns.  Regrettably it also pushed the BMD debate back into a regional context when this transatlantic conversation needs a global perspective.

With new missile threats arising as more missile-capable states join the club (in 1972 only nine states owned ballistic missiles; today there are more than two dozen) there is a compelling incentive to move toward implementing an effective allied BMD system alongside our European allies.  At the same time, the politics of BMD deployment in Europe not only incite Russian opposition but also continue to unfold against the backdrop of a changing strategic environment in which the United States seeks to rebalance its interests in the Pacific.  What is missing in Europe is the larger context of the issue: the need to move beyond the residual Russia dimension and the collective response to the threat of nuclear-armed Iran, linking it firmly to the transatlantic security agenda for the coming decade.

The current European debate on U.S. missile defense overlooks the fact that the United States is hardly the only player in the game, with Russia, India, and Israel among the most active.  Most objections to ballistic missile defense have come, to date, from Russia, China, and some U.S. analytical circles.  In Europe, Russia’s opposition to missile defense continues to be the recurrent theme.  Moscow has pushed back on BMD deployments in the region with a mixture of technical arguments and strategic objections; clearly, prestige is also at issue.  Arguably the least credible of Russia’s objections is the argument that BMD deployment will inevitably lead to destabilization, leading to expansion beyond the initial tasks.  The geopolitical argument is essentially about European basing of radar and interceptors, with the concomitant perceived loss of prestige.  Chinese opposition to BMD follows, in part, the Russian argument with its charges of destabilization.  Underneath this are concerns that a working ballistic missile defense system might become available in Taiwan, reigniting geopolitical dilemmas.  Like the Russians, the Chinese raise the question of a potential risk posed to China’s ICBM forces. Beijing argues that this increases the potential risk of a U.S. first strike (or simply adds political advantage to a BMD-defended United States).

Should Obama be reelected in November, it is uncertain whether Washington will go ahead with missile defense deployment absent an agreement with Russia in 2013, or back away from the project.  His open-microphone gaffe suggests that the administration might be willing to conclude a short-range missile agreement with Russia by offering concessions on missile defense in exchange.  Hence, unease in Europe on missile defense is fuelled by the realization that 2012-13 could be decisive for the future of a revised European missile defense plan.  The administration’s recent announcement of a “strategic pivot” to Asia has added to the distance across the Atlantic and concerns that the United States may now be less committed to BMD deployment in Europe.  Instead, the unease on the future of ballistic missile defense should re-energize the transatlantic conversation.  It should be the starting point for a public debate of how BMD systems deployed to Europe need to interlock with the larger U.S. system to address the truly global threat that is emerging.

Andrew A. Michta is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Director of the GMF Warsaw Office.

WARSAW—The new strategic defense guidance from the Obama administration aims to refocus the U.S. defense posture on the increasingly competitive security environment emerging in the Pacific. It also (despite the Pentagon’s protestations to the contrary) appears to put an end to the era of large-scale counterinsurgency and stability operations. Last but not least, it implies a strategic shift away from Europe. It thus brings the United States and Europe to a decisive point in their relationship: they will need to reframe the division of labor in the security dimension of the transatlantic alliance.

The Obama administration’s planned $489 billion defense cuts over ten years means that any buildup of U.S. capacity in Asia will have to be offset in part through further reductions in the U.S. presence in Europe. Cuts may even be double that if Congress fails to reverse massive automatic budget reductions by 2013. Moreover, under the “one war, one spoiling action” formula espoused by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the United States’ role in NATO may shift from that of ultimate European security provider to more of an enabler of European defense.

