BUCHAREST— Given the normal electoral model in Russia — where voting is generally not as important as how the votes are counted — last weekend’s elections were not out of the ordinary. The manipulation of elections is an intrinsic part of Russian history, and it has usually bothered only a few zealous and diligent activists. It is no wonder, then, that the ongoing protests have come as a surprise to the Kremlin. What is really extraordinary is how deaf Russia’s leaders have been to history’s recent lessons. The Arab Spring and the Color Revolutions offer considerable material on how nondemocratic governments should approach elections, yet Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev seem not to have studied for this test.

Earlier this year, people took to the streets in several Russian cities, as in many other cities around the world, in response to economic hardships. But the grievances of Russian protesters did not resemble those heard in London or Berlin. Instead they mirrored those in Cairo and Tunis, with people demanding civil rights and freedoms in addition to jobs and pensions. Their discontents were felt in regional elections, where Putin’s United Russia performed poorly. The Kremlin failed to respond to this show of public dissatisfaction and Putin’s plans to return to the presidency only further alienated the public. Subsequent protests have become more vocal and widespread. The cultural elite, usually an ally of those in power, put up a silent and largely unnoticed protest by refusing to promote United Russia, as is otherwise customary. Images of popular singers, ballerinas, and gymnasts — whose endorsements carry weight in this culturally-sensitive country — were largely absent from United Russia’s publicity posters.

Ever since the Rose and the Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Kremlin’s anxieties have increased. Wary of people taking the streets in protest of electoral fraud, it overreacted to allegations and evidence of electoral fraud during the latest elections and attempted to silence observers. Following previous elections during Putin’s tenure, such allegations were met with indifference and cold superiority. Disputes and appeals were dealt with quietly and implacably by electoral commissions and the judiciary, while domestic and international election monitors were simply dismissed. Drawing the wrong lessons from the Color Revolutions, the Kremlin decided not to decrease fraud this time around, but to hide it, with the predictable outcome that it revealed itself even more. GOLOS, the nationwide election monitoring group that was so obsessively harassed during these elections, denounced fraud on election day, and this activism was followed by thousands of protesters taking to the streets. As in several Arab countries earlier this year, protesters have used social media tools to communicate and organize. In response, the Kremlin has amassed militia forces to crack down on protesters in the main squares of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and many have already been imprisoned.

The lesson that autocratic governments such as Russia’s are tempted to take away from this year’s Arab revolts is to crush protests mercilessly, before they get out of control. But as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia demonstrate (along with East Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia before them), success is not always guaranteed and the strategy almost inevitably eventually backfires. The correct lesson of the Arab revolts, and a much wiser choice for any government, is to be sympathetic to the underlying reasons that motivate protesters to take to the streets and address them. This means not tightening the regime’s grip on power, but relaxing it.

This is not to say that spring has come to Moscow, or that the protests of the last two days will necessarily turn into a revolution. Putin thrives on crisis and he may well find ways to solve this one as well. But if he is to take away one lesson from the Arab revolutions earlier this year, it is that the last few days do not constitute a temporary eruption of anger. He did not just experience and steer his way past another ordinary election. The protests made an irreversible fissure in the political establishment, and helped ensure that fraud and repression are no longer publicly acceptable. Presidential candidate Putin would do well to dust off Medvedev’s speeches and bring about some of the measures eloquently addressed there: more media freedoms, free and fair elections, greater independence for the judiciary, and the modernization of the economy. As things stand now, Putin has only two choices: repress opponents and dissidents, manipulate elections, and fear revolt in the days after; or start liberalizing Russia’s society and modernizing it economy, while standing (and probably winning) Russia’s first free and fair elections.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation and the Bucharest office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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BUCHAREST – Last week we witnessed a surprising one-two punch in Ukraine (the pugilistic theme is appropriate for a country that has produced the world champion Klitschko brothers), meant to knock out former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, President Viktor Yanukovych’s main political rival. On October 11, the first punch sentenced Tymoshenko to seven years in prison. The move came as a surprise, especially to Europeans, who thought they had made it very clear that an indictment would put serious strains on the country’s relations with the European Union. Just as European concerns seemed alleviated by statements that the situation would be reversed, a second punch brought new charges against Tymoshenko, this time for attempts to embezzle government funds in the 1990s. There is, however, a major difference between these political moves and boxing, as the latter is known to be a sport of both strength and strategy while the former lacks both. In fact, the puncher made all the wrong moves.

