The recent leak of classified reports disclosing sensitive information about the military engagement in Afghanistan has once again put Pakistan in the spotlight. While simultaneously suffering from one of the worst floods in recent history, Pakistan is finding itself in a very difficult position. The more than 90,000 documents released by WikiLeaks last month strengthen previous allegations that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency, has direct links to the Afghan Taliban. Although analysts have been making these claims for years, the sheer magnitude and timing of the leak have come to exacerbate strains in Pakistan’s relations with its western allies. Counter-claims by Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States that the documents “do not reflect the current onground realities” paint a picture of a flawed partnership. However, regardless of inconsistencies in Pakistani policies and divergent strategic interests, Pakistan will remain an irreplaceable partner to the West in its efforts to defeat the Taliban.

While reports of the leak have dominated media outlets, a related piece of news has also made headlines. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the Pakistani army, has somewhat unexpectedly been granted a second three-year term. Prior to being army chief Kayani served as head of the ISI from 2004-2007, coincidentally not only the same time period covered by the leaked documents, but also the same years during which Pakistani support for the Taliban grew exponentially. Often publicly praised by the West for his crackdown against militants, Kayani is widely accepted as Pakistan’s main strategic decision-maker. Although criticized behind the scenes for his lack of will to sufficiently deal with the Afghan Taliban and other networks, Kayani’s extension has generally been welcomed by the West and several U.S. officials are known to have close ties with the army chief. Notably, the West’s direct engagement with Kayani undercuts the very government it wishes to see strengthened. However, due to the relative weakness of Zardari’s civilian government, which has become ever more evident in light of its poor response to the recent floods, the West is effectively left with little choice but to deal directly with Pakistan’s military elite.

Since launching the new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan last year, President Obama has worked to fully engage Pakistan in the war effort, acknowledging the extent to which it plays a part in the conflict. This has included billions of U.S. dollars in aid in return for cooperation on counter-insurgency missions in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas and elsewhere. This codependency reflects a reality in which Pakistan is part of both the solution and the problem. However, Pakistan’s strategic interests cannot be sufficiently understood without taking another piece of the puzzle into consideration: India. Ultimately, Pakistan’s dealings with the Taliban stem from its obsession with keeping India in check. As pointed out by Mohammed Hanif, Kayani did affirm earlier this year that India remains the focal point of Pakistan’s military and strategic concerns. As long as Pakistan, and perhaps more specifically its military, continue to perceive India as its main strategic threat, maintaining influence in Afghanistan will remain paramount to them. This situation makes it difficult for the West to reconcile its interests with that of Pakistan’s, while also curtailing its ability to control Pakistan’s involvement with the Afghan Taliban.

 David Cameron made one of the strongest statements on this issue during his recent trip to India, shortly after the WikiLeaks incident. In a question and answer session with Indian journalists Mr. Cameron asserted that “we cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country [Pakistan] is allowed to look both ways…to promote terrorism”. While some may initially have attributed this blunt accusation to Cameron’s relative inexperience in foreign policy, it has since become clear that the content of his remarks were intentional. This change in tone and open critique of the government generated tensions between Islamabad and London that led parts of the Pakistani public to call for President Zardari to cancel his trip to the UK. It should be noted that much of the critique also stemmed from the fact that he left the country in the midst of a national disaster. While the President’s trip did go to plan, another UK visit by ISI officers, was canceled. Arguably, Cameron’s comments reflected the private views of most political leaders. However, the cancelation of the ISI visit demonstrates how difficult it can be for the West to keep a forceful stance on this issue.

 So where is this tangled web of relationships and alliances headed? Despite the inherent dependency between Pakistan and its western allies, the fact remains that the partnership lacks an element of trust. The West strives to balance its strategic interests with its need to engage Pakistan, while Pakistan is conducting a similar balancing act of trying to meet expectations at home while simultaneously cooperating with its western allies. The reality of the situation is that the West has no choice but to partner with Pakistan, as it is instrumental in helping to provide logistics routes, military support along the Afghan border, a base for intelligence gathering and general support in counter-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless, the accusatory nature of the WikiLeaks documents has led to a state of affairs where diplomacy has taken on a hardening tone. Although these incidents are unlikely to cause a shift in policy, it is clear that they have already put a strain on relations. Cameron tried hard to turn this around during his recent meeting with President Zardari, but his remarks have not yet been forgotten. While the West has become more publicly vocal about their grievances with Pakistan, they will continue to cooperate with Pakistan’s power elites as a means of resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. Problematic as the partnership may be it is still intrinsic to Western success in the region. Unless the West manages to devise a strategy that significantly shifts their position in Afghanistan, they will have no choice but to continue to engage with this unreliable ally.

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