The implications for Europe are significant. Simply put: if the United States is engaged in a conflict on the other side of the globe, a contingency that could develop in or near Europe would require Europe to be ready to respond first. The “burden-sharing” debate has thus been redefined. Of course, the United States retains a strategic interest in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. But it will have to come to a much more explicit understanding with Europe about respective regional interests: where do they intersect/diverge? Is it possible, and if so under what circumstances to generate a credible sense of shared responsibility? And what assets and capabilities can Europe bring to the table — particularly if U.S. assets are needed elsewhere? The United States might opt for issue-based cooperation with individual countries or with regional groupings within the NATO framework. This could balance near-term the tilt of U.S. strategy towards Asia and create a pathway for the United States and Europe to maximize their shrinking capabilities on the continent and preserve the mutuality of their defense commitments. But will that be enough security for Europe? Does the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) have an answer to this question? And is anyone even asking that question in Brussels or national capitals?

One thing is clear at any rate: At a time when 40 cents of every dollar Washington spends is borrowed, Europe can no longer expect that the United States will remain its sole security provider. As long as the EU does not provide persuasive assets and capabilities that justify the as yet-elusive pursuit of an EU-NATO partnership, security cooperation under the NATO umbrella is the more realistic way to maintain transatlantic security relations. Admittedly, that would mean a partial renationalization of security, but it would offer real capabilities by willing players. An example of the latter is the recent Franco-British military cooperation treaty, which provides not only for nuclear sharing, but also for the creation of a joint strike force and the joint use of aircraft carriers. Central Europe might see similar arrangements, e.g. including Germany, Poland, Scandinavia, the Baltics, and Romania. Combined with NATO’s deterrent capability, European forces thus configured could really pull their weight — until such time when CSDP can actually be made to work.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Director of the GMF Warsaw Office.

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WARSAW – In Berlin this week, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski called for a greater federalization of Europe, emphasizing that, notwithstanding the economic dimension of the crisis, the core of the EU’s problem is one of leadership.  The enduring significance of Sikorski’s message lies less in the specifics of his proposed reforms and more in the tenor of his speech, with its sense of urgency, declaration of European solidarity, and willingness to point fingers and name names.  Sikorski has challenged Europe’s largest players to lead, follow, or step aside.

No other part of Sikorski’s address was more symbolic of the reality of European politics today than his direct appeal to Berlin to assume the lead.  The Polish foreign minister openly declaring in Berlin that he fears Germany’s power less than her inactivity shows how profoundly Central European relations have moved beyond the burden of history.  Poland, a country in which the past remains a part of quotidian politics, has shown her determination to look beyond the here and now, and to raise the larger question about the future of the European project.

Sikorski’s speech put paid to the notion that new EU members are still largely passive participants in the integration process, adapting to EU rules and regulations, and interested mostly in being the recipients of European funds.  Sikorski put Europe on notice that all members want to shape the European project, and this message, coming from a country that has fared better than most in the current economic climate, carries added significance.

In Warsaw, where intense and at times heated reactions to the Berlin speech ran the gamut from high praise to outright condemnation, one common thread linking Sikorski’s admirers with his critics was the recognition that Poland’s voice carries new weight.  Poland, an economic success story in Europe and a country which, only two decades ago was an economic basket-case burdened with the crippling legacy of communism, has challenged the status quo.  Declaring her commitment to further integration, proclaiming solidarity with Europe and rejecting the criticism of enlargement, Sikorski has asserted the country’s right to shape Europe’s future.

Andrew A. Michta directs the Warsaw office and is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund.

Image by Dirk Enters, DGAP.

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WARSAW — On October 9, Poles returned their government to power in a parliamentary election for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Poland’s course over the next four years will again be defined by the centrist Civic Platform (PO) of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, most likely in a coalition government with its current partner, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). This victory sends a signal to Poland’s EU partners that the next four years are not going to see a dramatic reorientation of policy. With the Civic Platform earning 39 percent of the popular vote and the main opposition party, Law and Justice (PiS), collecting almost 30 percent, Poles are generally pleased with the government’s performance.

Poland has fared quite well during the past four years, especially compared to the rest of Europe, and the Tusk government’s success at the polls reflects that. Its decision during the first term to focus on stability paid dividends at the ballot box, even if it meant delaying some urgently needed reforms in the area of public finance, deficit reduction, and infrastructure investment. But today, as the Civic Platform savors its electoral victory, the government is keenly aware of tough economic times ahead. In his second term, Tusk will be confronted with the deepening European sovereign debt crisis, the prospect of declining demand for Polish exports in key EU markets, and the impending battle over the country’s portion of the EU budget.