Soon after his inauguration, Yanukovych revealed Ukraine’s renewed choice of a European path and future. Pleasantly surprised, Europeans engaged on a quick track to offer Ukraine a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with the European Union, which was supposed to be signed by the end of this year. As negotiations progressed, worrying signs of democratic backlash started coming from the country, yet the European line held that closeness to the EU, through the FTA, is the only way to ensure further development of Ukraine and anchor it to a European future. Tymoshenko’s trial revealed the lack of independence in the court system and the indifference of authorities to the rule of law, placing in serious doubt the ability of the FTA to trigger development in such a tight political environment. All of the previous worrying signs have now gathered more importance and weight as the system they depict is not only far from European values, but also seems to be worsening. Under these circumstances, the European Commission would have a hard time reconciling its “more for more” approach to the neighborhood with an extension of FTA to a backsliding Ukraine. The one-two punch has left the EU with no choice but to postpone a scheduled official visit to Brussels by Yanukovych and perhaps the signing of the agreement, and for Ukraine to forego important economic benefits. For a country as deep in economic crisis as Ukraine is, Yanukovych made the wrong moves.

In recent years, numerous polls have shown that an increasing majority of Ukraine’s population is in favor of European integration. That is why, in 2010, Yanukovych adopted a different line and appeared to choose a different direction than he advocated in 2004. With the recent progress in relations with the EU and a clear perspective of an economic integration followed by visa liberalization, the public’s esteem for European integration has grown even higher. A move in a different direction, be it toward closer ties with Russia or outright isolationism, will aggravate the population and divide society, which should be an unpleasant prospect for Yanukovych with national elections 12 months away.

The alternatives are not great, for Ukraine or for the West. Should Europeans decide to halt the free trade agreement, the Russian offer to join the Customs Union and, down the road, a Russia-led “Eurasian Union” seems a possible alternative for Ukraine. After all, the little help the Russian government gave Ukrainian authorities in bringing the new charges in the Tymoshenko trial will, sooner or later, have to be repaid. Yet the choice of Russia over the EU would seriously irritate the Ukrainian population and most of the country’s businessmen. Moreover, nobody in the former Soviet Union takes these Russian constructs seriously. It is the specter of a third alternative that is now more worrying for Ukraine — a Belarus-type isolation, where relations with EU would be in tatters and the relationship with Moscow would be love-hate at best. Clearly, none of the country’s 21 billionaires would be happy to conduct their businesses in such a climate.

Yanukovych’s one-two punch has a chance to deliver a knockout, but not to Tymoshenko. Rather, Yanukovych has exposed himself to counterattack, whether in the form of electoral defeat, isolationism for his country, or a choice of allies Ukrainians don’t want. But he is not in a fair fight, either. His recent moves revealed the serious weaknesses of Ukraine’s political system. With his determination to block his main rival from running, and his attempts to change electoral rules to the advantage of his party, Yanukovych seems set to win the match without really playing it. In order to alleviate all these suspicions and bring the country back on the right path, he should make double efforts to ensure the freedom of the media, plenty of electoral observers, and a free and fair 2012 electoral process. This would be the right move.

Alina Inayeh is director of the German Marshall Fund’s Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.

Image by the European Commission.

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BUCHAREST — In an article published on Tuesday in the Russian newspaper Izvestia, Russia’s prime minister and presidential hopeful Vladimir Putin announced his major foreign policy goal: the creation of a “Eurasian Union.” This Union, he announced, would gradually encompass the countries of the former Soviet Union, but also stay open for other countries to join. Built on common values and converging economic and political interests, the Union would be “a new pole in the modern world” and together with “the European Union, the United States, China, and the Asia Pacific Economic Community, it should ensure the stability of global development.”

Prime Minister Putin has repeatedly expressed his regrets for the departure of the Soviet Union, so this latest plan should not have surprised anyone. It is meant to project an image of power, assertiveness, and strategic vision mainly for a domestic audience, and it is very likely only the first in a future series aimed to divert public attention away from the real problem: Russia’s increasingly dire domestic situation. Yet it deserves attention, as it reveals a serious concern with Russia’s decreasing influence in its near abroad, as well as a lack of viable and attractive offers from Russia for the countries in the region.

