Whither Kosovo’s future: Searching abroad for international representation, but who rules at home?
WASHINGTON — While capitals are awaiting the results of the international Troika of mediators and facing upcoming choices about next steps in the unresolved dispute over Kosovo’s legal status in the coming weeks and months, Kosovo’s interim government came due for their 4-year elections. In the midst of uncertainty about statehood, Kosovo’s political leaders were put to the vote and a new combination of personalities was selected to govern.
Unfortunately, participation was quite low (only 45%) and key groups such as the Kosovo Serbs largely boycotted. But the results were enough to usher in a new leadership, and to trigger a coalition-building exercise within Kosovo’s political elite. Of course the electoral results will have a direct impact on the daily lives of Kosovars for the next four years, as offices change hands into a government led by the party of the opposition since 2003 (the PDK). New leaders will have responsibility to continue the growth of functioning institutions, to build a government representative of and responding to its people, and to face a number of unresolved social and economic challenges (including an ominous unemployment rate of up to 60%).
Meanwhile, party politics at home may impact the sequencing of status developments of the next weeks, in so far as domestic political distractions affect Pristina’s actions.
Timing is a key ingredient of the weeks ahead. Analysts do not seem to be debating whether the Kosovars will declare their independence, but when. But the road ahead for the international community is still bumpy – uncertainty prevails. If the UN-mandated Troika attempts at a negotiated settlement between Belgrade and Pristina do not find a mutually acceptable result, attention will turn to the UN Secretary General to declare a stalemate. With stalemate, audiences in NY and capitals around the world will be watching to see if the Kosovars decide to unilaterally declare (UDI).
The UN-mandated Troika is due to submit their report on December 10. Anticipation has been rampant that the Kosovars will act immediately thereafter. But the Kosovars may not yet have a government. Instead they may still be focused on domestic politics and negotiation of a broad-based governing coalition.
The results of November 17 have left a splintered political scene (34% PDK, 22% LDK, 11.9% AKR, 10% LDD, 9% AAK, 3.4% ORA) with new rising players, some shocks to traditional stalwarts, and some additional options for leveraging coalition-building negotiations – all of which could slow down the process of agreeing on a government.
Mathematically, the expected Prime Minister Hashim Thaci could still pull off a coalition of the two leading parties, the PDK and LDK (a long-estimated coalition arrangement). But the fragmented electoral results may complicate this a bit, or at least slow down agreement.
First, the LDK (formerly the majority party in government) has taken a big hit in these elections dropping from a position of 45% to 22%, with a good portion of their base moving to new and breakaway parties. The LDK splintering is not entirely surprising, as they have been sorting through a house-cleaning and image reinvention since the loss of their iconic leader President Ibrahim Rugova nearly two years ago. But it is a bigger loss than expected. It may be difficult for the LDK to accept a smaller role in a coalition or just a few key Ministry posts. Contention over allocation of Ministries could drag out for a while. Meanwhile, the two newcomer parties may clamor to be included in a broad-based government.
Second, I wouldn’t expect much action on serious coalition negotiations before the December 8 municipal and mayoral runoffs. Thaci (and the PDK) are in tight races for a couple of their key party leaders, as well as across a number of other municipalities. The vote splintering to new parties means it is unclear how the numbers will play out in two-way runoffs. Thaci will not want to offend any of the smaller parties and drive away swing votes before these mayoral and municipal runoffs are pushed to the greatest gain. We should keep an eye on the Pristina and Mitrovica races in particular, where two of Thaci’s key party officials are in tight competition. He may need to hold government positions for them if they lose their electoral runoffs, again delaying any broader negotiation of posts for coalition members.
By this point, we could be looking at mid-December before coalition negotiations are in high gear. This is all speculation of course, and decisions will play out behind closed doors. They could be further along than expected. But it is viable that government formation could drag out into late December or January. There will certainly be incentive for Thaci and other leaders to move quickly and reach agreement so that they can move towards a declaration of independence. But stakes are high. The leadership have to agree on who will run the place for the next four years, particularly if they are expecting to run a new state.