Still, this Polish election was not just about continuity. The biggest surprise was the meteoric rise of the so-called Palikot Movement (RP), named after its founder, Janusz Palikot, a wealthy activist and businessman. The RP, which formed in the fall of last year, participated in parliamentary elections for the first time. Running on a platform advocating a radical secular social agenda, it came in third, with 10 percent of the votes. Palikot’s new party outpaced the government coalition partner, the Polish Peasant Party, which placed fourth with 8.36 percent. It also dealt a devastating blow to the Social Democratic Left Alliance. The Alliance — which prior to the election had designs on becoming Tusk’s new coalition partner — was relegated to fifth place, earning just 8.24 percent of the vote.

The election results underscored two important trends in Polish politics today. It confirmed the power distribution among the post-Solidarity political class while reaffirming the established voting patterns and allegiances of large segments of the Polish electorate. At the same time, it showed the power of an emerging, more amorphous electorate that is no longer satisfied with the traditional establishment. RP voters embrace a hodgepodge of liberal/leftist views on social issues, but hold strong liberal views on the economy. The spectacular rise of the RP movement indicates that there is still a good deal of churning in the Polish electorate. The program of Janusz Palikot’s party, with its demands for gender parity, the liberalization of Poland’s restrictive abortion law, and its overall criticism of the role of the Catholic Church in public life, suggests that Poland’s deepening integration in the European Union has reached beyond economics and is now beginning to shape the values and attitudes of some parts of the electorate. It is too early to say whether the rise of the RP movement is merely a transitory phenomenon or the beginning of a new political force, but it seems clear that the voters wished to warn the government not to be complacent.

Polish politics two decades after independence is now first and foremost about continuity, notwithstanding the 10 percent of the vote that went to the RP. The electoral results of the two largest parties, the PO and the PiS, reflect deep political divisions in Polish society. However, these are unlikely to change Poland’s overall trajectory of further integration with the EU while maintaining strong ties to the United States. Poland continues to buck the trend of economic and political turmoil gripping Europe today, though it is not immune from the clouds gathering over Europe’s economic horizon. The Polish economy is still expected to grow at 3.7 percent this year, but the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development projects Poland’s growth to decline to only 2.2 percent in 2012. The broader context of the Polish story, including the recent election, is the accelerated restructuring of Europe. The current eurocrisis has put paid to Europe’s traditional East-West polarization. In this new climate, the path flows ever-more North-South, dividing the countries that have been able to insulate themselves better from the crisis and those where economic troubles continue to deepen. In this new Europe, Poland has thus far been able to weather the financial storm better than some of the older and more established European players — viewed as a sphere of stability when compared to an unraveling Greece or a deeply troubled Italy. The recent Polish election results have reinforced that message.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and Director of GMF’s Warsaw Office.

Image by Civic Platform.

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by Andrew A. Michta

WARSAW — U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech last Friday, in which he warned that NATO is heading for irrelevance unless Europe reinvigorates its defense spending, ought to generate more than the usual finger-pointing and exasperation across the Atlantic.  Though driven by the immediate, and justifiable, concern over Europe’s continued demilitarization, the speech was an implicit admission that NATO’s post-Cold War paradigm of democratic enlargement and an expanded definition of Article V have run their course.

Europe currently has other priorities, and that means NATO is firmly caught up in a transatlantic drift.  Europe’s focus on the eurozone crisis, and the need to save its currency, has relegated transatlantic security to a second-tier concern.  Likewise, in the United States, exploding deficits coupled with a decade-long war in Afghanistan and new pressures rising in Asia and the Middle East continue to put more distance between the United States and Europe.