Russia has been trying to create a Customs Union within the former Soviet space for over ten years. This Union currently includes only Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. All the other former Soviet states have declined to join it, either openly or by procrastinating over negotiations. The most notable example is Ukraine, which made its position clear by choosing a free trade agreement with the European Union over the Customs Union, despite Russia’s attempts to prevent this. Two other countries in the region, Moldova and Georgia, are now in the course of negotiating free trade agreements with the European Union, with Armenia and Azerbaijan following. Despite the fact that they have been developed and implemented at an exasperatingly cautious pace, the European Union’s economic and political ties with the countries in Russia’s neighborhood now have firm roots, and these countries are gradually growing closer to European goods and labor markets, adjusting their internal legislation in the process. Even in its current economic crisis and general absent minded-ness, the European Union is seen as a better economic, not to mention political, partner than Russia, and thus remains a more attractive choice.

So it is precisely in reaction to the European Union’s increased reach in the region that Putin would like to offer countries in Russia’s neighborhood an alternative Union to aspire to. Yet it is also a counter-move to an even more pressing problem that Russia sees looming on the horizon. On September 9, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev announced the discovery of a (yet another) gas field in the country, at Absheron. The field has an estimated reserve of 350 billion cubic meters and 45 million tones of condensed gas. Its exploration will bring Azerbaijan’s annual gas output to 30 billion cubic meters, which happens to be the amount Europe needs to flow yearly through its Nabucco pipeline, meant to bring non-Russian gas to European countries. The new gas field thus makes Nabucco an economic reality, and it completely changes the energy equation in the region: Nabucco is meant to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian gas from 70 to 35 percent of total imports.

To add to Russia’s worries, on September 7, the European Commission approved a long overdue communication on EU energy relations with third countries. While this is still a minor step, it is the first time that the Commission has put forward a call for a common energy strategy and asked member countries to exchange information about international energy agreements with third countries. With Nabucco closer to becoming a reality, aiming for coherence among the national energy strategies of EU member countries becomes a more achievable goal — or at least stops being merely a utopia. Add to this Russia’s failure to fully control Ukrainian transit pipelines and the picture of Russia’s worries becomes very sharp indeed. As things are developing now, Russia’s gas exports to Europe would decrease substantially, and so would its leverage over European countries. A worrying prospect, and a difficult message in times of elections indeed.

A Eurasian Union would give Russia more clout, so it comes as a natural solution. Unfortunately for prime minister and presidential candidate, Vladimir Putin, it is a solution that comes both too late and too soon. Too late to curtail Europe’s increasing reach in the neighborhood that it shares with Russia, and too soon to be led by a Russia that now needs time to fix both its economy and all its other internal problems.

Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust at the German Marshall Fund’s Bucharest Office.

(Editor’s note: Post edited to clarify EU reliance on Russian gas. Numbers cited were for percentage of total imports, not percentage of total consumption.)

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by Alina Inayeh

KIEV—Although Russian and Ukrainian officials suggested this week that Ukraine was ready to sign the Commonwealth of Independent States’ free trade agreement (FTA), the accord’s significance should not be exaggerated. Attempts at implementing the FTA have constituted a pitiful 17-year-long saga, and it is widely believed that the FTA, even if agreed upon and signed, would never be ratified by all its signatories and thus never come into force. But the announcement reminds that Russia still stands in the way of integrating Ukraine more closely with Europe.

Ukrainians are well aware that Russia remains their country’s main trading partner and that Russians in Ukraine desire good relations with Moscow. Ukraine also remains an important link between Russian gas producers and European consumers. Given these realities, the recent Ukrainian U-turn toward Europe has rightly been applauded by many European governments and strategists. Not only has the rhetoric of the Ukrainian government altered radically, it has taken concrete steps to upgrade relations with its European partners. By the end of the year, it is likely to sign an association agreement with the European Union, which includes a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) and visa-liberalization action plan. Should that materialize, it would be the most generous package offered by the European Union to one of its neighbors. The Ukrainian legislature is currently reviewing a good portion of its legislation, attempting to bring its legal provisions more in line with EU requirements. And the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy is taking steps to increase the country’s domestic gas production, and thus decrease its dependence on Russian gas.

But despite these welcome steps, Ukraine’s road to Europe remains tortuous. The Ukrainian government does not subscribe to Western standards of democracy, freedom of speech, and fair elections. Its desire to integrate more closely with Europe arises not out of a sense of shared values, but out of practical interests. In and of itself, that might not be a bad thing—transactional relationships can sometimes be stronger than emotional ones—if Ukraine’s oligarchs did not have a strong sense of shared interests with Russia. This means the possibility remains of another U-turn back to Russia, barring the consolidation of stronger ties with Europe and the derivation of greater economic benefits.

