WARSAW—The new strategic defense guidance from the Obama administration aims to refocus the U.S. defense posture on the increasingly competitive security environment emerging in the Pacific. It also (despite the Pentagon’s protestations to the contrary) appears to put an end to the era of large-scale counterinsurgency and stability operations. Last but not least, it implies a strategic shift away from Europe. It thus brings the United States and Europe to a decisive point in their relationship: they will need to reframe the division of labor in the security dimension of the transatlantic alliance.

The Obama administration’s planned $489 billion defense cuts over ten years means that any buildup of U.S. capacity in Asia will have to be offset in part through further reductions in the U.S. presence in Europe. Cuts may even be double that if Congress fails to reverse massive automatic budget reductions by 2013. Moreover, under the “one war, one spoiling action” formula espoused by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the United States’ role in NATO may shift from that of ultimate European security provider to more of an enabler of European defense.

The implications for Europe are significant. Simply put: if the United States is engaged in a conflict on the other side of the globe, a contingency that could develop in or near Europe would require Europe to be ready to respond first. The “burden-sharing” debate has thus been redefined. Of course, the United States retains a strategic interest in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. But it will have to come to a much more explicit understanding with Europe about respective regional interests: where do they intersect/diverge? Is it possible, and if so under what circumstances to generate a credible sense of shared responsibility? And what assets and capabilities can Europe bring to the table — particularly if U.S. assets are needed elsewhere? The United States might opt for issue-based cooperation with individual countries or with regional groupings within the NATO framework. This could balance near-term the tilt of U.S. strategy towards Asia and create a pathway for the United States and Europe to maximize their shrinking capabilities on the continent and preserve the mutuality of their defense commitments. But will that be enough security for Europe? Does the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) have an answer to this question? And is anyone even asking that question in Brussels or national capitals?

One thing is clear at any rate: At a time when 40 cents of every dollar Washington spends is borrowed, Europe can no longer expect that the United States will remain its sole security provider. As long as the EU does not provide persuasive assets and capabilities that justify the as yet-elusive pursuit of an EU-NATO partnership, security cooperation under the NATO umbrella is the more realistic way to maintain transatlantic security relations. Admittedly, that would mean a partial renationalization of security, but it would offer real capabilities by willing players. An example of the latter is the recent Franco-British military cooperation treaty, which provides not only for nuclear sharing, but also for the creation of a joint strike force and the joint use of aircraft carriers. Central Europe might see similar arrangements, e.g. including Germany, Poland, Scandinavia, the Baltics, and Romania. Combined with NATO’s deterrent capability, European forces thus configured could really pull their weight — until such time when CSDP can actually be made to work.

Andrew A. Michta is Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Director of the GMF Warsaw Office.

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