What is striking about Gates’ speech is his recognition that an impending generational change in Europe will consolidate the shift in how NATO is being perceived there, cutting ever deeper into Europe’s willingness to make the necessary resource commitments to this common transatlantic project.  In fact, the devolution of NATO as the premier transatlantic security organization is more systemic than simply a matter of Europe’s lack of political will to spend money on defense and to engage in hard security missions without caveats.  It parallels the decline of American influence in Europe, where an emerging new European generation sees NATO more as an enabler of American global foreign policy than an immediate guarantor of Europe’s security.  In the United States, our own impending generational shift is reflected in growing unease with Europeans who, notwithstanding conceptual gyrations and summit declarations, are seen as content to coast along the familiar path of dependence on the United States.  To make matters worse, the Libya debacle has become symbolic of European indolence on all matters military, a kind of déjà vu of the early Balkan campaign in the 1990s–highlighted by a poignant moment in Gates’ speech referencing the shortages of munitions among European allies so early into the North African campaign.  And so the larger structural challenge is to reconnect American and European views on security in a way that will allow us to define the task of common defense to our respective publics.

But if we are to have the chance to debate “NATO 2.0,” we need to manage the current crisis.  In the end, it is not enough to recognize that the stress inside NATO is real and growing.  What is urgently needed is a commitment to do something about it, or else Gates’ prediction may, in fact, come true.  Today, rather than re-debating core principles, NATO needs to complete the current mission in Afghanistan to send the unequivocal message that it can still do things together, and do them well.  To complete this task, we should agree on and implement a strategy to depart from Afghanistan in a way that preserves a sense of shared purpose and allied solidarity.  For European leaders, this may mean a political risk–making an unpopular argument concerning the greater good that will flow from continuing to work with the United States and preserving this venerable alliance.  Europe needs to send the message to Washington that it can still act and fund its defense structures. To do so, the alliance needs to implement the Lisbon Critical Capabilities Commitment — a set of 10 defense priorities agreed upon at the 2010 Lisbon NATO summit — as both a sign that the United States and Europe are still serious about the alliance, and that we can do practical things to advance shared objectives in Afghanistan.

A new paradigm for NATO 2.0 will come not from incessant debates over terminology that assure everyone but offer no clear path as to how commitments will be funded.  It will come from completing the current mission. Only then can we have a serious discussion about what this vital alliance can offer in the coming decade.  Otherwise, the scenario Gates outlined will soon become a reality, culminating in the breakdown of a transatlantic security system that has provided the West with more than six decades of unparalleled security and prosperity.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and Director of GMF’s Warsaw Office.

Photo by lafrancevi

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WARSAW — Barack Obama’s visit to Poland on May 27-28 was markedly different from earlier U.S. presidential visits to the country.  There was no major policy speech, no overarching agenda item to drive the headlines, and only small groups of onlookers in the streets.  But the visit—which elicited a mixed response from the Polish media—was nonetheless an important step forward in bilateral U.S.-Polish relations, laying the ground for more cooperation in years to come.

Since 1989, the pendulum of U.S.-Polish relations has swung from optimism – Poland’s reliance on American support for its entry into NATO, and Warsaw’s strong commitment to back Washington on Afghanistan and Iraq – to unease — when the Obama administration cancelled the Bush-era missile shield and announced the “reset” of relations with Russia. The decline in the United States’ popularity in Poland can also be attributed to disappointment concerning Iraq (where Poland’s involvement was accompanied by high expectations of political and economic gain) and the refocusing of U.S. priorities away from a seemingly more secure Central Europe.

Poland’s own political orientation and social evolution have also been responsible for the present state of bilateral relations, especially the generational shift toward young Polish elites who have few memories of communism and the Cold War. Since Poland joined the European Union, there has also been a progressive “Europeanization” of its foreign policy optics.  Although Poland remains one of the most pro-American countries in continental Europe, the emergence of a new generation that lives in an increasingly European environment – travelling, studying and working in the European Union – has begun to shape new attitudes that place less emphasis on the relationship with the United States.  Although the foundations of the relationship remain strong, today there is less intimacy between Warsaw and Washington and more focus on specific issues, giving popular perceptions of U.S.-Poland relations an almost transactional quality at times.