Two possible inflection points loom on the horizon: Russian elections between December 2011 and March 2012, and Ukrainian elections in October 2012. Should the Russian government appear weak on the eve of elections, it may decide to increase pressure on Ukraine and Europe in the middle of winter, when the demand for gas is at its highest, and thereby slow Ukraine’s westward slide. Ukraine’s elections might be cause for more concern, as a government determined to maintain power by any means could become more populist and could undermine reforms, including those required by the European Union.  The government’s dependence on oligarchs for campaign funds might also influence its decisions. And there are signs that the government could resort to electoral fraud, to which Ukraine is no stranger. That would mark a major setback for relations with Europe.

Had Ukraine been governed by leaders who cherished European values, the country’s decision to sign the CIS FTA would have little or no significance. As the situation stands now, it is a reminder to an ever-busier Europe that it needs to remain focused on Ukraine, urge the Ukrainian government to follow its words with deeds, and ensure a coordinated response by its members to potential future obstacles in the EU-Ukraine relationship.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Seat Trust for Regional Cooperation and the Bucharest Office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Photo by LancerenoK

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By Alina Inayeh

BUCHAREST — Nearly four months after a young Tunisian fruit seller burned himself alive out of despair over the corruption of his country and sparked a popular revolt against autocracy that swept the region, thunderstruck leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are finding their voice again. Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama gave a major speech that compared the uprisings with America’s civil rights movement. This week, it was Europe’s turn to answer the call from Northern Africa and the Middle East. By European standards of deliberation, the European Union’s response was atypically timely.

On Wednesday, Baroness Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, and Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy,  released a joint policy paper called, in characteristically dry EU-speak, “A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood.” Technically, this document is the result of a routine review of the EU’s existing neighborhood policy, and was scheduled long before the Arab upheavals. But as events unfolded, it became clear that Europe’s response could no longer be routine. So the advance word was that this would be a bold reaction to the dramatic changes in what remains a very dynamic neighborhood.

But the paper published on Tuesday falls somewhat short of a genuinely bold vision. It does not go so far as to sketch out a desired democratic end state for the nations of the region. That kind of clarity might have made relations with some countries easier. Still, by European standards, it’s a courageous document. Most importantly, it rectifies the chief flaw of the earlier policy by introducing genuine conditionality; it seeks to encourage democratic reforms by offering the carrot of economic support–and threatening to withdraw it in case of backsliding. This in itself is a remarkable affirmation of European principles and values. Civic and opposition party leaders had asked for it in vain for years, and watched in frustration as the EU gave funds to regimes that paid no more than lip service to reform, if that.

Yet reformers and activists in the region still fear that the new policy will share the fate of so many other well-intentioned documents: a slow death by uncoordinated and incoherent implementation. And will the EU, they wonder, manage to preserve the courage of its convictions when it comes to countries like Ukraine and Azerbaijan, which are courted by individual member states for geostrategic and economic reasons?

Here are four modest proposals that could help make a success of Europe’s new neighborhood policy:

First, conditionality needs to be made to work. It has to be translated into clear and objective indicators or benchmarks of economic, social, and political transformation that the EU’s regional partners cannot fudge (but that also won’t allow the EU to move the goalposts) One key indicator–and condition for any further steps in relations with the EU–ought to be a country’s willingness to hold free and fair elections.

Second, good ideas need good processes. The new policy provides several new mechanisms–a European Endowment for Democracy, a Civil Society Facility, Migration Partnerships–to reinforce civil societies in the region, in recognition of the fact that they are key drivers of reform and were ignored by earlier policies. But these now need to be fleshed out and, even more importantly, backed with real political support. At the same time, existing but tired mechanisms like the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum need to be shaken up to make them work in the new democratic dispensation.

Third, in a world that is strapped for funds, the new and improved neighborhood policy will have to figure out some more flexible financing mechanisms. For example, the European Commission could consider public-private partnerships to fund different aspects of the policy. These partnerships would have the double benefit of bringing money where it is needed, and of ensuring coordination between various actors active in the same sector, country, or region.

Fourth, the policy remains weak on regional cooperation. In a region scarred by old conflicts, regional cooperation can build bridges where bilateral relations cannot. Cooperation across regional boundaries between civil society organizations, local governments, media, and trade unions can help address issues that national governments shy away from, whether from a lack of resources or political will. If regional cooperation is to be given its full importance, then the most powerful neighbor of Europe, Turkey, must be included.

All in all, the European Union’s new neighborhood policy looks better than many observers had feared. It could even be a sign that Europe is finally getting serious about its neighbors. It would be a very important achievement for the Polish Presidency of the EU (which begins on June 1) if it made sure that enough political push is provided to make the policy work.

