Haass is wrong on transatlantic relations
WASHINGTON — Two weeks ago, Richard Haass expressed doubts about the future efficacy of transatlantic cooperation in addressing international security challenges. He’s joining a popular bandwagon. In the lead up to the American presidential election, analysts from across the political landscape are grinding a rusty axe that we’ve heard year after year since the end of the Cold War: The principal strategic imperative that united the transatlantic community has disappeared, making sustained, predictable collaboration impossible. This is as wrong now as it was in the mid-90s.
Let’s begin with the premise. Have American and European interests really diverged as much as Haass and others claim? They’ve certainly changed and diversified, but the laundry list of current international challenges reads much the same across Europe as it does in the United States. In terms of public opinion, both Americans and Europeans feel threatened by energy dependence, international terrorism, and global warming, and we’ve expressed a common sentiment that working together to address these threats is better than going it alone.
To be sure, there are some fundamental disagreements when it comes to our preferences for addressing these threats. In our willingness to go to war in defense of justice, it’s true: Americans and Europeans, at least in theory, aren’t on the same page. But the reality is more complex. European nations played key combat roles in the Gulf War and the Balkans conflict, and their publics continue to show robust support for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in places as diverse as Darfur and southern Lebanon. In Afghanistan, things are more difficult. The diplomatic disaster from Iraq and Bush’s Article V debacle in 2001 have created a strained atmosphere of cooperation, and European publics are putting pressure on their leaders to disengage from the conflict. Taken as a whole, post-Cold War cooperation has shown that in the right context, Europeans can be committed and trustworthy allies.
Haass writes as if the transatlantic relationship of the “golden years” coalesced by osmosis in reaction to the emergence of a common threat. This could not be further from the truth. Like any alliance, the transatlantic partnership required difficult and protracted diplomacy at its post-war inception, and constant maintenance thereafter. Some set of shared interests might be a necessary condition for alliance-building, but it is in no way sufficient. What it took then, and what we need now, are strong leaders who understand the importance of diplomacy and compromise. Reaching consensus on how to address the great international challenges of our time won’t be easy, but if America wants to remain a legitimate operator around the world, and if Europe wants a say in the building of a post-Iraq international order, it’s our only choice.
January 10th, 2008 at 6:08 pm
“European nations played key combat roles in the Gulf War and the Balkans conflict, and their publics continue to show robust support for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in places as diverse as Darfur and southern Lebanon.”
It is easy to say that people support “peacekeeping” in countries like Darfur and southern Lebanon, but I think we find these visceral desires don’t often materialize into robust peacekeeping missions.
I think that if you ask most people anywhere, “do you support peacekeeping in Darfur to stop the genocide” they will say “of course”. But how many NATO, US, or European peacekeepers are actually stationed in Darfur? Are we really doing all that we can do… are we putting our money where our mouth is? I suppose you could argue we are doing our part by supporting the African Union forces… that is a tenous argument though.
As was recently written in the blog “A Fist Full of Euros”:
“the EU is still struggling to put together the promised peacekeeping mission to Chad. The problems are essentially that the member states are not forking out to provide enough support helicopters and tactical transport aircraft to support the force in part of the world with essentially no infrastructure. There is not really a shortage of choppers; even Slovenia has four, right? However, they are one of those assets which is always in short supply; national armies are very unwilling to part with them.”
January 10th, 2008 at 6:10 pm
Oops… meant to include the link for fist full of euros blog:
http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/europe-and-the-world/a-big-hand-for-slo venia
January 11th, 2008 at 2:32 pm
Kyle, thanks for your post. Your right: Even when transatlantic public opinion is aligned, there can still be barriers to effective engagement around the world. In other words, public opinion does not always translate into policy. But the problem here is not divergent interests or values, and Haass and others might suggest. Transatlantic solidarity doesn’t guarantee success, but it is in many important cases a necessary precondition.
January 24th, 2008 at 4:11 pm
I tend to agree that the US and Europe do not have divergent interests or values. As I am sure you are aware (since they presented at GMF), 5 prestigious military leaders from Europe and the US put out a report with a blueprint for hammering out a new and more efficacious transatlantic bargain.
The authors, including General Shinseki, contend that NATO provides the best opportunity for western countries to address new threats because it “links together a group of countries that share the most important values and convictions and that took a decision to defend those values and convictions collectively.”
I finally got finished reading the report last night, and wrote about it here: http://atlanticreview.org/archives/978-Military-Leaders-Outline-Plan-f or-New-Transatlantic-Bargain.html — although you and I seem to agree that the US and Europe continue to share values and interests and therefore benefit from a continued strong Alliance, some of the reader comments sharply disagree on this point.
In fact, it has been my experience writing for the Atlantic Review that the majority of readers (at least on our blog) are pessimistic about future military cooperation between Europe and the US.