Against this backdrop, and considering the evolving tenor of U.S.-European relations, Obama’s visit to Warsaw at the end of his European tour was welcome, even in the absence of a major speech and a warm public response.  Some of the agenda items discussed during the visit were familiar, such as the perennial problem of including Poland in the United States’ Visa Waiver Program, an issue Obama promised to bring up with Congress, and deeper security cooperation in the form of a negotiated agreement on periodic training and stationing of U.S. F-16s and transport aircraft on Polish soil.

However, Obama’s visit also provided glimpses of a path forward for Poland and the United States over the coming years.   The United States and Poland hope to find ways to leverage Poland’s experience of democracy promotion in order to encourage democratic transitions in Eastern Europe (especially in Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova), and in North Africa.  But arguably the most important aspect of the visit was discussion on the potential for greater economic cooperation in the energy sector, particularly on extracting shale gas.  Four U.S. energy companies are already involved in exploratory drilling in Poland, and there is anticipation that U.S. technological expertise in unconventional gas will be of immense value.  In the coming months, the focal point for both Washington and Warsaw will be the actual yields generated from existing wells, as well as the regulatory and tax regime the Polish government is going to establish if and when the country moves from exploration to production.

It is significant that the issues that had the most traction were practical ones.  Although any U.S. presidential visit carries considerable symbolism – in this case, Poland’s importance as a regional partner for the United States – issue-oriented cooperation was prominently displayed, reflecting the emerging “normalization” of Poland’s relations with the United States.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and Director of GMF’s Warsaw Office.

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MEMPHIS, Tenn. – Setting aside the questionable wisdom of the United States becoming involved in a rapidly evolving civil war in Libya, the larger, more urgent conversation should be about what the political endgame might look like, both there and in the region as a whole. 

The pathway from a popular rebellion against dictators to a rudimentarily functioning polyarchy is a narrow one, and in the Arab world made narrower still by decades of political repression and the deliberate destruction of civil society.  Plus, the general absence of what might clumsily be called a “usable past,” whereby—in contrast to the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe—there can be no “returning to” but only going forward into uncharted territory.   

Occasional rhetorical excesses in the U.S. media comparing the popular uprisings in the Middle East to the 1989 democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe are both inappropriate and poignant. There is no pre-war Latvian constitution to start democratic transition; no decades of Polish civil society-building marked by national surges in 1956, 1968, 1970, and finally the 1980 formative experience of the Solidarity movement; no Czechoslovak Charter 77.  In short, the Middle Eastern pathway post-dictatorship will most certainly be a transition, but to what?  

The most difficult questions must be asked now.  They are questions about who will participate in this process, about what can facilitate and what can limit the institutionalization of democratic norms, and about what meanders and power plays by forces, both seen and unseen, lie ahead, not just in Libya, but also in Egypt and elsewhere in the region.  The people are stirring to throw off dictators and monarchs, and they deserve our full support, but the rebellion is only the beginning—though it is accelerated and amplified by the networked world in which we live.  The United States and Europe, and especially the people in the region, need to think about the day after, of how to manage this transition process with full awareness that the risks are great, and the potential consequences of failure even greater.

And so, as we watch the Middle Eastern upheaval, the fundamental question is this: What is our level of ambition?

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MEMPHIS, Tennessee — The human and civil rights drama unfolding in Belarus in the aftermath of the electoral fraud perpetrated by the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko should be a teaching moment.  It shows that hopes of bringing Belarus closer to the West through a policy of carefully calibrated carrots and sticks were largely an illusion.  The question now is whether the United States and Europe can draw the necessary lessons from the crackdown in Minsk and, also, how they will translate those lessons into policy.

The West’s ability to influence Lukashenko has always been marginal at best.  In contrast, Russia holds far greater sway over Lukashenko’s decisions, notwithstanding occasional friction between Minsk and Moscow.  A “colored revolution” –- long a hope of the West — is not in the cards in Belarus due to the level of police terror applied by the regime, the changing regional dynamic in Eastern Europe, and the more inward-focused priorities in the European Union and the United States.