The Arab Spring has shamed many in Europe into reconsidering their previous support for stability over dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. So perhaps there is indeed scope for bold action. Still, there will be many tests of Europe’s resolve–the next fraudulent election, the next TV station to be shut down, or the next party to be banned. The next test may come far sooner than we would like.

Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation and the German Marshall Fund’s Bucharest Office.

Photo by Jasab

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The world’s attention is rightly focused on Asia, as the effects of the earthquake in Japan still unfold. It is thus not surprising that the regional elections held this Sunday in Russia went almost unnoticed. Most regional elections would probably have the same fate even in a world not confronted with a major disaster, yet the March 13 Russian elections deserve some attention.

Wisely scheduled nine months before elections to the State Duma and twelve months before the Presidential ones, this Sunday’s elections have been a real life test of the voters’ political preferences amid deep economic crisis. And the test has  indicated two already intrinsic features of Russian political life: first, United Russia continues to dominate the voters’ preferences, even if not with the definite majority its leaders would want it to (46%). It is obviously refreshing for its leaders that the party has only lost 0.2% in 4 years, despite economic hardships and (sporadic) social unrest.  The second feature proved by the test is that Russian elections continue to be rigged, from the very start of the process (candidate registration) to its very end (vote count). Indeed, reports of election monitors published over the last 10 years vary little, if at all, over time. Abuse of administrative resources, control of media, intimidation of voters are part of the Russian electoral process, in slight variations on the same theme.

This Sunday marked the beginning of an intense electoral year in Russia. For the next 12 months, elections to the State Duma and for the President will dominate political life. Analysts already started fiddling with results and their interpretation, running different electoral algorithms and political scenarios. It all worked, except for the simple fact that in Russia, still, opposition leaders are put in prison and media is tightly controlled, so to a big extent elections results depend “not on how they vote, but on who counts the votes”.

The numerous incidents of non-democratic behavior of the Russian establishment have triggered soft-spoken reactions from US, and hardly any reaction from the EU. It is foreseeable that, with current international preoccupations and major elections bundling up in the next 18 months or so, this will continue to be the attitude towards Russian violations of its citizens’ rights and freedoms, to the loss of democracy in the country.

It is true that Russia continues to play an important role in the international arena, and both US and the EU need its cooperation, or at least strategic silence, on a number of world issues. So it is no surprise that Vice President Biden reassured the Russian government (ironically right before the electoral test on Sunday) that United States will work with the next Russian president whoever he might be. Could “how he gets elected” also be an issue?

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BUCHAREST—Few may know that the game known to some as football and to others as soccer was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001.  The nomination letter by Swedish politician Lars Gustafsson observed that sports—of which football was “the greatest sport of all”—play a valuable role in international relations by enhancing “the understanding between people of different races and religions in different countries.” Two weeks ago, at the Zurich headquarters of FIFA, international football’s governing body, it was decided that Russia would host the 2018 World Cup, entrusting the country with its second major international sporting event in a decade after the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. It is now Russia’s turn to play a major role in building understanding between people, and thereby improve upon its poor record in this particular field.

Over the past year, Russia has appeared to adopt more constructive and positive rhetoric internationally, and has followed this rhetoric with important and welcome diplomatic steps: renewed relations with Poland, the Partnership for Modernization with the European Union, the negotiated New START arms control agreement with the United States, and cooperation with other international powers in imposing economic sanctions on Iran. Its recent international behavior suggests a more cooperative Russia that is keen on closer relations with the transatlantic community.  Yet the uneven results of the NATO summit in Lisbon on creating a joint NATO-Russian missile shield shows that the zero-sum thinking driving Russia’s international behavior has not changed significantly.  This was further confirmed by Russian threats that it would reconsider its positions on Afghanistan and Iran, and by hints that it would renew an arms race, should the ratification of the New START treaty fail in the U.S. Senate.

Domestically, Russia’s record of creating understanding between people is not much better. Racism and racism-related violence have reached worrying levels. Demonstrations of neo-Nazi groups are no longer uncommon, and more and more youth are attracted to the extreme right. Football itself is no stranger to hate speech, with racist banners displayed openly during league matches. Intolerance is also directed at natives of the North Caucasus, many of whom are discriminated against in major Russian cities. No one in Moscow is surprised when dark-complexioned men are stopped and interrogated for nothing more than appearing to be Chechen. The North Caucasus itself is sad proof of Russia’s inability to create deeper understanding between people within the country.

A saying in this part of the world goes: “Nothing brings people together better than corruption.” By that measure, Russia ought to be performing very well. The country ranked worst among global powers in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, falling from 146th to 154th place (in a tie with Cambodia) among a total of 178 countries rated. Russia’s endemic corruption paralyzes the state and suffocates its economy, making it one of the main obstacles to further modernization. President Dmitry Medvedev speaks tirelessly and blogs regularly about corruption in his country, but little real action to alleviate it has been seen so far. Another factor that often cements societies, the rule of law, is just as problematic in Russia. From the subservience of the judiciary to the political system—the emblematic case is that of imprisoned oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky—to the arbitrary enforcement of laws, Russia displays complete indifference to the rule of law.

Russia’s inability or unwillingness to create greater understanding between people is probably most obvious in its near abroad, the regions it now considers, as in years past, its sphere of influence.  Here, Russia plays an unhelpful role in solving regional conflicts. The most recent testament to this is the Russian delegation’s refusal to discuss an action plan to solve conflicts in the Black Sea region at the recent OSCE summit in Astana. Russia has also played an active role in deepening conflicts, as the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia bear witness, or sustaining them, as in Transnistria. It is in this region that Medvedev’s choice of words to show his satisfaction with the World Cup decision sends shivers down peoples’ spines. “I congratulate all Russian football fans,” he said. “This is a large multimillion-person army.” Clearly, if sports are to create understanding between people, no place is in greater need of a major sporting event—or two—than Russia.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation in the Bucharest office of the German Marshall Fund.

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BUCHAREST — On June 5, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a brief but significant memorandum on a joint EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Policy (ERPSC) in the German town of Meseberg. The document proposes to “explore” the creation of a ministerial-level committee to be chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, Lady Catherine Ashton, and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This would be a forum for the European Union and Russia to exchange views on issues of international security and foreign policy; to “establish ground rules for joint EU-Russia civil/military crisis management operations”; and to “exchange views and draft recommendations … on specific issues.” Transnistria is explicitly cited as a possible first test case for “cooperation” and even a “joint EU-Russia engagement.”

Such a move was not entirely unexpected. Since the 2009 Ukraine-Russia gas crisis froze half of Europe, forums for the EU-Russia dialogue have mushroomed. A leaked policy paper from the Russian foreign ministry suggests that Russia, too, seeks rapprochement with the West. And many experts thought that the meeting in Meseberg would produce something that would compensate for the EU’s recent decision to postpone the extension of its visa-free regime to Russia.

The German rationale for this initiative appears to be twofold. The key goal is to resolve the Transnistrian conflict by getting Russia back to constructive engagement, and using pressure on the Transnistrian leadership to compromise. Russian troops could be withdrawn, or put under a joint EU-Russian mandate. More generally, the initiative tests the seriousness of Russian offers of cooperation. A success in Transnistria would (for instance) greatly improve chances for a renewed conventional arms regime in Europe.

But how likely is such a committee to resolve specific security issues? Would it even be able to discuss European and Russian foreign policies straightforwardly? There is no single EU foreign policy; each of the 27 member states has its own foreign policy orientation and its own threat perception, and there is very little agreement among them. In fact, many new members still think Russia remains Europe’s chief external threat. Under these conditions, the conversations in the proposed committee are likely to be as interesting as they will be unproductive. And while it is good news that Germany is seeking an EU framework rather than acting bilaterally with Russia, it remains to be seen whether the slow and bureaucratic EU can successfully broker conflict resolution with Russia in its Eastern neighborhood. Given the cautious language of the memorandum, this  format might well be more symbolic than effective.

Nonetheless, the mere fact that Russia and the European Union would be willing to sit together to, “establish ground rules for joint civil/military crisis management operations,” would take the relationship to a new, unprecedented level.  The EU has undertaken a number of such operations, including in Kosovo and Georgia. Over the last 20 years, Russia has also deployed “peacekeeping” troops in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.  However, Russia’s activities often violated all of the three chief principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and non-use of force. Had the international community confronted Russia about this before 2008, the Russo-Georgian war might have been avoided.  In the case of Transnistria, Russia has broken every treaty it has signed since 1994, refusing to withdraw its troops despite Moldovan requests. Given this background, it would indeed be interesting, under the circumstances, to watch the EU and Russia develop joint “ground rules” for crisis management.