Nonetheless, Belarus requires a unified response, for it is a piece of a larger Europe, whose periphery is now increasingly being defined by the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia War, the 2010 Ukrainian election, and the resurgence of Russian influence.  It is in the interest of the West to develop a long-term strategy to prevent Belarus from becoming a new fault line.  The “Belarus question” needs to become part of the larger transatlantic agenda, with specific policies and significant resource commitments to follow.

So today, rather than courting him, the West should confront Lukashenko with coordinated diplomatic and economic pressure while making a serious sustained investment in Belarusian grass-roots democratic movement, disseminating uncensored information, and funding NGO democracy initiatives.  This has to be an enduring policy commitment, for clearly there are limits as to what can be achieved short-term.

One country already adjusting its Belarusian policy is Poland, which has made a good-faith effort to bring Minsk out of isolation in the last couple of years.  Today, Poland is developing a two-track policy to put pressure on the Lukashenka regime, while also making a long-term investment in Belarusian democratic opposition.  This is the model that should define the joint American and European response to Lukashenko’s crackdown on pro-democracy forces.  Warsaw has important experiences to share, building on its earlier efforts to promote free media and civil society initiatives in the East.  Since December 2007, the Polish government has been the principal funder of Belsat TV, a free-media outlet under the auspices of the Polish public television TVP, staffed by journalists based in Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania.  Poland has also played host to two radio stations broadcasting into Belarus, the Belarusian radio station “Ratsya” established in 1999 and supported by the Polish government, and the European Radio for Belarus, operating since 2006 with funding from an international consortium.  The ERB broadcasts both over the conventional wave spectrum and the Internet.

Maintaining and expanding such free media outlets will be critical to the future of democratic opposition in Belarus.  The stations operating from Poland urgently need additional funding—something that the United States government, the European Union and private foundations should support, especially now as independent sources of information have been more persistently targeted by Lukashenka’s security forces.  Belsat offices in Minsk were raided by the KGB at the beginning of the current crackdown, and a number of journalists working with the station have been arrested and sentenced.

The policy of supporting grass-roots democratic forces will also require additional seed money for Belarusian NGOs.  Recently, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski announced the doubling of assistance to the opposition in Belarus, from PLN 20 million to PLN 40 million (about $13 million).  This will not be enough, but Sikorski’s decision should be a signal to other Western governments as to what needs to be done.  The transatlantic community should also invest in people-to-people contacts with Belarus at multiple levels.  The Polish government has already lifted visa fees for ordinary Belarusian citizens while imposing travel restriction on regime officials.  In addition, Warsaw has offered to open Polish universities to Belarusian students who have been expelled for pro-democracy activities back home.  There are plans to foster exchange programs for Belarusian opposition activists and conferences in support of Belarusian democracy, organized both by the Polish government and the NGO community.  In short, Warsaw has put forth a series of initiatives to pressure the Belarusian regime while trying to sustain the democratic momentum in the country.  This is the beginning of a long-term policy that, if supported by other democratic governments, holds a promise of success.

The Polish strategy now needs political and financial backing from Washington and Brussels.  Poland cannot do it alone, especially since its ethnic minority in Belarus remains vulnerable to pressure from Minsk.  The crisis requires a joint response from the United States and the European Union. We find ourselves in a moment of stark simplicity: the West needs to stand up for its core principles and meet Lukashenko’s brutality head-on.  It should do so long-term, persistently and with ample resources to back up the effort.  We need to leverage the Internet, peer social networks, programs run by NGOs and universities, as well as the entire gamut of traditional broadcast media in the United States and Europe to keep the “Belarus question” in focus.  The Poles have decades of experience building democratic foundations in the difficult 1970s and 1980s.  The United States and the European Union should draw from that experience.

Andrew A. Michta is Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College and a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.  He is the incoming director of the GMF Warsaw office, which will open in June.

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