Possibly, Russia is genuinely willing to cooperate on Transnistria in exchange for economic advancement. But the real test would, of course, be an EU-Russian cooperation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Perhaps even the Northern Caucasus?) But that would require rather more than a bilateral memorandum and an EU committee—particularly now when European interest in the conflicts in its Eastern neighborhood seems to be on the wane.

One sign is the recent proposal by Catherine Ashton’s office to abolish the posts of special EU envoys for the Southern Caucasus and Moldova while maintaining similar positions for more distant regions:  Sudan, the Great Lakes region in Africa, and Central Asia. The special envoys to Moldova and Southern Caucasus, mandated to speak on behalf of the EU in negotiations for the conflicts in these regions, were almost permanently present on the ground and were able to interact with all the relevant local parties. Other existing EU programs for the region, including bilateral and regional ones, avoid addressing the conflicts head-on. With the abolition of the special envoys, the EU will lose the little political clout it has had in these conflicts. And certainly it will become increasingly difficult to hold meaningful joint civil/military operations with Russia in those crises that are closer to home.

If Germany is serious about its commitment to solving the conflicts in Europe’s neighborhood, it could use its economic leverage over Russia, and Russia’s thirst for economic advancement, as a stick, rather than having the EU offer a carrot. After all, the conflicts in Europe’s Eastern neighborhood remain a major cause of human, drug, and weapons trafficking to Europe, and a significant reason for economic retardation in a region where the EU has real economic interests. Perhaps more importantly in the short term, these conflicts remain a means by which Russia controls and manipulates oil and gas flows to Europe itself, as Germany well knows.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Sea Trust and the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bucharest

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BUCHAREST — On May 9, the streets of Moscow will witness a rare and memorable spectacle. In a parade marking the 65^th anniversary of Victory Day – the end of World War II, when Germany surrendered to Soviet commanders – 10,500 servicemen will march through Moscow for this special celebration, accompanied by 150 military vehicles. Former allied troops (British, American, French, and Polish) will march alongside soldiers from former Soviet Union countries. The Russian authorities have promised this will be the biggest and most impressive military show in Moscow in the last 65 years – and they know a thing or two about military shows.

Yet the politics on display may well turn out to be even more remarkable. For the official stands will be shared by old, current, and future allies and enemies, in a panoramic picture of Europe spanning 65 years. Watching the parade will be the Russian leadership – first among them President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. They will be joined by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and a host of other European notables.   The symbolism is, of course, deliberate: peaceful relations between Europe and Russia guarantee peace and stability on the continent. Yet it is also a reminder that the relationship is rooted to a significant degree in natural resources and hard power: Europe’s dependency on Russian gas, matched by Russia’s thirst for technology, furthered by potential sales of advanced military technology, and deepened by talks of a common security architecture.

Moreover, the notion of a “peace in Europe” works only if you firmly ban from your memory the wars and conflicts that took place since the end of the Cold War (from the Balkans to Chechnya to Georgia, to name only a few), and if you define Europe – as the Russians like to do – as contiguous with the territorial reach of the European Union. Even so, it’s hard to ignore the fact that the arc between Northeastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus remains a highly combustible zone, as well as a wellspring for organized crime and illicit trade of all kinds, from people to drugs and weapons, and coming from as far away as the Middle East and Asia.

Also present in the stands will be leaders from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – the club of former members of the Soviet Union. They are meeting at an informal summit a day earlier, with foreign policy cooperation as one of the main issues on the agenda. What this cooperation could look like was exemplified only a short while ago by the recent shift in Ukraine foreign policy toward a more Moscow-friendly stance.  Cooperation between Russia and what it used to call its “near abroad” could translate into progress and development for Russia’s neighboring countries; but for now, it appears to mean control over their military alliances, stimulation of social divisions, prevalence of Russia’s economic interests, and continuation of conflicts throughout the region.

Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia itself remain tied to a history and present that is marked by conflicts generated or catalyzed by the breaking up of the Soviet Union, and whose prolongation obstructs their economic and political development.  Georgian troops, of course, will not be marching in the parade, and Georgian leaders will be nowhere close to the other VIPs. Their absence will remind onlookers of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, which was in no small degree responsible for Russia’s current surge of confidence, and two “solved” frozen conflicts (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) by declaring them independent entities.

Only the absence of the Moldovan president Mihai Ghimpu will remind those who care to notice that this tiny country disapproves of Moscow’s neighborhood policy and is seeking economic and political integration with the West. Perhaps next year’s parade attendance roster may tell us whether it succeeded or not.

Former European enemies standing together to commemorate the end of one of the most terrible and bitter wars in human memory: that is indeed a reassuring sign of the continent’s enduring commitment to peace. Yet there is another, more subtle message in the lineup: authoritarian countries claiming “spheres of influence” have not fostered security, development, and prosperity in the past. And they are not doing so now.

Editor’s note: Corrected the description of the CIS to be the former Soviet Union states.

Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust and the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bucharest

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BUCHAREST –  In the historic beginnings of the Olympic Games in ancient Greece, athletes would all carry olive branches to the Games as a symbol of peace.   While the actual olive branches are no longer an official part of the Games, to this very day the Olympics remain the quintessential expression of international cooperation, human development, and progress.   Vancouver, Canada is fundamentally synonymous with that traditional spirit of the Olympic Games.

Four years from now, the Winter Olympic Games will be held in Sochi, Russia.   Unlike Vancouver, Sochi, and the eastern Black Sea region where it sits, is synonymous with poverty, corruption, and violence.   The question to ask between now and the closing ceremony of the Sochi Games is: will the bright glow of the Olympics influence Sochi and its neighborhood positively, or will the unstable character of the region tarnish the Olympic spirit?

As a port to the Black Sea, and home to a beautiful resort, Sochi is a summer destination for Russians and indeed visitors seeking a relaxing getaway from all over the former Soviet Union.   There is little surprise that the pristine landscape of the Caucasus mountains caught the eye of Olympic officials – as well as Josef Stalin, who decades earlier made Sochi his summer retreat – who decided to award the Games to the Russian resort town.   Yet Sochi’s palm trees and Krasnaya Poliana’s pristine slopes are only the tip of a dangerous iceberg.

Sochi borders Russia’s six autonomous republics of the Northern Caucasus, home of the Chechen wars and violent feuding that surfaced after the breakup of the Soviet Union and continues to date.   All of the republics have severe social problems that stem from massive unemployment and bad governance.   Islamist extremism and the terrorism associated with it continues to be a threat.   In Ingushetia, the clashes between local militias and the government restarted in 2009 with even more violence than before.   For 18 years, Chechnya has not known real peace; the fights between separatists and pro-Russian authorities have been replaced by the murders and kidnapping of human rights activists and opposition politicians.   In 2009, Freedom House placed Chechnya on its Worst of the Worst list of most repressive societies.

And Chechnya is not Sochi’s only vicious regional neighbor.   The entire region of the Northern and Southern Caucasus Mountains are an intricate web of ethnic minorities and long-standing conflicts.   Indeed, the first shots of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war were fired as the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games got underway.   Eighteen months later, the level of tension has not significantly diminished.

But violence and the potential of war are not the only features of the region.   No, Southern Russia and the Eastern Black Sea region is also a nest for organized transnational crime.   It is both a source and a route for trafficking people, drugs, and weapons – including documented instances of radioactive materials €“ into Europe.

Along with Sochi, poverty, unemployment, corruption, crime, and violence, very well might host the 2014 Winter Olympic Games.   To some, it might be too disheartening to think that the very expression of peace, tolerance, and fairness would be held hostage to a region where these ideas have little meaning.   But to the Russian hosts and organizers, it should be viewed as an important opportunity to heal so many wounds and at least try to begin real reconciliation processes.

Of course, the likelihood of real peace and reconciliation in a region where there is no real history of tolerance is unlikely before the Sochi Games.   But by campaigning to host the Olympic Games in Sochi, Moscow – maybe inadvertently – entered into a public trust with not only the peoples of the Eastern Black Sea region, but with the peoples of the world.   Russia’s commitment now can be no less than what is advertised on the Sochi Olymic Games official website: striving to become the embodiment of peaceful, productive dialog between peoples.

In all likelihood, taking on the large, until-now unsolvable conflicts will be too daunting.   Instead, Russia might seriously address rule of law issues and crack down hard on corruption and organized crime, including trafficking.   If Russia chooses to take this challenge on earnestly, it would be an important confidence builder for the entire region leading up to the Games.

If Russia does not want the Sochi Games to tarnish the Olympic spirit, and risk damaging Russia’s own reputation, it must also demonstrate its serious intention to promote increased tolerance instead of increased violence.   If Russia is serious, the international community should play its part and help as well.   In a region where soccer diplomacy has been known to play an important role, it is conceivable that Olympic diplomacy will have a significant role too.   If Russia is not serious and makes no real effort to improve the situation, the tension between rival athletes during the Games will be nothing compared to the real tensions only miles away from the Olympic village.

Alina Inayeh is the director for the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation for GMF.

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